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In the second half of the eighteenth century, military engineers working for the Austrian 
Habsburg monarchs mapped in detail for the first time the provinces and borders of their empire. 
Despite this development, there is a disjunction in the literature between scholars who examine 
the Habsburg monarchy’s evolution under Maria Theresa (1740–1780) and Joseph II (1765–
1790), and those who investigate maps and mapping in the period. This historiographical divide 
prevents scholars from considering the part maps may have played in the efforts of the Habsburg 
monarchs to construct a centralized multi-ethnic empire as a serious contender to nation-states 
premised on ethnic homogeneity. Maria Theresa’s and Joseph II’s military, social, religious and 
economic reforms and their attempts to increase uniformity within their dominions – which 
intensified practices, such as mapping and the making of geographic descriptions, and surveys of 
demographic and natural resources – suggest a modernising entity.   
This dissertation analyzes the production, circulation, and use of large-scale topographic 
provincial and border Habsburg maps for three provinces: the Austrian Netherlands, Lombardy 
and Transylvania. Based on archival sources located in Vienna, Brussels, Cluj-Napoca, Milan, 
Paris and Sibiu, I show how Maria Theresa’s and Joseph II’s desire to map their dominions led to 
the establishment of imperial corps of military engineers and the development of a network of 
scientific centers promoting the study of astronomy and geography. Once they had established a 
number of mapmaking institutions and recruited or educated a new generation of military 
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engineers, the Habsburg rulers commissioned the first detailed topographic survey of their lands 
and prepared cartographic material to be used in border regulations with their neighbors.  
Maps offer a new angle to interpret and assess the efficiency of early modern 
governments to construct centralized empires, such as the Habsburg monarchy. Maria Theresa’s 
and Joseph II’s determination to obtain a detailed image of their domains and imperial borders 
illustrates the reliance of Enlightenment rulers on emergent sciences, such as cartography, to 
further the defense and expansion of their empires. 
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1 
1.0 HABSBURG CARTOGRAPHY IN THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT 
The German language is the lingua franca of my Empire: why should I have the laws and 
public affairs in just one province be issued in its respective national language? I am the 
Emperor of the German Empire; thus, all the other states, that I own, are just provinces, 
which in union with the entire State make up a body, of which I am the head. If the 
Kingdom of Hungary would be the most important and first amongst my possessions, I 
would make its language the main language of my lands; but that is not the case.1  
 
In this fragment from a January 1785 letter, the Holy Roman Emperor and Habsburg Monarch 
Joseph II justified to a Hungarian Magnate his imperial decree from 1784 imposing German as 
the language of the central administration in Hungary.2 The emperor also expressed his imperial 
vision with respect to the Habsburg dominions, which throughout his life he had tried to fashion 
into a unitary body. In his crusade against provincially specific administrative organization, legal 
systems, and recruiting and taxation criteria, Joseph II was not trying to “Germanize” the empire. 
He simply wanted a centralized state, whose disparate provinces would share more than the ruler. 
After the death of his mother, Maria Theresa, at the end of 1780, Joseph II was the first 
Habsburg ruler in centuries who declined to attend the official coronation ceremonies that would 
have conferred onto him the Hungarian and the Bohemian crowns. This refusal symbolized 
                                                          
1 “Die deutsche Sprache ist Universalsprache meines Reichs; warum sollte ich die Gesetze und die öffentlichen 
Geschäfte in einer einzigen Provinz nach der Nationalsprache derselben traktiren lassen? Ich bin Kaiser des 
deutschen Reichs; dem zu folge sind die übrigen Staaten, die ich besitze, Provinzen, die mit dem ganzen Staat in 
vereinigung einen Körper bilden, wovon ich das haupt bin. Wäre das Königreich Hungarn die wichtigste und erste 
meiner Besitzungen, so würde ich die Sprache desselben zur Hauptsprache meiner Länder machen; so aber verhält 
es sich anderst.” Franz Schuselka, Briefe Josephs Der Zweiten (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1846), 151-152. 
2 Derek Beales, Joseph II. Volume 2: Against the World, 1780-1790 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 366 
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Joseph II’s commitment to the principle of Gleichförmigkeit, or uniform government, in all the 
Habsburg provinces.3  
Scholars have connected Joseph II’s bold restructuring of the Habsburg conglomerate 
with his education, the influence of his mother Maria Theresa, his interest in military affairs and 
his extensive journeys within and outside the Habsburg dominions.4 All of their analyses neglect 
an important factor: the emergence of a new geographical understanding of the Habsburg 
Monarchy’s lands. Joseph II grew up in a society with a growing interest in maps, and these 
maps impacted him. State documents and Joseph II’s private correspondence or travel diaries 
reveal the monarch’s use of maps in his decision-making process. Moreover, Joseph II’s rule is 
contemporary with the boldest and most wide-ranging Habsburg mapmaking projects of the 
eighteenth century. Indeed, from the beginning of Maria Theresa’s reign in 1740, the Habsburg 
rulers and their immediate advisors developed a high appreciation of maps as instruments of 
empire. At the same time that Joseph II became his mother’s co-regent in 1765, the cartographic 
agenda of the Monarchy intensified and encompassed the first topographic survey of the empire, 
the production of numerous border maps and the participation of Habsburg scientists in global 
geographic ventures.  
The best-known Habsburg mapmaking endeavor took place between 1764 and 1787, 
when Vienna invested immense financial and military resources in order to map its territories for 
the first time. Through its richness of detail and the sheer size of the area covered, the finished 
                                                          
3 Ibid., 64; Derek Beales, Enlightenment and Reform in eighteenth-century Europe (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 273. 
4 See for example: Derek Beales, Joseph II. Volume 1: In the Shadow of Maria Theresa, 1741-1780 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), 29-68; For some of Joseph II’s travels see Ileana Bozac and Teodor Pavel, 
Călătoria împăratului Iosif al II-lea în Transilvania la 1773 (Cluj-Napoca: Institutul Cultural Român, Centrul de 
Studii Transilvane, 2006); Erich Donnert and Helmut Reinalter, Journal der Russlandreise Kaiser Josephs II. im 
Jahre 1780 (Innsbruck: Kulturverlag, 1996); Eugène Hubert, Le voyage de l'empereur Joseph II dans les Pays-Bas, 
31 mai 1781-27 juillet 1781; étude d'histoire politique et diplomatique (Brussels: J. Lebègue, 1900); Peter von 
Radics, Die Reisen Kaiser Joseph II. und die Volkswirthschaft in Oesterreich-Ungarn: zum 100. Gedenktag seines 
Todes am 20.2.1790 und aus Anlass der großen land- und forstwirthschaftlichen Ausstellung in Wien 1890 (Vienna: 
Verlag der Oesterreich-Ungarische Revue, 1890).  
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map, known at the time as the Great Military Map and called in the literature the Josephinische 
Aufnahme (the Josephine Survey), was impressive, covering more than 220,000 square miles. 
Twenty-one different surveys of provinces and smaller regions resulted in more than 3,500 
sheets drawn at a 1:28,800 scale and 275 sheets drawn at a 1:11,520 scale. Despite all this 
intensive labor, because astronomic measurements did not precede the geodetic work, the final 
maps could not be put together to recreate a single, immense depiction of the empire.5  
Looking back from the twenty-first century it is tempting to characterize this cartographic 
episode as a debacle and a metaphor for the disappearance of the Habsburg Monarchy at the end 
of the First World War. Especially as, after 1918, the emerging national historiographies of the 
Monarchy’s successor states contributed to the development of a negative assessment of the 
deceased empire. In order to legitimize the existence of new political entities on the map of 
Europe, these new national histories presented the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy as an 
anachronistic entity bound to disappear.6 After 1990, the literature on historical memory and 
nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe deconstructed the process that led to the emergence of 
the historical myths that helped shape the identity of the post-World War I nation-states, which 
deconstruction led to a reevaluation of the importance of the Habsburg legacy.7  
                                                          
5 Annamária Jankó, “An Outstanding Person of the 1st Military Survey: Mihály Lajos Jeney,” in Studia Cartologica 
13. Papers in Honour of the 65th Birthday of Prof. István Klinghammer (Budapest: ELTE-Térképtudományi és 
Geoinformatikai Tanszék, 2006); Josef Paldus, Die militärischen Aufnahmen im Bereiche der habsburgischen 
Länder aus der Zeit Kaiser Josephs II., ausgeführt durch den K.K. Generalquartiermeisterstab in den Jahren 1763-
1785. Ein Beitrag zur historischen Landeskunde (Vienna: Alfred Hölder, 1919).  
6 Gary Cohen criticizes historians’ tendency to depict the Monarchy as bound to “disappear from the map because of 
its inability to accommodate the national aspirations of its people.” His article also includes numerous examples of 
historians prioritizing the current national framework over the historical context. Gary Cohen, “Nationalist Politics 
and the Dynamics of State and Civil Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914,” Central European History 40 
(2007), 241. For a comparative discussion of the national master narratives that developed in Austria, Hungary, the 
Bohemian lands and Slovakia after 1918 see Gernot Heiss, Árpád von Klimó, Pavel Kolář and Dusan Kováč 
“Habsburg’s Difficult Legacy: Comparing and Relating Austrian, Czech, Magyar and Slovak National Historical 
Master Narratives,” in The Contested Nation. Ethnicity, Class, Religion and Gender in National Histories, eds. 
Stefan Berger and Chris Lorenz (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
7 See for example: Patrice M. Dabrowski, Commemorations and the Shaping of Modern Poland (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2004); Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 
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Despite the above-mentioned historiographical advances, cartography remains an 
understudied significant aspect of Vienna’s legacy in Europe. This is especially surprising, as 
Benedict Anderson’s classical work on “imagined communities” has noted that maps, along with 
censuses and museums, shaped the way in which imperial powers imagined their dominions by 
creating “a human landscape of perfect visibility.”8 The Habsburg Monarchy was no exception. 
The Great Military Map, finalized in 1787, was an astounding triumph for the Habsburg rulers as 
it offered the first detailed image of their dominions and constituted an excellent tool for 
planning military campaigns and economic and administrative reforms. Moreover, the Great 
Military Map, although the most famous, was not an isolated Habsburg cartographic enterprise, 
but constituted just one piece of a larger imperial effort. Therefore, rather than interpreting 
eighteenth-century Habsburg cartographic feats based on our current understanding of what 
makes a map scientific or accurate, we need to contextualize Vienna’s mapmaking efforts and re-
assess their success based on the impact they had at the time.  
There exist some studies about the cartographic achievements of Maria Theresa’s and 
Joseph II’s reigns but, with one notable exception,9 they do not insist on the connection between 
the Habsburgs’ determination to invest resources in maps and the role of these maps in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1848 to the Present, eds. Maria Bucur-Deckard and Nancy M Wingfield (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University 
Press, 2001); Árpád von Klimó, Nation, Konfession, Geschichte - zur nationalen Geschichtskultur Ungarns im 
europäischen Kontext (1860-1948) (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2003). 
8 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1996), 184-185. 
9 In a brief article, James Vann suggested an intrinsic relationship between the maps that the Habsburgs 
commissioned and these rulers’ conceptualization of their own empire. However, Vann’s short piece offers only an 
outline of the development of cartography within the Habsburg lands and therefore his bold statements are not 
supported by substantial evidence. James Vann, “Mapping under the Austrian Habsburgs”, in Monarchs, ministers 
and maps: the emergence of cartography as a tool of government in early modern Europe, ed. David Buisseret 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 153-167. The article also contains many factual errors as pointed out 
by Michael Hochedlinger, “The Habsburg Monarchy: From ‘Military-Fiscal State’ to ‘Militarization’,” in The 
Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth-Century Europe, ed. Christopher Storrs (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 55-94, 
footnote 50. 
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governing the empire.10 Moreover, under the influence of national historians approaching the 
reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II “on a centrifugal and provincial basis,”11 the history of 
cartography of the Monarchy has been written in a very disjointed manner. For example, scholars 
suppressed the Habsburg legacy of the Great Military Map by stressing direct connections 
between eighteenth century Habsburg provinces and current national states. Therefore, for the 
past two decades we have been witnessing the publishing of books, multimedia discs and 
websites with a focus on the separate Habsburg provinces.12 Studying Habsburg cartographic 
projects for only one province, looking for a “national” cartographic tradition, or trying to 
reconstruct the historical geography of contemporary national states is to go against the original 
purpose of these maps. The Great Military Map, the Ferraris Map of Belgium, the cadastral and 
geographic maps of Lombardy and the numerous maps of the Monarchy’s borders were all 
coordinated from a single center: the Habsburg capital of Vienna. Clearly, the Habsburgs’ goal 
was to obtain a repository of geographical information about their lands, conceived as one 
empire, and not as the predecessor of twentieth first-century national states.  
Positioning the Habsburg cartographic projects within an imperial context allows us to 
assess the role of these maps in the process of state centralization as orchestrated by Maria 
                                                          
10 Johannes Dörflinger, Die Österreichische Kartographie im 18. und zu begin des 19. Jahrhunderts, vol. 1 (Vienna: 
Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1984); Ernst Hofstätter, Beiträge zur Geschichte der 
österreichischen Landesaufnahmen. Ein Überblick der topographischen Aufnahmeverfahren, deren Ursprünge, 
ihrer Entwicklungen und Organisationsformen der vier österreichischen Landesaufnahmen (Vienna: Bundesamt für 
Eich- und Vermessungswesen, 1989); Jankó, “An Outstanding Person of the 1st Military Survey;” Paldus, Die 
militärischen Aufnahmen; Robert Rill, “Die Anfänge der Militärkartographie in den Habsburgischen Erblanden. Die 
Josephinische Landesaufnahme von Böhmen und Mähren nach hofkriegsrätlichen Quellen,” Mitteilungen des 
Österreichischen Staatsarchivs, 49 (2001), 183-202; Oskar Regele, Beiträge zur Geschichte der staatlichen 
Landesaufnahme und Kartographie in Osterreich, bis zum Jahre 1918 (Vienna: Verlag des Notringes der 
Wissenschaftlichen Verbände Österreichs, 1955). 
11 Richard J. W. Evans, “The Origins of Enlightenment in the Habsburg Lands,” in Austria, Hungary, and the 
Habsburg. Essays on Central Europe, c. 1683-1867 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), ed. Richard J.W. 
Evans, 37. 
12 Hrvatska na tajnim zemljovidima. 18. I 19. stoljeća, ed. Alexander Buczynski, Milan Kruhek (Gradiška 
Pukovnija, Hrvatski institute za Povijest: Zagreb, 1999); Die Josephinische Aufnahme: die erste militärische 
Vermessung (Budapest: Arcanum, 2004); Wouter Bracke. De grote Atlas van Ferraris (Tielt: Lannoo, 2009). 
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Theresa, Joseph II and Chancellor Kaunitz. As Grete Klingenstein argues, in the second half of 
the eighteenth century, the expression “Austrian Monarchy” transformed “from a description of a 
ruling dynasty into a territorial term.”13 Whereas Klingenstein’s primary focus is the discussion 
of territorial identifiers, such as the Archduchy of Austria, House of Austria, Austrian Monarchy, 
Hereditary Emperor of Austria, this dissertation brings to the forefront the visual representations 
of the Habsburg lands that influenced the use of different names for this imperial entity. 
Examining the maps that the Habsburg rulers commissioned in the second half of the eighteenth 
century allows us to examine the process of centralization and provincial integration from a new 
angle. Moreover, a focus on Habsburg cartographic achievements reevaluates the contribution of 
Vienna and its dominions to international cooperation and the emergence of mapmaking as a 
scientific enterprise in the Age of Enlightenment.  
1.1 THE HABSBURG CARTOGRAPHIC GAZE 
In 1747, to celebrate the occasion of their official establishment, the Habsburg corps of engineers 
dedicated the first overall map of the Habsburg lands to Maria Theresa.14 The bottom right of the 
map includes a representation of Maria Theresa receiving a smaller version of this cartographic 
work, probably from a military engineer, and a variety of objects associated by the middle of the 
eighteenth century with the science of mapmaking. As seen in Figure 1.1, these items include a 
                                                          
13 Klingenstein examines contemporary topographies, encyclopedias, newspapers, periodicals, and maps to support 
her claim. Grete Klingenstein, “The meanings of ‘Austria’ and ‘Austrian’ in the eighteenth century,” in Royal and 
republican sovereignty in early modern Europe: essays in memory of Ragnhild Hatton, ed. Ragnhild Marie Hatton, 
Robert Oresko, G. C. Gibbs, and H. M. Scott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 423-478. 
14 Dörflinger, Die Österreichische Kartographie, vol. 1, 29; Hochedlinger, Austria's wars of emergence, 309; Oskar 
Regele, “Die erste Generalkarte der gesamten österreichischen Erblande,” Die Warte. Blätter für Literatur, Kunst 
und Wissenschaft 41 (October 18, 1947), 2. 
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globe, whose visible part displays Europe, a plan of Vienna, the Habsburg capital, scientific 
treatises and such geodetic instruments as a magnetic compass and a theodolite. In addition to the 
objects necessary for a successful mapmaking campaign, the scene includes a large cannon and 
cannon balls, reminding the viewers of the purpose of the military engineers’ cartographic 
works. Indeed, Maria Theresa is not simply admiring this cartographic gift for its artistic value. 
Instead, as seen in Figure 1.2, her gaze and scepter point towards a map fragment labeled as 
French territory (Galiae pars), one of the Habsburgs’ strongest opponents before 1756.15 
The General Map of all Imperial and Royal Hereditary Lands lacked detail and had no 
real military value. Nonetheless, it can be interpreted as a first concrete expression of the 
Habsburg cartographic agenda as it unfolded during the reigns of Maria Theresa and Joseph II. 
The Habsburg act of mapping was not a neutral process but had deep political, economic and 
social implications. Therefore, I define the Habsburg cartographic gaze as the attempt of 
Viennese rulers to transpose their vast, complex domains into manageable, comprehensible 
maps. The ever-present political motivations and consequences of the cartographic gaze entailed 
the development of specific mapping practices and institutions, such as the creation of an 
engineer corps, astronomic observatories, map archives, and special protocols for surveying 
imperial provinces and negotiating border demarcations.16 The political priorities of the 
Habsburg monarchs influenced the types of maps they commissioned. In this dissertation I 
discuss the most time- and resource-intensive cartographic projects pursued during the reigns of 
Maria Theresa and Joseph II: large-scale topographic maps, border maps and geographic maps.  
                                                          
15 Kriegsarchiv (hereafter KA), Karten- und Plansammlung (hereafter KPS), BIX a 1, Sections 11 and 12. 
16 I rely on Pickles’ definition of the “cartographic gaze” as a set of mapmaking practices and institutions with 
specific characteristics, such as: the prioritization of mathematical forms of abstraction, the understanding of 
mapping as a technical-scientific practice capable of representing nature, and the desire of governments to use maps 
for political purposes to control their dominions. John Pickles, A History of Spaces: Cartographic Reason, Mapping 
and the Geo-Coded world (London: Routledge, 2004), 80.  
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Figure 1.1 Cartouche of the General Map of all Imperial and Royal Hereditary Lands 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Detail from Cartouche of the General Map of all Imperial and Royal Hereditary Lands 
 
 
9 
Ideally, the Habsburg cartographic gaze was totalizing. In reality, Vienna’s desire to 
codify in the form of detailed maps all its territories encountered a variety of challenges. The 
limited number of trained mapmakers and the high financial costs of surveying slowed down the 
pace of the cartographic operations. The provincial authorities’ priorities influenced the degree to 
which local officials cooperated with imperial representatives. Last but not least, the Habsburgs’ 
political allies and rivals, including Britain, France, the Ottoman Empire, the Duchy of Parma 
and Portugal, sometimes challenged and sometimes facilitated the implementation of Vienna’s 
mapmaking agenda.  
  The Habsburg monarchs were not patrons of cartography only for science’s sake. Maria 
Theresa and Joseph II, together with their main advisor, Chancellor Kaunitz, spent considerable 
amount of time analyzing mapmaking proposals, commissioning new cartographic projects and 
inspecting finalized maps. For example, in 1777, when hearing about the death of the childless 
Duke of Bavaria, Maximilian III Joseph (1727-1777), Maria Theresa immediately understood a 
war was coming. Her first reaction after receiving this news was going to her rooms with Joseph 
II and Kaunitz to examine a map and decide on a military plan.17 By the 1770s, maps had 
become vital sources for the Viennese rulers in connection with military actions, but also as 
instruments of centralizing policies. 
The cartouche of the General Map of all Imperial and Royal Hereditary Lands can be 
interpreted not only as an expression of Habsburg policies but also as a reflection of 
developments in the field of mapmaking on a global scale. Before the time of eighteenth-century 
topographic surveys that aimed to capture all natural and man-made features of a state’s 
dominions based on first-hand observations and measurements, geographers followed a different 
                                                          
17 Paul P. Bernard, Joseph II and Bavaria: Two Eighteenth Century Attempts at German Unification (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), 38. 
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methodology: they compiled already existing textual and graphical information, combined it with 
existing astronomic coordinates, and selected what they considered to be the most reliable 
sources. Therefore, mapmakers prepared their works based on critical examination and 
discussion of a variety of sources.18 Indeed, one of the most famous mapmakers of the eighteenth 
century, Jean Baptiste Bourguignon d’Anville (1697-1782), never left Paris.19 
The rise of the belief in the existence of “objective” knowledge, however, penetrated the 
field of mapmaking, and statesmen began to try to harness the power of maps into their service.20 
Scientific transformations in the eighteenth century, such as the increased use of the plane table 
and reliance on subfields of mathematics, such as trigonometry, to perform land measurements, 
transformed the perception of maps by the end of the 1700s.21 “Instruments of precision” 
established themselves as necessary prerequisites for scientific activities, including 
mapmaking.22 Armed with plane tables and their own trained bodies, military engineers and 
astronomers travelled on-site to perform the data collection required for the production of what 
officers, civilian bureaucrats and statesmen considered more accurate maps. The trained gaze of 
mapmakers was seen as essential for the production of good maps so much so that by the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, “no longer understood as abstractions of reality, maps were 
                                                          
18 Anne Marie Claire Godlewska, Geography Unbound. French Geographic Science from Cassini to Humboldt 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 40-41. 
19 Jean-Baptiste Dacier declared at d’Anville’s death in 1782: “almost all the ancient geographers had traveled and 
very often spoke of what they had seen. Monsieur d’Anville, in contrast, knew the world without having seen it; he 
never left Paris, so to speak, and had never traveled more than forty leagues from it.” Reproduced in Robin 
Middleton, introduction to The Ruins of the Most Beautiful Monuments of Greece, by Julien-David Le Roy, trans. 
David Britt (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2004), 137; 139. To give another example, French hydrographer 
Jacques Nicolas Bellin (1703-1772) never went to sea and did not survey any coastline, but this did not negatively 
impact his career as a mapmaker. Mary Sponberg Pedley, The Commerce of Cartography. Making and Marketing 
Maps in Eighteenth-Century France and England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 25. 
20 For more information about the emergence of “objectivity” towards the end of the eighteenth century see Lorraine 
Daston, Peter Galison, Objectivity (New York: Zone Books; 2007); Theodore Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit 
of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
21 Godlewska, Geography Unbound, 47. 
22 Introduction to Instruments, Travel and Science: Itineraries of Precision from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth 
century, eds. Marie-Noëlle Bourguet, Christian Licoppe, and H. Otto Sibum (London; New York: Routledge, 2002), 
8-9. 
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instead taken to be realist replications of each small portion of the world.”23 Large cartographic 
projects using standardized measurement units such as the French toise24 or the Austrian klafter25 
allowed for a seemingly objective quantification of the territory. Quantification allowed science 
to rely more on global networks rather than remaining a local enterprise.26 In the same manner, 
maps based on large-scale topographic surveys and cadastral measurements, presented rulers 
with an apparently totalizing image of their lands. With the help of these new geographic 
instruments, the Habsburgs and other eighteenth-century rulers had a starting point on which to 
base their taxation, administrative and even social reforms.27  
The 1747 map of the Habsburg lands is a document produced at a moment of transition. 
Although a product of military engineers, this map was not based on first-hand surveys. Still, the 
expertise of the Habsburg military engineers was validated in the cartouche of the map by the 
inclusion of scientific treatises and cartographic instruments. This map also exemplifies that after 
the 1740s, Viennese decision makers relied on military engineers and astronomers equipped with 
innovative mapmaking instrumentation to survey and represent various portions of the Habsburg 
lands. Indeed, by the late 1780s, the intense labor of Habsburg cartographers had produced a 
variety of maps based on first-hand observation, including large-scale topographic maps, 
cadastral maps, geographic maps and border maps.28 The detailed topographic surveys of 
                                                          
23 Matthew H. Edney, “Reconsidering Enlightenment Geography and Map Making: Reconnaissance, Mapping, 
Archive,” in Geography and Enlightenment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), eds. David N. 
Livingstone and Charles W. J. Withers, 192. 
24 One French toise equals 1.94 meters. François Cardarelli, Encyclopaedia of Scientific Units, Weights, and 
Measures: Their SI  Equivalences and Origins, trans. M.J.Shields (London: Springer, 2003), 79. 
25 One Austrian klafter is equivalent to 1.896 meters. One Austrian mile equals 4 Austrian klafters or 7.584 meters. 
Ibid., 99. 
26 Preface to Porter, Trust in Numbers, ix. 
27 James C. Scott traces some of the technologies early-modern states developed to “see” their subjects, territories, 
and resources. James C. Scott, Seeing like a State. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). 
28 Large-scale topographic maps were mammoth projects based on the work of large teams of engineers and 
surveyors who performed first-hand geodetic measurements. In the case of the Habsburg Monarchy, most of the 
provinces were mapped at a scale of 1:28,800. Geographic maps encompassed a large area (such as an entire 
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provinces and imperial borders created thousands of map sheets spread nowadays among 
archives in Vienna and what used to be the provinces of the Habsburg Monarchy. Despite this 
active cartographic agenda, with a few exceptions, scholars have neglected these map-making 
efforts and the secondary literature is almost exclusively in German.29 These historiographical 
limitations do not allow historians of science and empires to justly evaluate the Habsburg 
contribution to eighteenth-century developments in the field of cartography.  
The Habsburg Monarchy was located at the crossroads of Europe, connecting lands under 
the Russian and Ottoman influence with Italy, France and Prussia. Moreover, until the end of the 
seventeenth century, another Habsburg branch controlled the throne of Spain. Geography and 
dynastic connections suggest that the Habsburgs had access to a variety of mapmaking traditions 
and were active participants in the development of cartography as a scientific enterprise in the 
eighteenth century. Therefore, an inquiry into the history of Habsburg cartography has to be 
related to developments in the field of the history of cartography and the production of imperial 
maps.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Habsburg province), were prepared at smaller scales, and therefore could not include the same amount of detail as 
large-scale topographic maps. For example, the geographic map of Lombardy discussed in chapter 8 had a scale of 
1:1,000. Border maps are a heterogeneous collection, ranging from large-scale representations of very small sections 
of the borderline, such as a village, to small-scale sketches of a province’s entire frontiers. Cadastral plans served the 
government’s interest to manage taxation; therefore, they focus on the land use and are usually accompanied by 
written lists containing details about the owners and the amount of the taxes. The cadastral maps prepared for the 
State of Milan in the early 1720s had a scale of 1:2,000. 
29 See for example: Dörflinger, Die Österreichische Kartographie, vol. 1; Paldus, Die militärischen Aufnahmen; 
Jankó, “An Outstanding person of the 1st Military Survey;” Jan Mokre, “Die Militärkartographie in der 
Österreichischen Monarchie bis zum Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts, mit einem Ausblick auf das 19. und das beginnende 
20. Jahrhundert,” in Galicja na józefińskiej mapie topograficznej: 1779–1783 / Die Josephinische Landesaufnahme 
von Galizien: 1779-1783, vol. 2, eds. Zdzisław Budzyński, Waldemar Bukowski, Bogusław Dybaś, Andrzej 
Janeczek and Zdzisław Noga (Krakow: Uniw. Pedagogiczny, 2014), 23-30; Jan Mokre, “Geheimhaltung, Spionage 
und Kartenverfaelschung: Aspekte des Verhaeltnisses zwischen Militaer und Kartographie zur Zeit Maria 
Theresias,” in Aspekte der Kartographie im Wandel der Zeit. Festschrift für Ingrid Kretschmer, eds. Wolfgang 
Kainz, Karel Kriz, and Andreas Riedl (Vienna: Institut für Geographie und Regionalforschung der Universität Wien, 
Kartographie und Geoinformation, 2004), 86-92; Regele, Beiträge zur Geschichte der staatlichen Landesaufnahme 
und Kartographie in Osterreich; Rill, “Die Anfänge der Militärkartographie in den Habsburgischen Erblanden.” 
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Historians have used maps not only to pin down in space their area of focus, but also as 
historical sources.30 The history of cartography is not entirely a new field, but it was not a 
consecrated area of research until John Brian Harley and David Woodward joined forces and 
launched The History of Cartography project, the most important initiative in recent decades for 
the history of maps and mapping.31 The enterprise dates back to 1975, when the history of 
cartography as a field still lacked a clearly defined goal, being caught among a number of more 
established disciplines, such as geography and history. Geographers and map historians, Harley 
and Woodward, aimed to make a synthesis of what was known at the time about maps and the 
process of mapmaking, while also suggesting directions for future research. They promoted an 
inter-disciplinary approach, combining fields such as history, geography and anthropology, in 
order to build a stronger foundation for the field known today as “history of cartography.” The 
published volumes in the series Harley and Woodward pioneered examine maps as products of 
specific societies, tracing the evolution of cartographic techniques and conventions. These 
volumes take an encyclopedic approach and represent an essential starting point in understanding 
the development of cartography in various societies. 
After 1980, a new approach to the history of maps, prioritizing the importance of the 
socio-cultural context, challenged the “whiggish” or “presentist” history of cartography.32 From 
                                                          
30 For a survey of developments in the history of cartography see Matthew H. Edney, “Putting ‘Cartography’ into 
the History of Cartography: Arthur H. Robinson, David Woodward, and the Creation of a Discipline,” Cartographic 
Perspectives 51 (2005): 14-29. 
31 Until now the following volumes have appeared: Cartography in Prehistoric, Ancient, and Medieval Europe and 
the Mediterranean, eds. J. Brian Harley and David Woodward (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); 
Cartography in the Traditional Islamic and South Asian Societies eds. J. Brian Harley and David Woodward 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Cartography in the Traditional East and Southeast Asian Societies 
eds. J. Brian Harley and David Woodward (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Cartography in the 
Traditional African, American, Arctic, Australian, and Pacific Societies, eds. David Woodward and G. Malcolm 
Lewis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Cartography in the European Renaissance, ed. David 
Woodward (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); The Volume on Eighteenth Century is forthcoming in 
2016 and is edited by Matthew Edney and Mary Sponberg Pedley. 
32 Matthew H. Edney, “Cartography’s ‘Scientific Reformation’ and the Study of Topographical Mapping in the 
Modern Era,” in History of Cartography, Lecture Notes in Geoinformation and Cartography 6, eds. E. Liebenberg 
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the nineteenth century onwards, this older strand of scholarship had strived to present the 
development of cartography towards more “accurate” representations of reality as a success 
story. But such narratives neglected the history of the belief in the power of “scientific” maps to 
represent geography in a precise manner. For example, my dissertation shows that, in the 
eighteenth century, the imperial commissioners and producers of maps considered maps based 
on geodetic surveys and astronomic measurements as the most reliable geographic 
representations. “Accuracy is in the eye of the beholder,”33 and therefore, when using terms like 
“accurate,” “precise,” “correct” or “exact,” I express the viewpoint of those past societies who 
created and used those maps.  
For eighteenth-century political decision makers, it became essential to obtain what they 
considered reliable representations of the territory, in order to expand, defend and centralize their 
dominions. As one of the leading cartographers of the age, Jean Dominique Cassini (Cassini IV) 
wrote in 1775: “it is only from the middle of this past century that geography surpassed its 
lengthy childhood and, supported by the arms of geometry and astronomy, made big strides and 
became an exact science, endowed with a perfection capable of astonishing the imagination and 
bringing honor to the human spirit.”34 This statement encapsulates the preoccupation widespread 
among worldwide empires to measure, inventory and draw the territory of their states. During the 
eighteenth century, Viennese rulers invested significant resources to train military engineers in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and I.J. Demhardt (Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2012), 299. I borrow the terms “whiggish” and “presentist” from 
David Livingstone’s assessment of trends within the larger field of the history of geography.  David N. Livingstone, 
The Geographical Tradition. Episodes in the History of a Contested Enterprise (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
1992), 4.  
33 Barbara E. Mundy, The Mapping of New Spain: Indigenous Cartography and the Maps of the Relaciones 
Geográficas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), xix. 
34 The original quote: J’oserai même dire que ce n’est qu’a datter du milieu de ce dernier siecle que la geographie 
sortie d’une longue enfance  et s’appuyant, pour ainsi dire, sur les bras de la geometrie et de l’astronomie, a marché 
a grands pas, est devenu une science sure exacte, et a acquis une perfection capable d’étonner l’imagination et qui 
fait honneur a l’ésprit humain,” in Projet d’un Carte Generale de la Toscane, Archives et Bibliothèque de 
l'Observatoire de Paris, D 5,33. 
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the science of mapmaking and to obtain detailed topographic surveys of provinces and imperial 
borders. The Habsburg Monarchy’s infatuation with cartography was not unique.  
During the last two decades, no doubt influenced by the legacy of John Brian Harley, 
interest in the history of cartography in connection with early modern empires has bloomed. The 
rich literature on the British, French and Spanish Empires demonstrate that imperial rulers 
actively created mapmaking institutions, commissioned cartographic projects and used the 
results of geographic surveys to inform further policies. Indeed, gathering geographical 
information in the form of maps was an essential stage in the expansion and consolidation of 
these far-reaching states.35 The studies devoted to China, Russia and the Ottoman Empire are 
catching up with the new trends in this field.36 However, the work on the Habsburg Monarchy, 
despite this empire’s central position in Europe, has largely remained focused either on technical 
mapmaking details or on only certain provinces.  
In contrast to the sea-oriented empires, for which the role of cartography has been studied 
more extensively, the Habsburg Monarchy’s expansion remained contained in Europe. In 1790, 
the Habsburg Monarchy’s frontiers covered a distance of more than 5,000 miles,37 the longest 
borderline of any European state except Russia. Moreover, Vienna’s territorial possessions 
                                                          
35 See for example Matthew H. Edney, Mapping an Empire. The Geographical Construction of British India, 1765-
1843 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Konvitz, Cartography in France; Paul W. Mapp, The Elusive 
West and the Contest for Empire, 1713-1763 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Pedley, The 
Commerce of Cartography; Ricardo Padron, The Spacious Word. Cartography, Literature, and Empire in Early 
Modern Spain (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); María M. Portuondo, Secret science: Spanish 
cosmography and the new world (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Neil Safier, Measuring the 
New World: Enlightenment Science and South America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); Heidi Scott, 
Contested Territory: Mapping Peru in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Notre Dame, IN: University of 
Notre Dame Press: 2009).  
36 Giancarlo Casale, The Ottoman Age of Exploration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); M. Pinar 
Emiralioglu, Geographical Knowledge and Imperial Culture in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire (Farnham, UK: 
Ashgate, 2014); Laura Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise. Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Valerie Kivelson, Cartographies of Tsardom. The Land and Its 
Meanings in Seventeenth-Century Russia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); Steven Seegel, Mapping 
Europe’s Borderlans: Russian Cartography in the Age of Empire (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012) 
37 Based on the estimation of Beales, Joseph II, vol. 2. Beales’ estimate of 3924 miles excluded the boundaries with 
Russia, Switzerland, and the frontiers of the detached provinces, namely Belgium and Lombardy. 
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presented additional geographic challenges such as: being an almost completely land-locked 
state with non-contiguous domains and borderlines with some of the greatest powers in Europe, 
including France, the Ottoman Empire, Prussia and Russia.38 Ensuring the defense and efficient 
administration of such a political colossus necessitated a good knowledge of the geographic 
realities and a well-organized bureaucratic machine connecting Vienna with all Habsburg 
provinces. Choosing the Habsburg lands as a unit of analysis allows us to nuance the definition 
of imperial maps. 
At first glance nothing differentiates an imperial map from a non-imperial map. Once we 
dwell more on the maps’ production and use, the distinction is clear. Although the territory’s 
inhabitants are active participants in the process of creating the imperial map, they are not the 
map’s primary audience. Imperial maps empower imperial decision makers.39 Therefore, “the 
idea of “empire” is constructed through cartographic discourses, which represent a territory for 
the benefit of one group but exclude the inhabitants of the territories represented.”40 The 
Habsburg rulers pursued a similar process of using local agents as informers and even 
mapmakers, in order to obtain a geographical representation of all their provinces as an essential 
step on the road towards centralization.  
Despite the efforts of political elites in Vienna to monopolize the production and use of 
cartographic information, keeping the information out of the hands of additional parties proved 
impossible. The Habsburg imperial vision was a project continuously contested both by 
provincial and international actors. For example, as shown in chapter 3, unauthorized local elites 
tried and even obtained access to sensitive cartographic information supposedly monopolized in 
                                                          
38 Ibid., 109. 
39 Matthew Edney, “The Irony of Imperial Mapping,” in The Imperial Map: Cartography and the Mastery of 
Empire, ed. James R. Akerman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 40-45. 
40 Ibid., 13. 
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Vienna. The Habsburg imperial project as reflected in their cartographic efforts clashed with 
competing mapmaking efforts, especially in the context of border demarcations. For example, 
the Principality of Moldavia and the Duchy of Parma disputed the validity of Habsburg maps and 
border tracing projects.  
In addition to documenting cartographic rivalries, this dissertation underscores 
collaborative projects that involved Habsburg engineers and scientists. For example, the joint 
commitment of Vienna and Versailles to eliminate all enclaves from their shared borderlands 
encouraged a whirlwind of mapmaking activities at the frontiers of the Austrian Netherlands 
with France. Moreover, the French scientist Cassini de Thury’s pan-European triangulation 
campaign relied on support from Habsburg centers such as Vienna and Milan. These complex 
interactions between the Habsburgs and their neighbors, involving competition and cooperation, 
cannot be unraveled without complementing a study of the technical aspects of the surveying 
process with attention to the discussion surrounding the maps’ commission and reception.  
In this dissertation, I am not only assessing the impact of cartography on the Habsburg 
Monarchy’s centralization, but I am also considering how the astronomers and military engineers 
working in the service of Vienna constituted nodal points in knowledge-producing global 
networks. In addition to mapmaking endeavors, the Habsburg government facilitated the 
construction of trans-imperial collaborations to further global geographic projects. With 
Vienna’s support, astronomers working at the observatories in Vienna and Milan took part in 
international ventures, such as establishing the shape of the Earth and calculating the distance 
from the Sun to the Earth. In this way, the Habsburg monarchs took active part not only in the 
mapping of their lands, but also in promoting global geographic projects.  
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The chapters of this dissertation discuss the types of maps that constituted a priority for 
the Habsburg government in the eighteenth century. Topographic, geographic and border maps 
emerged as desirable tools and allies in the efforts of Vienna to obtain a good spatial 
understanding of its territories.41 Examining the Habsburg Monarchy’s cartographic production 
reveals how the Viennese rulers integrated cartographic reason as part of their governmental 
philosophy, now known as Enlightened Absolutism. Rather than limiting my analysis to a 
theoretical discussion of the development of cartography in the eighteenth century and how its 
transformation impacted the aspect of maps, my case studies discuss the production, circulation 
and use of maps for the provinces of Transylvania, Lombardy and the Austrian Netherlands. 
With the help of these case studies, I integrate the rich Habsburg cartographic legacy with global 
developments in the Age of Enlightenment, such as the rise of scientific mapmaking.  
Large-scale topographic maps, such as the Great Military Map or the Ferraris Carte de 
Cabinet of the Austrian Netherlands, comprise hundreds and even thousands of map sheets, 
representing the geography of the land in tremendous detail. The most-often cited large 
topographic map of the eighteenth century is the Cassini Map of France.42 Whereas the project of 
the Map of France took more than 40 years to complete, between 1747 and 1788, the Habsburg 
general quartermaster’s staff mapped almost all Vienna’s territories in less than 25 years, beween 
1764 and 1787, thus offering the political elites a detailed geographical resource. Moreover, 
while the Cassini map sheets were done at a scale of 1:86,400 and each encompassed a surface of 
approximately 50 miles over 31 miles, the Habsburg officers drew much more detailed maps of 
most of their Monarchy at a scale of 1:28,800.43 Furthermore, in contrast to the Cassini map, 
                                                          
41 Ibid., 18-19. 
42 For more details about the map of Cassini see Monique Pelletier, La carte de Cassini. L’extraordinaire aventure 
de la carte de France (Paris: Presses de l’école nationale des ponts et chaussées, 1990). 
43 Konvitz, Cartography in France, 21-31.  
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which was made available to the public, Vienna jealously guarded the results of the Great 
Military Map in manuscript form in the imperial archives. One could argue that the Habsburg 
success in restricting access to these impressive maps for more than a century hindered the 
scholars’ access to these sources. I want to stress one additional impediment: as these Habsburgs 
maps finally became more widely known during the first decades of the twentieth century, the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire disintegrated and the priorities of the new national histories changed. 
Chapter 3 discusses the production of one section of this Great Military Map: the map of 
Transylvania (1769-1773). Chapter 4 analyzes the large-scale topographic map of the Austrian 
Netherlands (1771-1778). 
For some of their territories that had been the scene of numerous European wars and that 
had been mapped by Habsburg opponents, such as Lombardy and the Austrian Netherlands, the 
rulers in Vienna endorsed the production of publishable geographic maps. These low-resolution 
representations of Habsburg provinces served a dual purpose. On one hand, the imperial and 
provincial government obtained access to an updated representation of these dominions. On the 
other hand, these maps demonstrated to the larger scientific community the Habsburg agents’ 
cartographic ability. In this way, both Ferraris’ Carte marchande of the Austrian Netherlands 
(discussed in chapter 4) and the map of Lombardy prepared by the astronomers of Brera (chapter 
8) were the Habsburg contribution to the public cartographic discourse in the Age of 
Enlightenment.  
Border maps range in scope from a section of a village to the entirety of one province’s 
frontier. Some of these maps include numerous topographic details, while others present a 
schematized landscape. In certain cases, such maps were the product of joint commissions, 
including both Habsburg military engineers and their counterparts from neighboring states. More 
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often, this type of cartographic material was not shared across the border and was used by the 
Habsburgs to collect information in preparation for border negotiations. Chapters 5 and 6 explore 
the cartographic material produced in connection with the demarcation of three border segments 
located in Transylvania, the Austrian Netherlands and Lombardy. These graphic documents are a 
heterogeneous group of maps, ranging from large-scale representations of contested village 
sections to drawings showing the trajectory of a province’s borderlines.  
As the Viennese decision-makers strived to ensure the defense and efficient 
administration of their political colossus, they prioritized gathering knowledge about all 
Habsburg provinces, including the commission of maps. Therefore, this dissertation relates 
transformations in mapmaking technology and the increased interest of the government in 
investing in cartographic projects with the emergence of the Habsburg fiscal-military state and 
the form of government known as Enlightened Absolutism. In the same way that the Habsburg 
cartographic gaze encountered technological, social and economic limitations, rulers defined 
today as Enlightened Absolutists failed to achieve complete control and reform of their 
dominions. Nonetheless, the attempts of rulers such as Maria Theresa and Joseph II to mold their 
provinces into a unitary state should not be dismissed as their having illusions of grandeur. 
Analyzing enlightened projects in practice, such as the mechanics of mapping the provinces and 
borders of the Habsburg Monarchy, will offer new insight into the intertwined histories of 
empires and science.  
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1.2 THE HABSBURG CONTRIBUTION TO AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT 
During the past century, the field of Enlightenment Studies has gone beyond the paradigm of the 
existence of a unitary French Enlightenment that spread throughout the world. Scholars have 
integrated both local contributions and international networks of exchange that participated in the 
intellectual fervor of the Age of Enlightenment. The following pages are far from an exhaustive 
review of all of the significant books and articles that contributed to the historiography of 
Enlightenment.44 Instead, I trace a historiographical evolution that highlights the widening and 
the increasing connectedness of the geographic area that scholars subsumed under the umbrella 
of the Enlightenment. As the following discussion of the literature shows, we are at a point in 
historiography during which scholars are striving to reevaluate the contribution of various 
centers to the Age of Enlightenment as part of a multi-polar dialogue. As the prevailing political 
entity in Central Europe, the Habsburg Monarchy included some key centers that contributed to 
the articulation of Enlightenment’s ideas as related to the field of cartography.  
After the First World War, intellectuals proclaimed the Enlightenment to have been a 
necessary step in the development of liberal, humanist, and secular values. Ernst Cassirer’s The 
Philosophy of the Enlightenment and Paul Hazard’s The Crisis of the European Conscience, 
1680-1715 emphasized the cosmopolitanism and the unitary nature of the Enlightenment and at 
the same time had a strong central and western European bias. Indeed, Cassirer’s examples came 
only from the French, British and German lands.45 Despite their claim of the universality of the 
Enlightenment, leading scholars of the field used the work of French thinkers as a mirror through 
                                                          
44 For a very detailed and informative literature review of the historiography of the Enlightenment see John 
Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment: Scotland and Naples, 1680-1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), chapter 1.  
45 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1952); Paul 
Hazard, La crise de la conscience européenne, 1680-1715 (Paris: A. Fayard, 1961). 
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which they examined other intellectuals’ ideas.46 Peter Gay’s two-volume study, The 
Enlightenment: An Interpretation,47 builds on Cassirer’s legacy, and focuses on “the inherent and 
irrepressible liberalism of the Enlightenment.”48 This teleological view of history transforms the 
Enlightenment into an essential stage for Western European culture on its path towards its own 
version of modernity.  
In the 1970s and 1980s, the historiography of the Enlightenment became the 
historiography of the Enlightenments. A pioneering volume edited by Roy Porter and Mikuláš 
Teich in 1981 stressed the “national dimensions” of the Enlightenment and brought together case 
studies from all parts of Europe.49 By focusing on the plurality of voices contributing to 
intellectual debates and the specific political, economic and social factors of various geographic 
areas, historians demolished the idea of a monolithic Enlightenment.50 As Charles Withers 
argues, if one were to place on a map where various ideas originated in the eighteenth century, 
and then connect the dots, the Enlightenment would emerge as a connected, complex graph.51 
The new extreme in which Enlightenment studies were in danger of falling was writing about 
“national enlightenment,” as if the concept “national” had the same meaning in the eighteenth 
century as in today’s world.52 But the works of scholars, such as John Robertson, showed that 
                                                          
46 Dorinda Outram, The Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3.  
47 Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation (New York: Knopf, 1969). 
48 Joachim Whaley, “The transformation of the Aufklärung: from the idea of power to the power of ideas,” in 
Cultures of Power in Europe during the Long Eighteenth Century, ed. Hamish Scott and Brendan Simms 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 159. 
49 The Enlightenment in National Context, eds. Roy Porter and Mikuláš Teich  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981). 
50 Charles W.J.Withers, Placing the Enlightenment. Thinking Geographically about the Age of Reason (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007), 6. 
51 Ibid., 8-9. 
52 Jonathan Israel, “Enlightenment! Which Enlightenment?” Journal of the History of Ideas 67, no. 3 (2006), 528. 
 
 
23 
even though local and national contexts influenced the characteristics of Enlightenment greatly, 
there existed intellectual coherence based on a commitment to human betterment.53 
In addition to reassessing the impact of a multi-level context, the scholarship transitioned 
from viewing the Enlightenment as a European program of secular progress to newer attempts 
that highlight the development of alternative modernities.54 These alternatives did not develop in 
isolation. Connectivity was a central element for the emergence of “Enlightenment” that “was a 
product of, and a response to, global conjunctures.”55 Only by retrieving the variety of voices 
that contributed to the Age of Enlightenment we can reevaluate the contribution of non-Western 
societies, such as the Habsburg Monarchy.  
The reorientation towards the study of a network of enlightenments reassessed the 
originality of the reform movement in the eighteenth century Habsburg lands and its connections 
to what historians call Central European Enlightenment or Aufklärung.56 The enlightened 
projects from this part of the world became associated with political reforms, as German princes 
harnessed the enthusiasm and expertise of state officials and intellectual thinkers to pursue 
administrative, economic and religious reforms.57 Indeed, as László Kontler shows for the 
Habsburg Monarchy and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the pursuit of Enlightenment did 
not necessarily have to be subversive of established authorities, secular or ecclesiastical.58  
                                                          
53 Robertson, The Case for the Enlightenment. For more about Enlightenment in Bohemia and the centrality of 
morality see The Enlightenment in Bohemia: religion, morality and multiculturalism, eds. Ivo Cerman, Rita 
Krueger, and Susan Reynolds (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2011).  
54 Sebastian Conrad, "Enlightenment in Global History: A Historiographical Critique," The American Historical 
Review 117, no. 4 (2012): 1005-1009. 
55 Ibid., 1009. 
56 I follow Peter Wilson’s definition and consider Central Europe in the eighteenth century as the territory 
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dynasties. Peter Wilson, Absolutism in Central Europe (London: Routledge, 2000), 8.  
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While there is a historiographical debate about the characteristics of its early phase, 
Frühaufklärung, most scholars acknowledge the existence of such a stage in the last decades of 
the seventeenth century. The Aufklärung had its origins as an academic movement and developed 
in strong alliance with the state. The leading part the Protestant universities and cameralism 
played cannot be denied.59 Jonathan Israel’s work also identified a radical thread in German 
politics as a direct reflection of Spinoza’s writings; therefore, the political experience of the 
Reich at the end of the seventeenth century proved varied.60  
The middle of the eighteenth century witnessed the maturation of the Aufklärung and, 
some argue, the development of a particular form of political government: Enlightened 
Absolutism, strongly associated with monarchs like Maria Theresa and Joseph II. The common 
thread of all the various instances of absolutism, Habsburg Enlightened Absolutism included, 
was the way it legitimized princely authority. Monarchs refused to consult corporate institutions 
on a formal basis and preferred bargaining with different power groups; moreover, political 
rulers also responded to pressure from below and outside their lands.61 Indeed, the emergence of 
Protestant Prussia as a serious competitor to the authority of Catholic Austria in the Holy Roman 
Empire led to a military and economic race between the Hohenzollerns and the Habsburgs. The 
Aufklärung flowed from a university-contained current to penetrate the administration and 
political organization of German states.62  
                                                          
59 Grete Klingenstein, “Mondo Tedesco,” in L’Illuminismo: Dizionario Storico, eds. Vincenzo Ferrone and Daniel 
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For the Habsburg Monarchy, Prussia, and the smaller German states of the Holy Roman 
Empire, the century of reforms instituted from above known as Enlightened Absolutism is 
embodied in the reigns of Maria Theresa, Joseph II, Frederick the Great, and smaller princes 
such as the Duke Karl August of Weimar. These rulers all had intellectual interests that led to 
governmental innovations. Although the policies varied in each case, they all followed a similar 
trend: a move towards more human legal systems, greater tolerance, education reforms, measures 
against religious orders and the curtailment of the role of the church, the stimulation of trade and 
agriculture, and even social reforms such as the abolishment of serfdom.63 
Even though the eighteenth-century Central European Absolutist governments had a so-
called “enlightened” dimension, their priority remained building a military machine to preserve 
their edge in the international competition. The increase in military expenditure in eighteenth-
century European states like Prussia, the Habsburg Monarchy, and the smaller German states 
determined the reorganization of their administration and economy. Gerhard Oestreich showed 
how the need for territorial defense led to the formation of new institutions that established and 
managed military districts, military taxes, and military borders. An increase in army size implied 
higher costs and motivated rulers to exchange mercenary troops for territorial armies.64  
These Central European developments correlated with worldwide trends. Maria Theresa’s 
and Joseph II’s determination to increase the state’s revenue in order to support military 
expenses65 was not specific to Central Europe, but was a policy encountered on the whole 
continent and led to the rise of the so-called fiscal-military states a term first used by John 
                                                          
63 Eckhart Hellmuth, “Enlightenment and Government,” in The Enlightenment World, eds. Martin Fitzpatrick, Peter 
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64 Gerhard Oestreich, “Army organization in the German territories from 1500 to 1800,” in Neostoicism and the 
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Brewer to define British political developments in the eighteenth century.66 Since then, scholars 
have applied this theoretical framework to most early-modern European powers, including the 
Habsburg Monarchy.67  
The rise of the fiscal-military states was the result of early-modern governments’ 
commitment to developing more lucrative fiscal systems to fund larger armies in an age of 
recurring warfare.68 In the case of the Habsburg Monarchy, the humiliating military defeats at 
the hands of the Prussian armies convinced Maria Theresa and her advisers to pursue a 
reformation of the fiscal and military system. As Peter George Muir Dickson demonstrated in his 
heavily researched work about Maria Theresa’s reign, the Empress and her ministers prioritized 
“the assertion of fiscal and military power”69 in order to preserve the Habsburg Monarchy’s 
territories in the face of the Prussian challenge.  
Maria Theresa’s reform policies went through two main phases: one dominated by Count 
Friedrich Wilhelm Haugwitz (from 1742 to 1761), and one directed by Count Wenzel Anton 
Kaunitz-Rietberg (from 1761 to 1780).70 Count Haugwitz’s age introduced the principle of 
regular taxation of seigniorial lands in peacetime. This revolutionary measure led to negotiation 
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vol. 1, 15. 
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with the provincial Estates, and in 1749 ten-year taxation agreements were concluded between 
the monarchy and the local Estates in Bohemia and Austria.71 In her Political Testament, written 
shortly after the 1749 reforms, Maria Theresa underlined “how greatly [she] labored to organize 
and put on a firm footing the military force which is so indispensable for the preservation of the 
Monarchy…the object of this military system being to ensure that the Provincial contributions 
come in regularly every month, so that the forces are paid punctually.”72  
The Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) proved the deficiencies of Haugwitz’s system with 
respect to military and fiscal reforms and marked the emergence of Kaunitz as the main advisor 
of the Empress. Chancellor Kaunitz distinguished himself in the international arena of European 
politics as the person responsible for the “diplomatic revolution” that brought Versailles on the 
same side as Vienna after 1756.73 In addition to initiating a bold reorientation of the Habsburg 
Monarchy’s foreign policy, Kaunitz became one of the main architects of the empire’s internal 
restructuring.74 And mapmaking constituted one of the areas that Kaunitz promoted for almost 
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Political Testaments from 1750 and 1756 [Dickson, Finance and Government under Maria Theresia,, vol. 2, 3]. 
Regrettably for the ambitious bureaucrat, such a centralizing administrative reform proved incompatible with the 
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them” [Michael Hochedlinger, Austria’s Wars of Emergence: War, State and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 
1683-1797 (Harlow: Longman, 2003), 268]. Nevertheless, Haugwitz remained adamant that raising the level of the 
contribution was essential in ensuring enough funds for the army. In order to gather sufficient money to support a 
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sharply [Robin Okey, The Habsburg Monarchy c. 1765-1918. From Enlightenment to Eclipse (Basingstoke, 
England: Macmillan, 2001), 33]. 
72 Carlile Aylmer Macartney, The Habsburg and Hohenzollern Dynasties in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries (New York: Walker, 1970), 126. 
73 Ingrao, The Habsburg Monarchy, 172-174.  
74 One of the first measures Count Kaunitz introduced in 1761 was the creation of the Council of State (Staatsrat), 
whose role was in theory purely consultative; in practice it had a strong impact on the monarch’s final decisions 
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four decades. As shown in subsequent chapters, together with Maria Theresa and Joseph II, 
Kaunitz encouraged investment in topographic surveys, the preparation of maps to help with 
international border negotiations, and the recruitment of skillful mapmakers.  
Chancellor Kaunitz’s influence did not end with Maria Theresa’s death, but continued 
during the reign of Joseph II (1780-1790). This emperor’s rule is contemporary with 
Spätaufklärung (late Enlightenment) or Gegenaufklärung (Counter-Enlightenment), which 
developed as a result of a fundamental shift in the 1770s. As the Aufklärer became disappointed 
with the reforms of the political rulers, a debate about Aufklärung and “true” Aufklärung 
ensued.75 During this time, Joseph II faced serious rebellions in the Austrian Netherlands, 
Hungary and Lombardy. This political development was not so much a reflection of the debate 
mentioned above, as an attempt by provincial elites to reestablish their authority vis a vis various 
aspects of local government.76 
Historians attached to writing nation-centered histories credit Joseph II and his aggressive 
integration policies with the emergence of militant nationalism in his empire. On the other hand, 
Richard Evans questions the assumption that Joseph II’s centralizing policies and the Emperor’s 
goal to impose uniformity in the Monarchy sparked the rise of nationalist movements in places 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Dickson, Finance and Government under Maria Theresia, vol. 2, 233-234. Furthermore, Emperor Joseph II started 
attending the meetings of the Council of State in May 1761, and thus completed the Habsburg decisional 
triumvirate, composed for the next two decades of Maria Theresa, Count Kaunitz, and Emperor Joseph II. The 
importance of military might cannot be stressed enough, and just like Haugwitz, Kaunitz had to struggle with the 
refusal of the provincial Estates to allocate more funding for the army. The chancellor agreed that the size of the 
Habsburg army during peace-time had to be increased, but he also warned Maria Theresa that excessive military 
costs could destroy the economic foundations of the Monarchy. Therefore, in Kaunitz’s opinion, a good military 
system had to rest on solid economic bases. The chancellor’s efforts to improve agriculture, domestic industry, and 
customs regulations proved fruitful. Kaunitz managed to decrease the foreign debt of the Habsburgs, and in 1775 
and 1777 the Monarchy even registered a positive balance. Szabo, Kaunitz and Enlightened Absolutism, 278-280; 
Ingrao, The Habsburg Monarchy, 180.  
75 Whaley, “The transformation of the Aufklärung: from the idea of power to the power of ideas,” 169-171. 
76Antal Szántay discusses comparatively Joseph II’s policies in Hungary, Lombardy and the Austrian Netherlands, 
and the provincial reaction. Antal Szántay, Regionalpolitik im Alten Europa: die Verwaltungsreformen Josephs II. in 
Ungarn, in der Lombardei und in den österrechischen Niederlanden 1785-1790 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 
2005).  
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such as Hungary and the Austrian Netherlands. Instead, Evans suggests that imposing a 
“Habsburg” identity during Joseph II’s reign failed because the eighteenth century Aufklärung 
and the self-perception of the border provinces as backward with respect to Vienna had already 
contributed in the provinces to the crystallization of attachment to and promotion of vernacular 
languages, local history and geography.77 
For a long time the Anglophone historiography was reluctant to accept Joseph II’s 
characterization as an enlightened ruler because he was not an anti-Catholic ruler and he directed 
his reforms towards the goal of raising more taxes to support a larger army.78 More recently, 
however, the work of scholars such as Derek Beales, Heather Morrison, Franz Szabo and Ernst 
Wangerman, revealed the contributions of Vienna to the debates of the Enlightenment during 
Maria Theresa’s and Joseph II’s reign.79 I contend that as with education reforms, the elimination 
of censorship or pamphlets directed against the government expressed the enlightened facets of 
Maria Theresa’s and Joseph II’s rules, the Habsburgs’ contributions to the development of 
mapmaking and patronage of astronomic and cartographic projects denotes another aspect of the 
Enlightenment.  
Examining the development of a geographic consciousness helps illuminate the 
transformation of the Habsburg Monarch during the age of the Enlightened Absolutist rulers 
Maria Theresa and Joseph II. Despite a significant increase in the number of Habsburg 
cartographic initiatives after 1765, there remains a disjunction in the literature between scholars 
                                                          
77 Richard Evans, “Nationality in East-Central Europe: Perception and Definition before 1848,” in Austria, Hungary, 
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who examine the Habsburg Monarchy’s development under Maria Theresa and Joseph II,80 and 
historians who investigate the cartographic production for this period.81 Map-making was crucial 
to the process of centralization described by Habsburg scholars as it represented an essential 
turning point in the on-going negotiation for power between center and local authorities. The 
creation of special institutions in charge of preparing military maps, the training of military 
engineers as mapmakers, and Vienna’s commitment to establishing and representing on maps the 
trajectory of imperial borders, are all part of this restructuring of the Habsburg Monarchy from a 
loosely connected empire to a centralized state. Moreover, this empire’s position in the center of 
Europe and the networks of military engineers, Jesuits and other scientists connecting Vienna 
with the rest of the world clearly impacted the development of cartography in the region. In this 
sense, the Habsburg Monarchy was an active node in the network of Enlightenment both in a 
political and scientific sense. 
Indeed, a utilitarian and pragmatic perspective of the Habsburg government in the second 
half of the eighteenth century constitutes only part of the story. Even though the Viennese rulers 
prioritized military and financial demands as essential for the survival of the Monarchy, we 
should not discard their cultural and scientific contributions. The production of maps illustrates 
an overlap of the political-military aspect with the scientific one. On one hand, the participation 
of the Habsburg Monarchy in numerous military conflicts determined the strong involvement of 
the Aulic War Council in the process of cartographic production and the rise of the military 
engineers as an essential unit of the imperial corps. The exigencies of a fiscal-military state 
caught in an international political competition help explain the Habsburg penchant for keeping 
sensitive cartographic information secret. On the other hand, Maria Theresa, Joseph II and 
                                                          
80 Ingrao, The Habsburg Monarchy; Szabo, Kaunitz and Enlightened Absolutism; Derek Beales, Joseph II.  
81 Dörflinger, Die Österreichische Kartographie, vol. 1. 
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Chancellor Kaunitz were also powerful supporters of arts and sciences, and their patronage was 
sought after by European artists and scientists.82 The fields of astronomy and mapmaking were 
no exception.  
As scientists from all over Europe engaged in measuring the heavens and the earth, they 
relied on financial and political support from powerful monarchs to implement large projects, 
especially if travelling outside the borders of their rulers. For example, with the support of Maria 
Theresa and Kaunitz, the famous French mapmaker and astronomer César-François Cassini de 
Thury travelled to Vienna in 1761 to establish the correct longitude of the Habsburg capital in 
relation to Paris.83 When the Grand Duke Paul of Russia and his wife visited Vienna in 1781 
Joseph II took great pride in showing them the Astronomic Observatory located in the Academy 
of Fine Arts in Vienna and made sure they listened to Maximilian Hell’s description of the 
expedition he made to Lapland in order to observe the 1769 transit of Venus. Moreover, the 
emperor showed to his distinguished guests the main astronomic instruments housed in the 
observatory and explained their use himself.84 As this dissertation shows, the Habsburg 
monarchs participated in global scientific projects and promoted impressive mapmaking 
enterprises. Therefore, they took active part in the development of cartography in the Age of 
Enlightenment.  
                                                          
82 Michael Yonan selected a series of paintings, architectural settings and objects that benefitted from Maria 
Theresa’s patronage and analyzed these items as expression of this ruler’s monarchical power. Michael Elia Yonan, 
Empress Maria Theresa and the Politics of Habsburg Imperial Art (University Park: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 2011). Kaunitz supported art students and musicians, played a key role in the creation of the Academy of Fine 
Arts in Vienna in 1772, and promoted French theater.  Szabo, Kaunitz and Enlightened Absolutism, 23-27; 200-208. 
Joseph II had a strong interest in theater, music and opera, and appreciated Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart’s talent. 
Beales, “Mozart and the Habsburgs,” in Enlightenment and Reform in Eighteenth-Century Europe, 95-98. 
83 Cassini de Thury published a description of his journey in the German lands, including his time in Vienna. César-
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The mapmakers’ voices constituted another means for the Habsburg Monarchy to 
participate in a global geographic discourse. The eighteenth century witnessed the emergence of 
the public sphere as distinct from the private realm. Traditional historical narratives present this 
age as one of progress for the bourgeoisie, as the concept of citizenship emerged and commoners 
fought for their political rights. The bourgeois public sphere developed first as a realm for private 
individuals who shared common readings and intellectual pursuits. The Republic of Letters and 
the salons constituted a social setting in which aristocrats and burghers discussed cultural 
commodities, readily available in reading rooms, theaters, museums, and concert halls.85 The 
world of letters led to the development of a public discourse and forums for discussion. Although 
the bourgeoisie arose as the most dynamic element of eighteenth century German society, it still 
lacked political power and had insufficient financial power to threaten the absolutist political 
establishment. Therefore, the emergence of the absolute state and the dynamism of the 
bourgeoisie combined to create the bureaucratic Enlightened Absolutist states of the eighteenth 
century.86  
In a similar manner, the most successful mapmakers of the Age of Enlightenment 
collaborated with the political establishments. At the same time, these scientists built 
international connections through correspondence and collaborations on geographic projects, 
thus developing a mapmakers’ public sphere. The activity of the observatories in Vienna and 
Milan furthered Habsburg imperial cartographic projects, but also helped implement global 
scientific quests, such as establishing the shape of the Earth. The scientific publications based in 
Brussels, Milan and Vienna served not only to bolster the Habsburg monarchs’ reputation as 
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patrons of culture, but also to promote scientists such as Maximilian Hell and Barnaba Oriani 
among the ranks of the Age of Enlightenment’s intellectual elites.  
Examining eighteenth-century developments from the vantage point of cartography 
supports the statement that enlightened thinkers and rulers strived “to accumulate and 
systematize useful knowledge about man’s physical and social-moral environment in order to 
improve that environment.”87 The Habsburg Monarchy’s interest in cartography fits this 
definition perfectly, as gathering geographic information in the form of maps and territorial 
descriptions was not an end in itself, but rather a preliminary step for imperial reforms or for 
international border conventions. For example, in 1773, after his journey to Transylvania, Joseph 
II sent a report to Maria Theresa and the other main ministers in Vienna, expressing a strong 
criticism of the province’s governance and arguing that “the absence of local knowledge makes 
such a difference in provincial affairs that it is often impossible in practice to implement the best, 
most far-reaching and from a distance apparently most suitable plans, and that the total ignorance 
of all Your Majesty’s advisers and experts [...] is a real difficulty, impediment and drawback for 
the service.”88  
Maps offered one way to counteract the lack of local knowledge and, as shown in chapter 
3, Joseph II’s trip to Transylvania took place in the same year that military engineers finalized 
the first large-scale topographic map of this province. Habsburg imperial maps synthesized 
information about the administrative, demographic, economic, religious and social landscape. In 
this way, cartography bridged the wide distance separating Vienna from its border provinces and 
provided another thread that kept the Monarchy together. The Habsburg lands can be defined as 
“a kind of collection: pieced together and gaining definition over time, shaped by a range of 
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circumstances, accidents, and intentions.”89 Although envisioned as a way to centralize the 
empire, Habsburg cartographic projects did not always proceed according to the plans of the 
Viennese decision makers, and examining their history provides us a window into the intentions 
and accidents that mark the development of this Monarchy and its bumpy road towards 
centralization in the eighteenth century.  
1.3 STRUCTURE AND DOCUMENTATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
I have chosen to pursue a three-level approach for my project, underscoring provincial 
specificities, common imperial threads, and trans-imperial connections.90 I am not addressing 
these different geographic scales in isolation. By focusing on mapmaking projects in three 
different border regions - Transylvania, the Austrian Netherlands and Lombardy - I show how 
cartography contributed to provincial integration and imperial centralization. Additionally, I 
examine the empire-building project not only as a political program imposed from Vienna, but as 
a process of negotiation with other empires in the region and provincial elites within the 
Habsburg lands. To implement this theoretical framework, my research started in the imperial 
capital, Vienna, followed some of the Habsburg-Bourbon connections to Paris, and continued in 
the provincial centers of Habsburg authority located in today’s Belgium, Italy and Romania, 
namely in Brussels, Milan and Sibiu.  
                                                          
89 Maya Jasanoff, Edge of Empire: Lives, Culture, and Conquest in the East, 1750-1850 (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2005), 6. 
90 My work borrows from the three-level approach of Charles Withers and his suggestion to “consider both the 
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provincial, imperial, and trans-imperial.  Withers, Placing the Enlightenment, 41.   
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My proximate frame of analysis is cartography in the context of the Habsburg Monarchy, 
but my ultimate frame of analysis is connecting fiscal-military policies of imperial states, such as 
the Habsburg Monarchy, with the rise of science in the Age of Enlightenment.91 Although 
scholars have studied the relationship between early-modern empires and mapmaking, they have 
neglected the Habsburg Monarchy. As the dominant force in Central Europe, with holdings both 
in the West and the East of the continent, the Habsburg Monarchy was positioned at the 
crossroads of geographic traditions associated with France, the Italian states, Russia and the 
Ottoman lands, to name just a few of its neighbors. As the dissertation shows, Vienna both 
learned from and influenced its allies and competitors. Whereas French and Parmesan 
mapmakers used graphic conventions similar to the Habsburgs in preparing border maps, the 
Moldavians had a different understanding about how to draw such a map. Some of the experts in 
mapmaking that Vienna hired had perfected their skills in the service of other rulers. At the same 
time, some Habsburg military engineers left the service of Vienna for greener pastures.  
My dissertation approaches the topic of Habsburg cartography in relationship to three 
contexts of varying scales: the imperial background, the trans-imperial networks, and three 
provincial case studies, namely Transylvania, the Austrian Netherlands and Lombardy. Chapter 
two, “Engineering Elite Mapmakers: Recruiting, Educating and Organizing Habsburg Military 
Engineers in the Eighteenth Century,” traces the creation and centralization of imperial military 
mapmaking institutions in order to show how the Habsburg fiscal-military state subordinated the 
collection of geographical knowledge to imperial interests. I analyze the institutionalization of 
military engineers, the standardization of their training, and a number of individual careers 
between 1740s and 1780s. I argue that, by standardizing the training and organization of military 
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engineers, the Habsburg monarchs desired to centralize the production and preservation of maps, 
in the same way that they dreamed of consolidating their empire. 
Chapter 3, “Mastering Space: The Great Military Map of Transylvania,” discusses the 
efforts of the Habsburg Monarchy to integrate this province into the fabric of the empire. 
Between 1700 and the mid-1770s, with the help of both provincial and imperial mapmakers, the 
Viennese rulers obtained detailed maps of this province that focused on both economic and 
military points of interest. This chapter also reveals the limitations of the Habsburg policy of 
censorship as applied to military maps.  
Chapter 4, “A Private Initiative? The Ferraris Maps of the Austrian Netherlands,” focuses 
on the surveying of the Austrian Netherlands between 1771 and 1778. I explore the discussion 
surrounding the Ferraris project’s approval, the connection of this enterprise with the process of 
border demarcations, and the trans-imperial and provincial hurdles that slowed down the 
mapping operations. The difficulties Ferraris encountered in reaching his cartographic objectives 
reveal the challenges of the Habsburg government in the Austrian Netherlands due to the 
survival of strong local institutions, foreign enclaves and contested lands. 
Chapters 5 (“Sketching Imperial Contours: Mapping Habsburg Borders in Transylvania 
and the Austrian Netherlands”) and 6 (“An Elusive Border: Cartographic Projects in the Context 
of the Lombardy-Parma Border Inspections and Negotiations”) switch the thematic focus from 
large-scale topographic surveys to border maps. From 1750 until 1790, Maria Theresa and 
Joseph II pursued a consistent policy of signing border treaties with their neighbors. I explore 
how the development of cartography and scientific instruments impacted the border demarcation 
process in the eastern, western and southern parts of the Habsburg Monarchy, and led to the 
development of linear, continuous imperial borders marked by standard signs. I explore for the 
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cases of Austrian Netherlands, Lombardy and Transylvania, how in the eighteenth century, maps 
transformed from mere optional appendixes to international treaties, and then into a key 
documentary base used in the negotiation and the border demarcation process. I argue that 
cartographic products of the second half of the eighteenth century were not only mirroring 
political developments but were even conditioning diplomatic negotiations regarding the borders. 
Chapters 7 and 8 bring to the forefront of my discussion the contribution of Habsburg 
astronomers to mapmaking and other geographic projects. Chapter 7, “Scrutinizing the Heavens, 
Measuring the Earth: Astronomers in the Service of the Habsburg Monarchy,” investigates the 
activity of scientists who contributed to the development of astronomy and mapmaking in the 
Habsburg lands, with a strong emphasis on the 1760s and 1770s. By analyzing the contribution 
of Habsburg astronomers affiliated with specific provincial centers (Vienna, Milan, Brussels) in 
a larger context, I show how these scientists contributed to the development of Habsburg 
imperial cartography. Additionally, I reveal how Habsburg astronomers connected imperial 
cultural sites with the wider world and contributed to the development of astronomy and 
geography on a global scale.  
Chapter 8, “An International Network of Astronomers and the Mapping of Lombardy,” 
shows the direct impact of the work of astronomers on the Habsburg cartographic production. 
After a brief discussion of the limitations of cadastral maps prepared for the State of Milan in the 
second half of the eigtheenth century, I address the efforts of the Viennese government in the 
1770s and 1780s to obtain a geographic map of Lombardy. I explore the discussion 
accompanying the production process for the map of the Brera astronomers (1788-1796) and 
situate the story of this cartographic enterprise in two larger contexts: that of the Habsburg 
Monarchy and that of the trans-imperial scientific community. The efforts of the Brera 
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astronomers to transform their observatory into an important scientific node of the larger 
European network motivated these scientists to prepare a map of Lombardy. The astronomers’ 
correspondence networks and Barnaba Oriani’s trip to London ensured the acquisition of first-
class geodetic instruments and conveyed to Lombardy information about similar European 
projects.  
 Approaching the Enlightenment by examining one of its practical facets, namely 
cartography, allows us to explore connections and tensions between the interests of governments 
and the international Republic of Letters. The Habsburg rulers commissioned maps as aids in the 
process of centralization, military defense and expansion. These geographic representations that 
brought the image of far-away Habsburg provinces to Vienna possibly encouraged Emperor 
Joseph II’s bold reforms and his push towards the elimination of administrative specificities. The 
geographic projects discussed in this dissertation not only fostered Habsburg political agendas, 
but also furthered measurements of longitudes with respect to the meridian of Paris, the 
publishing of geographic maps of the Austrian Netherlands and Lombardy for a wider European 
audience and the collaboration of astronomers to observe the transits of Venus and to establish 
the precise shape of the Earth. With its exchanges among provincial centers belonging to the 
same political state and also across borders, cartography in this period embodies the nature of 
the Enlightenment.  
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2.0 ENGINEERING ELITE MAPMAKERS: RECRUITING, EDUCATING AND 
ORGANIZING HABSBURG MILITARY ENGINEERS  
In 1753, Empress Maria Theresa issued a diploma of ennoblement for the military engineer 
Stephan Lutsch, the son of a humble Lutheran preacher from the Habsburg province of 
Transylvania. Lutsch’s new surname, Luchsenstein, and the lynx holding a telescope included on 
his coat of arms alluded to the services the engineer had rendered to the empire: his invaluable 
activity as a mapmaker.92 The impressive upward social mobility of Stephan Lutsch reflects the 
Habsburg monarchs’ reliance on the services of military engineers throughout the eighteenth 
century to obtain information about their extensive dominions. In Emperor Joseph II’s words: “at 
least we should do what we can to obtain the necessary notions about the general situation of all 
the monarchy’s domains.”93 One of the measures the Habsburg authorities took to gather 
knowledge about their realm was investing resources to train and to organize military engineers, 
the most important mapmakers of the empire.  
From the time of its arrival on the stage of empires in the sixteenth century, the Habsburg 
Monarchy always had to take into consideration the possibility of war on two or even more 
                                                          
92 Luchsenstein’s coat of arms included three fossil tailbones of squids, the symbol of the earth sciences, and a lynx 
holding a telescope. The word Luchsenstein is a combination of the words “lynx” and “stone.” Even his maps are 
often mentioned in documents as “Luchsenstein” maps. Erwin Raisz, “Colonel Stefan Lutsch von Luchsenstein 
1710-1792,” Imago Mundi 10 (1953): 122. 
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monarchie.” Joseph II to the Habsburg ambassador in France, Mercy-Argenteau, on May 20, 1781, reproduced in 
Alfred von Arneth, Correspondance secrète du comte de Mercy Argenteau avec l'empereur Joseph II et le prince de 
Kaunitz, vol. 1 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1889), 34.  
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fronts. The eighteenth century was no different, as the Habsburg lands neighbored or came in 
close proximity to a wide array of possible dangerous enemies: France, Prussia, the Ottoman and 
the Russian Empires. Survival in the face of continuous warfare motivated Maria Theresa’s 
radical reforms in the second half of the eighteenth century and successfully increased the size of 
the Habsburg army. Indeed, the Habsburg Monarchy during Maria Theresa and Joseph II went 
through a process of militarization; the fiscal and economic systems supported war and defense, 
and the military also furthered internal transformation.94 Whereas in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries the three main elements of Habsburg unity were the dynasty, aristocracy 
and Catholic Church, the eighteenth century brought to the forefront the centralizing role of the 
army, bureaucracy and a managed economy.95  
In addition to the formation of centralized army institutions, the role of the Habsburg 
army as “a unifying and integrative factor in the defense of the dynastic state” can also be 
explored through the production of military maps.96 Military institutions such as the Aulic War 
Council, the imperial corps of engineers and the general quartermaster’s staff incorporated 
mapmaking activities as an essential component in the process of state defense and 
centralization. The Habsburg army, just as the empire it served, was not a monolithic entity. The 
various military corps, which incorporated mapmaking as part of their responsibilities, often had 
overlapping functions and interchangeable personnel. But despite an incomplete centralization of 
mapmaking by the second half of the eighteenth century, the strong collaboration of military 
                                                          
94 Hochedlinger, “The Habsburg Monarchy,” 63; For a discussion of the impact of eighteen century military 
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engineers, state officials and scientists accelerated Habsburg cartographic production and 
encouraged mapmaking projects with a very ambitious scope.97  
The militarization of cartography was not a process restricted to the Habsburg Monarchy, 
but was the direct result of a rising interest in maps as planning tools among military officers on 
a global scale.98 The development of fortifications impacted the war-waging technique and led to 
the formation of special groups of engineers. In France, the first official corps of engineers 
maintained and developed the Vauban-type fortifications.99 Innovations such as the socket 
bayonet and battlefield artillery also changed the nature of warfare. As armies had to cover larger 
areas during campaigns, geographical knowledge in the form of maps became crucial.100 The 
emergence of a new class of officers along with their appreciation of maps transformed military 
mapmaking into a scientific enterprise.101 As Charles Withers remarked, once “the military 
became map-minded and mapping military minded” states had the much-needed personnel for 
large-scale mapping projects.102  
How did the Habsburgs develop a tradition of military engineering? In the first half of the 
eighteenth century the Habsburg rulers tapped into the existing group of military engineers from 
newly conquered territories, such as Lombardy and the Austrian Netherlands. Moreover, foreign 
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engineers, especially from France, enrolled in the Habsburg ranks and contributed to the 
development of the art of fortifications and mapmaking. As a new generation of engineers 
trained in the first technical institutions of the Monarchy established itself, the Habsburg 
authorities diminished their reliance on foreigners and developed a homegrown group of military 
engineers.103  
Throughout the second half of the eighteenth century, the Aulic War Council in Vienna 
imposed centralizing policies on the military engineers’ group and attempted to control both their 
training and responsibilities. In the field of mapmaking, military engineers took over or started 
overseeing the work of provincial, civilian engineers. By the 1770s independent military corps 
with engineering expertise, such as the brigade of the Austrian Netherlands, was merged with the 
imperial army unit. The role of provincial engineering corps, such as the Collegio of Milan, was 
subordinated to the authority of imperial agents trained in Vienna. Despite all of these 
centralizing efforts, there remained a tension between the imperial desire to engage in detailed 
mapmaking operations whose results should be secret from prying eyes, and the acute need to 
hire foreign experts to compensate for the shortage of trained personnel.  
This chapter traces the creation and centralization of imperial mapmaking institutions in 
order to show how the Habsburg fiscal-military state subordinated the collection of geographical 
knowledge to imperial interests. Rather than restricting the discussion to developments in the 
Habsburg capital or taking as a unit of analysis only one Habsburg province, I recreate an 
intricate image of the dynasty’s involvement in the development of a group of imperial military 
                                                          
103 Prince Eugene of Savoy (1663-1736) played an important part in stressing the need for the organization and 
training of military engineers in the period prior to the one addressed in this chapter. This military commander 
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26 (1885): 70; Carl Schröder, Beiträge zur Geschichte des k.k. österreichischen Génie-Corps von seiner Errichtung 
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mapmakers. The first two sections explore the development of education institutions for military 
engineers and the creation of special army units for engineers. This institutional development 
happened both as a result of internal developments, and influences from other states with a 
powerful engineering tradition, such as France. The third section analyzes the careers of some 
military engineers who had an impact on the development of cartographic projects in the 
Habsburg Monarchy. On one hand, people like Stephan Lutsch von Luchsenstein and Dominic 
de Blasco served only the Habsburg rulers throughout their lives and thus their careers exemplify 
the influence of provincial mapmaking traditions on imperial cartography. On the other hand, 
during the eighteenth century, the global environment of imperial competition and cooperation 
encouraged the circulation of highly qualified mapmaking personnel from the service of one 
ruler to the other, thus contributing to the dissemination of cartographic knowledge. Mihàly 
Jeney, Michel Angelo de Blasco and Joseph Ferraris became important nodes in the networks of 
cartographic knowledge and intensified the exchange of scientific ideas across the Habsburg 
borders. By examining their career-paths we can better see how the Habsburg military 
mapmakers contributed to the development of cartography in the Age of Enlightenment. Subjects 
in the service of warfare waging fiscal military states, these military engineers were also active 
citizens of the Republic of Letters.104 Their careers were threads connecting the Habsburg lands 
with the wider world. The last part of the chapter shows how the Habsburg authorities strived to 
avoid the leaking of sensitive cartographic information, while at the same time they tried to 
obtain maps of foreign territories. The Aulic War Council’s map archive, re-organized and 
inventoried in the early 1780s, is a reflection of the Enlightened Absolutist state’s desire to 
control access to geographic knowledge.  
                                                          
104 The term Republic of Letters implies the existence of cosmopolitan networks of individuals and institutions, 
collaborating across borders in order to promote scientific projects. Withers, Placing the Enlightenment, 46.  
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2.1 THE IMPERIAL CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND THE GENERAL 
QUARTERMASTER’S STAFF 
Examining the institutionalization and training of military engineers as it emerged in the 
eighteenth century offers insight into a more general global story: the parallel rise of the category 
of “expert” and the development of the early modern states.105 The traditional thesis follows this 
line of argumentation: military engineers extracted from local communities and from on-site 
measurements what they considered relevant geographic information. Then, these experts 
transplanted the complexity of physical and human geographies into maps and written 
descriptions, which travelled to imperial centers. With the help of these instruments of 
government, early-modern imperial rulers attempted to refashion their states into centralized 
empires, often against the interests of the people from whom they had extracted this geographic 
knowledge.106  
Accepting the presence of such a group of experts in the eighteenth century Habsburg 
Monarchy does not elucidate how such a professional category came into existence. What was 
the background and training of Habsburg military engineers? How were they organized? What 
skills transformed them into mapmakers of an imperial realm? Answering such questions 
complicates the narrative of the imperial expert who assists decision-makers in the capital to 
build an empire. The Habsburg efforts to develop special military units to survey territories and 
draw maps were not always successful. The engineering corps of the Monarchy was not big 
enough to implement all the imperial projects. Even the engineers’ main responsibility of 
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maintaining the fortifications system often overwhelmed them. Nonetheless, the Viennese rulers 
persisted in their desire to implement large cartographic projects and used other military units, 
such as the quartermaster general’s staff or the artillerymen from the Austrian Netherlands.  
The organizing of military engineers in imperial brigades as part of the “military 
revolution” of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not develop in isolation among the 
various empires.107 Imperial rulers looked to their allies and competitors as examples, and tried 
to emulate successful military reorganizations.108 In 1757, a French officer serving as part of the 
Habsburg army during the Seven Years’ War prepared an unsigned report for Maria Theresa 
with ideas on how to reform the army. Among his suggestions, he recommended a reform of the 
engineering corps of the Monarchy because “if there is something close to the heart of its 
Imperial Majesty, is [the desire] to improve the corps of engineers by imitating the French 
one.”109 Therefore, in order to understand Maria Theresa’s and her military advisors’ attempts to 
organize a Habsburg corps of engineers, we need to take into account the development of French 
military engineering in the first half of the eighteenth century.110 
                                                          
107 The role of military engineers in the development of state mapmaking has been studied for the eighteenth century 
British, French, Spanish empires and the Italian states. Carolyn Jane Anderson, “State Imperatives: Military 
Mapping in Scotland, 1689-1770,” Scottish Geographical Journal 125 (2009): 4-24; David Buisseret, “Monarchs, 
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108 In 1694, the French Academy of Sciences defined the term engineer as “one who invents, sketches, and conducts 
the works and instruments for the attack and defense of fortifications.” Ken Alder, Engineering the Revolution: 
Arms and Enlightenment in France, 1763-1815 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 56-57. 
109 Vincennes, Service historique de la Défense (hereafter SHD), Archives de l’armée de terre (hereafter AAT), M 1 
1582, vol. 3, 25. The document is unsigned so we cannot identify the officer who prepared it. 
110 For an in-depth discussion of the development of French civil and military engineering especially in the second 
half of the eighteenth century see Charles Coulston Gillispie, Science and Polity in France at the End of the Old 
Regime (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 479-548. Jean-Baptiste Vaquette de Gribeauval is one of 
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director of the French artillery in the 1760s, Gribeauval modeled the reform of this military corps on its Habsburg 
counterpart. Alder, Engineering the Revolution, 38. 
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Numerous studies have analyzed in detail the institutionalization and the activity of 
French military engineers in the early-modern period.111 Scholars have demonstrated the role of 
the Marquis of Vauban in developing a science of fortifications, the interest of the Bourbon kings 
in using new technologies in improving their odds during warfare, and the emergence of French 
military engineers as experts in fortifications and mapmaking. Towards the end of the 
seventeenth century, Le Peletier de Sougy, general commissary of fortifications, organized the 
French engineering corps in 19 divisions, each under a director of fortifications. The first 
complete list of military engineers dates from 1696 and includes 280 people.  
The consequent reforms of the next decade were not codified in writing until the first 
official directive for the corps of engineers issued in 1744.112 The French Minister of War, Marc-
René de Voyer Count d’Argenson, influenced the issue of the royal ordinance from February 7, 
1744, which issued a regular charter for the corps of engineers, detailing their responsibilities 
and ranks. Janis Langins considers these ordinances part of d’Argenson’s larger effort “described 
as bureaucratic rationalization, increasing militarization, and formal training.” In 1755, 
d’Argenson continued the process of centralization of the military by unifying the engineers and 
artillerymen as part of the new Royal Corps of Artillery and Military Engineering.113 Although 
short-lived, this 18-month union of French engineers and artillerymen might have influenced the 
Habsburg’s slower approach to the centralization of engineering brigades described in the next 
pages.  
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In France, for most of the first half of the eighteenth century, the recruitment of new 
engineers was based on an exam administered by experts in fortifications. Most candidates had 
to travel to Paris for their examination, but exceptions were made until 1740 for the sons of 
engineers, tested wherever their fathers were deployed. In 1720, the director of fortifications, the 
Marquis d’Asfeld, instructed the newly appointed examiner, François Chevallier, to ensure that 
all recruits knew how to draw plans of fortifications and maps of territories. Additionally, the 
candidates had to demonstrate knowledge of architectural drafting, arithmetic, geometry, 
leveling and mechanics.114 In 1748, after the king established a school for engineers at Mézières, 
this educational institution became a compulsory step for a career in military engineering.115 
On April 8, 1756, D’Argenson issued an instruction for this school that reiterated the 
importance of teaching future young engineers how to use a graphometer, a plane table, and the 
compass.116 Moreover, as part of their training, students learned how to survey areas around 
Mézières.117 As a result of this extensive apprenticeship, by mid-eighteenth century, French 
military engineers were renowned all over Europe for their surveying and mapping abilities; 
furthermore, the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) contributed to the spread of their fame. During 
this first global conflict, both Austria and Prussia tried to hire officers with engineering 
knowledge from France. For example, Jean-Baptiste Vaquette de Gribeauval, famous for having 
reformed the French artillery system in the 1760s, fought on the Habsburg side; meanwhile, 
Lefebvre, colleagues with Gribeauval during their school days, joined the Prussian troops.118 
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Combatants on both sides of the Seven Years’ War acknowledged the quality training of French 
engineers in the art of fortifications and surveying, and tried to emulate this model.  
During the first half of the eighteenth century, a distinction developed in France between 
the corps of military engineers responsible primarily for fortification, and the corps of the 
ingénieurs géographes, who developed as the main group producing maps for the army.119 These 
ingénieurs géographes devoted most of their energies during peacetime working on large 
topographic surveys and participating in border demarcation operations.120 It seems the members 
of the corps of the ingénieurs géographes were trained more in the field than in schools. In the 
late 1740s, during the early phases of the work on the Cassini Map of France, Cassini did not 
have access to enough trained engineers in the art of mapmaking. Therefore, he selected 
personnel from the corps of ingénieurs géographes and developed their surveying skills on the 
job in an area between Paris and Versailles.121  
Since 1716, in addition to military engineers, the French kingdom also relied on the so-
called corps of the Ponts et Chaussées (Bridges and Highways), experts in constructing and 
maintaining the road network. Similar to the military engineers, this corps was centralized and 
regularized in the decades after its formation. The 1747 creation of the preparatory school for the 
members of this corps preceded by one year the creation of the school at Mézières. As road 
building and mapmaking were naturally entwined, the graduates of the School of Ponts et 
Chaussées became valuable cartographers in the service of the French state. Initially, the task of 
the Ponts et Chaussées employees was to evaluate maps made by engineers, and monitor the 
road and bridge construction projects. By the 1750s, students attending the School of Ponts et 
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Chaussées devoted their time to the study of architectural, mechanical and mathematical 
subjects, and training in cartography was considered an essential skill for making maps in the 
field. Furthermore, for their final exam, students had to design a detailed map of an imagined 
territory, a task that illustrated the importance of cartography in developing spatial thinking.122 
These civil engineers of the Ponts et Chaussées produced numerous maps in connection to 
infrastructure projects.123  
The rich tradition of French engineering could not fail to inspire other great powers of 
Europe, such as Spain and the Habsburg Monarchy.124 The year 1756 marked the “diplomatic 
revolution” of Europe, as the Habsburg foreign minister, chancellor Kaunitz, managed to sign an 
alliance with the French monarchy. This political rapprochement also gave Vienna more access 
to French officers trained in the engineering sciences. In 1747, only three years after the first 
official directive issued for the French corps of engineers, Maria Theresa ordered the formation 
of an imperial Genie Corps (corps of engineers) under the command of the governor of the 
Austrian Netherlands, Charles of Lorraine (who served in this honorific function until 1780), and 
a Pro-Director (deputy director) who carried out the actual responsibilities.125  
The 1747 order, followed on July 20, 1748 by an official regulation for the corps of 
engineers, was not the first attempt to clarify the role of these army experts; the Habsburg army 
had also used engineers as part of their ranks a century before. For example, on December 4, 
1673, the president of the Aulic War Council, Raimund Montecuccoli, issued a set of 
instructions for all the engineers in the imperial service and subordinated them to the Aulic War 
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Council. As part of their work on the maintenance and defense of fortifications, it was necessary 
that these experts prepared drawings and architectural plans. During wartime operations, the 
military engineers deployed with the imperial troops drew maps showing the encampment of 
troops, marching routes, and especially the territory of newly acquired lands. These maps, 
incorporated all the settlements, rivers, streams, mills, forests, mountains, swamps, lakes and 
other significant geographical features. The engineers sent one copy of each map to the Aulic 
War Council and a second copy to the commanding general. The drawings could not be shared 
with anyone else.126  
The existence of prior official instructions for military engineers, such as the 
Montecuccoli document, does not diminish the importance of the 1747 imperial order and 1748 
regulation. Maria Theresa’s decision marked the transition of the corps of engineers to 
institutional permanence.127 By centralizing this valuable human resource under a common 
leadership, the Aulic War Council could better plan the allocation of military engineers to 
fortifications all over the empire.128 Initially, the corps of engineers was divided into four 
brigades: German, Hungarian, Italian and belonging to the Low Countries (Netherländisch).129 
The table below includes information on the geographic areas for which these four brigades were 
responsible.  
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Table 2.1 The Division of the Corps of Engineers into Brigades 
Brigade In charge of fortifications in 
German  The German hereditary lands: Lower, 
Upper, Further and Inner Austria, 
Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia  
Hungarian  Hungary, Slavonia, Croatia, Banat of 
Temesvár, Transylvania  
Italian The Italian lands (Lombardy, Tuscany) 
Low Countries The Austrian Netherlands 
 
 
Each brigade included twenty-three engineers of various ranks: one colonel, one 
lieutenant-colonel, two majors, four captains, five first lieutenants, five second lieutenants and 
five interns. The commander of the engineer corps transferred engineers from one brigade to 
another, recommended officers for advancement, and prepared yearly projects regarding the 
repair and construction of fortifications. All second lieutenants and interns carried with them 
mathematical instruments, a compass, colors and paintbrushes. The officers with higher rank, 
who supervised the work of these lower engineers, had in their possession at least an astrolabe 
and a plane table. Clearly, the officers carrying these instruments crucial in the art of surveying 
and land representation possessed mapmaking skills.  
  In 1753 the total number of engineers, including the four brigades and the General 
Administration increased from 98 to 113. By the early 1760s the Italian, German and Hungarian 
brigades were combined into a single brigade and by 1770 the Belgian brigade was also unified 
with the imperial corps.130 On paper it looked like the engineering corps quickly became a 
centralized institution whose members came from the various provinces of the Monarchy and 
could be deployed anywhere in the Habsburg lands. In this sense, the creation of the corps of 
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engineers seems to confirm Richard Evans’s claim that the army played an important 
centralizing role in the formation of the Habsburg national-territorial state.  
However, military officers’ complaints and reports from the second half of the eighteenth 
century reveal another story. For example, throughout the 1750s and 1760s, there were not 
enough military engineers in Lombardy to help with the maintenance of the fortifications. In 
1754, the Plenipotentiary Minister of this province, Beltrame Cristiani, complained that the 
imperial military authorities had relocated many engineers officially assigned to the Italian 
brigade to other provinces. These engineers only cashed their stipends from the Italian Treasury 
but did not contribute to the defense of Lombardy.131 Moreover, a 1762 report from the 
lieutenant colonel Domenico de Blasco to the Plenipotentiary Minister of Lombardy revealed 
that only four engineers were actually present in the province during that year.132 Clearly, the 
reality on the ground often differed greatly from the paper regulation of the corps of engineers.  
Even more striking than the lack of enough engineers to satisfy the needs of the 
Monarchy, was Maria Theresa’s attempt to reduce the number of foreigners in her engineering 
corps. Knowing that during the Seven Years’ War non-Habsburg officers enrolled under Maria 
Theresa’s banners, it might be tempting to think that this ruler was open to hiring experts from 
anywhere at any time. However, as engineering schools started producing graduates from within 
the subjects of the Monarchy, the desire to hire foreigners decreased. In June 1764, Kaunitz 
urged Maria Theresa to obtain foreign engineers either from Alsace or France, in order to 
contribute to the construction of new fortresses. Initially the empress tried to move engineers 
from the Austrian Netherlands’ brigade to other parts of Monarchy. However, all these engineers 
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were involved in building channels, roads and dams within this province. Despite Kaunitz’s 
suggestion, Maria Theresa decided they should wait for another year, and at that time they could 
use the Austrian Netherlands engineers, “without needing to hire foreigners.” 133 This instance 
demonstrates that the number of engineers was often insufficient for the needs of the Monarchy. 
Moreover, it shows Maria Theresa’s commitment to recruit engineers from within her own 
domains. Despite a small increase in the engineers’ contingent by 1771, this army unit only 
comprised 150 engineer officers during peacetime and 170 during wartime.134 
 The creation and development of the corps of military engineers marks the decision of the 
Habsburg decision-makers to train and support a special army segment devoted to fortification 
works. Additionally, as part of their work, the engineers drew maps and plans to improve the 
system of fortifications, to organize military campaigns and to negotiate border demarcations, 
such as the ones between France and the Austrian Netherlands in the 1760s and 1770s. At the 
occasion of their formal institutional establishment, the engineers dedicated an overall map of the 
Habsburg lands to Maria Theresa.135 The map includes four territorial divisions corresponding to 
the imperial brigades of engineers.136 This symbolic gift expressed not only the cartographic 
function of military engineers, but also their role in bringing the imperial lands together through 
the maps they prepared. Indeed, the General Map of all Imperial and Royal Hereditary Lands of 
1747 was the first map of all the Habsburg lands prepared by an imperial body.137 The map can 
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also be interpreted as a graphical expression of the Pragmatic Sanction from 1713, a document 
that legitimized Maria Theresa’s claim to power.138 
Despite their important role as mapmakers, the military engineers did not monopolize the 
state’s cartographic production. In addition to the regular corps of engineers, the Habsburg 
military authorities relied on another institution for the production of large maps: the general 
quartermaster’s staff.139 During the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), this wartime military body 
planned the logistics of campaigns, and thus relied heavily on maps and plans.140 Due to its 
immense utility for the defense of the Monarchy, by the end of the Seven Years’ War, the 
general quartermaster’s staff had become the military mapping institution of the Monarchy.141 
The ability to organize the logistics of the army during warfare was applied to planning on how 
to allocate financial and human resources in order to map the vast lands of the Habsburg 
monarchs. Much like the corps of engineers, the general quartermaster’s staff was subordinated 
to the Aulic War Council.142 The general quartermaster’s staff employed elite mapmakers and 
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promising cadets who had recently graduated from the Academy of Engineering in Vienna.143 
Michael Hochedlinger suggests that the transformation of the general quartermaster’s staff into 
the imperial mapping institution allowed the members of the corps of engineers to focus on 
rebuilding and constructing fortresses.144 This observation is consistent with an evolution that 
emerged at the same time in France: the separation of the functions of the military corps of 
engineers from the ingénieurs géographes. 
The transformation of the general quartermaster’s staff into the mapmaking engine of the 
Monarchy was probably a deliberate reform, as some statistical numbers reveal. In 1757, only a 
small group of staff officers knew how to map territories, but by 1766 more than half of the 
senior officers and 40% of the subalterns had this training. By 1786, 100% of the staff officers 
had the ability to contribute to mapmaking operations.145 This shift was also influenced by Franz 
Moritz Lacy, the first Quartermaster General of the Habsburg Monarchy during the Seven Years’ 
War and consequently in charge of preparing the military operation plans.146 No one knew better 
than Lacy the disadvantage Habsburg troops suffered in the field because of the lack of maps. In 
her detailed biography of Lacy, Edith Kotasek demonstrated this officer’s interest in cartography 
as a government tool, especially after his appointment in 1766 as the Aulic War Council 
President.147  
                                                          
143 For example, in 1766, Karl Fischer was a student at the Engineering Academy in Vienna, and in 1768 was 
assigned to help with the Great Military Map of Transylvania. Friedrich Gatti, Geschichte der K.u K. Ingenieur- und 
K.u K. Genie-Akademie, 1717-1869 (Vienna: W. Braumüller, 1901), 233; Sibiu, National Archives (hereafter AN), 
Comandamentul general al armatei austriece din Transilvania 1703-1865 (hereafter CC), Document 1 (1769), May 
10, 1769. 
144 Hochedlinger, Austria’s Wars of Emergence, 307. 
145 Lund, War for the Every Day, 152-153. 
146 Hochedlinger, Austria’s Wars of Emergence, 307. Edith Kotasek, Feldmarschall Graf Lacy: ein Leben für 
Österreichs Heer (Horn, Austria: F.Berger, 1956), 24-27. The military historian Christopher Duffy considers the 
Habsburg general quartermaster’s staff the first of the modern staffs, due to Lacy’s ability to ensure skilled officers 
to help every general in the army. Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, 180. 
147 For example, in the early 1780s Lacy sent officers undercover into Ottoman territories to gather information 
about those territories and their inhabitants. Kotasek, Feldmarschall Graf Lacy, 169-170. 
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Clearly, the large mapmaking projects financed by the Habsburg Monarchy after 1763 
imposed the ability to survey and represent the land as a criterion for selecting members of the 
general quartermaster’s staff. After the Seven Years’ War, the general quartermaster’s staff 
possessed capable personnel to direct the first detailed topographic survey of most of the 
Habsburg lands and to coordinate cadastral surveys. A 1776 document detailing the skills an 
officer candidate should develop during his instruction included the ability “to map three or four 
miles of route a day, prepare a plan of a place, or of a camp, [and] reconnoiter.”148 Although the 
general quartermaster’s staff fulfilled a lot of cartographic operations within the Monarchy, the 
corps of engineers also continued working on imperial mapmaking projects, such as the 
operation for the border demarcation in the Austrian Netherlands reveal. Moreover, due to the 
lack of sufficient personnel within the ranks of the general quartermaster’s staff, the engineering 
corps continued to fulfill the role of mapmakers.149  
The surveying work of the general quartermaster’s staff on the Great Military Map 
started in the border provinces and moved inwards.150 Between 1763 and 1787, the Habsburg 
officers surveyed more than 220,000 square miles (approximately 570,000 square kilometers), an 
estimate that does not include the territory of the Austrian Netherlands. The Habsburg dominions 
in Italy and Tirol were not surveyed as part of the Great Military Map project.151 Chapter 3 
discusses in detail the Transylvanian section of this cartographic enterprise.  
                                                          
148 Cited in Lund, War for the Every Day, 153.  
149 In December 1768, out of the total of 94 engineers belonging to the Hungarian, German and Italian brigade, eight 
participated to the topographic surveys unfolding within the Monarchy. KA Hofkriegsrat (hereafter HKR), 1769 56 
25. In December 1769 the number had been reduced to three. KA GHA, 1769 17 65. 
150 This map is officially known in the literature as the Josephinische Aufnahme. The expression Theresianisch-
Josephinischen Landesaufnahme is used in Johannes Dörflinger, “Landesaufnahme und Militärkarten,” in Austria 
picta. Österreich auf alten Karten und Ansichten: Ausstellung der Kartensammlung der Österreichischen 
Nationalbibliothek, Prunksaal, 11. Mai bis 8. Oktober 1989: Handbuch und Katalog, eds. Franz Wawrik, and 
Elisabeth Zeilinger (Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1989), 118. 
151 A detailed discussion of this military survey is included in Paldus, Die militärischen Aufnahmen im Bereiche der 
habsburgischen Länder aus der Zeit Kaiser Josephs II. In the case of the Austrian Netherlands, instead of using the 
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The general quartermaster’s staff had to travel from province to province to survey and 
draw the vast domains of the Monarchy; the project suffered repeatedly as a result of the low 
number of officers. In order to accelerate the mapping of the empire, Maria Theresa and Joseph 
II remained open to mapmaking proposals coming from the provinces, as long as the military 
preserved the monopoly of sensitive cartographic information. The imperial desire to obtain 
accurate maps of their lands motivated in 1769 the commander of the artillery corps in the 
Austrian Netherlands, Joseph Ferraris (1726-1814), to forward to Vienna a project for a map of 
this province.152 Initially, Kaunitz and Maria Theresa refused to finance this project due to lack 
of sufficient funds, and only the personal interventions of Charles of Lorraine and Joseph II 
transformed this initiative into reality.153  
An important factor in the favor of Ferraris was his decision to utilize as mapmakers the 
artillery corps. The education infrastructure training this army division had was similar to 
imperial engineering academies. Therefore, even Kaunitz had to acknowledge that although the 
survey of the Austrian Netherlands seemed more a project for the engineering corps, using the 
artillerymen gave the ever so rare military engineers the possibility to focus on maintaining the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
scale of 1:28,800 preferred for all the other sections of these maps, the survey was done at 1:11,520 and a smaller 
version of this map (1:86,400) was engraved and sold to the public. Dörflinger, Die Österreichische Kartographie, 
vol. 1, 64.  
152 When he was nine years old, Ferraris became the page of the Habsburg empress Amalia. During his stay in 
Vienna Ferraris studied with the Court Mathematician and Director of the Engineering Academy, Marinoni. After 
enrolling in the army, when he was 15 years old, Ferraris took part in the War of the Austrian Succession and the 
Seven Years’ War. After his participation in these conflicts, Ferraris spent the next decades in Brussels under the 
protection of Charles of Lorraine. In 1767, Ferraris became general director of the Artillery Corps of the Austrian 
Netherlands and organized the engineering school of the Artillery Corps at Malines. Ernst Bernleithner, 
“Oesterreichs Kartographie zur Zeit des Grafen Ferraris,” in La Cartographie au XVIII siecle et l'oeuvre du Comte 
de Ferraris (1726-1814): Colloque International Spa 8-11 Sept 1976 (Brussels: Credit Communal de Belgique, 
1978), 134; Marinette Bruwier, “Le comte de Ferraris et son oeuvre,” in Ibid., 21; Claire Lemoine-Isabeau, Les 
militaires et la cartographie des Pays-Bas méridionaux et de la Principauté de Liège à la fin du XVIIe et au XVIIIe 
siècle (Brussels: Musée Royal de l’Armée, 1984), 33, 62. 
153 The project of Ferraris was greatly inspired by Colonel de Bon the French ambassador in the Austrian 
Netherlands from the late 1760s. De Bon had served in the Habsburg army during the Seven Years’ War and 
envisioned the map of the Austrian Netherlands as a continuation of the Cassini project. Lemoine-Isabeau, Les 
militaires et la cartographie des Pays-Bas méridionaux et de la Principauté de Liège, 62-63. 
 
 
58 
fortifications and implementing the 1769 Border Treaty signed with France.154 The Ferraris 
survey of the Austrian Netherlands produced detailed maps and geographic descriptions very 
similar to the Great Military surveys. This example demonstrates that the general quartermaster’s 
staff and the imperial corps of engineers did not control the monopoly of imperial cartographic 
enterprises. Even by the late 1770s, the Aulic War Council had not relegated mapmaking to only 
one institution, and officers with cartographic skills entered the Habsburg service in various 
army divisions. The incomplete centralization of military mapmaking was also a reflection of the 
structure of education institutions for engineers. Located in only some imperial centers, 
engineering schools trained both military officers and civilians. Moreover, as the next section 
reveals, the imperial authorities had to adapt their policies to the existence or lack of a pre-
eighteenth century provincial tradition of engineering. 
2.2 EDUCATING MAPMAKERS IN VIENNA, BRUSSELS AND MILAN 
In his study on the “generation of 1683” of Habsburg generals, Erik Lund showed how most of 
these officers did not receive formal education in military academies during the seventeenth 
century. Despite not taking courses at such institutions, a significant number of officers 
belonging to Lund’s case study had technical knowledge as artillerymen, engineers, or staff 
officers with mapmaking responsibilities.155 Therefore, the existence of able engineers precluded 
the creation of a formal learning institution. Lund’s conclusions can be expanded to the next 
generations, as in the first half of the eighteenth century, most Habsburg military mapmakers 
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1771, Kaunitz to Maria Theresa. 
155 Lund, “The Generation of 1683,” 209-210. 
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developed their mapmaking skills under the supervision of a mentor and not inside the walls of 
an Engineering Academy. Moreover, after 1718, the integration of new provinces in Italy and the 
Austrian Netherlands offered the Habsburgs access to a significant group of already trained 
military engineers.156 However, this strategy was bound to have a short lifespan and the 
Habsburgs had to invest in building a new group of military engineers. As the central authorities 
in Vienna understood the importance of trained engineers on the battlefield, they promoted the 
creation of Technical Schools in order to increase the number of specialists.157  
Italian military engineers traditionally played an important role in fortress building and 
mapmaking in the Habsburg lands and this trend left its imprint on the development of the first 
Engineering Academy in Vienna.158 Leander Anguissola from Piacenza, who had distinguished 
himself soon after he entered the Habsburg service in 1680 as an outstanding drawer of military 
situation maps (Situationszeichner), petitioned prince Eugen of Savoy in 1710 and 1711 to open 
up a school for engineers and war architects.159 Anguissola’s appeal was consistent with Prince 
Eugen’s desires, as this skilled military commander had been confronted on the battlefields of 
the Netherlands with a serious lack of able engineers. Therefore, in 1710, Prince Eugen wrote a 
plea to Emperor Charles VI, urging the monarch to build a school for engineers and to organize 
military engineers into a special army corps; in his words: “there is not one among our engineers 
who can construct a proper fortress or even maintain our existing works.”160  
                                                          
156 Schröder, Beiträge zur Geschichte des k.k. österr Génie-Corps, 54. 
157 For a very detailed study of the history of the imperial engineering schools and academies in Vienna see Gatti, 
Geschichte der K.u K. Ingenieur- und K.u K. Genie-Akademie. In France formal engineering schools were also 
established in the first half of the eighteenth century: the school for artillerymen (1720), the school of Ponts et 
Chaussées (1747) and the school for the Corps du Génie (1748). Alder, Engineering the Revolution, 57. 
158 Lund, “The Generation of 1683,” 210. 
159 Bernleithner, “Oesterreichs Kartographie zur Zeit des Grafen Ferraris,” 133.  
160 Franz Rieger, “Prinz Eugen und das Fürstenthum Siebenbürgen. Vortrag, gehalten im militär-wissenschaftlichen 
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Finally, on December 24, 1717, Charles VI ordered the founding of the Imperial 
Academy of Engineering in Vienna (Wiener K.K.Ingenieurakademie).161 The directors of this 
Academy, until its relocation in 1755, were two Italians with strong mapmaking expertise: 
Anguissola (1718-1720) and Gian Giacomo Marinoni (1720-1755).162 Charles VI’s order for the 
creation of this new Engineering Academy, strongly influenced by Anguissola’s proposals, 
prefigured a curriculum structured around arithmetic, theoretical and practical geometry, statics 
and mechanics.  
Despite their strong influence over the organization of the Academy, the work of the 
Italian professors did not go unsupervised. The Aulic War Council kept a close eye on the 
Engineering Academy and one of the Habsburg generals deployed in Vienna acted as the 
superintendent of this educational institution.163 As many of the graduates of the Engineering 
Academy joined the ranks of the military engineers, the Aulic War Council wanted to ensure 
their training fulfilled the needs of the imperial army. Whereas Marinoni privileged a focus on 
theoretical mathematical sciences, the Habsburg military commanders preferred recruits with a 
strong practical knowledge of engineering sciences. Therefore, on January 7, 1754, the deputy 
director of the recently formed army corps of engineers, de Bohn, sent an official complaint to 
the Aulic War Council about the poor preparation of the new recruits. Bohn mentioned that 
although the graduates of the Engineering Academy had some knowledge of geometry and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
proceedings of the Third Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy, 8-9 May 1969, eds. Monte 
D. Wright, Lawrence J. Paszek (Washington, DC: U.S.G.P.O.,1971), 77. 
161 For a discussion of some other institutions initiated by individuals or local estates, in which students could get 
some training in the engineering sciences before the opening of the Engineering Academy in Vienna, see Gatti, 
Geschichte der K.u K. Ingenieur- und K.u K. Genie-Akademie, 5-55. 
162 Bernleithner, “Oesterreichs Kartographie zur Zeit des Grafen Ferraris,” 133. 
163 Gatti, Geschichte der K.u K. Ingenieur- und K.u K. Genie-Akademie, 57. During the first years of this Academy, 
Marinoni and Anguissola taught sixteen classes per week on arithmetic, geometry, mechanics and military 
architecture. Schröder, Beiträge zur Geschichte des k.k. österr Génie-Corps, 54.  
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surveying, they had no proper understanding of other engineering sciences, such as mechanics, 
hydrostatics or hydraulics.  
In their answer to de Bohn’s complaint, the directors of the Academy, Marinoni and 
Millius, admitted that the sciences of mechanics, hydrostatics and hydraulics were very recent 
additions to their curriculum, as a result of a direct order from the Aulic War Council. 
Marinoni’s and Millius’s in-depth discussion of the 1754 curriculum of the Academy, reveals the 
extensive training students received in the art of mapmaking. During their three years of studies, 
students learned mathematical notions for surveying and also received practical training on how 
to perform measurements with the help of instruments such as the plane table. Military 
architecture also occupied a large segment of the program of study; students learned how to 
prepare plans and profiles of buildings and studied fortifications designed by Vauban, Pagan and 
Blondel.164 The strong bias of the curriculum towards training students on how to survey and 
represent the territory reveals the existence of a group of skilled mapmakers. And although de 
Bohn disagreed with the structure of the curriculum, Marinoni developed it based on his 
understanding of the Habsburg imperial priorities and his prior experience as the coordinator of 
the survey of the State of Milan in the 1720s.165  
Shortly after Marinoni’s death in 1755, Maria Theresa closed down the first imperial 
Engineering Academy and reopened it in Gumpendorf, a suburb of Vienna, as a continuator of 
                                                          
164 Gatti, Geschichte der K.u K. Ingenieur- und K.u K. Genie-Akademie, 82-85. 
165 Marinoni’s background helps explain the strong focus of the Engineering Academy on preparing experts in the 
art of surveying. The court mathematician, Marinoni, had introduced in the Habsburg lands an improved version of 
the pretorian table, also known as the plane table, a surveying instrument that allowed its operator to draw the 
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the Chaos'sche Stiftung’s (Chaos Foundation) engineering school.166 The authorities in Vienna 
used the promise of an army career as a motivating factor for people coming from more modest 
backgrounds. Moreover, as there were not sufficient engineers within the borders of the 
Monarchy, poor students were offered free training. For example, on February 29, 1756, the 
Chancellor of Transylvania sent six poor youngsters from this province to Vienna, so that they 
could pursue a military career. Maria Theresa decided that four of these youths should take 
classes at the engineering school in Gumpendorf.167  
Whereas the earlier Engineering Academy had been under the direct control of the Aulic 
War Council, the new school in Gumpendorf fell for a brief time under the authority of the 
Directory of Administration and Finance (Directorium in Publicis et Cameralibus), a sort of 
ministry of interior of the Monarchy.168 This “divorce” between the engineering school and the 
military authorities was short-lived. In 1760, Ferdinand Philipp Count Harsch took over the 
position of deputy director of the corps of engineers and the same year, Maria Theresa moved the 
engineering school under the direction of this army unit. Harsch became the Ober-Director of 
the school and major Hirschenhan received the position of School Director. For the following 
decades, the military authorities considered the Gumpendorf engineering school as one of the 
best recruiting places for future military engineers. In 1760, seven graduates of this school 
became cadets in the imperial engineering corps.169 Indeed, experience showed that the 
individuals recruited from the engineering school in Gumpendorf became, with time, the best 
                                                          
166 The new institution opened its gates on May 1, 1755. Gatti, Geschichte der K.u K. Ingenieur- und K.u K. Genie-
Akademie, 88, 110. The “Chaos Foundation” provided education for talented noble orphans, and since 1715 included 
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officers of the corps of engineers.170 The Gumpendorf curricula showed similarities with the 
earlier Academy of Engineering. In 1760 students took classes in foreign languages (French and 
Latin), history, geography, drawing, mathematics with a strong focus on geometry and 
trigonometry, civil and military architecture, military exercises, fencing and dancing.171 Based 
on this schedule, military mapmakers could have developed good cartographic skills during the 
school years.   
A report Harsch prepared in the late 1760s illustrates the role of the engineering school in 
relationship to the imperial engineering brigades. From 1755 until 1767, out of more than 600 
students who passed through the Gumpendorf school, 79 joined the corps of engineers. Harsch 
believed that the engineering corps should only be composed of the Monarchy’s own subjects, 
and not rely on foreigners, as such people could change their allegiance anytime. Therefore, in 
Harsch’s opinion, the Gumpendorf School was the only way to create a trustworthy engineering 
corps for the Monarchy, and he envisioned a recruitment rate of 10-15 graduates from the school 
every year.172 Even after the school was transferred in 1769 to Laimgrube, it remained under the 
strict control of the corps of engineers and constituted the main recruiting base for this military 
unit.173  
As shown by the creation of the imperial engineering corps, Maria Theresa and her 
advisers took the French case as a model. Indeed, the Habsburgs tried to recruit people who had 
served in the French engineering corps and learn from their experience. In 1757, an experienced 
French officer recommended that the Habsburg empress open another engineering school in 
Vienna to train the students in mathematics, mechanics and hydraulics. In this way, the graduates 
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of such an educational establishment could serve the Monarchy not only during war, but also by 
draining swamps or building channels to improve the waterways network.174  
Another example showing the importance of the French model for the Habsburg 
engineering education was the hiring of Johann d’Arnal (1729-1793) at the Engineering 
Academy in Vienna during the 1770s. Earlier in his career, D’Arnal had served under the French 
banner as a captain engineer.175 In 1773, he developed a new method for teaching the science of 
fortifications and included in his proposal for the class a list of the skills all members of the 
engineering corps should gain during their training. In d’Arnal’s opinion, the Academy in 
Vienna had to impart to students knowledge of mathematics, physics, topography, geometrical 
drawing, levelling, civil architecture, hydraulics, tactics, artillery, the art of encamping and 
underground war.176 As the various examples from the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
showed, the knowledge required of military engineers involved surveying and map drawing. The 
curriculum of the engineering school in Vienna reflected the international trend of this 
profession’s mathematization, which also impacted the development of eighteenth century 
cartography.  
Developing engineering educational institutions in Vienna was part of a larger attempt to 
centralize the training of military officers at the scale of the Monarchy.177 However, an imperial 
army could not rely on training military experts in only one center. In the case of the Habsburg 
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and War, eds. Béla Király, Gunther Rothenberg, and Peter Sugar (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 
116-121.  
 
 
65 
Monarchy, the cities of Brussels and Milan also had a strong tradition in preparing highly 
qualified engineers. The westernmost Habsburg province, the Austrian Netherlands, was the 
home of two schools where engineers could develop their mapmaking skills: the Engineering 
Academy in Brussels and the Mathematic School of the Artillery Corps in Malines.  
Inherited from the Spanish regime, the Engineering Academy in Brussels initially 
functioned under the name Military Academy for the Study of Fortifications and Mathematics 
(Académie militaire de fortification et de mathématique) and was open to all the regiments from 
the Spanish and then the Austrian Netherlands. During the same decade when the deputy director 
of the engineering corps triggered the restructuring of the Engineering Academy in Vienna, the 
director of the Belgian engineering brigade, Jacques Robert Spalart, initiated a similar reform in 
Brussels. On January 4, 1752, Spalart wrote a memoir discussing the following principles for the 
reforming of the Engineering Academy in Brussels: subordinating this school to the corps of 
engineers by ensuring that the main professor was an officer in this army’s body, and 
encouraging promising civilian students to join the imperial army.  
Governor Charles de Lorraine’s new regulation for the Engineering Academy in Brussels 
implemented Spalart’s suggestions and created a curriculum organized around three years of 
study, and encompassing mathematics, mechanics, cosmography, geography, mapmaking, 
notions of fortifications and artillery. Moreover, Lorraine named as the new director of the 
school a captain from the Belgian engineering corps, Nicolas Bernard de Hucher.178 In this way, 
just as in the case of the Engineering Academy in Vienna, the military authorities supervised 
closely the training of potential future recruits. The Academy in Brussels educated not only 
experts in fortifications, but also some of the main mapmakers of the province. The graduates of 
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this Academy contributed to the first detailed topographic map of Belgium, the Ferraris Map, and 
worked on the border demarcations of the province during the second half of the eighteenth 
century.179 However, despite their pivotal role, these engineers were not the only contributors to 
the development of Habsburg cartography in the province: the majority of military-men who 
contributed to the Ferraris map studied at the Malines school and belonged to the artillery corps. 
The school of the artillery corps, probably founded around 1763 by F.L.Cogeur, was a 
later educational institution in the Austrian Netherlands. Cogeur and most of the other professors 
teaching in Malines were graduates of the Military Academy in Brussels. In 1767, around a 
dozen students were pursuing their first year of studies in Malines, and by 1770 this school 
included sixty students. As the commander of the corps of artillery of this province, Ferraris also 
coordinated the first detailed topographic survey of the Austrian Netherlands; he used students 
from this school as mapmakers.180 This school closed down around 1777 or 1778, after the 
Ferraris Map had been finalized and the corps of artillery of the Austrian Netherlands was united 
with the main imperial artillery unit.181 Despite its short existence, the Malines School proved 
instrumental in furthering the Habsburg cartographic projects in the Austrian Netherlands.  
The existence of training institutions in the Austrian Netherlands did not stop people 
from pursuing their engineering education abroad. In December 1759, the central government of 
this province refused the request of Joseph de Villers de Strasbourg, an official from Agimont, to 
send his son to serve in a French regiment for two years in order to improve his engineering 
skills. The argument used by the Privy Council to deny this claim was that Habsburg recruits had 
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enough opportunities in the province to study mathematics, a clear reference to the educational 
institutions functioning in the region. Interestingly, the governor of the Austrian Netherlands, 
Charles of Lorraine, intervened in the favor of the Agimont official and granted his request.182 
France was only one of the destinations for students of military engineering. In 1767, Charles of 
Lorraine approved the petition of Jean Ignace d’Handel, who wished to send his 16-year old son 
to study with his maternal uncle, the chief of the engineering corps of Bavaria.183 One possible 
reason for continuing to send officers abroad to become military engineers might have been the 
desire to keep the Habsburg military in tune with foreign developments. 
 The Austrian Netherlands was not the only province with a strong pre-eighteenth century 
engineering tradition. The State of Milan, annexed in 1713, was the home of the famous Collegio 
of engineers (Collegio degli Ingegneri), a centuries-old corporation, which dominated the 
surveying and fortification operations in the area.184 The first conflict between Habsburg military 
engineers and the Milanese Collegio occurred right after the conquest of this province. In the 
first stages of the surveying operations for the cadaster of Lombardy, the local engineers opposed 
the methodology the imperial agent, Marinoni, proposed in 1719. Although Italian himself, by 
the time of the Censimento he had been living in Vienna for a significant amount of time, and 
had recently become the director of the Engineering Academy. Marinoni desired to measure the 
                                                          
182 AGR Conseil Privé (hereafter CP), Box 967 B, December 22, 1759.  
183 Ibid., letter from Charles de Lorraine, September 29, 1767. 
184 In the Italian states free professions, such as the engineers, architects and surveyors, were organized in 
institutions called Collegi, similar to the trade guilds. These urban institutions regulated the access of individuals to 
a certain profession. The Collegio of the engineers accepted only male students born in Milan whose parents had not 
practiced any mechanical arts or trades at least for two generations. Elena Brambilla, “Scientific and Professional 
Education in Lombardy, 1760-1803: Physics between Medicine and Engineering,” in Nuova Voltiana. Studies on 
Volta and his Times, eds. F. Bevilacqua, L. Fregonese, vol. 1 (Milan: Università degli Studi di Pavia-Hoepli, 2000), 
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territory of the State of Milan in a way that would offer the Habsburg Court an accurate appraisal 
of the territory and a detailed map of Lombardy.185  
The resistance of local engineers and surveyors revealed how the training offered in 
Milan contrasted with that in Vienna. The engineers sent from Vienna had a more scientific 
training and understood the advantages of using the plane table. In contrast, the traditional 
Collegio, which licensed the engineers from Milan, privileged practical over theoretical 
instruction and had very strict membership requirements. Moreover, as many of the local 
engineers were intrinsically connected to the interests of Milanese elites, Vienna could not trust 
them in the process of taxation reform.186 The experience of the cadastral work encouraged the 
government in Vienna to subordinate the engineers from the State of Milan to imperial 
authorities. This process of centralization involved the following aspects: reforming the structure 
and regulation of the Collegio of engineers, introducing educational institutions for engineers, 
and bringing to this province military engineers from other parts of the Habsburg Monarchy.  
The government in Vienna tried to subordinate fortifications and mapmaking projects 
under strict military authority. The creation of the Italian brigade of engineers in 1748 eroded the 
centuries-old monopoly the local authorities of the Duchies of Milan and Mantua had over the 
maintenance of fortifications. Before this date, non-military engineers affiliated with the 
Collegio of engineers in Milan had the responsibility of maintaining this province’s military 
structures.187 However, one of the main obstacles the Habsburg soon encountered in their efforts 
to centralize the control of fortifications and military mapmaking was the lack of sufficiently 
trained military engineers. Despite the existence of a number of institutions training and 
                                                          
185 Zaninelli, Il Nuovo Censo dello Stato di Milano, 42-46.  
186 Giovanni Liva, “Il Collegio degli ingegneri architteti e agrimensori di Milano,” in Il Collegio degli ingegneri e 
architetti di Milano: gli archivi e la storia, eds. Giorgio Bigatti and Maria Canella (Milan: F. Angeli, 2008), 17-18. 
Carlo Capra, La Lombardia Austriaca Nell’Età delle Riforme (1706-1796) (Turin: Utet Libreria, 1987), 70-71. 
187 Dattero, “Ingegneri militari Italiani, austriaci e belgi in Lombardia nel XVIII secolo,” 180-181. 
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organizing civil engineers in Lombardy, no similar framework existed at the provincial level for 
their military counterpart.188 Therefore, initially the engineers enrolled in the Habsburg army and 
deployed in Austrian Lombardy were, for the most part, not from the province. As a result, the 
Habsburg authorities repeatedly had to entrust sensitive military projects, such as the preparation 
of border maps, to non-military engineers. This necessity explains why the Viennese Court 
devoted a lot of attention to the regulation of the Milanese Collegio.  
Indeed, in the imperial order for the reform of the Collegio of engineers that Maria 
Theresa issued on May 29, 1771, she mentioned her desire to create a group of engineers whose 
work would serve both civilian and military objectives. Furthermore, the government in Vienna 
suspended the certifying of new engineers for the State of Milan until the complete reform of the 
licensing process. In addition to requesting suggestions for such a reform from the Collegio of 
Milan, the central authorities gathered reports from Count Carli, the president of Magistrato 
Camerale in charge of supervising waterways and canals, as well as Giuseppe Pecis, member of 
the council for the waters, roads and borders, and the recently hired mathematics professors of 
the Scuole Palatine (Palatine School), Paolo Frisi and Francesco Luino.189 In his detailed answer 
dated December 9, 1771, Paolo Frisi included a discussion of the licensing system for engineers, 
architects and surveyors in Tuscany, Bologna, Venice and Piedmont.190 Frisi’s report reveals that 
various Italian states, including the Habsburg province of Tuscany, developed a standard 
procedure for educating and licensing engineers. In this sense, the Habsburg government was not 
innovative, but representative of a more general trend.  
                                                          
188 Brambilla, “Scientific and Professional Education in Lombardy,” 56. 
189 State Archive of Milan (hereafter ASM), Dispacci Reali (hereafter DR), box 245, May 29, 1771. The Magistrato 
Camerale employed engineers belonging to the Collegio in Milan for the projects related to waterways and canals. 
Brambilla, “Scientific and Professional Education in Lombardy,” 55.  
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based system, or a combination of the two. The main subjects engineers and surveyors studied were mathematics, 
geometry, physics and hydraulics. 
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Based on these suggestions and the comments of the plenipotentiary minister, Firmian, in 
1775, the Viennese authorities issued a General Regulation for Engineers, Architects, Geometers 
and Surveyors from the State of Milan. The government created a standard procedure for 
obtaining the license of engineer, architect or surveyor, which involved a clear educational 
curriculum, and a series of exams and practical training under licensed professionals.191 The 
subjects of study included mathematics, physics, hydraulics and architecture, therefore a course 
list similar to the engineering institutions in Vienna and Brussels. As a result of suggestions from 
local Habsburg bureaucrats, such as Frisi, the new 1775 regulation for obtaining the license of 
engineer made mandatory a two-year course in mathematics and hydraulics, which could be 
taken at the schools in Milan, but also at other institutions. Proving a certain financial stability in 
order to join the Collegio replaced the earlier condition of having Milanese citizenship and a 
certain family background.192 Because military engineers proved insufficient to provide for 
Lombardy’s surveying and fortification building needs, the Habsburgs tried to rein in the skills 
of the Collegio engineers.  
If we examine the centralization of military mapmaking based on the creation of 
educational institutions and special military units, it seems the Habsburg imperial decision-
makers managed to concentrate the production of and maintain control of all cartographic 
material. The standardization of engineering education and the organization of engineers into 
special army units suggest the triumph of Enlightened Absolutism in controlling this branch of 
scientific production. However, some of the main supervisors and contributors to the production 
of large topographic surveys within the Habsburg Monarchy did not follow a streamlined 
educational and institutional path. Additionally, the Habsburg military engineers organized in the 
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engineering brigades and the general quartermaster’s staff controlled only part of the imperial 
cartographic production, as the case of the Milano Collegio shows. Centralizing Habsburg 
imperial mapmaking was a gradual process and only partially successful, as the careers of the 
following cartographers reveal. 
2.3 CAREER STORIES OF MILITARY ENGINEERS 
The nationalization of Habsburg science from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards 
owed a lot to the institutionalization done at imperial level by the Viennese rulers during the 
eighteenth century.193 Additionally, the obvious tensions towards the end of the nineteenth 
century between imperial programs and nationalistic politics can be traced back to the 
incomplete control from Vienna of scientific practices, such as cartography. As military maps 
became a priority for the eighteenth-century Habsburg rulers, they tried to address the lack of 
qualified personnel. As described in the preceding sections, by the 1760s, the central authorities 
in Vienna had developed an institutional framework for training and organizing military 
engineers with mapmaking responsibilities.194 However, this centralized system was far from all-
pervading, and did not exclude the role of apprenticeship at the local level or the recruitment of 
capable officers trained abroad. Indeed, some of the best military mapmakers of the eighteenth 
                                                          
193 See the studies in The Nationalization of Scientific Knowledge in the Habsburg Empire, 1848-1918, eds. Mitchell 
G. Ash, and Jan Surman (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
194 Alessandra Dattero argues that in eighteenth century Austrian Lombardy the corps of engineers developed from 
an apprenticeship-based profession into a group of experts trained in special government institutions. This historian 
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century did not attend the courses of the engineering schools in Vienna, Brussels or Milan, and 
until the 1760s they were not necessarily integrated as part of the engineering corps, artillery 
corps or the general quartermaster’s staff.195 Such unorthodox careers reveal the importance of 
putting the story of Habsburg cartography in a larger context, and acknowledging the role of 
provincial and trans-imperial influences.  
Mapping the geography of imperial biographies brings into the spotlight connections 
within and across imperial borders, which impacted the development of scientific practices, such 
as cartography.196 Although the current literature on early-modern empires addresses imperial 
development by focusing on the careers of particular individuals, more work of this nature has to 
be done for the Habsburg Monarchy.197 Therefore, this section presents details about the careers 
of military officers that did not follow the cursus honorum of Habsburg institutions. Stephan 
Lutsch von Luchsenstein served in the Habsburg army for more than fifty years and became one 
of the best mapmakers of the province of Transylvania without having studied in Vienna or 
having been part of the imperial engineering corps. Dominic and Michel Angelo de Blasco 
started their careers in Sicily right after the Habsburgs took over the island in 1720. Whereas 
Dominic died as part of the Italian Brigade of the engineering corps, Michel Angelo entered the 
Portuguese service in 1750 and spent most of the late 1760s trying unsuccessfully to again 
become a Habsburg officer. During his career, Mihály Jeney served at least three powerful states, 
France, Prussia and the Habsburg Monarchy, and was probably trained in the art of mapmaking 
                                                          
195 In the 1760s the genie and artillery corps were still young institutions and the general quartermaster’s staff 
became a permanent military institution only in 1758. Zeinar, Geschichte des österreichischen Generalstabes, 110. 
196 Introduction to Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial Careering in the Long Nineteenth Century, 
eds. David Lambert and Alan Lester (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1-2. 
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on the job. The stories of these men intersect the imperial institutions discussed in the earlier 
sections in an unpredictable manner and bring to the forefront the role of provincial and trans-
imperial influences in structuring Habsburg cartography as an imperial science.  
2.3.1 Stephan Lutsch von Luchsenstein 
Born in 1707 as the son of a Transylvanian Lutheran priest, Stephan Lutsch von Luchsenstein 
had the fortune of becoming acquainted during his early years with the experienced Habsburg 
engineer Johann Conrad Weiss. At the time, Weiss was the commander of the Carlsburg (Alba-
Iulia) fortress in Transylvania and had established himself as an important provincial figure due 
to his work on the construction of the fortress and the drawing of what was considered the first 
accurate geographical map of this province.198 Once Weiss took Luchsenstein under his wing, he 
ensured that the youngster received training both at the Hermanstadt (Sibiu) gymnasium and 
under his direct guidance.199 From Weiss, Luchsenstein learned mathematics, drawing, French 
and the art of fortifications; he also became the inheritor of Weiss’s library and instruments. The 
professional training Weiss offered to Luchsenstein mirrored the curriculum of the engineering 
schools in Vienna, Brussels and Milan. From the early stages of his career, Luchsenstein learned 
how to assist in fortification construction and maintenance, while also improving his mapmaking 
technique. All of these skills were compatible with the instructions for engineers as issued both 
before and during Maria Theresa’s time.  
                                                          
198 As a reward for his contributions, Weiss received in 1736 the rank of colonel. Being a Lutheran, Weiss attended 
the services at the church where Stephan Lutsch’s father preached. The biographical information about Weiss and 
Luchsenstein comes from the following sources: Blasek and Rieger, Beiträge zur Geschichte der K. u. K. Genie-
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identifier after Maria Theresa ennobled him in 1753 and conferred to him the title “von Luchsenstein.” Raisz, 
“Colonel Stefan Lutsch von Luchsenstein,” 122. 
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During his career, Luchsenstein met other military engineers skilled in the art of 
mapmaking, such as Jacob Zultner, who had contributed to the mapping of Austrian Wallachia 
and the Weiss map of Transylvania.200 In 1733 the Aulic War Council commissioned Weiss 
together with lieutenant Schwentner and First Lieutenant Zultner to go into a reconnaissance 
mission over the Vulcan Pass, connecting Transylvania and Austrian Wallachia. The goal of this 
inspection was to prepare a plan for the construction of a new road going through the Carpathian 
Mountains, and Stephan Lutsch compiled the journal Weiss kept as part of this mission.201 
Therefore, we can assume that Luchsenstein accompanied his mentor during this reconnaissance 
journey and worked together with some of the top Habsburg mapmakers in the area. Once the 
engineers completed their mission, they returned to Carlsburg, where Schwentner and Zultner 
offered to prepare the maps accompanying the plans for the road construction. Luchsenstein 
probably had plenty of opportunities to learn from these experienced mapmakers, especially as 
Zultner worked in Carlsburg from 1726 until his death in 1755.202  
As part of his training, Luchsenstein worked under the guidance of Weiss and Zultner, 
and learned from them the art of surveying and map drawing. For example, the War Archive in 
Vienna houses a copy of the 1735 Weiss Map of Transylvania, which Luchsenstein probably 
prepared before 1750.203 In addition to the geography of Transylvania, the Weiss Map and the 
copy made by Luchsenstein included information about part of Austrian Wallachia. As Zultner 
                                                          
200 Between 1718 and 1739, the Habsburgs occupied the western section of the Danubian Principality Wallachia. 
Friedrich Schwantz coordinated the survey of Austrian Wallachia between 1720 and 1722. See Şerban Papacostea, 
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had worked on the Schwantz map of Austrian Wallachia before coming to Carlsburg, his 
geographical knowledge probably impacted the final form of the Weiss map. 
Luchsenstein’s work, inspired by Weiss’s map and entitled New and accurate geometric 
map of Mediterranean Dacia or the modern Principality of Transylvania (Nova et accurata 
Geometrica Mappa Daciae Mediterraneae seu Moderni Principatus Transilvaniae), includes the 
location of fortresses, castles, various types of settlements, monasteries, ruins, mines, main 
roads, and the provincial administrative subdivisions. However, the density of toponyms for the 
Austrian part of Wallachia (Figure 2.1) was far greater than that for the part of Wallachia outside 
Habsburg rule (Figure 2.2). The Habsburg cartographic gaze did not stray far from the empire’s 
borders, at least for the first half of the eighteenth century. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Austrian Wallachia on Luchsenstein’s 
New and accurate geometric map of Mediterranean 
Dacia or the modern Principality of Transylvania 
 
Figure 2.2 Ottoman Wallachia on Luchsenstein’s New and 
accurate geometric map of Mediterranean Dacia or the 
modern Principality of Transylvania 
 
 
In 1734, Luchsenstein joined the Habsburg army and accumulated extensive campaign 
experience by fighting in Italy, Bavaria, Silesia, Bohemia and Moravia as part of the Regiment 
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Roth.204 With his extensive knowledge of both the art of fortifications and mapmaking, 
Luchsenstein would have been a suitable candidate for the imperial engineering corps or the 
permanent general quartermaster’s staff created after 1758. However, rather than pursuing a 
career as part of the top imperial institutions, by the late 1740s Luchsenstein had returned to 
Transylvania and served in this province until his death in 1792.205 The role of Transylvania as a 
Habsburg border province in the close vicinity of both the Ottoman and Russian empires, most 
likely impacted Luchsenstein’s career. As the wars of the first half of the eighteenth century 
taught the Habsburgs, their southeastern border was very unstable.206 Skilled local military 
engineers like Luchsenstein were instrumental in preserving the Habsburg upper hand in the 
region. Therefore, the Habsburg military authorities valued the mapmaker’s presence in the 
province. 
Luchsenstein’s biography is not exceptional, as the story of one of his mentors, Zultner, 
reveals. Zultner was also the son of a Transylvanian priest, and studied mathematics and drawing 
from an early age. He trained under the direction of the military engineer Friedrich Schwanz von 
Springfels from 1713 until 1726. Until his death in 1755, Zultner participated in various 
mapmaking campaigns: the survey of Austrian Wallachia in the early 1720s, the surveys of 
Transylvania and Austrian Wallachia under the direction of Conrad Weiss finalized in 1735 and 
1740 respectively. Moreover, Zultner also had extensive knowledge of fortifications and even 
                                                          
204 Raisz, “Colonel Stefan Lutsch von Luchsenstein,” 123. 
205 By 1760 Luchsenstein became the commander of the Transylvanian Sanitätswächtercorps (quarantine line 
troops) with the rank of Major. When the Habsburg Military Border was extended to Transylvania, Luchsenstein 
received the rank of lieutenant colonel and became the commander of the First Wallach Regiment with headquarters 
in Orlat. Under the entry for Siebenbürgen, in Lexikon zur Geschichte der Kartographie: von den Anfängen bis zum 
ersten Weltkrieg, eds. Johannes Dörflinger, Franz Wawrik, E. Tomasi, and Ingrid Kretschmer (Vienna: F. Deuticke, 
1986), 742. 
206 The 1718 Peace of Belgrade conceded to the Habsburgs the western part of Wallachia, but the 1739 Peace of 
Belgrade undid this cession.  
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served as the director of fortifications at Carlsburg (Alba-Iulia) from 1747.207 From these two 
cases of Transylvanian mapmakers, we can infer that not all capable military engineers were 
trained within the walls of engineering academies. Local promising youngsters coming from 
modest backgrounds could also rise in the ranks of the Habsburg army.  
Even in the case of Austrian Lombardy, a province with a strong tradition of training 
engineers, the lack of enough military engineers motivated proposals for implementing an 
apprenticeship-based system. On September 1, 1768, the lieutenant colonel engineer Nicolo 
Baschiera suggested recruiting young people from Lombardy who already had some knowledge 
of arithmetic, drawing and writing, and developing their engineering skills on the job.208 
Whereas in Transylvania the authorities had no option but to tolerate the existence of the 
apprenticeship-based system, in the case of Lombardy, the plenipotentiary minister declined 
Baschiera’s suggestion and, as per the Viennese government’s orders, coopted non-military 
engineers to work with the military. For example, during the late 1770s campaigns of 
mapmaking on the borders of Lombardy with the Duchy of Parma, the Habsburg authorities 
delegated as their representative the civilian engineer Cesare Quarantino, member of the Milan 
Collegio.209  
Military authorities did not have the luxury to appeal to experienced civilian engineers in 
provinces such as Transylvania, so they had to preserve the apprenticeship tradition. For their 
easternmost province, the Habsburgs assigned military officers for the border mapping 
                                                          
207 Constantin Wurzbach, Biographisches Lexikon des Kaisertums Österreich, vol. 60 (Vienna: Druck und Verlag 
der k.k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1891), 306-307. Joseph Trausch, Schriftsteller-Lexikon oder biographisch-
literärische Denk-Blätter der Siebenbürger Deutschen (Kronstadt[Braşov]: Johann Gött & Sohn Heinrich, 1871), 
543-545. 
208 Dattero, “Ingegneri militari Italiani, austriaci e belgi in Lombardia nel XVIII secolo,” 189-190, footnote 33. 
209 See numerous documents about Quarantini’s commission in Milan, ASM Confini parte antica (hereafter Confini 
p.a.), box 76.  
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commissions, and Luchsenstein was one of the mapmakers they relied on the most.210 It is 
interesting to note that both Luchsenstein’s ennoblement in 1753 and his promotion to the rank 
of colonel in 1777 happened shortly after the military officer prepared maps of Transylvania’s 
eastern borders. As addressed in later chapters, during the second half of the eighteenth century, 
the Viennese rulers invested time and resources in stabilizing their imperial borders. In the case 
of Transylvania’s eastern border, the neighboring Principality of Moldavia contested the 
Habsburg desires. With the help of Luchsenstein, who prepared a series of border maps and 
historical memoirs, the Habsburgs managed to gain the upper hand in the border negotiations.211 
Therefore, Maria Theresa repeatedly rewarded the Transylvanian mapmaker for his imperial 
service.212  
An expert in fortifications and military mapping, Luchsenstein developed another 
important skill during his time in the service of the Habsburgs: gathering historical documents 
and organizing them in an archive. On May 3, 1769, the Aulic War Council ordered the General 
Commander in Transylvania to ensure the preparation of written memoirs supporting 
Transylvanian claims in the border areas towards Moldavia and Wallachia. As he was the 
renowned expert on Transylvanian geography and border disputes, Luchsenstein travelled during 
1770 to gather documents from Transylvanian archives in Bistritza (Bistriţa), Marusvásárhely 
(Târgu Mureş), Udvarhely (Odorheiu Secuiesc), Clausenburg (Cluj-Napoca) and Carlsburg 
                                                          
210 Whereas Luchsenstein helped regularize the Transylvania/Moldavia border in the Habsburg advantage, Zultner 
participated in 1741 to the border demarcation between Transylvania and Wallachia. Trausch, Schriftsteller-Lexikon, 
543-545; Wurzbach, Biographisches Lexikon des Kaisertums Österreich, vol. 60, 306-307. 
211 Madalina Valeria Veres, “Redefining Imperial Borders: Marking the Eastern Border of the Habsburg Monarchy 
in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century,” History of Cartography, Lecture Notes in Geoinformation and 
Cartography 7, eds. Elri Liebenberg, Peter Collier, Zsolt Török (Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2014), 6-8. 
212 Raisz, “Colonel Stefan Lutsch von Luchsenstein,” 122-123. Luchsenstein’s case was not exceptional in this 
sense. The military mapmaker of Austrian Wallachia, Friedrich Schwantz, was also ennobled as a result of his 
cartographic work and received the title von Springfels. Ileana Cazan, “Spațiul românesc în hărți şi atlase germane 
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(Alba Iulia).213 Moreover, he also received a series of original documents or old authentic copies 
from the Military District of Rodna and he also organized papers from the War Chancellery.214 
In addition to his maps and memoirs, one of Luchsenstein’s most impressive achievements 
remains his organization of the collection of all documents he had gathered during his life 
regarding the disputed borders between Transylvania and the Danubian Principalities.215  
Luchsenstein’s career demonstrates how the Habsburg central authorities had to coopt 
local elites in the process of provincial integration. Not only was Luchsenstein born, raised and 
trained in Transylvania, but he also became the geographical expert of the region. However, 
towards the end of his career, Luchsenstein worked together with a new generation of military 
engineers who had served the Habsburgs in different provinces and had coordinated cartographic 
projects at the scale of the empire. After Maria Theresa ordered the beginning of the work on the 
Great Military Map of Transylvania in 1768, Luchsenstein’s name does not appear on any of the 
lists of engineers working on this project. The authorities in Vienna preferred to delegate an 
Italian engineer, and later a Transylvanian officer with international experience, as coordinators 
of the provincial survey. Dominik Camiotti de Fabris had already supervised the mapping of 
Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, and Mihály Lajos Jeney had served in the French and Prussian 
armies. 
  
                                                          
213 I am using the toponyms as they appear in Luchsenstein’s memoir. However I am also adding in brackets the 
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214 AN, series Brukenthal, 106/L 1-8, 366, 7-7 verso. 
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2.3.2 Dominic and Michel Angelo de Blasco  
Luchsenstein provided an example of an engineer born, trained and deployed in the same 
province. On the other hand, the two brothers, Dominic and Michel Angelo de Blasco, exemplify 
another path through which Habsburg authorities strived to integrate capable military engineers 
as part of their imperial army. The Habsburg occupation in the second decade of the eighteenth 
century of Sicily and Naples proved short-lived, but some of the military engineers originally 
from these regions followed their new rulers and found employment in other provinces of the 
Monarchy.216 Michel Angelo and Dominic de Blasco belonged to an old Spanish family who 
moved to Sicily during the thirteenth century. Both of them joined the Habsburg army in the 
1720s.217 Michel Angelo distinguished himself during the work on the fortifications of Messina 
as an able military engineer. Dominic contributed in the early 1720s to the preparation of a 
detailed topographic map of Sicily. After the loss of Sicily in 1735, the de Blascos gave up all 
their properties on this island, and continued their service as part of the Habsburg army.218  
The Wars of the Spanish and Polish Successions included battlefronts in Italy and thus 
brought an influx of non-Italian military engineers in the area. Likewise, by 1748 the Habsburg 
Monarchy had lost all of their Italian possessions with the exception of Lombardy and Tuscany, 
                                                          
216 In 1720 Charles VI took over Sicily in return for the cession of Sardinia to Savoy. Hochedlinger, Austria’s Wars 
of Emergence, 199. 
217 The de Blasco brothers might have been very suitable recruits for the Habsburg army also because of their family 
background. Their father, Diego Francesco was born in Messina and travelled a lot during his youth. Diego 
Francesco met his wife, Anna Kock, in Genoa. Anna was the daughter of an infantry captain originally from 
Bohemia, a Habsburg province. Biblioteca Ambrosiana (hereafter BA), Archivio Beccaria (hereafter Beccaria), B 
234, 6.  
218 ASM, Atti di Governo (hereafter AG), Araldica parte antica (hereafter Araldica p.a.), 54, Blasco. Document from 
July 29, 1735, through which the emperor offered Michel Angelo de Blasco the position of imperial captain of 
engineers. Document from January 18, 1736, increase in salary for Michel Angelo de Blasco. Document from 
September 18, 1722, with which the Aulic War Council conferred Dominic de Blasco the rank of imperial captain of 
engineers. Two other de Blasco brothers, Bartolomeo and Giovanni Giorgio, who had joined the Church were exiled 
by the Spanish Government from Messina and lost all their property because Dominic and Michel Angelo served as 
military in the Habsburg army. Ibid., May 24, 1735, document signed by Lobkowitz. 
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so the military authorities relocated engineers from the lost territories.219 After the loss of Sicily 
in 1735, Dominic and Michel Angelo de Blasco continued their careers in the lands of 
Lombardy.220 Similar to Stephan Lutsch von Luchsenstein, the de Blasco brothers possessed a 
good knowledge of the art of fortifications and mapmaking. The first commission Dominic de 
Blasco received outside his homeland was related to the redevelopment of a fortification system 
in the Tuscan Presidii ports, on the coast of the Tyrrhenian Sea.221 After spending around four 
years working on this project, especially in Porto Ercole, Dominic travelled back to Sicily around 
1727 and climbed through the army ranks to the position of captain.222 During the War of the 
Polish Succession (1733-1738) this engineer contributed to the fortification constructions in the 
eastern part of the Monarchy, in Belgrade, Peterwardein (today Petrovaradin) or Carlstad.223 
Dominic’s work impressed the supreme commander of the artillery Otto Ferdinand Count of 
Abensberg and Traun, who, on August 21, 1736, personally requested, the deployment of Major 
Dominic de Blasco under his command in Lombardy.224  
On July 11, 1744, Maria Theresa promoted Dominic de Blasco to the rank of lieutenant 
colonel as a result of his work in Sicily, and his inspection of fortresses in Hungary and the 
Italian lands. Additionally, this promotion was possible due to the recommendation of Maria 
Theresa’s brother in law, Charles of Lorraine (the director of the engineering corps) and Count 
                                                          
219 Dattero, “Ingegneri militari Italiani, austriaci e belgi in Lombardia nel XVIII secolo,” 181. 
220 In 1736 Dominic had the rank of major, and Michel Angelo the rank of captain. ASM AG, Araldica p.a., 54, 
Blasco, documents from August 21 and August 31, 1736.  
221 On September 19, 1722, Dominic de Blasco was ordered to travel to Naples, where he would receive further 
instructions regarding his mission on the coast of Tuscany. However, after his arrival in Naples, Dominic waited for 
more than three months to receive any further orders and had to compete for the leadership of this mission with a 
captain from the regiment Seckendorf. Ibid., order from September 19, 1722; Vienna, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv 
(hereafter HHStA), Große Korrespondenz, box 76a, February 5, 1723. 
222 ASM AG, Araldica p.a., Blasco, May 2, 1727, letter from the commander of Porto Ercole, and a lettter from 
February 24, 1731.  
223 On March 14, 1735, Dominic de Blasco received the order to travel to Peterwardein, but there are no identified 
documents regarding his activity there. Ibid., order from March 14, 1735 to Domenic de Blasco. 
224 Ibid., August 21, 1736 
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Traun, who described Dominic de Blasco as an expert in military architecture.225 Although 
Dominic received his accolades in the early 1720s for his work as a surveyor and mapmaker, 
later in life he specialized in fortification works.226 This career path shows that during their 
youth, many military engineers had solid knowledge in both the fields of mapmaking and 
fortifications, but ended up specializing in one of these branches. As the engineering corps of the 
Monarchy took over the responsibility of maintaining the fortifications, it is not surprising that 
Dominic de Blasco became a key figure in the Italian engineering brigade after its creation in 
1748.227 He died in the service of the Habsburgs in 1768. 
Whereas after he entered the Habsburg service Dominic de Blasco was loyal to Vienna 
throughout his life, his brother, Michel Angelo, pursued an international career. Younger than 
Dominic, this engineer remained one step behind his brother in military rank until the late 1740s. 
Originally acclaimed by his supervisors due to his experience regarding fortifications, Michel 
Angelo soon emerged as one of the leading military mapmakers of the Italian Peninsula. During 
the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) he served in northern Italy and drew very 
detailed battle maps, which show the opposing sides’ camps and organization, while also 
representing the geographical characteristics of the territory in which the battles took place. His 
most famous cartographic contribution from those days, proven by the multiple copies in which 
it survives, was the Geometrical Map of the Mountains, Valleys, Waters and neighboring 
                                                          
225 Ibid., July 11, 1744. 
226 Based on the original survey of Sicily Dominic de Blasco prepared two smaller copies: one for the emperor 
Charles VI and one for the Aulic War Council. Vladimiro Valerio, Societa, uomini e istituzioni cartografiche nel 
Mezzogiorno d’Italia (Florence: Istituto Geografico Militare, 1993), 317. 
227 Although he did inspection of various fortresses in Lombardy, Dominic’s work was connected especially with the 
fortress of Pizzighettone. ASM AG, Militare p.a., 16, Maria Theresa’s imperial order to the general Harrach on 
September 4, 1748 and Dominic de Blasco report from March 18, 1767.  
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Regions of the City of Genoa (Mappa Geometrica delle Montagne, Valli, Acque, e Situazioni 
Circonvicini Alla Citta di Genova).228  
This map was the result of cooperation between de Blasco, at the time lieutenant colonel, 
and Carmine de Beaumont, the captain of the Sprecher Regiment. The map shows not only a 
static position of the entrenchments of the Austrian-Piedmontese troops and their enemies, but 
also the troops’ movements during the 1747 siege of Genoa.229 During the spring and summer of 
1747, the Austrian-Piedmontese troops sieged the city of Genoa but failed to capture it.230 The 
latest date included on the map’s legend is an attack led by General St. André on June 13, 1747, 
so it is clear that the map was completed sometime after this date. In addition to the troops’ 
movements, the map includes a representation of Genoa with all of its fortifications and gates, 
and also a detailed depiction of the surrounding landscape. Figure 2.3 shows the port of Genoa 
on a 1769 copy of de Blasco’s map. The letters from A to Z mark the different gates of the city 
and the gates of the newer surrounding wall built in 1632.231  
                                                          
228 Some copies of this map: Österreichische Nationalbibliothek (hereafter ÖNB), Kartensammlung, ALB Port 14b, 
18; Ibid., ALB kleinPort 43,1; Ibid., ALB Port 154,8 Kar; KA KPS, HIII e 952.  
229 During the spring and summer of 1747, the Austrian-Piedmontese troops sieged the city of Genoa but failed to 
capture it. The latest date included on the map’s legend is an attack led by General St. André on June 13th, 1747, so 
the map was done after this date. In addition to the troops’ movements the map includes a representation of Genoa 
with all its fortifications and gates, and also a detailed depiction of the surrounding landscape. Reed Browning, The 
War of the Austrian Succession (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 297. 
230 Ibid., 297. 
231 KA KPS, H III e 952. Copy of the 1747 Genoa map made in 1769 by Senior Lieutenant Hirsch. 
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Figure 2.3 Detail from a 1769 copy of de Blasco’s and de Beaumont’s Geometrical Map of the Mountains, Valleys, 
Waters and neighboring Regions of the City of Genoa 
 
 
Together with his maps of the battles of Camp Santo and Veletri, de Blasco’s contribution to the 
map of Genoa impressed his military commanders, who continued to foster his career after the 
end of the War of the Austrian Succession.232  
Throughout his career, Michel Angelo cultivated his network of military patrons and 
asked them for recommendations to obtain a better rank in the army. One of his strongest 
supporters in the 1730s and 1740s was Prince Lobkowicz, the commander of imperial troops in 
Italy. Michel Angelo de Blasco served under the command of prince Lobkowicz during the battle 
for Sicily against Spain (1734-1735).233 After the Habsburgs yielded the fortress of Messina in 
1735 and lost Sicily this same year to the Spanish crown, Michel Angelo followed his protector 
                                                          
232 Ibid., H III e 710 (Campo Santo); Ibid., H III e 751 (Veletri). 
233 During the 1734-1735 siege of Messina, Syracuse and Trapani, de Blasco served under the command of Prince 
Lobkowitz. The engineers Obristlieutenant Pelthier and Lieutenant Beaumont prepared Messina for the Siege, while 
Lieutenant Michel Angelo de Blasco prepared Syracuse. Raimund Gerba, Polnischer Thronfolge-Krieg: Feldzug 
1735: Nach den Feld-Acten und anderen authentischen Quellen (Vienna: Verlag des K. K. Generalstabes, 1891), 19. 
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to Italy and received the position of captain.234 Furthermore, even after his transfer to 
Transylvania, Lobkowicz continued encouraging Michel Angelo’s career. In 1737, immediately 
after the death of the Director of Engineers of Transylvania, Conrad Weiss, the protector of 
Stephen Lutsch von Luchsenstein, Lobkowicz nominated Michel Angelo de Blasco for this 
vacant position.235 There is no documentary proof to suggest why de Blasco did not accept or 
obtain this promotion. However, this example shows the important role of patronage networks in 
obtaining promotions within the imperial army ranks.  
After his participation in military campaigns in Italy during the early 1740s, as 
documented both by imperial orders and the maps de Blasco produced during this time, Michel 
Angelo hoped to receive the rank of colonel. In his effort to obtain this coveted promotion, he 
wrote to another of his patrons, commander Schulenburg-Oeynhausen, and asked him to interfere 
in his favor at the Viennese Court.236 Shortly after Schulenburg-Oeynhausen’s recommendation, 
in August 1745, Maria Theresa conferred on de Blasco the rank of lieutenant colonel and thus 
partially satisfied de Blasco’s ambition.237 After the creation of the Italian brigade in 1748, just 
as his brother, Michel Angelo also became part of this unit.238 However, none of these 
promotions seemed to satisfy the younger de Blasco’s desire for a better position and he soon 
looked for employment across imperial borders.  
The dynastic alliance between the Austrian and Portuguese crown helps explain how de 
Blasco, an experienced Habsburg military engineer, could be discharged from Vienna’s service 
                                                          
234 Michel Angelo de Blasco received the rank of Engineer Captain at the recommendation of Prince Lobkowitz and 
because of his service during the siege of Messina. ASM AG, Araldica p. a., Blasco, Order from June 29, 1735.  
235 Ibid., letter from Lobkowicz to Michel Angelo de Blasco, December 24, 1737.  
236 Ibid., letter signed by Schulenburg-Oeynhausen, from May 29, probably 1745.  
237 Ibid., order from August 18. 1745.  
238 ASM AG, Militare p.a., 16, Maria Theresa’s imperial order to the general Harrach , September 4, 1748. 
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and moved under the Portuguese banner.239 Whereas the dynastic alliance framework eased the 
transfer of the engineer, the decision seems to have also been influenced by the Portuguese 
émigré, the Duke Silva-Tarouca, president of the council of the Netherlands and Italy in 
Vienna,240 and de Bohn, the deputy director of the corps of engineers.241 The Portuguese king 
named de Blasco the leader of the Portuguese border demarcation commission, sent to Brazil to 
implement the Treaty of Madrid signed with Spain in 1750.242 
Despite the extensive amount of time de Blasco worked for the Portuguese crown and his 
important advisory role during the reconstruction of Lisbon after the 1755 earthquake, due to 
Lisbon’s decision-makers’ desire to keep all sensitive cartographic material secret, de Blasco 
was perceived as a foreigner and a potential threat.243 Clearly, de Blasco’s earlier allegiance to 
the Habsburg monarchs in Vienna blocked the development of his career in Lisbon. Therefore, it 
should not be surprising that in the mid-1760s, de Blasco contacted the court in Vienna and 
expressed his desire to return under the command of Maria Theresa. De Blasco’s request 
                                                          
239 Joao V of Portugal married Maria Anna of Austria, daughter of emperor Leopold I, and aunt of Empress Maria 
Theresa. Jonathan Dewald, Europe 1450 to 1789: encyclopedia of the early modern world (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 2004), 26. 
240 Kenneth Maxwell, Pombal. Paradox of the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 8. 
241 HHStA Staatskanzlei (hereafter StK), Noten vom Hofkriegsrat (hereafter Noten vom HKR), box 78, fascicle 2, 
84. 
242 By signing the Treaty of Madrid, the kings of Portugal and Spain redrew the border line between their 
possessions in Brazil. Portugal gave up its outpost Colônia do Sacramento on the Río de la Plata, while Spain 
handed over the lands demarcated by the Uruguay and Ibicui rivers. However, these lands between the rivers were 
occupied by seven Jesuit missions and sheltered around 30,000 Amerindian converts. The Jesuits and the Guaraní 
Indians refused to relinquish their use of this territory and to relocate, thus starting open warfare against the joint 
Portuguese and Spanish troops. The conflict lasted until 1756 and complicated the work of the special border 
commissions sent from Europe to mark the Treaty of Madrid border. Mark A. Burkholder and Lyman L. Johnson, 
Colonial Latin America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 281-301; Maxwell, Pombal, 52-55. 
243 In July 1750, Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, known as the Marquis of Pombal, became the secretary of state 
for foreign affairs and dominated the Portuguese political life until 1777. He regarded foreign engineers with 
suspicion and introduced a lot of restrictions against them. Foreign engineers could not preserve copies of any maps 
or geographical descriptions of the interior of Brazil, not even maps of their own creation. De Blasco’s return to 
Lisbon in 1758 led to the confiscation of his prospects, maps, annotations, and measurements, because, as directed 
by Pombal, the foreigners could not keep any other documentation in their possession except the information 
preserved in their memory. Maxwell, Pombal, 51; Burkholder and Johnson, Colonial Latin America, 291-292. Luiz 
Carlos Tau Golin, A Guerra Guaranítica: como os exércitos de Portugal e Espanha destruíram os Sete Povos dos 
jesuítas e índios guaranis no Rio Grande do Sul (Porto Alegre: Editora da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do 
Sul, 1998), 220, footnote 255; 362, footnote 515. 
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initiated more than five years of correspondence between chancellor Kaunitz and other State 
Chancellery representatives, Maria Theresa, the Aulic War Council in Vienna, and de Blasco 
himself, in order to decide on the feasibility of the cartographer’s return to Vienna.  
To convince the Habsburg authorities of his value as a mapmaker, de Blasco defied the 
Portuguese censorship. In 1769, the mapmaker sent two of his works to Vienna: a detailed map 
of the Italian Peninsula entitled Geographical, Geometrical, Nautical, Military and Historical 
Map of Italy (Italia Geografica Geometrica Nautica Militare ed Istorica) and the drawing 
Prospect of the Big Waterfall of Paraná (Prospetto Del Salto Grande del Paraná) showing a 
Brazilian landscape decorated with various plants and animals from the region. Examining the 
few details we have about the production of these maps and their sources reveals how de Blasco 
used the circumstances of his trans-imperial career to access geographical knowledge produced 
in various scientific centers.  
The 28 sections of De Blasco’s map of Italy, out of which two are reproduced in Figure 
2.4, include a discussion of the sources used to prepare the map.244 The engineer placed a special 
emphasis on d’Anville’s Analyse Geografique d’Italie, work published in 1744. Additionally, de 
Blasco mentioned the use of a series of maps surveyed with the help of the “pretorian table” or 
with the help of a compass and therefore worthy, in his opinion, of being considered 
geographical maps. The mapmaker did not include in this bibliographical paragraph the authors 
or the titles of the maps he accessed; he simply listed the geographical areas these sources 
covered and mentioned the existence of a separate document offering all the details about the 
source maps. Unfortunately the additional document de Blasco refers to was not preserved 
together with the map, and its location evades us.  
                                                          
244 ÖNB, Kartensammlung, K III 113230, sections 9 and 10. 
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Figure 2.4 Detail from de Blasco’s Geographical, Geometrical, Nautical, Military and Historical Map of Italy 
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Even without having a complete list of manuscript sources, we can infer de Blasco had 
access to the maps of Sicily prepared by his brother in the 1720s. In the 1740s, the mapmaker 
had prepared a map of Lombardy based on the manuscript maps of the Milanese cadaster, so we 
can safely assume he used part of that governmental cartographic information. Figure 2.5 
reproduces a small detail of de Blasco’s map, showing the surrounding area of the Sicilian town 
of Messina.245 The cartographer played especially close attention to the position of the 
settlements, the main roads and water-bodies. However, the rest of the landscape is just sketched 
and is far from being at the same level of detail as the Great Military Maps of the Habsburg 
provinces surveyed between 1763 and 1787.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 The area nearby Messina on de Blasco’s Geographical, Geometrical, Nautical, Military and Historical 
Map of Italy 
                                                          
245 Ibid., section 26.  
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The de Blasco drawing sent to Vienna and entitled Prospect of the Big Waterfall of 
Paraná includes a variety of drawings of animals and plants from the Portuguese possessions in 
Brazil (Figure 2.6).246 Maria Theresa and Joseph II were interested in information from colonial 
domains such as the Americas, or India, even though they had no actual possessions in those 
areas. When sending his materials to Vienna, de Blasco clearly took into account the Habsburgs’ 
efforts to bring to the botanical garden and menagerie at their imperial palace at Schönbrunn a 
variety of specimens from the whole world.247The engineer tried to present himself as a desirable 
employee not only because of his mapmaking abilities, but also his first-hand experience in the 
Portuguese colonial lands. 
What de Blasco conveniently omitted from the description of this drawing was that the 
Prospect was a modified version of a plan prepared by a Portuguese engineer, João Bento 
Python.248 De Blasco and Python worked together as part of the commission sent to implement 
the Treaty of Madrid, so it is hard to establish who the actual author of the drawing was. 
However, one thing is certain: de Blasco had access to secret geographic plans and decided to 
risk sharing some of that information with the Habsburg authorities in order to convince them of 
his desirability as an employee. 
                                                          
246 The explanation that most likely accompanied the map and included a description of the types of animals, insects 
and plants represented was not preserved together with the map. ÖNB, Kartensammlung, K III 103848. 
247 Marianne Klemun, “Space, State, Territory, Region and Habitat: Alpine Gardens in the Habsburg Countries,” 
Studies in the History of Gardens & Designed Landscapes. An International Quarterly 20, no. 3-4, (2008): 414-415; 
Yonan, Empress Maria Theresa and the Politics of Habsburg Imperial Art, 160-161. In his letter from 30 April 
1782 to Joseph II, Philippe Cobenzl mentioned some small birds from the Indies that the emperor had bought and 
also suggested to Joseph II acquiring a zebra. Sebastien Brunner, Correspondances Intimes de L'Empereur Joseph II 
avec son ami le Comte de Cobenzl et son Premier Ministre le Prince de Kaunitz (Mayence: F. Kirchheim, 1871). 
248 This representation is discussed and reproduced in A terra de Vera Cruz: viagens descrições e mapas do século 
XVIII: exposição integrada nas comemorações do V Centenário da Descoberta do Brasil eds. Jorge Costa, João 
Carlos Garcia, and André Ferrand de Almeida (Porto: Biblioteca Pública Municipal do Porto, 2000), 26-27, 85. I am 
grateful to Renata Malcher de Araujo for identifying the de Blasco drawing as a modified version of Python’s work.  
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Figure 2.6 De Blasco’s Prospect of the Big Waterfall of Paraná 
 
 
Chancellor Kaunitz forwarded the de Blasco maps to the Aulic War Council for an 
evaluation, which reveals that the Habsburg Monarchy had centralized mechanisms for assessing 
the value of cartographic material.249 Despite the high quality of de Blasco’s work, Maria 
Theresa and her advisers decided that he should be rewarded only financially and not with a 
long-term position in the Habsburg army. The implications of de Blasco’s transfer would have 
led to too many political complications, and the engineer’s advanced age did not seem to justify 
risking a diplomatic incident.250  
The story of de Blasco’s efforts to return into the service of Maria Theresa brings to the 
forefront the importance of trans-imperial approaches for the study of the history of cartography. 
                                                          
249 KA HKR, 1770 57 107. 
250 HHStA StK, Wissenschaft, Kunst und Literatur (hereafter WKL), box 5, Michel Angelo de Blasco. 
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Experts such as de Blasco played an essential part in knowledge transfer, and their stories show 
the strong ties between the history of science and empires in early modern Europe. Likewise, the 
timing of de Blasco’s campaign to return in the service of Vienna was not accidental; in the early 
1760s Maria Theresa ordered a detailed topographical survey of her domains and there were also 
initiatives from provinces such as the Austrian Netherlands for starting a variety of mapmaking 
projects. Moreover, border demarcations campaigns and treaties regularizing the Habsburg 
frontiers were numerous, starting with the 1750s and 1760s. If one was a military engineer with 
mapmaking expertise in Europe during the 1760s and was looking for a job, Vienna was an 
attractive employer.   
The de Blasco brothers did not participate in the whirlwind of cartographic activities that 
took over the Habsburg Monarchy in the second half of the eighteenth century. Luchsenstein’s 
career as a mapmaker also slowed down by the 1760s. A new generation of military engineers 
affiliated with the general quartermaster’s staff came to the forefront and coordinated 
topographic surveys for the empire’s provinces.  
2.3.3 Mihály Lajos Jeney 
As the engineering schools of the Habsburg Monarchy produced more and more graduates, the 
military authorities integrated these experts either as part of the imperial engineering corps, the 
artillery corps or the general quartermaster’s staff. The existence of a larger trained group of 
engineers allowed Viennese rulers to plan ambitious cartographic projects. The first general map 
of the Habsburg Monarchy published in the 1720s by Homann in Nüremberg (Tabula 
Geographica Europae Austriacae Generalis) had quickly become an outdated image of the 
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empire.251 Starting around the year 1759, Maria Theresa had been inquiring on ways to obtain a 
geographic map of her lands. The empress’s order of the first detailed military topographic 
survey of the Monarchy in 1763 is part of the same cartographic impulse.252 Managing a detailed 
mapmaking campaign at the scale of an empire required astute and devoted military engineers 
who could adapt to various provincial circumstances and work with local personnel. The general 
quartermaster’s staff provided qualified personnel, steeled by their contribution to the Seven 
Years’ War campaigns. Additionally, as mentioned earlier, there was a conscious campaign after 
1763 in recruiting for this army unit skilled mapmakers.253 
 Although the imperial authorities in Vienna considered Stephan Lutsch von Luchsenstein 
the best mapmaker of Transylvania and its borders, he did not coordinate the military 
topographic survey of this region. Instead of him, the Aulic War Council preferred to delegate a 
colonel from the general quartermaster’s staff: Dominik Camiotti de Fabris Count of Cassano 
(1725-1789). Although local officers performed most of the ground measurements and copying 
for the Great Military Map, the success of the project hinged on this imperial coordinator. 
Having successfully completed the mapping of Bohemia and Moravia by 1768, Fabris used his 
prior experience in preparing the military survey of Transylvania.254 As he was promoted to the 
rank of general major before the completion of the map of Transylvania, the military authorities 
                                                          
251 This map is reproduced in Descriptio Austriae. Österreich und seine Nachbarn im Kartenbild von der Spätantike 
bis ins 19. Jahrhundert, eds. Johannes Dörflinger, Robert Wagner, and Franz Wawrik (Vienna: Tusch-Druck 
GesmbH, 1977), 159. 
252 In 1759 Maria Theresa contacted Charles Lorraine and revealed her intention to order a general map of her 
domains. AGR Secrétairerie d’Etat et de Guerre (hereafter SEG), box 2273, 11-14. Also mentioned in Louis-Prosper 
Gachard, “Notice historique sur la rédaction et la publication de la carte des Pays-Bas Autrichiens par le général 
comte de Ferraris,” Nouveaux mémoires de l'Académie royale des sciences et de belles-lettres de Bruxelles 16 
(1843): 5. 
253 Lund, War for the Every Day, 152-153. 
254 On October 29, 1778, during the War of the Bavarian Succession, the Aulic War Council informed the corps of 
engineers and fortifications, that Maria Theresia had named Fabris to the rank of Fieldmarshall Lieutenant and gave 
him the position of Quartermaster of the army. KA GHA, 1778 10 152. For some biographical information on Fabris 
see Ludwig Rona, Geschichte des K.U.K. Infanterie-Regimentes Adolf Grossherzog von Luxembourg Herzog zu 
Nassau, Nr. 15, 1701-1901 (Prague: Karl Bellmann Verlag des Regimentes, 1901), 248. Wurzbach, Biographisches 
Lexikon des Kaisertums Oesterreich, vol. 46 (Vienna: Druck und Verlag der k.k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1882). 
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in Vienna named a new director for this project in 1772. Again, they found the replacement 
within the ranks of the general quartermaster’s staff, and chose an individual with both 
international experience and of Transylvanian origin: Mihály Lajos Jeney (1723/1724-1797). 
This military engineer supervised a variety of cartographic operations within Transylvania 
during the early 1770s and contributed to numerous mapmaking campaigns within the Habsburg 
lands until the end of his career.  
Jeney was born into a protestant, noble Transylvanian family and had a tumultuous life. 
His earlier participation in war was as a hussar during the 1737-1739 Habsburg-Ottoman conflict 
and during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748).255 As European states such as 
France admired the effectiveness of small-units waging what tacticians called the petite guerre, it 
is not surprising that Jeney found a place in the French army. Between 1747 and 1753, Jeney 
served as part of the Bercsényi Hussar-Regiment.256 As a result of his vast experience with this 
type of warfare, in 1759 Jeney published the first tactics manual for conducting irregular 
operations, Le Partisan ou l’art de faire la petite-guerre avec succés selon le génie de nos jours 
(an English edition with the title The Partisan: Or, The Art of Making War in Detachment 
appeared in 1760).257 
The preface of Jeney’s book reveals that by 1759, this officer had served in twenty-four 
campaigns in various geographic areas such as the Ottoman lands, Hungary, Silesia, the Italian 
and German states, Flanders and Westphalia. Jeney included seven maps of small geographical 
                                                          
255 Biographical information on Jeney was taken from Jankó, “An Outstanding Person of the 1st Military Survey,” 
201-207. 
256 The Bercsényi Hussar Regiment was founded in France by supporters of the early eighteenth century Rákoczi 
rebellion against the Habsburgs. Ferenc Tóth, “Emigrated or exiled?: Francis Rákóczi II and his exile in France and 
Turkey,” in Monarchy and exile: the politics of legitimacy from Marie de Médicis to Wilhelm II, eds. Philip Mansel 
and Torsten Riotte (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 100. For a discussion of the meaning of 
“petite guerre” see Bruce Buchan, “Pandours, Partisans and Petite Guerre: Two dimensions of Enlightenment 
Discourse on War,” Intellectual History Review 23, no. 3 (September 2013): 12-15. 
257 John Grenier, The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), 95, 100-102.  
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areas to further illustrate his discussion of how partisan troops should wage war. Moreover, he 
stressed that the inclusion of such maps made his work better than earlier, similar books on this 
topic.258 When listing the qualities of partisan troops, Jeney included the ability of fast territorial 
reconnaissance and preparation of accurate maps.259 Whereas there is no evidence regarding his 
early training as a military engineer, Jeney’s book reveals this officer’s ability to draw maps and 
use them as part of the war effort. Additionally, it is known that from 1754 Jeney worked as a 
geographer-engineer officer at the French Army of the Rhine, and between 1758 and 1763 he 
served as captain of engineers in the Prussian army.260 The career of Jeney needs to be put into a 
larger context: the rise in importance of military reconnaissance during the Seven Years’ War 
and the increase in value of the officers belonging to the general quartermaster staff.261  
Similar to the Habsburg monarchs, the Prussian kings relied on the services of foreign 
engineers, especially French or with training in France, for the improvement of their 
fortifications system and cartographic projects. Peter de Montargue (1660-1733), Jean de Bodt 
(1670-1745) and Charles Louis de Lecoq (1754-1829) were representative of a larger group of 
protestants who had to flee from France due to religious persecutions and found employment in 
the Prussian army.262 Jeney, with his training in the French army, probably fit right in with the 
other military engineers serving in the Prussian army. Although the details of his time in Prussia 
                                                          
258 Mr. de Jeney, Le Partisan ou l’Art de faire la Petite-Guerre avec Succès selon le Génie de nos Jours (The Hague: 
H. Constapel, 1759), Preface. 
259 Ibid., 1, 8. 
260 Jankó, “An Outstanding Person of the 1st Military Survey,” 203.  
261 Ewa Anklam, “Battre l’Estrade: Military Reconnaisance, in the German Theatre of War,” in The Seven Years’ 
War: Global Views, eds. Mark H. Danley and Patrick J. Speelman (Boston: Brill, 2013), 214. Another example of a 
similar eighteenth century career is the Welshman Henry Humphrey Evans Lloyd. Lloyd served as part of the 
Habsburg general quartermaster’s staff during the Seven Year’s War. Patrick J. Speelman, Henry Lloyd and the 
Military Enlightenment of Eighteenth-Century Europe (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002). 
262 Wolfgang Hans Stein, “Les atlas militaires topographiques, une spécificité de la cartographie militaire 
allemande,” in Atlas militaires manuscrits européens (XVI-XVIIIe siècles), eds. Isabelle Warmoes, Emilie d' Orgeix, 
and Charles van den Heuvel (Paris: Musée des plans-reliefs, 2003), 209. David Buisseret, The Mapmakers’ Quest. 
Depicting New Worlds in Renaissance Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 136. 
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elude us for the moment, we can safely infer that Jeney improved his cartographic skills and 
participated to mapmaking campaigns under Frederick II.263  
For Joseph II to re-hire Jeney after he had served the Prussian king must have been quite 
a diplomatic coup, although the details of this transfer remain unknown. The skill of military 
engineers to capture strategic information on maps and plans made them important participants 
to the war effort. It was not unusual in the eighteenth century for the Habsburgs to delay the 
exchange of military engineers and cartographers captured by the Prussians in conflicts such as 
the Seven Years’ War. These captives had the skill to bring back to the Habsburg lands reliable 
topographic information about enemy territory.264 Therefore, the transfer of a military engineer 
from the service of Prussia meant for Frederick II not only the loss of a skilled employee, but 
also a possible leak of strategic information.  
Regardless of Jeney’s motivation to re-join the Habsburg army, on April 15, 1768 he was 
in Vienna. Jeney received the rank of major and contacted the Governor of Transylvania, Samuel 
Brukenthal, to inform him of the beginning of his journey towards Transylvania.265 This officer 
was surely not the first and not the last military engineer that Habsburg rulers hired from a rival 
or ally state in the second half of the eighteenth century. In 1778, Joseph II hired the French 
engineer d’Abrange, who had left his homeland for the Ottoman lands to avoid punishment for 
breaking French law. D’Abrange changed his name and was dispatched to Transylvania to avoid 
                                                          
263 Frederick II encouraged numerous topographic surveys such as Wreder’s survey of Silesia (1746-1753). Klaus 
Lindner, “Wredes “Krieges Carte von Schlesien” – die erste preußische Landesaufnahme Schlesiens,” in 
Kartographiehistorisches Colloquium Lüneburg '84, 15.-17. März 1984: Vorträge, eds. Wolfgang Scharfe, and 
Eckhard Jäger (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1985), 39-53. 
264 Jan Mokre, “Geheimhaltung, Spionage und Kartenverfälschung: Aspekte des Verhältnisses zwischen Militär und 
Kartographie zur Zeit Maria Theresias,” in Aspekte der Kartographie im Wandel der Zeit. Festschrift für Ingrid 
Kretschmer, eds. Wolfgang Kainz, Karel Kriz, and Andreas Riedl (Vienna: Institut für Geographie und 
Regionalforschung der Universität Wien, Kartographie und Geoinformation, 2004), 87-88; Blasek and Rieger, 
Beiträge zur Geschichte der K. u. K. Genie-Waffe, vol 1, 613. 
265 “Dem Andenken des vor hundert Jahren gestorbenen Gubernators von Siebenbürgen Freiherrn Samuel von 
Brukenthal,” Archiv des Vereines für siebenbürgische Landeskunde 31, no 1 (1903): 60. 
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being identified and reclaimed by the French authorities.266 Joseph II understood the importance 
of having skilled military engineers under his banners and took every opportunity to achieve this 
goal, even at the risk of going against his allies’ interests. The cases of Jeney and d’Abrange 
reveal that highly qualified military engineers often worked under different banners and 
contributed to the circulation of knowledge over imperial borders.  
Soon after his arrival to Transylvania, Jeney was sent to inspect the mountain passes 
connecting the province with the Danubian Principalities. This sensitive mission needs to be seen 
in the context of the 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman war, which was plaguing the area. The presence 
of Russian troops on Moldavian territory had brought the war to the Habsburg borders. Although 
the Aulic War Council was hoping to use Jeney’s skills for the ongoing mapping of the region, 
Jeney’s first mission was the inspection of mountain passes in order to offer suggestions to 
improve the defenses.267 Just like the earlier generation of military engineers, Luchsenstein and 
the de Blasco brothers, Jeney had in-depth knowledge of the art of fortifications.  
A closer examination of Jeney’s inspection of the Rodna pass, located in the northeastern 
mountainous part of the province, illustrates the type of work this major did at the borders of 
Transylvania.268 Jeney’s map (figure 2.7) brings to the forefront the numerous waterways and 
paths connecting Transylvania with Moldavia. Such a variety of access points made the 
Principality vulnerable, and Jeney uses this map to illustrate suggestions for defending the pass. 
Jeney took into consideration the layout of the land and saw the fortification points as pieces of a 
larger topography. For example, he suggested adding an encampment for troops close to Szent 
György, village located in the rightmost part of the map, and recommended four to ten battalions 
                                                          
266 Ibid., 264. 
267 AN CC, Document 6 (1768), November 26, 1768.  
268 AN CC, Document 1 (1769), April 2, 1769. 
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for its defense. He gave clear guidelines on where the detachments should be placed around the 
area to keep the numerous footpaths under supervision. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Jeney’s map of the Rodna Pass 
 
 
Jeney’s report on the situation of the Rodna Pass exemplifies his understanding of using maps as 
military planning tools. In 1772, the Aulic War Council rewarded his service and named him the 
new coordinator of the military survey of Transylvania. Additionally, Jeney directed a similar 
project into the Moldavian and Wallachian borderlands.269 This officer’s career after 1770s was 
not restricted to Transylvania, although he was often recalled to this province to offer advice on 
                                                          
269 During his tour of the Transylvanian province in 1773, Emperor Joseph II ordered the surveying personnel to 
improve the accuracy of the cartographic representation of the border between Transylvania and its neighboring 
provinces Moldavia and Wallachia. The emperor desired not only the mapping of the frontier-line, but hoped to 
obtain accurate representations of a significant segment of these Danubian Principalities. Veres, “Redefining 
Imperial Borders,” 13-16. 
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different projects. By the end of the 1780s, Jeney had coordinated or actively surveyed 
approximately 930 sheets, so more than a quarter of the total number of sections for the Great 
Military Map.270  
                                                          
270 Jankó, “An Outstanding Person of the 1st Military Survey,” 207. 
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Figure 2.8 Habsburg territories surveyed under Jeney’s direction271 
                                                          
271 This map has been inspired from Ibid., 203. 
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People played an essential part in trans-imperial technology transfer openly or secretly, 
and by tracing personal journeys we can analyze how people impacted the “contents and the 
paths of knowledge.”272 Jeney’s experiences in France and Prussia contributed to his 
development as a skilled mapmaker, and the Habsburg rulers benefitted from his foreign 
expertise. The product of the Habsburg military, the Great Military Map of Transylvania was 
indirectly a trans-imperial work. Jeney, and probably some of the other military engineers, had 
learned mapmaking skills as part of an international dialogue. In understanding the development 
of Habsburg cartography in the second half of the eighteenth century we need to examine both 
trans-provincial and trans-imperial threads.  
2.4 THE MAP ARCHIVE OF THE AULIC WAR COUNCIL 
Centralizing the production of military cartographic material involved both creating mapmaking 
specialists and managing the circulation of their work. The eighteenth century Habsburg rulers 
were not the first ones faced with the dilemma of how to control access to maps. Centuries 
before, the Spanish Habsburgs had already developed an impressive framework for the 
protection of cartographic material. In the sixteenth century, the Council of Indies and the House 
of Trade in Seville collected and controlled access to geographic material related to Spain’s 
                                                          
272 Liliane Hilaire-Perez, Catherine Verna, “Dissemination of Technical Knowledge in the Middle Ages and the 
Early Modern Era: New Approaches and Methodological Issues,” Technology and Culture 47, no. 3 (2006): 536-
565. See the introduction to The Brokered World. Go-Betweens and Global Intelligence, 1770-1820, eds. Simon 
Schaffer, Lissa Roberts, Kapil Raj, and James Delbourgo (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications, 
2009). 
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overseas lands.273 The lands encompassed by the Habsburgs by the eighteenth century also had a 
strong tradition of secrecy towards sensitive cartographic material.274 For example, the 1673 
Montecuccoli instruction for all military engineers in Habsburg service required them to send a 
copy of all the maps they produced to the Aulic War Council. Moreover, the engineers were 
banned from sharing the product of their work with anyone else except their commanding 
general.275  
As the number of military engineers and maps increased substantially in the eighteenth 
century, the presidents of the Aulic War Council introduced a series of measures to organize this 
institution’s archive. After the Seven Years’ War, Lacy ensured that all original sheets of the 
Military Maps of various provinces were preserved in this archive. A decade later, in 1776, 
Andreas Hadik ordered the merging of the map and plans archive of the corps of engineers with 
the archive of the Aulic War Council. These centralizing measures culminated in 1781, when 
Emperor Joseph II ordered a re-organization of the War Council’s map archive together with a 
list of all its holdings.276 This inventory is, to our knowledge, the oldest surviving catalogue of 
this imperial collection. As the Aulic War Council controlled the main mapmaking institutions of 
the empire, the corps of engineers and the quartermaster general’s staff, the early 1780s 
inventory is an indispensable primary source for historians of cartography studying Habsburg 
mapping enterprises in the eighteenth century.  
                                                          
273 Portuondo, Secret Science, 103-107. 
274 Zsolt G. Török, “Renaissance Cartography in East-Central Europe, ca. 1450-1650,” in The History of 
Cartography, ed. David Woodward, vol. 3, part 2, Cartography in the European Renaissance (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2007), 1806-1851. 
275 Blasek and Rieger, Beiträge zur Geschichte der K. u. K. Genie-Waffe, vol. 1, 8-9, 217-218, 221-222. 
276 Oskar Regele, Der österreichische Hofskriegsrat, 1556-1848 (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen 
Staatsdruckerei, 1949), 44; Ernst Nischer-Falkenhof discusses Joseph II’s order but does not analyze the resulting 
inventory. Ernst Nischer-Falkenhof, “Die Kartensammlung des österreichischen Kriegsarchiv,” Archivalische 
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On April 28th, 1781, Joseph II sent a letter to Hadik, the president of the Aulic War 
Council, and ordered the reorganization of this institution’s archive. The emperor wanted the 
best maps selected and organized in separate chests based on geographical regions. He also 
expected inventories for each chest.277 By May 5, 1783, the emperor had received a total number 
of twelve inventories, organized geographically, and describing the map collection of the Aulic 
War Council.278 Joseph II played an active part in the process of preparing these lists and 
provided detailed feedback after receiving the first inventories. For example he suggested that 
the compilers of these inventories should leave more space between the various headings, so that 
new additions to the War Archive could easily be recorded in the same tables.279 
 
 
Table 2.2 List of Inventories of the Aulic War Council’s Map Collection 
Protocol number Region Finalized on 
1 Kindom of Hungary  March 31, 1782 
2 Kingdoms of Croatia and Dalmatia  May 29, 1782 
3 Kingdom of Slavonia and Duchy of 
Syrmia  
August 6, 1782 
4 Banat of Temeswar  August 6, 1782 
5 Great Principality of Transylvania  August 6, 1782 
6 Kingdom of Galicia and District of 
Bukovina  
August 6, 1782 
7 Kingdom of Bohemia  October 28, 1782 
8 Margraviate of Moravia and Habsburg 
Silesia  
October 28, 1782 
9 Archduchy of Austria, Duchies of Styria, 
Carinthia and Carniola, Princely County of 
Tyrol and the Austrian Forelands  
October 28, 1782 
10 Habsburg Italy  October 28, 1782 
11 Austrian Netherlands  October 28, 1782 
12 Foreign Lands  May 5, 1783 
 
                                                          
277 KA HKR, 1781 34 54; KA HKR, 1781 34 128/2. 
278 KA HKR, 1782 34 52; KA HKR, 1782 34 76; KA HKR, 1782 34 105; KA HKR, 1782 34 135; KA HKR, 1783 
34 60. 
279 KA HKR, 1782 34 52. The inventories are: KA HKR, 1782 34 52; KA HKR, 1782 34 76; KA HKR, 1782 34 
105; KA HKR, 1782 34 135; KA HKR, 1783 34 60. 
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The inventories numbered from one to eleven included Habsburg provinces. The foreign lands 
list included the following subdivisions in this particular order: Portugal and Spain, France, 
Great Britain and Ireland, the Dutch Republic, Switzerland, Italy, Denmark and Norway, 
Sweden, the Prussian States, Westphalia, Upper Saxony and Lower Saxony, the Holy Roman 
Empire, Poland and Lithuania, Russia, Turkey, Asia, Africa and America.  
All twelve inventories were divided in the same three main categories: maps of specific 
settlements or small landmarks (such as fortifications, churches, mines, castles, post stations, 
military buildings), maps of large territories, and maps representing bodies of water. There are 
14,899 map units of specific settlements or landmarks, 742 map units of larger territories and 
285 map units showing bodies of water. In some cases, one map unit contained more copies of 
the same map, a multi-section map, or a group of related maps. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9 Distribution of maps of specific landmarks 
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Figure 2.9 shows a graphical distribution of the maps of specific settlements or landmarks per 
inventory. In 1780 the map collection of the Aulic War Council had the highest number of maps 
devoted to particular settlements or landmarks associated with cities, villages, castles, 
fortifications and mountain passes for the Kingdom of Hungary. It is not surpring that for the 
most recent acquisitions, Galicia and Bukovina, the Habsburgs had a very limited number of 
maps in their archive. However, in the case of maps of larger territories, as shown in Figure 2.10, 
almost 35% of the maps contained in the Aulic War Council’s archives represent non-Habsburg 
lands. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10 Distribution of map units of larger territories 
 
 
Examining closer the number of foreign lands’ maps the Habsburgs had gathered in their 
Military Archives reveal that the regions of special interest were Prussia, the Ottoman Empire, 
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Italy and the Holy Roman Empire. This distribution of maps, presented in Figures 2.11 and 2.12, 
is a direct reflection of the Habsburg military priorities. During the reigns of Maria Theresa and 
Joseph II, the Habsburg armies waged exhausting wars against Prussia and Frederick II’s 
German allies. Although the only direct Habsburg-Ottoman military confrontation occurred in 
the late 1780s, the Viennese rulers started seeing the Ottoman lands as a possible direction for 
territorial expansion and tried to gather local knowledge about those territories. A similar 
connection between familiarity with the territorial layout and expansionist goals also helps 
explain the high number of maps representing the non-Habsburg Italian lands.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.11 Distribution of foreign lands’ maps of specific landmarks 
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Figure 2.12 Distribution of foreign lands’ map units of larger territories 
 
 
This impressive collection of almost 16,000 maps was not the only cartographic 
repository of the Habsburg rulers, but was the most important one with respect to manuscripts 
maps containing sensitive information.280 Therefore, the composition of this archive illuminates 
somewhat how the Habsburg rulers and their military advisers used cartography in the service of 
their empire. Gathering maps and geographical descriptions in one central archive limited access 
to these resources to a select group of military commanders and top administrators. For example, 
during the Austrian-Russian-Ottoman War (1787-1792), Emperor Joseph II and the President of 
the Aulic War Council, Hadik, had the final say in utilizing cartographic material as part of the 
war effort. In October 1787, Joseph II ordered the production of 150 engraved copies of the so-
                                                          
280 The Court Library also included a map collection, which is today part of the Austrian National Library. Ernst 
Trenkler, “History of the Austrian Nationalbibliothek,” Library Quarterly 17, no. 3 (1947): 230. 
 
 
108 
called Hungarischen Grossen Charte (Large Map of Hungary). These maps were distributed 
among the regiment commanders deployed in the eastern parts of the Monarchy.281 
 However, the army commanders knew that in addition to Müller’s map, the general 
quartermaster’s staff had spent the 1760s to 1780s surveying in great detail most of the provinces 
of the Monarchy. Therefore, in November 1787, general major Zechenter suggested to the 
emperor that the army would benefit from receiving copies of the great military map’s sections 
for Croatia, Slavonia, Banat of Temesvár, Transylvania and Galicia. Joseph II gave this 
permission for the commanding generals of the imperial army, but also warned them to show 
extreme caution and avoid at all costs any loss of such sensitive material.282 Maps could not 
leave the Aulic War Council’s archive without leaving a trail of paperwork behind, which 
demonstrates the high value they had in the eyes of Habsburg authorities. 
 The standard procedure of recovering maps and geographic descriptions from deceased 
officers also exemplifies the authorities’ consistent effort to direct all precious maps towards this 
archive. When the Transylvanian mapmaker Stephan Lutsch von Luchsenstein died in 1792, the 
provincial commanders found in his possession 103 maps and drawings. This collection included 
numerous representations of Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia, but also segments of the 
Rhine River, plans of Luxembourg, Naples, Prague, and maps of other areas of the empire.  
The order of the Aulic War Council was clear: the Transylvanian general commander had 
to send to Vienna all hand-drawn maps and plans together with some other war diaries and 
geographic descriptions of what used to be Austrian Wallachia.283 For some of these maps, the 
                                                          
281 KA HKR, 1787 34 191. The “Big Map of Hungary” probably refers to Ignaz Müller’s Map engraved in 1769 and 
showing both the counties of Hungary and the Great Principality of Transylvania. Each military officer who 
received a copy of the map had to send a confirmation receipt. For example, the Governor of Transylvania, Count 
Banffy, confirmed the reception of his copy through a note sent to Vienna by Count Carl Palffy. KA HKR, 1787 34 
205. 
282 KA HKR, 1787 34 200. 
283 KA HKR, 1792 34 39. 
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Aulic War Council already had copies. However, they still desired to minimize the risk of 
sensitive information falling into unauthorized hands. Luchsenstein’s case was not singular and 
the Military Archive in Vienna preserves many other inventories summarizing the possessions of 
defunct officers.284  
Recovering maps and geographic descriptions from defunct Habsburg officers, and 
ordering surveys of lands within the boundaries of the Monarchy were not the only ways to 
enrich the Aulic War Council’s archive. Military engineers sometimes served as part of 
reconnaissance missions outside the Habsburg territories. For example, during the 1768-1774 
Russo-Ottoman conflict, the Aulic War Council in Vienna sent some officers to serve under the 
banners of both belligerent states. Whereas the officers fighting alongside the Russian troops 
could due to a prior agreement between Vienna and St. Petersburg reveal their identity, the 
Habsburg agents enrolled in the Ottoman ranks had to keep their background secret to avoid 
capture as spies. In both cases, the Aulic War Council instructed the officers to write detailed 
journals of the war operations and prepare maps and plans of marches, encampments and the 
geography of the land they were travelling through.285  
Vienna’s decision was not unheard-of during this age. One decade before, during the 
Seven Years’ War, all combatant sides had used similar techniques. The foreigners serving as 
part of short-distance reconnaissance units were especially prone to switching sides once their 
mission had been accomplished.286 All military commanders were aware of this danger and in a 
continuous state of alert regarding spies. Therefore, Vienna cautioned its officers to gather 
information about the armies involved in the war and the territories in secret, and send it 
                                                          
284 See for example KA HKR, 1789 34 58 (the general commander of Transylvania, Fabris), KA HKR, 1781 34 39 
(the military engineers from Lombardy Baschiera and Cristiani). 
285 HHStA StK, Vortrage, box 104, 302-308 verso. 
286 Anklam, “Battre l’Estrade,” 216. 
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whenever possible to the Aulic War Council. Examining the early 1780s inventory of this 
institution’s map archive reveals such documents that survived all the way to Vienna. For 
example, this collection contained a description of the status quo for the Ottoman controlled 
lands between Belgrade and Constantinople, together with a diary of the 1769 Ottoman 
campaign, which included observations about the situation of the Ottoman army, its technique of 
gathering, marching and encampment.287 Clearly, at least one of the Habsburg officers fighting 
undercover alongside the Ottoman troops was successful in his mission.  
Through the example of the Indian Army Intelligence Branch, James Hevia has recently 
argued that military intelligence, including the development of cartography, “was a product of 
the new mechanisms of state formation, the disciplinary and regulatory regimes [...] that 
transformed European states in the second half of the nineteenth century into militarized 
polities.”288 However, the professionalization of the military and the formation of special army 
corps for gathering military intelligence were not nineteenth century inventions, as the case of 
military mapmakers in the service of the Habsburgs shows. The Aulic War Council in Vienna 
had, by the end of the eighteenth century, access to a rich resource of cartographic information.  
  
                                                          
287 KA HKR, 1783 34 60, under the category Türkei, the entry: “Situations Beschreibung der Türkey von den 
Gegenden zwischen Belgrad und Constantinopol bis Hantepe am Bruht Fluß, dann Journal von der Türkischen 
Campagne de anno 1769, sammt anmerkungen über die beschaffenheit einer Türkischen Armée, derselben Art sich 
zu versammlen, zu marchiren, und sich zu laagern, in einem Band.” 
288 James Louis Hevia, The Imperial Security State: British Colonial Knowledge and Empire-Building in Asia 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 5. 
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2.5 CONCLUSION 
In 1779, one year before the end of Maria Theresa’s reign, the Aulic War Council ordered the 
General Commander in Transylvania to gather all the plans, descriptions, or war diaries 
regarding military conflicts from 1740 onwards and send them to Vienna. The president of the 
Aulic War Council anticipated that many of these documents were either in the hands of military 
personnel or their families, but hoped he could retrieve a significant number.289 This order 
represents just one of the instances through which the Viennese authorities tried to control access 
to geographic information. 
At the same time, the protection of maps and geographic descriptions from enemies’ eyes 
implied controlling not only the circulation of cartographic artifacts, but also the movements of 
their makers. By standardizing the training and organization of military engineers the Habsburg 
monarchs desired to centralize the production and preservation of maps, in the same way that 
they dreamed to consolidate their empire. However, these imperial designs often conflicted with 
the lack of sufficient trained personnel, provincial traditions of training and controlling access to 
official bodies of engineers, and the trans-imperial careers of elite mapmakers.  
                                                          
289 AN CC, Document 7 (1779), November 24, 1779, 11. 
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3.0 MASTERING SPACE: THE GREAT MILITARY MAP OF TRANSYLVANIA 
Because of its location, strong colonization and many bounties of nature, the mentioned 
Principality [of Transylvania] is of great importance [for the Monarchy]; through orderly 
organization and just administration it is, could and should remain one of the most 
flourishing imperial lands. [Transylvania] is surrounded by high mountains, which 
separate this whole region not only from enemy lands, namely Wallachia and Moldavia, 
but also from the Banat of Temesvar and part of Hungary; [this province] is accessible 
during winter through few places and fortified with a perpetual natural wall.290 (1740 
Description of Transylvania)  
The Great Principality of Transylvania is enclosed on all sides by a chain of high 
mountains, through which, for the most part, there are rugged passes. Next to these passes 
there are other side-roads called Playen, which are more rugged and can only be 
considered footpaths. This mountain chain is only clearly interrupted where the Alt River 
flows into Wallachia and where the Buzau Pass seems to cut through the mountains.291 
(1773 Description of Transylvania’s Passes and Fortresses) 
A land surrounded by mountains from all sides, Transylvania constituted an almost natural 
southeastern corner for the Habsburg Monarchy. In 1740, the Habsburg military applauded the 
“natural wall” defending Transylvania, and thus the Habsburg dominions, as an almost 
impenetrable barrier in front of any enemies. However, by 1773, after an extensive campaign of 
                                                          
290 Original text: Bedachtes Fürstenthums ist wegen seiner Lage, starcken impopulation, und vieler gaben der Natur, 
von solcher wichtigkeit, das selbes bey wohl geordneter einrichtung, und gerechter administration eines deren 
florissantesten Kayserlichen Erblanden seyn, und verbleiben könte, und müste. Es ist dessen ganzer Bezirck nicht 
allein gegen die feindlicher Lande, nehmlich Wallachey und Moldau, sondern auch gegen das Temesvarer Bannat, 
und zum Tail gegen Hungarn selbstmit einen hohen Gebürg umbgeben, von wenigen Ohrten, forderist in der 
Winterzeit, accessible, und folgsam mit einer Beständig-natürlichen Mauer gleichsam befestiget. From an unsigned 
1740 description of Transylvania. KA KPS, K VII K 329 F, 1-1verso. 
291 Original text: Das Groß-Fürstenthum Siebenbürgen ist von einer Ketten hoher Gebürgen aufallen Seiten 
eingeschlossen, durch welche nachstehende meistentheils aber unbequeme Passagen vorhanden sind. Nebst diesen 
finden sich einigen andere Seiten Weege so Playen genamet werden, die noch unbequemer, und nur als 
beschwerliche Fußsteige anzusehen seynd. Diese Ketten ist nur sichtbahr unterbrochen, wo der Alt Fluß in die 
Wallachey fliesset, und bey dem Paß Buzau scheinet auch das Gebürg in etwas sich zu vereienderen. From a 1773 
description of the Transylvanian passes and fortifications prepared by the General and Commander of the Genie 
Corps, Count Karl Clemens Pellegrini. KA KPS, K VII K 338 F. 
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mapping and describing the geography of this province, the Transylvanian border did not seem 
so impermeable anymore. More geographic descriptions of the area presented the numerous 
mountain passes connecting Transylvania with the Danubian Principalities as dangerous 
passages, through which armies, diseases, illegal trade and migrants could circulate freely. As 
Transylvania’s topography became visible for the political authorities in Vienna, this region 
became more tightly integrated into the larger imperial fabric. This chapter examines how 
cartography became an essential tool in collecting an impressive array of information about this 
easternmost Habsburg province. Examining the production process of the Great Military Map of 
Transylvania shows that these cartographic operations involved both imperial and provincial 
agents. Although Habsburg officials directed the mapmaking work in the region, they relied 
heavily on the help of local officers and inhabitants.  
The chapter will first offer historical background of the political integration of 
Transylvania into the Habsburg Monarchy, as the cartographic initiatives in the area were an 
intrinsic part of this larger political context. Next, this chapter examines the Habsburgs’ 
determination to gather geographic information about the key border points connecting 
Transylvania with non-Habsburg lands: the passes of the Carpathian Mountains. Controlling 
access to these passes enabled the empire to protect itself from enemy armies and dangerous 
contagious diseases, while also assisting the policing of trade and the circulation of people.  
Thirdly, this chapter explores aspects related to the production process of the Great 
Military Map of Transylvania. Scrutinizing the production of this map reveals that this 
cartographic project was more ambitious than it turned out to be in the end. Examining the 
various types of mapmakers involved in the cartographic production elucidates the role of 
imperial agents in the processes of provincial integration, imperial state-building and building 
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trans-imperial connections. Around the mid-eighteenth century, the most accomplished 
mapmaker in the region was the Transylvanian officer Stephan Lutsch von Luchsenstein. By the 
1770s, Dominik Camiotti de Fabris Count of Cassano and Mihály Lajos Jeney had become 
significant mapmakers of this province as the coordinators of the Great Military Map. Whereas 
Luchsenstein spent his career working only in Transylvania, both Fabris and Jeney worked for 
the Habsburgs in various provinces, and Jeney had also pursued an international career in the 
service of France and Prussia. People like Fabris and Jeney had a clearer understanding of the 
mechanisms of the empire as a whole than provincial figures like Luchsenstein. This 
generational shift did not exclude the importance of provincial agents in the process of empire 
building; it simply added an extra layer that strengthened the connection of Transylvania with the 
larger empire. To complete the surveying and mapping of the province, Fabris and Jeney relied 
on the contribution of local officers belonging to the military border’s regiments. In the end, I 
will bring to the forefront the tensions that emerged between imperial and provincial agents, due 
to the unauthorized circulation of cartographic material. Specifically, with the help of local 
mapmakers, provincial Transylvanian authorities obtained copies of high quality topographic 
maps, subverting the desire of Viennese authorities to keep cartographic information secret.  
3.1 TRANSYLVANIA WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE HABSBURG MONARCHY 
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Ottoman control over Transylvania posed a 
significant threat to the security of the Habsburg Monarchy. Therefore, in this period, the 
principality maintained a high geopolitical value as part of the Habsburg-Ottoman 
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confrontation.292 The Transylvanian political elites used the province’s position as a buffer 
between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans to enforce freedom of worship for Christians of 
various denominations and to impose at times the principle of freely electing their prince.293 
Repeatedly, Hungarian nobles residing in Transylvania joined anti-Habsburg coalitions as, for 
example, when they supported the Protestant armies’ war against Vienna during the Thirty 
Years’ War.294 
 As the end of the seventeenth century approached, the Austrians prevailed over their 
Ottoman rivals. The House of Habsburg accelerated negotiations for an alliance with the 
principality of Transylvania and in the spring of 1685, Vienna sent a mission led by the Jesuit 
diplomat Antide Dunod. When the Transylvanian Estates refused to allow the Habsburg military 
forces to enter the principality, the diplomat summed up Vienna’s intentions: “Like it or not, you 
will still come under His Majesty’s protection.”295 The Ottoman danger motivated the Habsburg 
government to consolidate their conquests. After capturing the fortress of Oradea from the Turks 
in 1692, they sent eight thousand soldiers to the principality of Transylvania.296 By signing the 
1699 Treaty of Karlowitz, the Ottoman Empire confirmed the Habsburg rule in Hungary and 
Transylvania.297  
The Principality of Transylvania was the launching pad for anti-Habsburg Hungarian 
rebellions throughout the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, as Hungarian elites 
                                                          
292 Ingrao, The Habsburg Monarchy, 65.  
293 Graeme Murdock, “'Freely elected in fear': Princely elections and political power in early seventeenth-century 
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294 Hochedlinger, Austria’s Wars of Emergence, 66.  
295 Nolens volens proteget vos Sua Majestat. Magyari András, “The Beginnings and the Consolidation of the 
Habsburg Rule in Transylvania”, in The History of Transylvania, eds. Ioan-Aurel Pop, Thomas Nägler, and Magyari 
András, vol. 2 (Cluj-Napoca: Romanian Academy, Center for Transylvanian Studies, 2009), 345. 
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dominated the political life of this Principality.298 Therefore, although Transylvania used to be 
integral part of the medieval Kingdom of Hungary, Chancellor Kaunitz and Maria Theresa 
decided to maintain the Principality as a separate political entity. Indeed, in 1767, Maria Theresa 
raised Transylvania to the rank of a Great Principality.299 Clearly, Vienna desired to keep the 
troublesome Hungarian nobility divided between two provinces. Additionally, despite the 
Habsburgs’ conquest of Transylvania, Russo-Ottoman-Habsburg confrontations continued to 
threaten the region throughout the eighteenth century. Therefore, the Habsburg rulers tried to 
build a fast chain of command from Vienna to this eastern province, circumventing provincial 
levels of authority.  
As part of this centralization process, for most of the eighteenth century the Habsburg 
monarchs refused to convene the traditional Transylvanian legislative institution, the Diet. 
Instead of relying on this provincial institution, the imperial authorities ran the province with the 
help of normative laws, namely diplomas and patents.300 Furthermore, the provincial Treasury 
was subordinated to the Imperial Treasury in Vienna, and the Transylvanian Chancellery was 
moved to Vienna.301 Finally, during the 1760s, the following non-Transylvanian imperial 
officials cumulated the positions of military commander and governor of this province: Baron 
Adolf Nicolaus von Buccow (1762-64), Count Andreas Hadik of Futak (1764-1767) and Count 
Karl Claudius O’Donnel-Tyrconnel (1767-1770).302 Along with other responsibilities, the 
                                                          
298 For a discussion of the kuruc Rebellion led by Francisc II Rákoczi (1703-1711) see Ingrao, The Habsburg 
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military governor of Transylvania coordinated the implementation of the extensive mapmaking 
operations and the border demarcations of the late 1760s and early 1770s.  
Cartography needs to be seen as part of a larger package of measures directed at 
defending the south-eastern Habsburg border, such as the extension of the Military Border to 
Transylvania in the early 1760s.303 Beginning in the sixteenth century, the Habsburgs relied on 
the communities of peasant-soldiers, known as gränzer, in their confrontation with the Ottomans. 
These local peasants, who received lands and confessional rights in exchange for their military 
service, helped decrease Habsburg military expenses in the region.304 In the case of 
Transylvania, the gränzer were organized initially into four infantry regiments (First Szekler, 
Second Szekler, First Wallach, Second Wallach) and two cavalry regiments (First Szekler 
Hussars and First Wallach Dragons) that were merged into only one cavalry regiment in 1764.305 
The term “military border” designated a geographic region with fluctuating limits. Nonetheless, 
the Transylvanian gränzer helped map and implement what became a more fixed borderline 
marked with standard indicators, called Imperial Eagles (Kaiserliche Adler).306 
                                                          
303 Ingrao, The Habsburg Monarchy, 164. For a discussion of the Habsburg Military Border, with a focus on Croatia, 
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Figure 3.1 The Habsburg Monarchy’s Military Border in 1764 
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In creating the new Transylvanian border regiments, the Habsburg authorities 
reorganized the province’s geography to fit their larger imperial strategy: extending the military 
border in order to obtain a continuous defended line from the Adriatic Sea to the northern part of 
Transylvania (Figure 3.1).307 For the province of Transylvania, this imperial vision inevitably 
clashed with the local administration; the land that the Habsburg authorities divided among the 
newly created border regiments along the Carpathian Mountains was taken from Saxon towns 
such as Braşov, Sibiu and Bistriţa.308 Moreover, the establishment of Border Regiments in the 
1760s defied the traditional administrative organization of Transylvania, as the gränzer became 
free men and their feudal ties to the local noblemen were cut.309  
Local authorities did not yield easily to the desires of the empire. For example, the 
Magistrate of the town of Bistriţa fought the confiscation of the twenty-three villages intended to 
form the military border district of Rodna Valley, headquarters for the Second Wallach Infantry 
Regiment. In the end, the imperial authorities had to provide a monetary compensation of 38,481 
florins and 43 kreutzers and also offer certain taxation rights for Bistriţa’s authorities.310 
Emperor Joseph II recorded another instance of local defiance during his 1773 journey to 
Transylvania. On June 18, 1773, Joseph II met the mayor of the community of Bârgău, located in 
the northeastern part of the province, and two local serfs. These, at first glance, insignificant 
local actors told the emperor about the punitive actions of Count Bethlen, the lord of the 
domains, taken against the mayor. The administrator of Count Bethlen had imprisoned the mayor 
for having mentioned to a Habsburg officer that the inhabitants of Bârgău would have gladly 
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joined border regiments if this institution had been extended to the area.311 This incident shows 
that provincial elites did not always welcome imperial plans for the region. At the same time, the 
Habsburg authorities could count on the alliance of some of the local inhabitants, who hoped that 
joining the gränzer group would bring them economic advantages and protection from their 
landlords.  
The extension of the Military Border into Transylvania was more than a purely military 
measure; the existence of this institution eased the introduction of reforms through the Aulic War 
Council and thus the circumvention of Transylvania’s provincial authorities.312 On November 
13, 1766, the Regulation issued by Maria Theresa for the Second Wallach Infantry Regiment 
made it clear that the gränzer were free men who had as their main goal defending the borders of 
the empire. In addition to foreign invasions, among possible dangers threatening the Habsburg 
dominions Maria Theresa listed criminals, unauthorized migrants, contraband and diseases such 
as the plague.313  
Indeed, the gränzer spent 52 days, namely one third of their yearly service, ensuring the 
enforcement of the Habsburg sanitary cordon.314 This important Habsburg institution had been in 
place as a permanent cordon since the time of Charles VI, who on October 22, 1728 justified its 
creation on the borders with the Ottomans in order to fight epidemic diseases, especially the 
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plague.315 Imperial orders from August 25, 1766, stated that anyone using counterfeit health 
documents or giving false declarations regarding their origin or their goods would be sentenced 
to death.316 However, despite the severity of these protective measures, during the reigns of 
Maria Theresa and Joseph II four major plague epidemics spread into Transylvania (1742/43, 
1755/56, 1770/71, 1786).317 Clearly, the sanitary cordon was not a perfect seal for the 
Monarchy’s provinces; people managed to avoid the controls by bribing guards318 or 
circumventing the quarantine points.319  
Controlling migration was another priority for the Habsburg authorities. Transylvanian 
subjects often crossed the border and settled in the neighboring Danubian Principalities without 
authorization from Vienna. For example, in 1738 and 1739 fifteen inhabitants from the Rodna 
Valley, together with their wives and children, left this area for Moldavia or neighboring 
counties.320 A report from 1760 revealed that the runaways would usually gather at a designated 
site, and after they organized themselves, would continue together the journey towards 
Moldavia.321 The extension of the Military Border to Transylvania did not put a stop to these 
illegal migrations and even some of the gränzer left the Monarchy. For example, between 1771 
and 1777, 659 soldiers belonging to the First Wallach Infantry Regiment defected.322  
The extradition of deserters became one of the main concerns of the Viennese Court with 
respect to its policy towards Moldavia and Wallachia during the eighteenth century. And even 
after the 1776 border convention signed between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans that 
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consecrated the trajectory of the Transylvanian-Moldavian borderline and included a specific 
article regarding the extradition of deserters by the Moldavian prince, the situation was not 
ameliorated.323 The desertion of gränzer was especially dangerous because these people 
possessed sensitive knowledge of the Habsburg borders’ defenses. For example, a 1785 report 
from the Habsburg representative in Constantinople mentions that a deserter going by the name 
of Kotzi had gained the protection of the Ottoman Court in exchange for the preparation of an 
accurate description of the Habsburg-Ottoman border. This deserter had brought with him 
“numerous plans and maps,” and thus endangered the security of the Habsburg border.324 Given 
all of these examples, it is not surprising that in his 1773 report about Transylvania to Maria 
Theresa, Joseph II expressed his disappointment with the gränzer and labeled them a simple land 
militz (territorial militia) that could barely enforce even the quarantine regulations.  
Despite the yearly expense of 220,000 florins, the Transylvanian Military Border 
appeared discontinuous, and Joseph II prepared a list of additional settlements that should be 
militarized to improve this dire situation. The emperor planned to redraw a segment of the 
imperial border based on his personal geographical knowledge of the province. Whereas part of 
this knowledge came from the emperor’s inspection of the border areas, the role of maps cannot 
be neglected. Indeed, Joseph II ended his 1773 report to Maria Theresa on the Military Border 
with a note ensuring the empress, that after his return to Vienna “I will explain my thoughts more 
precisely and more surely based on my notes and on the map.”325  
Despite Joseph II’s harsh criticism of the efficacy of the military border regiments to 
defend Transylvania from enemy attacks, diseases, contraband or illegal migrants, some of these 
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regiments’ officers contributed significantly to the gathering of geographic information about 
this province. The gränzer mapmaking work influenced how decision-makers in Vienna 
imagined and organized the southeastern border of the Monarchy.  
For a long time scholars have been studying the impact of the creation of border 
regiments on the elimination of serfdom, the promotion of education and the conversion of the 
local population to the Greek-Catholic church. Moreover, the literature about the border 
regiments in Transylvania connected these institutions to the formation of an ethnic Romanian 
and Szekler identity in the region.326 However, the contribution of border regiment officers to the 
mapping of Transylvania has remained unexplored.  
3.2 THE CONTROL OF TRANSYLVANIAN MOUNTAIN PASSES 
Gathering detailed geographic descriptions and maps of Transylvania preoccupied the Habsburg 
military throughout the eighteenth century. This geographic production focused especially on the 
Carpathian Mountains’ passes, which connected Transylvania to the Danubian Principalities. In 
1780, the Aulic War Council’s archives contained around 150 maps and plans showing the 
topography of specific Transylvanian mountain passes, projects for their defense, the road and 
pathway network connecting them with the neighboring Danubian Principalities, or elements 
belonging to the Sanitary Cordon and the customs. Most of these maps and plans date from the 
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second half of the eighteenth century, thus revealing Vienna’s strong interest during this time in 
obtaining detailed geographic information about mountain passes and developing plans for their 
defense.327 Figure 3.2 shows a map of the main passes connecting Transylvania with Moldavia 
and Wallachia.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 Principal mountain passes connecting Transylvania with the Danubian Principalities 
 
 
The devotion of such attention to the topography of the mountain passes was connected 
to their strategic importance. These passes made Transylvania vulnerable to foreign invasions, 
unwanted migrants, contraband and the plague. Therefore, as the ones living on this vulnerable 
frontier, the Military Border regiments played leading roles in collecting geographic information 
about Transylvania and its borders in the form of maps and narrative descriptions. 
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The first significant wave of maps, plans and geographic descriptions dates from the early 
1750s. After the disastrous War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), during which the 
Habsburgs lost most of the prosperous province of Silesia, Maria Theresa prioritized a series of 
military reforms, including the creation of an imperial corps of engineers328 and the construction 
and improvement of fortifications in border provinces, including Transylvania.329 The War 
Archives in Vienna has preserved a series of plans from the early 1750s prepared at the order of 
the General Commander of Transylvania under the direction of the engineer Major Rebain. The 
early 1750s plans I located in Vienna represent the following border passes: Eisernen Thors (Iron 
Gates on the Danube), Rothe Thurn, Törtzburg, Tömös, Oytos, Rodna, and the road going 
through the Fagaras Mountains from Transylvania to Wallachia.330 
In addition to concern for the state of the fortifications guarding the mountain passes 
connecting Transylvania with Moldavia and Wallachia, another priority of the Viennese Court in 
the early 1750s was asserting without any doubt their territorial pretentions in the border areas. 
Therefore, starting with 1750, the Transylvanian officer Stephan Lutsch von Luchsenstein spent 
almost a decade preparing maps of Transylvania’s borders and detailed reports to support the 
Habsburg claims.331 The contribution of these border maps to further Habsburg territorial claims 
is discussed in chapter 5.  
Mountain passes were one of the key elements Luchsenstein represented on his border 
maps. For example, during 1753 and 1754, Luchsenstein prepared a representation of the 
borderline between Transylvania and Wallachia entitled Map of Transylvania’s borders towards 
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Walachia (Siebenbürgische Gräntz-Carte gegen der Walachey).332 Luchsenstein captured on this 
document information about the location of all roads and paths crossing over the border between 
Transylvania and Wallachia, especially the lesser-known ones. The Habsburg authorities were 
interested in policing the people’s circulation on these footpaths. Therefore, we can infer that 
Luchsenstein’s border map was to not only help support Habsburg claims against their 
neighbors, but was also supposed to assist the Habsburg border officers to control movement of 
the population and to put a stop to contraband, illegal migration and the spread of diseases.  
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the area nearby the mountain passes Buzau and Tömös. In the 
case of the Bozauer Pass, Luchsenstein marked the position of a fortification (red rectangle 
surrounded by a sketch representing walls, in the center of Figure 3.3.). For the Tömös Pass, the 
officer added the location of the Vor-Contumatz, a quarantine and customs station (in the center 
of Figure 3.4.). Moreover, as seen in these figures, Luchsenstein marked numerous roads and 
footpaths, making this map invaluable for the gränzer patrolling these regions. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Bozauer Pass on Luchsenstein’s Map of 
Transylvania’s borders towards Walachia 
 
Figure 3.4 Tömes Pass on Luchsenstein’s Map of 
Transylvania’s borders towards Walachia  
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Luchsenstein was not merely an officer with mapmaking abilities. By 1760 he had 
become the commander of the Transylvanian quarantine line troops and, when the Habsburg 
Military Border was extended to Transylvania, Luchsenstein became the commander of the First 
Wallach Regiment.333 This engineer’s professional trajectory demonstrates that his broad 
geographic knowledge regarding Transylvania’s borderlands made him essential in enforcing the 
Habsburg sanitary and military policies in this province.  
After the first wave of detailed mapping of Transylvania’s mountain passes in the 1750s, 
the Habsburg authorities continued to send high officers to inspect these areas and prepare 
descriptions with suggestions for the improvement of the province’s defense. In 1763, Lieutenant 
General Ferdinand Philipp von Harsch visited all significant Transylvanian fortresses, castles and 
mountain passes and wrote a memoir.334 As a supplement to this document Harsch prepared a 
series of plans and maps showing these interest points and suggesting improvements to their 
defensive structures. Although the location of these drawings in Viennese archives eluded me, I 
located a second copy of Harsch’s description in Sibiu. This copy included six plans showing the 
area nearby the mountain passes Borgo, Gymes, Oytos, Buzau, Tömös and Törtzburg.335 
 In his memoir, Harsch underscored that in addition to the main passes connecting 
Transylvania with the Danubian Principalities, there existed hundreds of other paths accessible 
only on foot or on horse. He considered these smaller paths dangerous not because of the 
possibility of an enemy invasion, but because they constituted outlets for the inhabitants of 
Moldavia and Wallachia to circulate freely between their lands and Transylvania, thus promoting 
robberies and movement of contraband. For a better protection of Transylvania’s borders, Harsch 
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proposed the preparation of a detailed map displaying all footpaths and the topography of the 
mountains. Furthermore, this officer expressed his concern that imperial troops deployed in 
Transylvania had no chance to ensure the protection of the border, due to its length and the 
existence of these numerous passages.336 Harsch’s inspection and suggestions probably 
constituted one of the factors that supported the creation of Transylvanian Military Border 
regiments. Recruited from among local peasants, the gränzer had a good knowledge of the 
province’s topography and provided much needed manpower to police the borderlands.  
 In his report, Harsch also described in detail the main mountain passes and their defenses 
at the time of his visit and offered suggestions for further improvements. For example, when 
describing the Borgo Pas, this officer mentioned the existence of a road going all the way to the 
foot of the mountains and continuing across the border, in the form of a difficult road that could 
be travelled on horse or by foot. The entrance to the Borgo pass was located between two 
heights, and Harsch suggested building two fortresses at those sites and protecting them with an 
abatis, i.e. an obstacle composed from the branches of trees.337  
 
 
  
Figure 3.5 Map of Borgo Pass accompanying the 1763 Harsch Memoir 
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Figure 3.5. shows details from the map Harsch prepared for the area nearby Borgo.338 In 
the left side image, the letter A represents the custom and quarantine point, and the letter B 
indicates the presence of an inn. In the right side image, the two letters E show the position of the 
fortifications Harsch proposed as new defenses for this pass, and the letter F marks the location 
he suggested for the abatis. Harsch’s map reveals that the mountain pass represented both an 
important strategic military point and also helped enforce customs fees and sanitary measures. 
The Habsburg desire to accumulate what they considered accurate representations of 
Transylvania’s borders, especially the mountain passes, improved the defense of the Monarchy’s 
borders both from foreign troops and peacetime invaders, including germs and different types of 
criminals. The efforts of Viennese rulers to learn as much as possible about the geography of the 
province guided Maria Theresa and Joseph II’s military, sanitary and population control policies 
in the Carpathian Mountains. 
3.3 INVENTORYING TRANSYLVANIA’S GEOGRAPHY 
The Habsburgs desired not only to obtain good maps of their empire’s strategic points on the 
borderline, but also to acquire accurate representations of their dominions. Before the expansion 
of the Military Border into Transylvania and the gränzers’ contributions to mapping the 
province, Stephan Lutsch von Luchsenstein’s 1751 map of Transylvania, Principatus 
Transylvaniae (The Principality of Transylvania) remained the most coveted cartographic work 
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for this area. Known as the Luchsenstein Map, this representation of Transylania has survived in 
multiple copies both in archives in Vienna and Romania (Figure 3.6).339  
The map’s legend includes a variety of interest points, such as fortresses, settlements, 
churches, mills, mines, post stations, customs stations, roads, ruins, famous battle points and 
administrative subdivisions. For example, Figure 3.7 includes a detail from Figure 3.6, centered 
on the Saxon seat Mühlenbach (Sebeş), for which Luchsenstein prefers to use the Latin toponym, 
Sabesiensis.340 The red circles mark villages, while the main town of this Saxon seat appears as a 
series of red squares surrounded by walls. Above the main town, we encounter the symbol for a 
post office station. On the left side of this fragment star-shaped signs mark the presence of gold 
in the gravel bed of the river. The image includes two types of border: the yellow line marks the 
border of the Saxon seat, while the light green contour delimitates the neighboring Hungarian 
county.  
 
                                                          
339 See for example KA KPS, BIX a 702; Ibid., BIX a 716; Ibid., BIX a 717; ÖNB, Kartensammlung, FKB 
C.105.1a-v; Ibid., FKB C.107.A.1-4; Ibid., FKB C.107.3, Cluj-Napoca, Biblioteca Centrală Universitară (BCU), 
Special Collections, H 70/1; Sibiu, Biblioteca Brukenthal, Harti, No 5731. Figure 3.6 is a reproduction of ÖNB, 
Kartensammlung, FKB C.107.5a-d. 
340 ÖNB, Kartensammlung, FKB C.107.5a-d. 
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Figure 3.6 Luchsenstein’s Principality of Transylvania (1762) 
 
 
Figure 3.7 The Saxon seat Mühlenbach on Luchsenstein’s Principality of Transylvania (1762) 
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Luchsenstein’s Map demonstrates the complex situation of Transylvania’s administrative 
subdivisions. For centuries, Transylvania had been divided among eleven Hungarian counties 
and two districts, five Szekler seats, and nine Saxon seats and two districts.341 The creation of the 
Military Border in the early 1760s only added to the complexity of the administrative geography 
of this province. The Transylvanian elites and town inhabitants defended the maintenance of 
their traditional counties and seats, as this system conferred them political and economic 
advantages.  
Luchsenstein’s career, discussed in detail in chapter 2, demonstrates how the Habsburg 
central authorities co-opted local elites in the process of provincial integration. Not only was 
Luchsenstein born, raised and trained in Transylvania, but he also became the geographical 
expert of the region. However, towards the end of his military service, Luchsenstein worked 
together with a new generation of military engineers who had served the Habsburgs in various 
provinces and had coordinated cartographic projects that encompassed more than one of 
Vienna’s domions. After Maria Theresa ordered the beginning of the work on the Great Military 
Map of Transylvania, Luchsenstein’s name does not appear on any of the lists of engineers 
working on this project. Instead, the Aulic War Council commissioned two officers of the 
general quartermaster’s staff, Dominik Camiotti de Fabris Count of Cassano and Mihály Lajos 
Jeney, to coordinate this enterprise.  
Luchsenstein’s maps offered the authorities in Vienna an image of Transylvania that 
brought to the forefront the position of settlements, the larger roads and waterways, a series of 
economic interest points and the complex administrative division of the province. However, 
Luchsenstein’s work did not offer detailed representations of each of the settlements and did not 
convey well enough the complexity of the natural and human landscape. Moreover, projects such 
                                                          
341 Elke Josupeit-Neitzel, Die Reformen Josephs II. in Siebenbürgen (Munich: Rudolf Trofenik, 1986), 99. 
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as Luchsestein’s map could not compete with larger topographic works, such as the famous 
Cassini Map of France. Therefore, it did not take long for the Habsburg rulers to commission a 
series of large-scale topographic maps accompanied by detailed geographic descriptions, known 
in the literature as the Josephine Survey (Josephinische Aufnahme), but called in eighteenth 
century documents the Great Military Map.342  
The order for a comprehensive mapping project of the Monarchy was linked to the 
disastrous defeats at the hands of the Prussian armies during the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763). 
After the Peace of Hubertusburg, signed on February 15, 1763, the President of the Aulic War 
Council, Count Leopold Joseph Daun, convinced Maria Theresa to order a detailed topographic 
map of her vast dominions.343 The proposal for such a cartographic project came initially from 
the Lieutenant Field Marshal Count Franz Moritz Lacy, who had served for most of the Seven 
Years’ War as the first Quartermaster General of the Habsburg Monarchy and thus had been in 
charge of preparing military operation plans.344 No one knew better than Lacy the disadvantage 
Habsburg troops suffered on the field because of the lack of maps. In her detailed biography of 
Lacy, Edith Kotasek makes clear this officer’s interest in cartography as a government tool, 
especially after his appointment in 1766 as the Aulic War Council’s President.345 Lacy’s 
proposal resonated with the prior President, Daun, who agreed that the Aulic War Council’s 
efficiency relied on knowing very well “the location of all borders and the situation of territory 
                                                          
342 The Great Military Map of Transylvania is known in the literature as the Josephinische Aufnahme due to Joseph 
II’s important part in the development of cartography and the continuation of this mapping project throughout his 
reign. Moreover, after Joseph II’s promotion to the rank of co-regent in 1765, the emperor became responsible for 
imperial military matters, which included map-making. Dörflinger, Die Österreichische Kartographie, vol. 1, 63.  
343 Ibid., 63. 
344 Hochedlinger, Austria’s Wars of Emergence, 307. Kotasek, Feldmarschall Graf Lacy, 24-27.  
345 For example, in the early 1780s Lacy sent officers undercover into Ottoman territories to gather information 
about those territories and their inhabitants. Kotasek, Feldmarschall Graf Lacy, 169-170. 
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of the [Monarchy’s] own polities.” Therefore, Daun also believed in the need to collect maps and 
geographic descriptions of the Habsburg Monarchy’s domains.346 
Initially, Maria Theresa approved a trial mapping of the fragment of Austrian Silesia that 
had survived the Prussian conquest. This territory had been the entry point for Prussian troops 
during the War for the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years’ War. Therefore, Maria 
Theresa’s decision to start the mapping in Silesia demonstrates the primarily military purpose of 
this cartographic project. The success of the mapping of Silesia, together with Lacy’s proposal 
from May 2, 1764, convinced her to extend the map to the rest of the Habsburg dominions. As a 
result, the surveying work for the Great Military Map started in border provinces and moved 
inwards. Between 1763 and 1787, the Habsburg officers surveyed 570,000 square kilometers, an 
estimate that does not include the territory of the Austrian Netherlands mapped under the 
direction of Count Ferraris.347 As can be seen in Figure 3.8, Lombardy and Tyrol, were not 
included in this project.348 Moreover, in the case of the Austrian Netherlands, instead of using 
the scale of 1:28,800 preferred for all the other sections of these maps, the survey was done at 
1:11,520 and a smaller version of this map (1:86,400) was engraved and sold to the public.349 
                                                          
346 Original: “von der lage aller gränzen und von der situation deren landen des eigenen staates.” Cited in Claudio 
Donati, “L’organizzazione Militare della Monarchia Austriaca nel secolo XVIII e i suoi rapporti con i territori e le 
popolazioni italiane. Prime Ricerche,” in Osterreichisches Italien – Italienisches Osterreich? Interkulturelle 
Gemeinsamkeiten und nationale Differenzen vom 18. Jahrhundert bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges, ed. Brigitte 
Mazohl-Wallnig, and Marco Meriggi (Vienna: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1999), 
310. 
347 Johannes Dörflinger, “Vom Aufstieg der Militärkartographie (nach 1683) bis zum Wiener Kongress (1815),” in 
Österreichische Kartographie: von den Anfängen im 15. Jahrhundert bis zum 21. Jahrhundert, eds. Ingrid 
Kretschmer, Johannes Dörflinger, and Franz Wawrik (Vienna: Inst. für Geographie und Regionalforschung, 2004), 
78. 
348 The information included in this figure has been adapted based on: Ernst von Nischer-Falkenhof, “The Survey by 
the Austrian General Staff under the Empress Maria Theresia and the Emperor Joseph II, and the Subsequent Initial 
Surveys of Neighbouring Territories during the Years 1749-1854,” Imago Mundi 2 (1937): 83-88; Jankó, “An 
Outstanding person of the 1st Military Survey,” 202; Karen De Coene, Thérèse Ongena, Frederic Stragier, Soetkin 
Vervust, Wouter Bracke and Philippe De Maeyer, “Ferraris, the Legend,” Cartographic Journal 49, no. 1 (February 
2012): 30-42. A detailed discussion of this military survey is included in Paldus, Die militärischen Aufnahmen im 
Bereiche der habsburgischen Länder aus der Zeit Kaiser Josephs II. 
349 Dörflinger, Die Österreichische Kartographie, vol. 1, 64.  
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Figure 3.8 The Habsburg Provinces and the Great Military Map (1763-1787) 
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An exhaustive study of the Great Military Maps of the Habsburg lands is beyond my 
scope. Here, I discuss, the southeastern border of the Monarchy, Transylvania. The cartographic 
production, in this focal point for military confrontations among Russians, Ottomans and 
Habsburgs in the eighteenth century, exemplifies the importance of inter-imperial and trans-
imperial connections and negotiations the Viennese rulers faced in order to preserve their control 
of Transylvania. However, the richness of objectives included on this map suggests the influence 
of cameralist economic thought and the impact this map probably had on more than military 
measures. That is, the Great Military Map of Transylvania served a variety of military purposes, 
but also encompassed numerous economic objectives such as mines, types of crops, and a 
detailed layout of all settlements.350 Moreover, this project did not remain limited to the imperial 
southeastern borders. Emperor Joseph II ordered the extension of the map into the border areas 
of the neighboring Danubian Principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, as a preparatory step for a 
possible Habsburg expansion.351 The following section aims to uncover some of the details of 
the mapping process such as the survey techniques, the costs, the personnel and the continuous 
effort to jealously guard this detailed cartographic information to help it remain in the hands of 
the central authorities. The whirlwind of cartographic activities that engulfed Transylvania in the 
eighteenth century demonstrates the importance of geographical knowledge for the imperial 
strategy of consolidation and possible expansion. 
The cartographic work of Habsburg military officers should not be seen as having 
importance only for the army or the defense of the province. The Habsburg authorities 
envisioned the Great Military Map of Transylvania in conjunction with other projects that would 
have described the economic potential of the region. On September 10, 1768, the president of the 
                                                          
350 Madalina-Valeria Veres, “Putting Transylvania on the Map: Cartography and Enlightened Absolutism in the 
Habsburg Monarchy,” Austrian History Yearbook 43 (2012): 141-164. 
351 Veres, “Redefining Imperial Borders,” 1-21. 
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Aulic War Council in Vienna informed Transylvania’s military commander, O’Donnell, that in 
addition to the mapping of Transylvania, the Habsburg rulers desired detailed information about 
all the settlements. In preparation for this project, O’Donnell had to use instructions and 
templates similar to those that had been used for the earlier work in Bohemia.352 O’Donnell 
conveyed this order, together with a standard form for gathering data, to the commanders of 
regiments and battalions from Transylvania on January 7, 1769.353 Each commander had to send 
one or more officers in their district’s settlements to gather information about the numbers of 
houses and stables, the capacity of each place to accomodate troops and horses during war or 
peace, the distances between various settlements in “hours,” an estimate of cattle and other 
provisions, and a complete list of all cities, market towns and villages. The officers had to collect 
the information in a peaceful manner, avoiding conflicts with the local authorities. According to 
O’Donnell, the project was not extremely urgent and could be finished by 1770.  
Whereas for the provinces of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, the great military map was 
accompanied only by a description of the land and a list of all the settlements, Maria Theresa had 
different plans for Transylvania. On January 4, 1769 the imperial order sent from Vienna to 
O’Donnell stated that in addition to the mapping of the province, the description of the land and 
a list of all settlements, the military engineers should also prepare an öconomische Conscription 
(economic survey). The template of this economic survey included sections for the amount of 
cultivated and uncultivated fields; the size of meadows, vineyards, forests, swamps and lakes; the 
types and number of mills, inns, distilleries, breweries, tanners, abattoirs, lime ovens; and 
additional information about the best crops for each settlement and the occupations of the 
                                                          
352AN CC, Document 6 (1768), November 26, 1768. 
353 AN CC, Document 1 (1769), January 7, 1769 
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inhabitants.354 This project exemplifies the Habsburg authorities’ desire to inventory and 
quantify the economic potential of Transylvania.  
The aspiration to map and quantify the Transylvanian territory was part of the larger 
eighteenth century esprit géometrique (quantifying spirit) that had pervaded various branches of 
knowledge and the practice of state-government.355 In the case of the Habsburg Monarchy, land 
surveying and mapping bolstered the development of this state’s fiscal and military power.356 
The need to build a strong army in the context of eighteenth century military competitiveness 
triggered the innovative administrative, economic, religious and social measures introduced by 
Maria Theresa and Joseph II, known in the [recent] literature as Enlightened Absolutism.357 
Studies focusing on these two rulers have repeatedly looked for the origins of their Enlightened 
Absolutism in the emergence of cameralist policies, influential in numerous German states from 
the seventeenth century onwards.358  
Cameralists, or the servants of the treasure chamber of the prince (Kammer), emerged as 
a specific bureaucratic class and developed plans to increase the princes’ revenue all over the 
German world.359 Cameralist writings argue that the power of political rulers was based on 
economic prosperity that relied on the state’s ability to raise revenue from its domains and 
subjects. Two influential eighteenth-century cameralists, Johann von Justi and Joseph von 
                                                          
354 Ibid., April 1, 1769. 
355 J.L. Heilbron, introduction to The Quantifying Spirit in the Eighteenth Century, eds. Tore Frangsmyr, J. L. 
Heilbron, and Robin E. Rider (Berkeley: University of California Press 1990), 2.  
356 Dickson analyzed in great detail the development of government during Maria Theresa, with a special focus on 
the variety of economic mechanisms used to increase the revenue of the Habsburg Monarchy. Dickson, Finance and 
Government under Maria Theresia. 
357 Hochedlinger, “The Habsburg Monarchy,” 55-94. 
358 Szabo, Kaunitz and Enlightened Absolutism, 5 
359 For works on cameralism see Albion Small, The Cameralists: The Pioneers of German Social Polity (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1909); Keith Tribe, Governing Economy: The Reformation of German Economic 
Discourse, 1750–1840 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Andre Wakefield, The Disordered Police 
State: German Cameralism as Science and Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
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Sonnenfels, received teaching positions at the University of Vienna in the 1760s.360 Under the 
influence of cameralist thinkers, such as Justi and Sonnenfels, the Habsburg political authorities 
strived to transplant the cameralist ordinances’ ability to gather revenues to the scale of their 
empire.361 As part of this effort, the political authorities in Vienna relied on territorial knowledge 
compiled in the form of maps, geographic and economic descriptions. The economic survey 
Maria Theresa envisioned for Transylvania was no different in that sense.  
At first, O’Donnell was not sure what the term “economic survey” entailed and why it 
was so urgent, so he asked for further clarification from the president of the Aulic War Council, 
Lacy.362 In his answer, Lacy explained that the province of Transylvania encompassed many 
undeveloped and uncultivated areas. Moreover, the taxation system did not reflect the actual 
distribution of land ownership and revenue as the authorities had no clear record of all the land 
pieces. Lacy warned O’Donnell to proceed with caution and to instruct the officers in charge of 
the economic survey to avoid starting any conflicts with the local inhabitants of the surveyed 
lands. The imperial authorities wanted to keep the economic survey operations secret from the 
locals and therefore they ordered the Transylvanian authorities to combine the surveying work 
with the process of mapping the province.363 In his query to Vienna from January 25, 1769 
O’Donnell inquired whether the economic survey would precede a new taxation system.364 This 
should not be surprising, as even during the surveying for the Cassini Map of France, peasants 
regarded the work of surveyors with suspicion, as possible precursors to an increase in 
                                                          
360 Tribe, Governing Economy, 19, 55, 78-79. 
361 Charles Ingrao, “The Problem of “Enlightened Absolutism” and the German States,” The Journal of Modern 
History 58 (1986): 161-180; Grete Klingenstein, “Between Mercantilism and Physiocracy. Stages, Modes, and 
Functions of Economic Theory in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1748-63,” in State and society in early modern Austria, 
ed. Charles Ingrao (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1994), 200. 
362 AN CC, Document 1 (1769), January 25, 1769. 
363 AN CC, Document 1 (1769), March 16, 1769. 
364 AN CC, Document 1 (1769), January 25, 1769 
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taxation.365 Moreover, we also know that for the mapping of Bohemia and Moravia, which 
preceded the Transylvanian survey, the imperial orders had prohibited the disclosure of 
information about the detailed land description to the local political authorities. The mapping 
officers had to describe the survey operations to the locals as focusing on the names of the 
settlements, the main rivers, mountains, forests, and the distance between various settlements.366 
In theory, these precautionary measures helped protect the surveyors from possible aggressive 
and uncooperative reactions from local authorities and inhabitants. 
Aware of the complexity of joining a mapping project with a detailed economic survey 
for the Transylvanian territory, the Habsburg military authorities first ordered a trial for the small 
Saxon seat of Mühlenbach (Sebeş). Therefore, on May 8, 1769, the coordinator of the mapping 
project, Fabris, and his subordinates left for Mühlenbach to start the survey.367 The choice of the 
Mühlenbach seat was not accidental; the Viennese authorities suspected the Saxon Nation living 
in Transylvania for trying to evade paying all their taxes. Therefore, surveying in detail the small 
Saxon seat of Mühlenbach could provide evidence to support such a suspicion and justify a 
detailed economic survey of all Saxon lands. Indeed, the results of the economic survey of 
Mühlenbach confirmed that the community owed 10,800 florins more than they had paid in 
taxes.368 
This measure to obtain an accurate estimation of the capacity of Mühlenbach’s 
inhabitants to pay land taxes was part of a more general package of economic measures the 
Habsburg rulers implemented from the 1750s onwards. In 1754, the authorities approved the 
plan of Court Chancellor Graf Bethlen to introduce a new fiscal system for Transylvania, which 
                                                          
365 Konvitz, Cartography in France, 14. 
366 Rill, “Die Anfänge der Militärkartographie in den Habsburgischen Erblanden,” 183-202, 188. 
367 AN CC, Document 1 (1769), May 10, 1769. 
368 KA HKR, 1769 66 137, 13, November 4, 1769, O’Donnell. 
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moved from collective towards individual fiscal responsibility with respect to taxes.369 However, 
Bethlen’s system was not equitable, and soon gave way to governor Adolf von Buccow’s 1763 
reform and later to future governor Samuel Brukenthal’s 1770 system.370 Clearly, the 1769 plans 
for an economic survey have to be seen in the context of these imperial taxation reforms that 
relied on statistical information from the province. In 1767, just a couple of years before the 
Mühlenbach experiment, Chancellor Kaunitz had presented to Maria Teresa a plan for agrarian 
reform in order to increase the amount of taxes; Kaunitz’s plan stressed the importance of 
gathering accurate economic statistics.371 Therefore, the Mühlenbach economic survey fit the 
chancellor’s vision perfectly.  
The results Fabris and his subordinates gathered, in the form of maps and a detailed 
economic inventory, underwent an evaluation process in Vienna. Anton Koczian, a junior 
treasury official and former estate steward for Count Harrach, was chosen to analyze the results 
of this economic survey.372 For the Mühlenbach map and economic survey, Koczian 
recommended a clearer representation of the borders between villages, a clearer identification of 
the imperial estates, the addition of a list of represented settlements on each of the map sections, 
and the insertion of information about schools and their religious affiliation.373 Whereas the first 
three points would have contributed to preparing the immediate taxation reform, the last point 
                                                          
369 Ioan Lumperdean, Rudolf Gräf, Thomas Nägler, “Economy and Social Structures,” in The History of 
Transylvania, vol 3, 78. 
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regarding schools demonstrates that cartographic projects served as repositories of information 
for both current and possible future reforms.  
Figure 3.9 shows a fragment of the Mühlenbach map displaying the village Petersdorf 
(Petrești, Péterfalva) and its neighboring area.374 The mapmakers paid special attention to the 
position of the buildings and their gardens, the road network and the waterways. However, just 
by itself, the map does not capture fully the value of the domains and does not offer all of the 
necessary information that could have helped assess or reform taxation for this area. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9 Petersdorf on the map of the Mühlenbach seat (1769) 
 
 
Both Koczian and the imperial authorities were satisfied with the result of the 
Mühlenbach trial, as it revealed the existence of significant amounts of land that had escaped the 
tax collectors. However, probably because of time and resources limitations, the Aulic War 
Council ordered on February 19, 1770, that the mapping of the rest of Transylvania should not 
                                                          
374 KA KPS, BIX a 741, section 11. 
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involve all the operations done for Mühlenbach, namely the addition of the economic survey. 
Nonetheless, the authorities encouraged all military engineers to include on their maps 
information useful for both military and economic purposes.375  
A close examination of the commissioning and results of the Mühlenbach surveying 
operations clarifies how Vienna hoped to use maps as instruments in the process of 
centralization. The Habsburg authorities decided to gather geographic information in the form of 
maps, descriptions and economic surveys in order to use it against local groups who repeatedly 
tried to evade paying taxes. The lack of sufficient financial resources and trained personnel 
hampered the Habsburgs from extending this complete package of knowledge-gathering 
mechanisms at the scale of the whole province. The commissioning of a detailed inventory of all 
the land plots, in the form of an imperial cadaster, had to wait until the Josephine cadaster of the 
late 1780s. The Great Military Map of Transylvania, together with its accompanying description, 
became in this context the most important official repository of both military and economic 
information. 
3.4 IMPERIAL AND PROVINCIAL MAPMAKERS 
Examining in detail the personnel who worked on the Great Military Map of Transylvania allows 
us to shed new light on the development of the concept of surveying and mapmaking expertise. 
The Habsburg authorities co-opted different groups to contribute to the implementation of their 
cartographic projects. Military officers that had worked on similar surveying enterprises on the 
scale of the empire, and sometimes even had an international experience, conceptualized and 
                                                          
375 KA HKR, Protokoll 1037, Rubric 57, entry 19; AN Brukenthal, 120; RR 1-68, folios 108-108 verso. 
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supervised the mapping of Transylvania. Secondly, officers belonging to the regiments stationed 
in Transylvania carried on the basic surveying work and the copying of drafts into clean copies. 
Thirdly, all the surveyors relied on the help of locals in gathering information about the 
toponymy and the layout of the land. Members of the local Hussar regiments, fluent in the local 
languages, assisted the process of communication between the mapmaking engineers and the 
local population. Chapter 2 discussed the institutionalization and training of military engineers in 
the eighteenth century and offered information about the careers of Stephan Lutsch von 
Luchsenstein and Mihály Lajos Jeney, both of whom prepared cartographic material for 
Transylvania. Military engineers subordinate to the Aulic War Council collected geographic 
information about Transylvania from the local inhabitants. The maps prepared for the Habsburg 
government travelled to Vienna and helped the rulers centralize their dominions, frequently 
against the interests of the Transylvanians who had provided the geographic information.  
Initially, in order to ensure a consistent high quality for this ambitious mapping 
enterprise, the imperial authorities planned to use only personnel attached to the centralized 
quartermaster general’s staff and so sent to Transylvania Colonel Fabris, Captains Stadler and 
Bienner, and Cadets Bromig and Fischer.376 Furthermore, Captain Hohenhausen and Major 
Jeney377 were already working on military projects in this region.378 However, the prior mapping 
of Bohemia and Moravia (1764-1768) had demonstrated the insufficiency of trained personnel 
attached to the quartermaster general’s staff for the efficient completion of these provincial Great 
Military Maps. Even though initially imperial authorities had planned for the mapping of 
Bohemia and the Military Border of Transylvania to start concomitantly, by 1765 it became clear 
                                                          
376 Although initially some of the personnel were supposed to help only with copying, some did more. For example, 
Fabris insisted that due to lack of personnel Cadets Fischer and Bromig also had to assist with the surveying process. 
AN CC, Document 1 (1769), May 10, 1769. 
377 Spelled in many documents as “Geneyne.” 
378 AN CC, Document 6 (1768), August 20, 1768. 
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that this was not a viable option.379 Although the mapping of Bohemia and Moravia had been 
finalized before starting the work in Transylvania, the lack of sufficient officers affiliated to the 
Quartermaster General Staff persisted. Therefore, the Aulic War Council ordered the general 
commander of Transylvania to enlist from the local regiments all officers specialized in the art of 
land surveying and mapmaking.380 On August 20, 1768, O’Donnell forwarded this command to 
all the commanders of regiments deployed in Transylvania, asking for lists of all the officers that 
could help with the mapping of the province.381 
For three summer and three winter campaigns, from the summer of 1769 until the winter 
of 1771-1772, around twenty-five officers from the regiments deployed in Transylvania 
contributed to the completion of the Great Military Map.382 The gränzer became a key 
component in mapping the region, and at least twelve border officers contributed to this 
enterprise. Some of them, such as Captain Gärtner, Senior Lieutenant Benselini/Penzolini and 
Second Lieutenant Brunetz, took part in the mapping operations for the duration of this project. 
Moreover, they were involved in both the surveying and copying operations. The prevalence of 
gränzer names demonstrates the importance of the Military Border regiments to mapping the 
region. Some of their strong points included their familiarity with this province and their ability 
to communicate with the local population. 
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Table 3.1 Table of Military Border regiments’ officers who contributed to the Great Military Map of Transylvania 
Regiment Rank Name Summer 
Operations 
Winter 
Operations 
First Szekler 
Infantry 
Captain A Sole 1770-1771 1771-1772 
First Wallach 
Infantry 
Captain Gärtner 1769-1771 1769-1772 
First Wallach 
Infantry 
Captain Teseo 1769-1771  
Second Szekler 
Infantry 
Senior 
Lieutenant 
Benselini/Penzolini 1769-1771 1771-1772 
Second Wallach 
Infantry 
Cadet Bedeus 1771 1771-1772 
Second Wallach 
Infantry 
Second 
Lieutenant 
Brunetz 1769-1771 1769-1772 
Second Wallach 
Infantry 
Cadet Mieg 1771 1771-1772 
Second Wallach 
Infantry 
Captain Schnitter 1770  
Second Wallach 
Infantry 
Second 
Lieutenant 
Schotenstein 1770  
Second Wallach 
Infantry 
Second 
Lieutenant 
Schuller 1770  
Wallach Dragoner Captain Kraus 1770-1771  
Wallach Dragoner Second 
Lieutenant 
Rauchmüller 1770  
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Although local officers performed most of the ground measurements and copying for the 
Great Military Map, the success of the project hinged on the imperial coordinator, Dominik 
Camiotti de Fabris, Count of Cassano. Having successfully completed the mapping of Bohemia 
and Moravia, Fabris used this prior experience in preparing the survey of Transylvania. In his 
report regarding the beginning of the mapping operations in this province, Fabris asked that each 
officer should travel together with a local Hussar (member of the light cavalry) who knew 
German and the other languages of the land (Hungarian and Romanian).383 These local 
intermediaries were essential as more than half of the mapping officers came from outside the 
province and could not communicate easily with the locals. The Transylvanian authorities were 
also active agents in other aspects of the surveying process; Fabris requested his superiors ensure 
that each administrative sub-unit send a report of the state of their lands and the local toponyms 
for settlements, mountains, forests, waters and other important geographical units.384 Although 
the archival documents have not preserved the name of the Hussars and the local officials, their 
work contributed significantly to the final military map of Transylvania.  
As the project’s coordinator, Fabris was also responsible for the payment of wages and 
other financial expenses. Already during the planning phase, the military authorities in Vienna 
had suggested ways to keep the cost of the survey operations low. For example, the officers 
recruited from the regiments deployed in Transylvania to help with the mapping received 30 
florins per month during the summer and 20 florins during the winter. On the other hand, the 
members of the staff with no officer rank received 20 florins per month during the summer and 
15 florins during the winter. From this allowance, the army personnel paid for their 
                                                          
383 AN CC, Document 1 (1769), April 1, 1769. 
384 Ibid. 
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transportation, paper, colors and other materials needed for the map-making operations.385 The 
Habsburg military authorities hoped to find free accommodation for the surveying officers, 
especially during their summer travels. Moreover, Fabris requested good winter accommodations 
for himself and his personnel so that the officers could turn the map drafts into clean copies.386 
Local institutions such as the provincial Gubernium (Government) and the Aerario (Treasury) 
had to offer these officers transportation vehicles, provisions for men and horses at a fair price 
and free accommodation.387  
Fabris had an important role in deciding not only the composition of the surveying teams 
and their payment, but also in choosing the surveying technique used. In order to accelerate the 
work, the Habsburg military authorities decided to disregard correlating geodetic measurements 
with astronomic ones. However, the final result had to be precise enough to serve military 
purposes. Therefore, using the plane table as part of the survey process became an important 
element that differentiated the work done in Transylvania from the earlier mapping of Bohemia 
and Moravia.388 Lacy gave O’Donnell the option to either combine the à la vue technique used 
for Bohemia and Moravia with some measurements done with the plane table or to prioritize the 
use of plane tables.389 After consulting with colonel Fabris, O’Donnell informed Lacy that he 
preferred performing a geometrical survey with the help of the plane table. At Fabris’s 
suggestion, O’Donnell adopted this technique for Transylvania because, in addition to military 
interest points, the final map could incorporate information about the quality of the land and the 
precise dimensions of the domains. In the military commander’s words, a map surveyed in this 
                                                          
385 AN CC, Document 6 (1768), November 26, 1768 
386 AN CC, Document 1 (1769), April 1, 1769. 
387 AN CC, Document 1 (1769), January 18, 1769. 
388 The plane table was a wooden plank mounted on a tripod that served as a drawing surface for the surveyor. In 
addition to the plane table, the surveyor used a straight edge called an “alidade” to draw his sight lines. Edney, 
Mapping an Empire, 108.  
389 AN CC, Document 1 (1769), March 16, 1769. 
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manner would offer the Habsburg rulers “one of the most complete maps through which the 
knowledge of this Great Principality can be used for various goals,” such as a future taxation 
reform.390 
From the planning phases and throughout the implementation of this project, Fabris 
influenced the personnel choices and techniques used for the mapping of Transylvania. Due to 
his prior experience in coordinating similar projects in other parts of the empire, Fabris had a 
larger vision than the local military officers. However, the Great Military Map of Transylvania 
and its accompanying geographic description could have not been finalized without the help of 
more than twenty military engineers, local administrators, the Hussars who eased the 
communication between imperial and local agents, and the local population, who offered 
essential information such as the toponymy of all settlements and landscape features. The Great 
Military Map of Transylvania embodies the imperial center-province collaboration that took 
place in the process of state consolidation.  
                                                          
390 “Ihre Mayt eine der vollkommeste Carten getiefert werden kann mittelst welcher allerhoechst dieselbe in die 
Kanntnußdieses Groß Fuerstenthums in verschiedenen Betracht kommen können, und worzu sich etwa niemahlen 
mehr eine so bequeme Gelegenheit, wie die dermählige ist, fügen dörfte.” AN CC, Document 1 (1769), April 18, 
1769.  
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Figure 3.10 Carlsburg and its surroundings on the Great Military Map of Transylvania 
 
 
The immense detail incorporated in the final map sheets is impressive. Figure 3.10 
reproduces a very small fragment from section 170, showing the town of Carlsburg and its 
surroundings.391 The officers captured the layout of the town, the structure of the fortification, the 
road network and the waterways. The word Gericht close to the bottom left of the image marks 
an execution place. The number 30 indicates a customs point, and the horn symbol next to this 
number represents a postal station. In addition to these elements included in figure 3.10, the 
mapmakers paid special attention to the location of mines and mills, crops, monasteries, ruins 
and famous battlefields. In general, the scrutinizing Habsburg cartographic gaze tried to 
incorporate all significant economic, military, religious and social sites. Due to this project’s 
ambition to categorize the Transylvanian landscape and represent it with precision and accuracy, 
the Great Military Map can be considered part of the Habsburg Enlightenment.392 
                                                          
391 Az Elsö Katonai Félméres Erdély és a Temesi Bánság, section 170. 
392 For a detailed analysis of the elements incorporated on this map accompanied by graphs highlighting the main 
elements’ frequency, see Veres, “Putting Transylvania on the Map.” 
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In 1772, as Colonel Fabris received the rank of general-major, Mihály Lajos Jeney (1723-
1797) became the new supervisor of the military map of Transylvania. In the summer of 1772 
and the following winter, Jeney coordinated around one third of the total survey and the 
preparation of the corresponding map sheets.393 Starting in 1773, at Joseph II’s order Jeney 
extended the mapmaking operations to the borderlands of Moldavia and Wallachia.394 Figure 
3.11 reproduces a fragment from the 1774 Jeney map entitled New Situation Map of the Great 
Principality of Transylvania together with the borderlands of Moldavia and Wallachia (Neue 
Situations Charte de Gros Fürstenthums Siebenbürgen nebst angraenzenden Theilen der Moldau 
und Walachey). As its title indicates, this map shows the Transylvanian province alongside part 
of Moldavia’s and Wallachia’s territory, and it was a reduced version of the Great Military 
Map.395  
                                                          
393 Each map section covered an area of 2 x 1.75 Austrian square miles or 15.16 x 13.27 square kilometers. We 
know that Jeney coordinated the survey of more than 300 Austrian square miles in the summer of 1772. Paldus, Die 
militärischen Aufnahmen im Bereiche der habsburgischen Länder aus der Zeit Kaiser Josephs II., 76-77. One 
Austrian mile equals 4,000 Austrian klafters or 7.584 meters. Cardarelli, Encyclopaedia of Scientific Units, Weights, 
and Measures, 99 
394 Veres, “Putting Transylvania on the Map,” 154.  
395 I have found two copies of this map. KA KPS, B IX a 715 and ÖNB, Kartensammlung, FKB AA.8.1-4. Figure 
3.11 is a reproduction from KA KPS, B IX a 715, section 4. Annamaria Jankó dates this map to 1775, but a 
document from the Austrian National Library mentions an earlier date (1774). Jankó, “An Outstanding Person of the 
1st Military Survey,” 204. 
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Figure 3.11 Cartouche from Jeney’s New Situation Map of the Great Principality of Transylvania together with the 
borderlands of Moldavia and Wallachia (1774) 
 
 
The mapmaker included in the rightmost corner a scene showing the team of surveyors at 
work. The different hats and clothes distinguish among what I identify as the three categories of 
mapmaking personnel. Dominating the scene are three military engineers who are using 
surveying instruments, such as the plane table (the bottom left corner of the figure), to measure 
and represent the landscape. They are represented as engrossed in the process of surveying. The 
horseman is probably a Hussar in charge of helping the military engineers communicate with the 
locals. The two standing figures in the middle of the image are most likely local officers 
belonging to the border regiments. Whereas one of them is actively participating in the 
measurement process, the other one is simply standing and carrying the engineers’ instruments, a 
clear sign of their inferior position with respect to the officers from the general quartermaster’s 
staff. Missing from the image are the inhabitants of Transylvania whom these officers 
encountered during their surveying operation and who offered information about toponymy and 
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provided lodgment, food and other types of support for the mapmaking operations. Although 
their names have not survived in the imperial archives and their presence has been erased from 
the Habsburg maps, Transylvania’s inhabitants did participate in the surveying of their province. 
The participants in the surveying process influenced the circulation of the cartographic 
information. On one hand, the official Habsburg policy was keeping the Great Military Map of 
Transylvania secret, even from the eyes of provincial authorities. As shown in the next section, 
due to the involvement of local officers in all the phases of this cartographic enterprise, Vienna’s 
authority was subverted, as some of the gränzer reused the information acquired during their 
surveying efforts for their own projects. 
3.5 THE LIMITATIONS OF CARTOGRAPHIC CENSORSHIP 
It might be surprising that a map drawn to help authorities govern their state more efficiently was 
kept out of the reach of the state’s top bureaucrats. However, at a time when border provinces 
often changed masters and the loyalty of provincial elites remained uncertain, this was a logical 
action as the Viennese authorities wanted to avoid the dissemination of strategic information. 
Vienna’s attitude towards cartography stressed the importance of keeping military maps secret. 
This is consistent with the experience of other early-modern empires such as the Spanish 
Habsburgs’ protection of maps.396 Although some historians have argued that by the eighteenth 
                                                          
396 The Spanish monarchs kept their cartographic enterprises secret, a detail which explains why many of their maps 
have never been printed. Indeed, the two main institutions involved with mapmaking worked closely with the 
government to administer the New World. The Casa de Contratación in Seville had, among other responsibilities, 
the task of maintaining accurate maps of the coastal areas and routes to the New World, information constantly 
updated by royal pilots. The Council of Indies worked closely with the king and played a key part in initiating 
projects such as the 1572 initiative to obtain accurate information about all the Spanish colonies. Centralization and 
secrecy characterized the Spanish crown’s cartographic projects. See Portuondo, Secret Science. 
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century the printing industry had made cartographic information available to a wider public,397 
the results of the Great Military Map of the Monarchy (Josephinische Aufnahme) were kept 
secret until the 1850s. Nevertheless, rumors about illicit copies of this map led to thorough 
inquiries shortly after the finalizing of this cartographic project. 
In December 1774, Chancellor Kaunitz ordered the Military Commander of 
Transylvania, General Preiss, to investigate a disturbing rumor: whether the President of the 
Transylvanian Gubernium, the Baron of Brukenthal, had obtained a copy of the smaller scale 
version of the Great Military Map of Transylvania.398 Kaunitz was most likely afraid that 
Brukenthal had obtained a copy of the map Jeney prepared for Emperor Joseph II in 1774, which 
included information about part of the Moldavian and Wallachian territory. In this work Jeney 
had combined and reduced to a smaller scale the two large projects he had worked on: the Great 
Military Map of Transylvania and the Map of the Moldavian and Wallachian borderlands. Figure 
3.12 reproduces one of the twelfth sections of this 1774 map, and shows territory belonging to 
Moldavia (Moldau on the map) and Wallachia.399 Jeney had highlighted the position of 
settlements, the road network and the waterways.  
                                                          
397 Pedley, The Commerce of Cartography. 
398 KA HKR, 1775 57 6.  
399 ÖNB, Kartensammlung, FKB AA.8.1-4, section 12. 
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Figure 3.12 Section 12 of Jeney’s New Situation Map of the Great Principality of Transylvania together with the 
borderlands of Moldavia and Wallachia (1774) 
 
 
As per Kaunitz’s request, Preiss interrogated Major Jeney and Captain Turati. However, both 
officers assured the commander of Transylvania that the military engineers working on the 
survey had not been allowed to preserve any drafts or clean copies of the map sections; 
furthermore, nine military engineers gave written declarations accompanied by their seals that 
they had not kept any drafts or clean copies of the Great Military Map sections, nor made copies 
for anyone else. Indeed, Major Jeney kept all maps under lock and key and no one could access 
them without his knowledge. In the end, however, Jeney informed Preiss that some of the 
personnel working under him spent some of their free time making copies of the well-known 
Luchsenstein Map of Transylvania. Preiss also confessed to Kaunitz that he had heard once 
about the circulation within Transylvania of some copies of the Luchsenstein Map. Therefore, it 
seemed plausible that Brukenthal did not possess the 1774 Jeney map but a copy of the 
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Luchsenstein map. Jeney defended his subordinates and stressed in his report to Preiss that there 
had been no imperial orders prohibiting making copies of the Luchsenstein map.400 
To the report he sent to Vienna on January 10, 1775, Preiss annexed a list of all the 
copies of the Luchsenstein map that Jeney’s subordinates had made or were working on; this 
report also included the names of the final recipients of these copies. The nine officers who made 
the copies prepared them either for their army superiors or other high bureaucrats from the 
province of Transylvania and even Vienna. Brukenthal’s name does not appear in this table and 
probably these fifteen declared copies were only some of the copies made throughout the second 
half of the eighteenth century.  
The reaction of the Aulic War Council was prompt: Preiss was ordered to put a stop to 
the dissemination of the Luchsenstein map.401 The archives in Vienna, Cluj and Sibiu house 
some copies of this map. Therefore, we can infer that the Aulic War Council in Vienna tried to 
recover this highly sensitive cartographic material.402 Moreover, an examination of some of the 
Luchsenstein map copies reveal that, despite their claims, the officers did not simply replicate 
this map of Transylvania, but also added elements or changed the dimensions of the 
representation. For example, Captain Kraus403 from the Second Szekler Infantry regiment 
declared as part of the 1774-1775 investigation that he had made one copy of Luchsenstein’s 
map for himself and was in the process of executing a second copy. It is plausible that Kraus did 
not want to disclose the patrons for which he was executing these copies, especially as one of 
these maps ended up in the Aulic War Council’s Map Archive, probably as a result of the official 
                                                          
400 KA HKR, 1775 57 6. 
401 Ibid. 
402 See for example KA KPS, BIX a 702; Ibid., BIX a 716; Ibid., BIX a 717; ÖNB, Kartensammlung, FKB 
C.105.1a-v; Ibid., FKB C.107.A.1-4; Ibid., FKB C.107.3, BCU, Special Collections, H 70/1; Sibiu, Biblioteca 
Brukenthal, Harti, No 5731.  
403 I was unable to identify the first name of Captain Kraus.  
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enquiry. What Kraus concealed from his superiors was the extent to which his map incorporated 
geographic information gathered during the work for the Great Military Map. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.13 The area around Clausenburg on 
Luchsenstein’s Principality of Transylvania (1762) 
 
Figure 3.14 The area around Clausenburg on Kraus’ Map of 
Transylvania (1774) 
 
 
One can see the additions that Kraus made from Figures 3.13 and 3.14, which display the area 
around the city of Clausenburg (Cluj-Napoca) as it appears on the 1762 Luchsenstein version of 
the map and on the 1774 Kraus copy.404 One major change is the richness of the road network as 
represented on the later map. Moreover, Kraus omits the borders delimiting the privileged 
Clausenburg jurisdiction and marked with light blue on the Luchsenstein map. This absence is 
coherent with the tendency of the Habsburg authorities to promote the elimination of local 
privileges, and anticipates on paper the drive towards administrative uniformity promoted by 
Joseph II in the 1780s. Nevertheless, although he eliminated smaller local jurisdictions, Kraus 
marked with Roman numerals the Hungarian, Szekler and Saxon counties, seats and districts.  
                                                          
404 Luchsenstein’s map: ÖNB, Kartensammlung, FKB C.107.5a-d. The copy finalized in 1774 by Captain Kraus 
from the Second Szekler Infantry Regiment: KA KPS, B IX a 702.  
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 In calling his version of Luchsenstein’s map an improved one, Kraus probably also 
referred to his inclusion of details from the Moldavian and Wallachian territory. As one of the 
officers working under Jeney on the Border Maps of Moldavia and Wallachia, Kraus had access 
to this information. The fragments reproduced below demonstrate the detailed territorial 
representation of the Moldavian territory as it appears on Kraus’s map, in contrast to 
Luchsenstein’s earlier work. The area around the Gymes Pass, located in the eastern Carpathian 
Mountains between Transylvania and Moldavia, appears barely sketched on the 1762 map 
(Figure 3.15).405 Moreover, with the exception of some waterways, there is no indication of the 
Moldavian territory, east of the red line marking the imperial border. However, on Kraus’s map 
(Figure 3.16), the Gymes Pass is a small point in the upper-left corner of the map fragment.406 
The mapmaker reproduced numerous settlements, roads and waterways across the imperial 
border. This detailed representation of the communication network connecting the Habsburg 
province of Transylvania with Moldavia was exactly the sort of information the Habsburg 
military authorities strived to control. In the wrong hands, Kraus’s map could have facilitated an 
enemy invasion, contraband and illegal migration.  
                                                          
405 ÖNB, Kartensammlung, FKB C.107.5a-d. 
406 KA KPS, B IX a 702.  
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Figure 3.15 The Gymes Pass on Luchsenstein’s Principality of Transylvania (1762) 
  
 
Figure 3.16 The Gymes Pass on the Kraus’ Map of Transylvania (1774) 
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The military officers’ motivation for copying and modifying the Luchsenstein map of 
Transylvania cannot be clearly determined from the information available. Still, their use of their 
scarce spare time to work on these copies reveals the local officers and authorities stringent need 
for detailed maps of this province. As revealed in this chapter, the Habsburg authorities could not 
have implemented the mapping of Transylvania without the help of local officers. On the other 
hand, as shown by the scandal of the Luchsenstein map’s copies, these officers were the main 
channel for disseminating unauthorized information. Therefore, the central authorities’ desire to 
preserve imperial maps for their own use clashed with actual practices.  
In some cases, local authorities used proper outlets to obtain copies of classified 
cartographic information. For example, in his report to Vienna about the unauthorized copies of 
the Luchsenstein map, Preiss referred to some extracts based on the new Military Map done at 
the order of the Thesaurariatus in Montanisticis et Monetariis.407 This copy was supposed to 
help the department for mining and monetary issues, subordinate to the Transylvanian Treasury, 
with the development of mining enterprises.408 Indeed, starting at the end of 1773, the 
Transylvanian Treasury, which already had in its possession a copy of the Luchsenstein map, had 
begun trying to obtain extracts from the Great Military Map of Transylvania that would help 
with the expansion of the mining enterprises. Furthermore, on September 28, 1774, the same 
institution asked for a copy of the small-scale version of the Military Map of Transylvania and 
for additional map excerpts that included the land recently enclosed by the Habsburg border 
markers in Moldavia.409 Advised by Jeney regarding the risk of possible leakage of sensitive 
information, the General Commander of Transylvania recommended to the Aulic War Council 
                                                          
407 In 1746, the Transylvanian Treasury was split into two different departments: Thesaurariatus in Cameralibus (in 
charge of cameral issues) and Thesaurariatus in Montanisticis et Monetariis (in charge of monetary and mining 
aspects). Anton Dörner, “Central and Local Institutions,” 39. 
408 KA HKR, 1775 57 6, January 10, 1775. 
409 They probably asked for a copy of the map Jeney prepared for Joseph II in 1775. 
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that the Thesaurariat should only receive a copy of the reduced-scale map of Transylvania that 
did not include the key defense points.410 Emperor Joseph II decided that the Thesaurariat could 
use the Luchsenstein Map together with extracts from the Great Military Map of Transylvania 
for the sections where the mines were located and that they could receive complete details for the 
gold sources at Bezedmezö.411   
What these two examples reveal is that access to sensitive cartographic information was 
not automatically granted to provincial institutions. Not even the governors of certain provinces, 
such as the case of Samuel Brukenthal revealed, received copies of classified maps. However, 
provincial employees often found ways to circumvent the official channels of communication. 
With the help of military engineers, such as the local officers from the Military Border 
regiments, sensitive cartographic information circulated within, and maybe even outside, the 
province.  
3.6 CONCLUSION 
On March 2, 1786, Emperor Joseph II wrote to his brother, future Emperor Leopold II, 
about the beginning of a new cadastral survey in Transylvania. The emperor mentioned how “all 
the engineers and sub-commissions are en route to measure all the counties at the same time.” 
Moreover, in this same letter he added the following with respect to his newly introduced 
measures of centralization throughout the Monarchy: “In Italy, my new system [...] has just been 
implemented. I am introducing the same arrangements for the [Austrian] Netherlands, and after 
                                                          
410 KA HKR, 1774 57 117, 8. 
411 KA HKR, 1774 57 117, 1. 
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that the whole Monarchy will be an entity ruled uniformly.”412 More than a decade after the 
completion of the Great Military Map of Transylvania, a project that failed to integrate a detailed 
economic survey of this province, Joseph II was optimistic with respect to the success of his 
centralizing measures. However, this emperor’s confidence proved unfounded. The drive for 
uniformity came to a sudden halt in 1787, when elites in Lombardy, the Netherlands and 
Hungary all revolted against Joseph II’s reforms, forcing him to reconsider most of his policies. 
Clearly, although the Monarchy’s provinces had been represented on the Great Military Map as 
integral parts of one political entity, this imperial map did not represent a reality, but a Habsburg 
aspiration. 
The analysis of imperial cartographic projects in this chapter shows how both imperial 
and provincial agents contributed to the accumulation of geographic information about 
Transylvania. The Habsburg desire to accumulate what they considered accurate representations 
helped improve the defense of the Monarchy’s borders both from foreign troops and peacetime 
invaders, including germs and different types of criminals. Although the Carpathian Mountains 
surrounding Transylvania were never an impenetrable barrier, the efforts of Viennese rulers to 
learn as much as possible about the geography of the province guided Maria Theresa and Joseph 
II’s military, sanitary and population control policies in the area. Although Viennese authorities 
tried to restrict the access of locals to these maps, military engineers belonging to the 
Transylvanian regiments thwarted such intentions. At the same time that these centrifugal, 
insubordinate tendencies manifested within the province, another group of military officers 
                                                          
412 Original quotes: “tous les ingénieurs et sous-commissions sont en mouvement pour mesurer dans tous les 
comitats à la fois;” “En Italie, mon nouveau système [...] vient de commencer aussi. Je suis après pour les mêmes 
arrangemens aux Pays-Bas, et alors toute la monarchie ne fera qu’une masse dirigée également.” Alfred Ritter von 
Arneth, Joseph II. und Leopold von Toscana: ihr Briefwechsel von 1781 bis 1790, vol. 2, 1786-1790 (Vienna: 
Wilhelm Braumüller, 1872), 17. 
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strived to solidify the process of centralization. Fabris and Jeney, together with the officers from 
the general quartermaster’s staff, served the Habsburg rulers in various parts of their empire. 
Through their assiduous collection of information about the southeastern border of the 
Monarchy, these military engineers helped strengthen the fabric tying Transylvania to Vienna. 
The analysis of Habsburg cartographic production for the province of Transylvania reveals the 
tensions between provincial and imperial interests at an important crossroad in the destiny of this 
empire.  
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4.0 A PRIVATE INITIATIVE? THE FERRARIS MAPS OF THE AUSTRIAN 
NETHERLANDS  
On December 10, 1777, in Vienna, Joseph Jean François, Count of Ferraris (1726-1814) 
presented to Emperor Joseph II his printed map of the Austrian Netherlands, known as the Carte 
marchande.413 Joseph II had been one of the main champions for the mapping of this Habsburg 
province under the leadership of Ferraris, and the map’s cartouche testifies to the emperor’s 
unwavering support. As seen in Figure 4.1, the scene included in the map’s cartouche shows 
Ferraris offering to Joseph II a map sheet showing the entire Austrian Netherlands.414 The 
emperor appears very satisfied with the final result and smiles benevolently at Ferraris.  
The image of the Austrian Netherlands as a united Habsburg province, as represented on 
the cartouche, was, sadly, a mere aspiration. In fact, Ferraris’s effort to survey the geography of 
this province brought to the forefront the complexity of a political system composed of 
overlapping provincial and local authorities. The artillerymen working with Ferraris on this 
survey encountered a lack of cooperation, ignorance and even resistance from the local officials. 
Moreover, the Austrian Netherlands’ territory included the intermingling of many political 
political entities, such as the Bishopric of Liège, the Principality of Stavelot-Malmedy, the 
Duchy of Bouillon and French enclaves. The Ferraris survey revealed to Habsburg authorities the 
                                                          
413 Peter Barber, “Maps and monarchs in Europe 1500-1800,” in Royal and Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern 
Europe: Essays in Memory of Ragnhild Hatton, eds. Ragnhild Marie Hatton, Robert Oresko, G. C. Gibbs, and H. M. 
Scott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 117.  
414 Koninklijke Bibliotheek van België (Royal Library of Belgium) (KBR), s. III 622-646, section 16. 
http://lucia.kbr.be/mapview/index.php?image=/CM/1627904.imgf, last accessed on February 18, 2015. 
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urgency of establishing clear borderlines with the province’s neighbors and promoting territorial 
exchanges in order to eliminate political enclaves. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Cartouche of the Ferraris Carte marchande of the Austrian Netherlands 
 
Figure 4.2 shows the composition of the Austrian Netherlands and its neighbors during 
the time Vienna controlled the area.415 This map does not include all the small French and 
Habsburg enclaves located in the borderlands of these two states before the border treaties signed 
among France, the Austrian Netherlands and the Bishopric of Liège from 1769 onwards. Chapter 
5 includes a detailed discussion of the treaties concluded between Versailles and Vienna in an 
effort to eliminate these enclaves and a map showing the border’s situation in the late 1760s. The 
                                                          
415 This map is based on Léon van der Essen, Atlas de géographie historique de la Belgique (Brussels: G. Van Oest 
et Cie, 1919), “Carte X. La Belgique en 1786 (Pays-Bas Autrichiens).”  
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purpose of figure 4.2 is to convey the intermingling of the various political entities and the 
complex composition of the Austrian Netherlands.  
 
 
Figure 4.2 The Austrian Netherlands 
 
 
The 1713 Treaty of Utrecht had confirmed the transformation of the Spanish Netherlands 
into the Austrian Netherlands. As seen on the map included in figure 4.2, this province was not 
one single entity, but consisted of nine principalities: the duchies of Brabant, Limburg and 
Luxembourg, the counties of Flanders, Hainaut and Namur, the province of Tournai-Tournaisis, 
the lordship of Malines and the upper quarter of the duchy of Guelders.416 The unity and the 
integrity of this territory was based on the orders of Holy Roman Emperor and Habsburg ruler 
                                                          
416 Helma Houtman-De Smedt, “Living Apart Together. Socio-Economic Changes in the Southern Netherlands 
within the Habsburg Monarchy in the 18th century,” in Social Change in the Habsburg Monarchy, eds. Harald 
Heppner, Peter Urbanitsch, and Renate Zedinger (Bochum: Dr. Dieter Winkler, 2011), 37-39. 
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Charles V (1519-1556), who introduced the same orders of succession for all the subdivisions of 
the Netherlands, and the international treaties that had transformed the Spanish into the Austrian 
Netherlands with the condition that this province would continue to form an indivisible and 
inalienable domain. Charles VI’s Pragmatic Sanction, published in Brussels in 1725, confirmed 
the unity of the Austrian Netherlands.417 Despite the existence of these documents, the composite 
nature of this Habsburg province seriously impeded Vienna’s efforts to raise taxes without the 
intervention of the provincial estates.418 Whereas the government could successfully collect the 
regular grants and subsidies, it encountered problems requesting the additional financial help that 
became essential during wartime.419 
In order to promote better the imperial interests, after 1725, the governor general of the 
Austrian Netherlands was always a member of the royal family. The person having this function 
directed the Council of State, the Privy and Finance Councils, and worked together with 
Vienna’s representative in Brussels, the Minister Plenipotentiary.420 Maria Theresa had to 
respect the rights of the estates regarding taxation, some of them originating in the fourteenth 
century; however, during her reign, governmental centralization slowly led to the nobility’s loss 
of control in real policy-making decisions.421 For example, in 1764, the Habsburg government 
created a commission in charge of administration and grants in order to prepare an overview of 
local and regional finances and supervise bookkeeping at the local level. Implementing the 
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functions of this commission proved harder than anticipated and this incident revealed the limits 
of the central power in Vienna.422 
Throughout her rule, Maria Theresa warned her co-regent and successor, Joseph II, that 
the Austrian Netherlands’ constitutions and administration should be respected in exchange for 
their generous financial contribution.423 Moreover, the empress disagreed with Joseph II 
regarding the possible exchange of the Austrian Netherlands for the lands of Bavaria. That is, 
after the death in 1777 of Max Joseph, the elector of Bavaria, Joseph II put forward a claim to 
succession, as the emperor had been married to a Bavarian princess. The Habsburgs promised to 
compensate the other pretender, Elector Palatine Charles Theodore (1742-1799), by offering him 
the territory of the Austrian Netherlands. The plan would probably have worked were it not for 
Vienna’s refusal to also compensate Frederick II of Prussia with some territories. In the end, the 
King of Prussia invaded Bohemia and supported the claim of Duke Charles of Zweibrücken to 
the Bavarian succession. The 1779 Treaty of Teschen, which Maria Theresa signed without 
Joseph II’s approval, confirmed Vienna’s defeat in the War of the Bavarian Succession.424 
However, Joseph II did not give up on a potential exchange between Belgium and Bavaria until 
the mid-1780s. Once his plans proved futile, he embarked on a program of major reforms in the 
Austrian Netherlands.425  
Although he did not travel to the Austrian Netherlands until 1781, Joseph II had begun 
the acquisition of information related to this Habsburg province long before.426 During the 
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1770s, he was a strong supporter of the first detailed topographic survey of the Austrian 
Netherlands, coordinated by Count Joseph Ferraris (1726-1814), between 1771 and 1778. This 
cartographic enterprise offered an in-depth image of the province that possibly influenced some 
of Joseph II’s reforms, such as the administrative reorganization of the area. Yet, the unitary 
image of the Austrian Netherlands as displayed on the Ferraris map is misleading and conceals 
the challenges the mapmakers faced in surveying the province.  
The commander of the artillery corps in the Austrian Netherlands, Count Joseph Ferraris, 
presented the results of his topographic survey in two formats: three copies of a manuscript map 
with a scale of 1:11,520 prepared for the imperial authorities and a printed commercial version of 
this map at a smaller scale of 1:86,400.427 For more than a century and a half, historians of 
cartography have applauded the Ferraris maps as a turning point in the representation of what 
became the territory of Belgium.428 Recent research has also underscored the interest of the 
Habsburg government in the success of this project, the influence of French surveys performed 
in the area during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) and the implementation of the 
Ferraris project at a local level.429  
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My works builds on these studies devoted to the Ferraris maps by underscoring the 
importance of the larger imperial context. The Habsburg rulers’ evaluation of the Ferraris project 
and involvement in its implementation was informed by their previous experiences with 
cartographic enterprises, such as the Great Military Map. Rather than offering an exhaustive 
discussion of the Ferraris survey and maps, this chapter strengthens the argument of chapter 3 
and shows how Maria Theresa, Joseph II and Kaunitz utilized officers and artillerymen skilled in 
mapmaking to obtain a detailed image of the empire. My work takes into account the Habsburg 
rulers’ empire-wide perspective and combines it with an assessment of trans-imperial 
connections and provincial-specific circumstances.  
When first reading Ferraris’s proposal in Vienna, Chancellor Kaunitz and Empress Maria 
Theresa did not anticipate the enthusiasm of later historians, quite the contrary in fact. These two 
decision-makers feared the high costs of such a project and did not consider it a governmental 
priority. The Ferraris project divided the key decision-makers into two camps: whereas Maria 
Theresa and Kaunitz wanted to reject the proposal, Emperor Joseph II and the governor of the 
Austrian Netherlands, Charles de Lorraine, were strong supporters of this enterprise. This debate 
should make us wary about arguing that the principal figures of the Habsburg Court had a clear 
master plan in their mind regarding mapping the Monarchy. Instead, if Ferraris had not 
convinced some key decision-makers in Vienna that his methodology and budget would allow 
for the preparation of an accurate map, the mapping of the Austrian Netherlands might have had 
to wait for decades.  
After approving financial and logistical support for the project of Ferraris, the 
government in Vienna consistently tried to distance itself from this enterprise, claiming that this 
project was a private initiative. The Court’s reasons for formally detaching itself from this 
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cartographic work had to do with the existence of enclaves and contested borderlands within this 
province. Fearing that their neighbors would see a government map as a preparatory step for 
territorial claims, Vienna tried to reduce its apparent involvement. Nonetheless, as the narrative 
of the Ferraris project reveals, in order for this mapmaker to complete his work successfully, he 
had to rely on the government both in his attempts to obtain cartographic sources from the 
French archives and to gather local information from provincial authorities.  
This chapter explores the discussion surrounding the Ferraris project’s approval, the 
connection of this enterprise with the process of border demarcations, and the trans-imperial and 
provincial hurdles that slowed down the mapping operations. The difficulties Ferraris 
encountered in reaching his cartographic objectives reveal the challenges of the Habsburg 
government in the Austrian Netherlands due to the survival of strong local institutions, foreign 
enclaves and contested lands. In this way, cartography offers a window into the operations of the 
Habsburg government at the provincial level.  
Ferraris collected information for his map from a variety of sources. Topographic surveys 
and information from local authorities about the position of the borderlines and the toponymy 
was complemented with attempts to retrieve maps from French repositories and the results of 
astronomic measurements performed by French mapmakers on the territory of the Austrian 
Netherlands.430 Unraveling the threads that led to the creation of the Carte de cabinet and Carte 
marchande of the Austrian Netherlands reaffirms that, just as in the case of the Great Military 
Map, the production of Habsburg maps involved provincial, imperial and trans-imperial forces. 
                                                          
430 French troops occupied the Austrian Netherlands between 1744 and 1748 as part of the War of the Austrian 
Succesion (1740-1748). Janssens, “The Spanish and Austrian Netherlands,” 236. 
 172 
4.1 PROJECTS FOR A MAP OF THE AUSTRIAN NETHERLANDS 
The Austrian Netherlands had a strong tradition in training engineers and preparing cartographic 
material. As discussed in chapter 2, the Engineering Academy in Brussels and the School of the 
Artillery Corps in Malines both functioned as preparatory institutions for mapmakers. Despite 
the existence of this educational infrastructure, the provincial and imperial authorities did not 
possess a large-scale map of the Austrian Netherlands, and by the second half of the eighteenth 
century this issue attracted the attention of local geographers.  
Before the approval of Ferraris’s plans for surveying the province, three other projects for 
mapping the Austrian Netherlands made their way to Vienna. In 1751, governor Charles de 
Lorraine forwarded to Maria Theresa the project of his chaplain, Antoine Palquois de Regnière, 
for surveying a topographic map of the Austrian Netherlands.431 This geographer offered only a 
very general idea on how he planned to perform the survey, mentioning his desire to combine 
on-site measurements with a technique he called à coup d’oeil, which probably implied 
observations with the naked eye. De Regnière believed that such an approach would accelerate 
the implementation of the project. He planned to include on the map both the external borders of 
the province and the internal frontiers separating the various divisions of the Austrian 
Netherlands. Additionally, he envisioned the representation of imperial domains, forests and 
buildings, the location of favorable encampment sites and battlefields. He promised to pay 
special attention to smaller roads or domains and the precise trajectory of the rivers. He also 
expressed the hope that if this project was approved, it could later be extended to all the 
Habsburg dominions. This geographer planned not only on drawing a map but hoped to prepare 
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for each province a series of written documents describing the resources, the situation of the 
inhabitants and settlements, the trade and other significant aspects. In his words, such 
information would encompass “all that is necessary to know, both military aspects for the 
military, but also for trade and tax purposes.”432 To pay for this ample project, de Regnière 
suggested utilizing the taxes raised from two domains belonging to the Duchy of Luxembourg. 
Although he did not offer a detailed budget, de Regnière mentioned the following resources as 
essential for the successful completion of his project: two or three horses and a carriage to 
transport the instruments, boxes for the documents, food and linen for the surveyors, six 
surveyors, six guides and six people to carry the instruments, seven or eight draftsmen, a separate 
house to draw the map in secret, paper, color, tables and heating. De Regnière’s project was very 
general, lacked a clear timeline and did not contain specific information about the expenses such 
an enterprise would incur. It merely suggested a very rough plan, probably in order to gauge the 
reaction of the government to the proposal of surveying a topographic map of the province. 
Nonetheless, de Regnière’s proposal underscores the elements that the government would have 
had to consider when sponsoring such a mapmaking venture.  
Even though the project was not implemented, it did not disappear without repercussions. 
In 1759, Maria Theresa contacted Charles Lorraine and inquired about the possibility of 
implementing a General Map of all the Habsburg provinces based on de Regnière’s proposal.433 
Although the corps of engineers had dedicated to Maria Theresa in 1747 the General Map of all 
Imperial and Royal Hereditary Lands, that document was no longer up to date. Maria Theresa 
desired a map that would also include the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and all the states neighboring 
the Habsburg lands. Considering that Vienna’s possessions were not contiguous, the project was 
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very challenging. Moreover, Maria Theresa desired the preparation of additional documents, 
discussing for each province its political and economic relationship with neighboring lands.434   
Consulted to offer his opinion with respect to this project, plenipotentiary minister 
Johann Karl Philipp von Cobenzl (1712-1770) warned his superiors that if de Regnière proved 
incapable of coordinating this work, there was no one else working for the government qualified 
to implement such an ambitious enterprise. Instead, Cobenzl recommended commissioning for 
this project the famous Homann Heirs’ publishing house located in Nuremberg. These 
mapmakers had published already in the 1720s a map of the Habsburg dominions (Tabula 
Geographica Europae Austriacae Generalis), and Cobenzl hoped they could adjust the plates 
used for that map to reflect the new political changes that had impacted the Habsburg Monarchy 
since then.435 Cobenzl also suggested that if Maria Theresa did not want to advertise her desire 
for such a map, she could hire an intermediary to make the proposal to the heirs of Homann.436  
Cobenzl’s idea would have offered the Habsburg rulers a fast way to obtain a small-scale 
representation of their lands. Such an image would have advertised to the other European powers 
the vastness of the Habsburg Monarchy, but would not have improved Vienna’s ability to govern 
its territories. Figure 4.3 reproduces the fragment from the Homann map showing the Austrian 
Netherlands.437 Even a brief glance at this image shows the main limitations of this 
representation. Only a few settlements and major rivers were included, and the borders’ 
trajectory failed to encompass the complexity of the enclaves.  
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Figure 4.3 The Austrian Netherlands on the Homann Map (1720s) 
 
 
Such a map could not assist the provincial and central Habsburg governments in their efforts to 
plan the military defense of the Austrian Netherlands and to introduce economic, administrative 
and social reforms. The Great Military Map, commissioned in the 1760s - only half a decade 
after Maria Theresa expressed her desire for a cartographic representation of the Monarchy - 
made better use of the new technological innovations and the abilities of the imperial military 
engineers discussed in chapter 2.  
At the same time that the work on the Great Military Map started, shortly after the end of 
the Seven Years’ War, the French engineer Colonel Baron de Bon, who had been delegated in 
the Austrian Netherlands during this conflict, sent a proposal for a map of the Austrian 
Netherlands.438 Cobenzl forwarded this document to Chancellor Kaunitz in the summer of 1765 
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together with some comments. The plenipotentiary minister had mixed feelings regarding de 
Bon’s request to hire French engineers for the implementation of this project. On one hand, the 
minister feared that the French would obtain detailed information about the Austrian 
Netherlands’ territory; on the other hand, Cobenzl believed de Bon would gain access to prior 
French surveys of the area.439 Cobenzl probably referred to French cartographic enterprises on 
the Austrian Netherlands’ territory pursued during the 1744-1748 French occupation, as part of 
the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748).440 At the time, French military engineers 
together with astronomer and mapmaker César-François Cassini de Thury had surveyed these 
Habsburg territories and had measured a triangulation network for the northern part of the 
Austrian Netherlands.441 Convinced of the utility of de Bon’s proposal and possibly hoping that 
he would indeed gain access to existing French maps of the Austrian Netherlands, Kaunitz 
approved the foreign engineer’s proposal to perform a survey of the Austrian Netherlands. Yet, 
the Chancellor did not offer any governmental support for de Bon’s initiative. 442 
Without Vienna’s involvement and financial patronage, de Bon’s proposal did not 
materialize. Still, it probably constituted one of the main sources of inspiration for the Ferraris 
project to map the Austrian Netherlands. De Bon, as did Ferraris later, envisioned the production 
of two maps: a manuscript large-scale military map and an engraved version without military 
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details. The biggest difference in the Ferraris proposal was the total cost of the project: Ferraris 
promised the implementation of the project for an amount one-fifteenth that of de Bon’s 
estimation.443  
The third proposal predating the project of Ferraris belonged to an employee of the 
Finance Council, Desloges. On June 12, 1765, Desloges presented an ambitious cartographic 
plan: the correction of the famous map of Eugène Henri Fricx of the Austrian Netherlands and 
the preparation of a dictionary listing economic information about all provinces of this Habsburg 
dominion.444 To achieve this goal, Desloges planned to use documentation from the Finance 
Council.445 Desloges did not consider the map and the accompanying documentation an end in 
itself, but simply a way to gather geographic and economic information about the Austrian 
Netherlands that could later ease the introduction of reforms to encourage trade, expand taxation 
and increase the productivity of agriculture and manufacturing. For example, Desloges argued 
that compiling a detailed inventory of crops would help identify possible export opportunities.446 
The proposal of Desloges came only two years after Maria Theresa’s commissioning of the Great 
Military Map. However, whereas the personnel working on the Great Military Map involved 
officers from the general quartermaster’s staff and personnel from the provincial regiments 
helped by local authorities, Desloges anticipated hiring only one engineer to perform on-site 
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inspections and hoped to gather additional information from local authorities with the help of a 
62-point questionnaire. 
The projects of de Regnière, de Bon and Desloges failed to obtain the support of the 
Habsburg authorities in Vienna due to reasons such as the high cost, the lack of trained personnel 
and, most likely, because of the methodology these officials suggested for the drawing of the 
map. Whereas in 1765, de Bon proposed using French military engineers to help with the 
surveying operations, the implementation of de Regnière’s project from 1751 and the proposal of 
Desloges from 1765 would have had to rely on Habsburg engineers. Furthermore, the Habsburg 
authorities considered the mapmaking techniques proposed by de Regnière and Desloges as 
inappropriate for obtaining an accurate representation of the province. De Regnière planned to 
combine geodetic measurements with unaided eye observations and Desloges hoped to gather 
most geographic information based on questionnaires submitted to local authorities. Such a 
mapmaking methodology had fallen out of favor with military authorities as they became able to 
rely on engineers trained in mathematics, surveying, drawing and the art of fortifications to 
prepare cartographic material based on in situ operations.  
The intensification of mapping proposals for the Austrian Netherlands after 1750 reveals 
the provincial officials’ awareness that Vienna supported such initiatives. Additionally, this type 
of project would have served the interests of Habsburg representatives in the Austrian 
Netherlands, such as the governor and the plenipotentiary minister. Maria Theresa’s and 
Kaunitz’s rejection of the three mapmaking projects did not reflect a disinterest in cartography. 
The empress’s hope that de Regnière’s proposal could be extended to all the Monarchy – along 
with Kaunitz’s decision to acquire a map of the Austrian Netherlands if de Bon managed to 
prepare one - reveal the Habsburg authorities’ desire for good geographic representations of their 
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provinces. Maria Theresa’s commissioning in 1763 of the Great Military Map confirms her 
commitment to cartography as a tool of empire. Therefore, when Ferraris submitted his project 
for a map of the Austrian Netherlands, he had high hopes for an approval.  
From the beginning, Governor Charles de Lorraine was a strong supporter of the Ferraris 
project and compared it favorably with the earlier de Bon proposal. Whereas de Bon conditioned 
the success of his project on the approval of a significantly high budget and did not offer a 
practical solution for identifying a group of individuals capable of working on the survey, 
Ferraris planned to use the labor of the Austrian Netherlands artillerymen and prepared an initial 
budget of only 12,000 German florins. Furthermore, to keep the initial expenses low, Ferraris 
suggested requesting, from the French crown, access to Versailles’ archives, which he believed 
had probably preserved manuscript maps of the Austrian Netherlands. Charles de Lorraine was 
aware that even if the French gave this permission to Ferraris, they might limit his actual access 
to printed or outdated material, which would not be so valuable. However, on one point, the 
governor of the Austrian Netherlands felt the Habsburgs had the upper hand: asking for copies of 
the maps of Limburg and Luxembourg, surveyed at the end of the Seven Years’ War by the 
French engineers with Vienna’s permission.447 Charles de Lorraine’s steadfast determination to 
ensure the implementation of the Ferraris project can be connected with two motivations. On one 
hand, the governor most probably saw the advantages of having a detailed representation of the 
Austrian Netherlands for the provincial government. Secondly, Charles de Lorraine was an avid 
collector of maps, and he justly appreciated the capability of Ferraris to transform his project into 
reality.448  
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Charles de Lorraine tried to underscore the differences between the de Bon and the 
Ferraris project in order to ensure the approval of the latest proposal. Yet Kaunitz considered that 
such an enterprise would have high costs regardless of the estimates of Ferraris.449 The 
Chancellor did not doubt the ability of Ferraris and his subordinates to survey a precise map of 
the province, but expressed serious concerns about the soundness of the budget. Indeed, Kaunitz 
feared that, once the surveying work started, Ferraris would request additional amounts and 
Vienna would have to continue supporting the project since it had already invested significant 
funds. Additionally, Kaunitz expressed a serious concern that the work on the Ferraris map 
would interfere with the more stringent cartographic operations on the borders between the 
Austrian Netherlands and France, a corollary of the Border Treaty signed by these two Courts on 
May 16, 1769.450 The Chancellor’s concern was justified, especially if we take into account the 
limited number of trained engineers deployed in the Austrian Netherlands who had the required 
cartographic ability.451  
In his recommendation that Maria Theresa deny the request of Ferraris, Kaunitz also 
mentioned the need to “limit ourselves at this present time to what we’re already doing with 
respect to geographic and topographic maps.”452 Although the Chancellor did not elaborate on 
this point further, it is plausible that he was referring to the work on the Great Military Map, in 
full swing at the time in such Habsburg provinces as Transylvania. The general quartermaster’s 
staff officers in charge of implementing the Great Military Map were always complaining about 
the lack of sufficient hands to finalize their work. Therefore, it is understandable that Kaunitz 
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would fear that the imperial human resources proficient in mapmaking had been stretched too 
thin. Moreover, obtaining detailed manuscript maps of the Austrian Netherlands would not have 
given the Habsburg authorities any tactical advantage, as this region had been a war theater in 
recent centuries, and therefore Vienna’s neighbors were familiar with the geography of the 
province.453  
The Chancellor’s resistance to ordering a detailed survey of the Austrian Netherlands 
should not be interpreted as opposition to the utility of maps. Kaunitz’s opposition arose from his 
fear that the Ferraris project would redirect human and financial resources from other, more 
important cartographic enterprises: the Great Military Map of the Monarchy and the mapmaking 
operations on the border between the Austrian Netherlands and France. The Chancellor’s 
preoccupation with the border demarcations explains why, initially, the only point Kaunitz found 
desirable in the proposal of Ferraris was requesting, from the French court, the copies of the 
maps of Luxembourg and Limburg. The Chancellor envisioned combining these maps obtained 
from France with the maps of the French-Austrian Netherlands borderlands currently being 
surveyed as a result of the 1769 Border Treaty.454 In this way, Kaunitz believed, the Habsburgs 
would obtain a version of a map of the Austrian Netherlands, until a later time when the Ferraris 
project could be implemented. 
Despite Maria Theresa’s and Kaunitz’s reluctance to approve the Ferraris project for a 
map of the Austrian Netherlands, Ferraris had two powerful allies in the persons of Charles de 
Lorraine and Joseph II. These supporters intervened successfully in the summer of 1770 and 
convinced the Empress to change her mind.455 In his letter of support, the governor of the 
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Austrian Netherlands insisted on the need for a precise map of the province and suggested that 
the project of Ferraris had a very low budget.456 In addition, Charles de Lorraine vouched for the 
ability of the artillerymen to survey and represent accurately the geography of the land, as they 
had proven their skills during the survey of the Sonian Forest (Forêt de Soignes).457 Moreover, 
the governor took full responsibility for the Ferraris project and stated: “I commissioned General 
Ferrari [sic] to form a Project for a survey of a General Map of the Netherlands, especially 
because this always seemed to me a useful and necessary thing, and I also remembered that some 
years ago, the late Count Cobenzl had sent here a similar project that was rejected only because it 
would have been too expensive.”458 In case the project were to be rejected, Charles de Lorraine 
warned Maria Theresa that these accomplished mapmakers belonging to the artillery corps would 
go in search of similar jobs in other lands, despite the Habsburg Monarchy’s investment in their 
education.459 Considering how hard it was to train and recruit engineers with mapmaking skills, 
Charles de Lorraine’s fear was justified.  
In his projects, Ferraris stressed the importance of using artillerymen to implement his 
project. Working with the artillery corps would allow the imperial military engineers to continue 
their mapmaking efforts at the borders with France. Moreover, the position of Ferraris as the 
commander of the artillery corps, together with the recent training in mathematics and surveying 
of the youthful artillerymen, eliminated the need for additional stipends. Ferraris understood that 
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the most important factor that deterred Kaunitz and Maria Theresa from supporting his project 
was their fear of the high cost of such an enterprise. Therefore, in November 1770, Ferraris 
argued that his plans would be approved if “one considers the excessive costs for such a work in 
France, and finally the amount that had been already spent in the hereditary lands for the same 
objective.”460 In this quote, Ferraris was surely referring to the Cassini map of France and the 
great military map commissioned by Maria Theresa at the end of the Seven Years’ War.  
In the face of the insistence of Charles de Lorraine’s and Joseph II, Maria Theresa’s 
resistance started to crumble. Nonetheless, the Empress’s lukewarm support for the survey of the 
Austrian Netherlands stands out clearly on one of her written notes to the Chancellor, in which 
she states: “I confess that I find the expense for our finances to be too great, especially as it will 
not remain at that amount but will be higher; but the Emperor and the War Council desire to have 
it [the map]”461 
The Empress was correct in expressing these fears. As soon she submitted her approval 
for the Ferraris project, this officer requested additional financial and logistical support for his 
men, including lodging and food during the cartographic operations. This additional appeal to 
Vienna and the reaction of the central authorities sheds additional light on how Maria Theresa, 
Joseph II and Kaunitz understood the role of the Ferraris project as part of their larger imperial 
strategy. Georges-Adam Starhemberg, the plenipotentiary minister of the Austrian Netherlands, 
suggested that additional funding to cover housing and food for the surveyors could come from 
the coffers of the Aulic War Council. This institution was interested in the production of military 
maps and was at the time involved in surveying some other provinces of the Habsburg 
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Monarchy.462 However, the President of the Aulic War Council, Lacy, refused to support the 
Ferraris enterprise. He argued that no military funds had been assigned for the new military maps 
of the Habsburg dominions and that the institution he directed had no prior involvement with the 
mapping of the Austrian Netherlands.463 Lacy’s answer reveals that the existence of parallel 
imperial mapmaking institutions, such as the artillery corps in the Austrian Netherlands and the 
general quartermaster’s staff subordinated to the Aulic War Council, was not always beneficial 
for the Monarchy. Instead, it could lead to institutional rivalries and could slow down the 
implementation of certain projects.  
In the face of the Aulic War Council’s refusal, Kaunitz and Maria Theresa could have 
taken a hard-line approach, forcing Lacy to approve the required funds. However, on December 
31, 1770, the Chancellor recommended to his Empress a conciliatory course: subsidizing these 
additional costs. Kaunitz mentioned in his proposal his certainty that “General Ferraris, in order 
to obtain approval for his project, believed he should present it in the least expensive manner for 
the royal finances, convinced [...] that once [the project] was accepted, the Court would pursue 
its execution regardless of the cost.”464 Despite this suspicion, the Chancellor recommended 
further financial support for Ferraris as he had come to consider obtaining a map of the Austrian 
Netherlands important for the government.465  
By scrutinizing the Ferraris proposal from an imperial vantage point, 
 we are reminded that by the 1760s the Habsburg rulers had developed a clear understanding of 
what made a map useful for the defense and consolidation of their empire. Additionally, the 
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hurdles encountered during the work on the Great Military Map, such as the lack of sufficient 
imperial mapmakers and the rising costs of the enterprise, had taught the Viennese decision-
makers to make good use of provincial resources. The scientific approach of Ferraris to 
surveying the Austrian Netherlands and his decision to use artillerymen that he had trained 
himself offered the Habsburgs a feasible alternative to their mapmaking efforts in other parts of 
the empire.  
4.2 TRANS-IMPERIAL AND PROVINCIAL CHALLENGES 
From the first proposals he submitted to Vienna, Ferraris underscored the importance of 
obtaining access to French maps of the Austrian Netherlands in order to accelerate the survey of 
this province and to decrease the costs. During the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), 
French troops invaded the Austrian Netherlands and César-François Cassini de Thury supervised 
a team of French military engineers in the surveying of this province. This geodetic survey had 
as a result a triangulation network of 26 triangles linked with the Paris meridian.466 The French 
mapmaker did not share his results with the authorities in Brussels. Nonetheless, it was realistic 
for Ferraris to assume that because of the Vienna-Versailles alliance, the French would offer 
their support for his cartographic enterprise. 
On September 22, 1770, Ferraris asked for Charles de Lorraine’s official intervention so 
that he could obtain access to the maps the French engineers had surveyed in the Austrian 
Netherlands and to the geographical coordinates of the main border towns as calculated by the 
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academicians from Paris. Ferraris mentioned in his request that as the new map of the Austrian 
Netherlands was planned as a continuation of the Cassini Map of France, he desired to use the 
same measurement unit and therefore required a copy of the pied de France with its 
subdivisions.467  
As a result of the request of Ferraris, on November 3, 1770, Vienna initiated the official 
discussion to obtain cartographic material from France. The Habsburg ambassador, Florimond 
Claude Count de Mercy-Argenteau, contacted French foreign minister Étienne François Duke de 
Choiseul and offered him a brief description of the Ferraris project to survey the Austrian 
Netherlands. Mercy asked for Choiseul’s support in obtaining information from the French 
archives and the Academy of Sciences in Paris. Whereas the French king’s ingenieurs 
géographes had prepared various manuscript maps of the Austrian Netherlands, including 
especially the map of Limburg and Luxembourg, the Parisian academicians had performed 
astronomic and geometric calculations to identify the geographic coordinates of the main cities 
located in the French-Austrian Netherlands borderlands.468 
Mercy’s request was fruitful and, after a brief letter offering the French king’s support, 
Choiseul confirmed by mid-December 1770 that the French archival deposits contained 
numerous maps that might help with the survey of the Austrian Netherlands. In order for the 
Habsburg government to obtain copies of these documents, they had to send a representative to 
Versailles to perform the actual research. Additionally, Choiseul promised his full support for 
this Habsburg agent to also obtain the coordinates of the borderlands’ towns.469  
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It should come as no surprise that the person chosen for this mission was Ferraris himself. 
Christian-Frédéric Pfeffel, the French commissary for the border negotiations, reported from 
Brussels that Ferraris had been very grateful for the French king’s permission to make copies of 
maps located in the French war archive. Pfeffel also mentioned that the only remaining concern 
of Ferraris was asking for a royal authorization to ensure the copying of the maps would be done 
“under his eyes.”470 The officer’s apprehension suggests his desire not only to ensure the 
accuracy of the cartographic material he would be bringing back to the Austrian Netherlands 
from France but also to avert the possibility that the French agents might restrict his access to 
some maps. 
On August 7, 1771, the Duke de la Vrillière had written to Aiguillon in reply to the 
Foreign Affairs minister’s request to help Ferraris access the works created by the French 
academicians to determine through astronomic observations the position of the main towns of 
France’s northern border. The duke’s advice was that the officer should contact Cassini de 
Thury, in charge of preparing the Map of France.471 Although it is doubtful that Ferraris 
established a direct correspondence or met Cassini de Thury during his trips to France, it is 
probable that he relied on the French mapmaker’s published materials when preparing the final 
version of the printed map of the Austrian Netherlands.472 The documentary evidence 
surrounding the trip of Ferraris to Paris also proves that the French foreign affairs minister made 
efforts to obtain information relevant for the Habsburg officer.  
On September 18, 1771, de Bon wrote to the Count of Aiguillon to inform him that the 
General Count Ferraris would be presented to him by Mercy and to ask for the minister’s 
protection for the officer during his trip to Versailles. De Bon stressed how Joseph II appreciated 
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Ferraris for his military talents, how he had the friendship of prince Charles de Lorraine, and that 
the Government in Brussels was very interested in the completion of the Map of the Austrian 
Netherlands.473 With such a high-profile list of supporters, Ferraris hoped to obtain all possible 
support from the French authorities.  
Ferraris started his mission in Paris in the Fall of 1771 and, on October 3, 1771, he wrote 
to Brussels with disappointing news. The new French foreign minister, the Duke of Aiguillon 
and the new war minister, the Marquis of Monteynard, failed to find the maps Choiseul had 
promised to Ferraris and blamed this glitch on the disorderly state of the archives. Frustrated 
with this situation, Ferraris decided to return to Malines and continue the work on his map until 
further notice from Versailles.474  
In the same way, as the Aulic War Council in Vienna was interested in the success of 
mapmaking operations, the French War Minister, Monteynard, also became involved in the 
negotiations connected with the exchange of cartographic material. Initially, Monteynard failed 
to find, in his department, any traces of the promises Choiseul had made to send maps to Ferraris 
from the war archives’ map holdings. 475 Nonetheless, the war minister gave his full support to 
Ferraris. On May 6, 1772, Monteynard informed Habsburg ambassador Mercy-Argenteau of the 
successful completion of a copy of the map of the Austrian Netherlands surveyed by the French 
engineers and promised to send a similar copy of a map of Limburg. In exchange for the services 
he provided for the Habsburg Court, Monteynard also tried to obtain some cartographic material 
from Brussels. He claimed that Ferraris had promised to the French court a copy of a recently 
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surveyed map showing the surroundings of Brussels.476 Therefore, the trips of Ferraris to France 
to obtain material for his map of the Austrian Netherlands became an opportunity for both 
Versailles and Vienna to exchange cartographic material. Regrettably, neither side was satisfied 
with the final results of these negotiations.  
In the first stages of the discussions, Ferraris was hopeful. In early February 1773, he 
obtained ten maps from the French War Ministry. Unfortunately, after an analysis of these maps, 
Ferraris concluded they encompassed the parts of the Austrian Netherlands that his personnel 
had already surveyed, so they had no further utility for his project. Moreover, missing from the 
package were precisely the maps of Luxembourg and Limburg that Ferraris needed the most. 
Therefore, this officer asked the Habsburg minister, Starhemberg, to request that Versailles 
correct this oversight.477  
On August 2, 1773, after another series of unsuccessful attempts to locate the maps of 
Luxembourg and Limburg in the archives of the French War Ministry, Ferraris concluded that 
those documents were probably not housed there.478 An additional trip to Paris confirmed to 
Ferraris his conclusion was probably correct, as even after searching through all the maps of the 
Austrian Netherlands located in the archives of the War Ministry he failed to locate the material 
he needed. Moreover, Count de Vault, the director of these archives, suggested that the French 
engineers who had surveyed the areas of Luxembourg and Limburg might have worked for 
Cassini’s Map of France; in which case, Ferraris would have to contact Cassini de Thury.479 In 
response to de Vault’s suggestion, Ferraris asked his superiors in Brussels to look in the 
governmental archives and locate the documents regarding the work of French engineers in 
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Luxembourg and Limburg, in order to clarify this issue.480 By January 1774, Ferraris had given 
up on obtaining cartographic material from France to help him with the mapping of Luxembourg 
and Limburg. Instead, he requested additional financial assistance from Vienna so he could 
survey these areas, together with Guelders and the bishopric of Liège.481 The Habsburg rulers 
approved his request for financial help promptly.482  
The cartographic exchange between Vienna and Versailles was disappointing not only for 
the Habsburgs. Monteynard’s request for a map of Brussels remained unfulfilled, despite 
insistent appeals from Versailles. Ferraris did not deny that he had mentioned the existence of 
such a map during his discussions with the French representatives. Yet, in a report from May 21, 
1772, Ferraris claimed that the only promise he had made was providing a copy of the map if the 
Habsburg government approved the French Court’s request. Moreover, Ferraris made clear in the 
letters to his superiors that, whereas Vienna had asked the French Court for maps showing areas 
belonging to the Austrian Netherlands, Versailles had asked for representations of lands outside 
French control. Therefore, Ferraris argued that the two requests were not equivalent. 
Furthermore, the French officer assisting Ferraris with his work in the Versailles archives had 
refused to authorize copying a map of the Dutch Brabant because it was outside the Habsburg 
sphere of influence.483 Clearly, Ferraris was only following the same principles.  
Despite the Habsburg officials’ refusal to send a copy of the map of Brussels, the French 
authorities persisted with their request. In 1773, Count de Vault threatened the Habsburg officer, 
saying that unless he sent the requested map, the French would not send any other copies from 
their archives. Ferraris characterized this request as inappropriate and reminded his superiors 
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again that Brussels was a domain outside the French borders.484 On February 18, 1775, the 
French War Ministry asked Foreign Minister Vergennes to intervene in their behalf and obtain 
from Ferraris this much-coveted map. The War Ministry’s request reminded Vergennes how 
eight engineers working as part of this ministry had worked for six months to prepare a copy of a 
map of the Austrian Netherlands surveyed by the French during the 1741 military campaign. As 
this map lacked a representation of the area surrounding Brussels and as Ferraris surveyed this 
territory during his mapping of this Habsburg province, the war ministry considered that their 
request for a copy of this cartographic representation was more than justified. In Ferraris’ 
repeated refusal to send the map of the area of Brussels he mentioned that he could not share this 
material without Emperor Joseph II’s approval. Therefore, we can imply that this Habsburg ruler 
preferred to preserve maps of his dominions away from his political allies’ prying eyes.485 
 Even though the trans-imperial connections were not as fruitful as expected for the 
implementation of the Ferraris project, the correspondence between the Habsburg officials and 
Versailles representatives exemplifies how diplomatic channels could ease the circulation of 
cartographic information. Ferraris did not receive significant help from across the Habsburg 
borders, and he also faced challenges from local authorities when gathering information from the 
various administrative subunits of the Austrian Netherlands.  
 Whereas the mapping of Transylvania was done under the direct coordination of the 
Aulic War Council in Vienna, the survey of the Austrian Netherlands occurred officially under 
the leadership of a private individual, who also received some financial support from Vienna. As 
the commander of the Austrian Netherlands’ artillery corps, Ferraris had an official position in 
the Habsburg hierarchy and he used his subordinates to implement the mapping of the province. 
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Nonetheless, the Habsburg Court insisted repeatedly that this mapping initiative was not a 
governmental project. Vienna took this precautionary measure to defend itself from accusations 
of trying to claim contested lands in the border areas or of attempting to take over foreign 
enclaves.486 On the other hand, this approach required an impressive amount of paperwork in 
order to ensure that the local authorities offered their full-fledged support to Ferraris’ men. 
Therefore, if for Transylvania it is hard to retrace the involvement of locals in the process of 
mapping, the archives in Brussels preserve rich documentation about the mechanics of the 
Ferraris survey at local level.  
 Whenever Ferraris moved forward with his survey in a new area of the Austrian 
Netherlands, Governor Charles de Lorraine or Maria Theresa issued documentation authorizing 
the artillerymen to perform their work and ordering the local authorities to assist them in their 
operations, especially by showing them the borderlines of their jurisdictions.487 In some cases, 
the initial order was not sufficient, and the surveyors encountered problems in some 
communities. For example, during the summer of 1772, when working in the area of Marche-les-
Dames, part of the county of Namur, the local official did not allow Ferraris’ men to perform any 
measurements until he received additional orders from Brussels.488 Authorities of the town and 
district of Tournai did not acknowledge the orders sent to Flanders and Hainaut to assist the work 
of the surveyors; instead, the Estates of Tournai reaffirmed their status as a separate entity of the 
Austrian Netherlands, independent from Flanders and Hainaut, and therefore in need of orders 
directly from the Habsburg government in Brussels.489 The fragmentation of the Austrian 
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Netherlands into numerous administrative units and jurisdictions complicated the work of the 
artillerymen, who had to interact with a variety of local officials.  
 The situation became even more delicate when the survey moved to Habsburg enclaves 
surrounded by foreign dominions and the non-Habsburg bishopric of Liège. In December 1774, 
Lambert de Ruvigny wanted to start the survey of the areas of Kerpen and Lommersum, enclaves 
within the duchy of Juliers and the electorate of Cologne. De Ruvigny’s plans were thwarted by 
the bailiff of Kerpen who asked for additional instructions from Brussels, probably to make sure 
that the surveyors worked for the Habsburg government.490 The local official, Baron de Tiège, 
wrote to his superiors in Brussels a justification of his decision. He claimed that his predecessor, 
the deceased fiscal counselor de Cock, had given him orders in the past that he should pay 
special attention to the borders of these domains.491 It is revelatory that de Tiège associated 
surveying operations with a possible threat to the integrity of his territory and only agreed to 
allow the continuation of the mapmaking work once Charles de Lorraine intervened.492 In the 
end, the mapmakers marked the lands of Kerpen and the lands of Lummersum as belonging to 
the duchy of Brabant on the printed map, but preserved them as a separate entity on the 
manuscript large-scale version.493  
 An even more serious incident occurred on the domain Tignée, enclave of Liège. In the 
summer of 1774, three of Ferraris’ men surveying the Bishopric of Liège got involved in a 
violent incident with Libotte, the lord of Tignée, who claimed that he depended only on the 
authority of the Holy Roman Emperor and thus his lands were not part of any other political 
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entity.494 The fierceness with which Libotte and his men raised their weapons against the 
artillerymen to chase them from Tignée motivated one of the surveyors to use his handgun to 
intimidate their opponents; or at least that was what Ferraris claimed to defend his employees. 
Moreover, to defend his decision to allow the artillerymen to carry handguns when performing 
surveying work, Ferraris reminded his superior that his men had to defend themselves from 
bandits, as they had been attacked by malefactors when returning to their headquarters in the 
evening.495 Although I could not retrieve more details about this attack, this occurrence reveals 
that as part of their mission, the artillerymen had to face a variety of foes, including outlaws and 
recalcitrant lords. 
The lord of Tignée reacted firmly against what he perceived to be trespassers 
endangering his authority, probably because he feared that his lands would be stolen by one of 
his neighbors, either Liège or the Austrian Netherlands. The Tignée incident also reveals that, 
although the Habsburg authorities took preventive measures to ensure that the Ferraris survey 
was not perceived as a governmental initiative, foreign officials and lords considered it that way. 
In his complaint to Charles de Lorraine, Libotte mentioned that the artilleryman leading the 
surveying team, Lambert de Ruvigny, claimed they worked for the emperor. If this claim was 
true, it is not surprising that Libotte considered his domains threatened by the Habsburg 
ambitions and felt he had to contact the governor of the Austrian Netherlands.  
The efforts of Ferraris and his men to prepare a comprehensive map of the Austrian 
Netherlands brought to the forefront the survival of administrative fragmentation and the 
determination of local officials to preserve the specificity of the domains within the Habsburg 
conglomerate. The artillerymen surveying the Austrian Netherlands had to rely on the help of 
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local authorities, especially with respect to two issues: the toponymy of the land and the position 
of boundaries.  
The process of preparing this map of the Austrian Netherlands, as illustrated by the case 
of toponyms and borders, demonstrated to the Habsburg government that their local and 
provincial functionaries had only a vague idea of the province’s geography.496 All the subunits of 
the Austrian Netherlands were asked to provide a list with the correctly spelled names of cities, 
market towns, villages and other significant sites within their borders.497 Obtaining these lists 
was not an easy task, even with the help of governmental agents. For example, on November 23, 
1773, the Estates of Flanders contacted the local administrations with this query but received few 
replies, many incorrect and without following a coherent naming system. In the justification they 
wrote to their superiors in Brussels, the Estates of Flanders blamed the local authorities’ inability 
to fulfill the order in part on their ignorance regarding the correct spelling of the names. The 
Estates of Flanders offered some alternative solutions to the government: sending some 
artillerymen on-site to gather the correct settlements’ names from the locals or copying the 
toponyms from Sanderus’s Flandria illustrata, published in 1641.498 Rather than following 
either of these options, the authorities in Brussels preferred to commission the fiscal counselor of 
Flanders, Dierix, also actively involved in the process of border demarcations, to gather the 
information about the province’s toponymy.499 Dierix fulfilled this commission; on July 13, 
1773, he sent a list with the names of all settlements both in Flemish and French, accompanied 
by additional observations of local magistrates.500  
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Sometimes the local authorities hurried to implement the government’s instructions, but 
failed to provide satisfactory information to the mapmakers. For example, on April 5, 1774, only 
one month after Charles de Lorraine’s order, the authorities of Rolduc sent a three-page 
enumeration of all the settlements located within their dominions.501 Although Ferraris was 
probably happy to receive this information so promptly, he probably would have preferred a 
document that was organized better. On November 20, 1774, this mapmaker sent very strict 
guidelines to the deputies of the duchy of Luxembourg regarding how they should format their 
list; he even included a template of the table he expected them to follow (Figure 4.4).502  
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Form sent by Ferraris to the Estates of Luxembourg (1774) 
 
 
For each district, Ferraris wanted the table to start with the main town, followed in the 
same column by a list of all other towns. For each settlement listed in the first column, a second 
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column had to incorporate the names of all hamlets depending on it and a third column including 
significant sites, such as monasteries, castles, mills, chapels, and other points of interest. 503 
Probably as a result of these new guidelines, Rolduc sent a new list of toponyms only on 
November 25, 1776.  
Gathering information about the toponymy of the province was far from the effortless 
task that Ferraris anticipated. Even though the Austrian Netherlands had been part of the 
Monarchy for more than half a century, the provincial government lacked a detailed inventory of 
the geographic characteristics of this province. The Ferraris project brought to the forefront the 
problem of lack of provincial government records regarding the toponymy of the lands and 
offered a solution to this shortage of information. 
4.3 BORDERLINES ON THE FERRARIS MAPS 
The challenges encountered by Ferraris in preparing an accurate map of the Austrian Netherlands 
did not end once this officer completed the survey. The artillerymen had to verify on-site the 
map drafts and redraw the position of numerous borderlines in order to avoid diplomatic 
incidents or any territorial prejudices towards the Habsburg rulers. Indeed, one of the main 
factors that motivated Chancellor Kaunitz to recommend that Maria Theresa fund Ferraris was 
the importance of a new map of the Austrian Netherlands for border demarcation efforts.504  
As discussed further in chapters 5 and 6, Maria Theresa and Joseph II strived in the 
second half of the eighteenth century to eliminate foreign enclaves from their territories and 
signed border treaties with many of their neighbors. In the case of the Austrian Netherlands, by 
                                                          
503 Ibid. 
504 AGR CAPB, box 476, folder D 98 C 11 N 19, December 31, 1770, Kaunitz to Maria Theresa. 
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the end of 1770, when the Ferraris proposal was approved, the Habsburg-French commissions 
had been working for months on implementing the 1769 border convention. These officials had 
quickly come to the realization that the local situation on the frontier was more complex than the 
Courts of Vienna and Versailles had anticipated. Indeed, the context of the 1769 and 1779 
Franco-Habsburg border treaties and the 1776-1780 Liège-Habsburg border negotiations helps 
explain why the representation of the frontiers on the Ferraris map was such a sensitive issue for 
the Habsburg government.505  
 From the early stages of the Ferraris project, the provincial and central Habsburg 
authorities considered the representation of borders to be one of the main benefits of a new, 
large-scale topographic map of the Austrian Netherlands. Governor Charles de Lorraine stated 
clearly that he desired a “general map that shows and determines correctly the borders in general, 
and especially those towards France that have been and will be changed.”506 The uncertain 
situation of the borderline with France motivated Henri Crumpipen, the state and war secretary 
of the province, to suggest that the government might ask Ferraris to survey the frontier with 
France only at the end of his project.507  
The continuing negotiations with France and Liège also caused the Austrian Netherlands 
government to take a cautious stance with respect to their support of Ferraris and his 
artillerymen. Rather than openly admitting that Ferraris worked for Vienna, the Habsburg 
government desired that this mapmaking enterprise be perceived as a private enterprise, along 
                                                          
505 Sebastien Dubois uncovered, published and analyzed rich archival material related to this connection. Dubois, La 
rectification du tracé des frontières; Sébastien Dubois, Les bornes immuables de l'état: la rationalisation du tracé 
des frontières au siècle des Lumières (France, Pays-Bas autrichiens et principauté de Liège) (Heule, Belgium: 
UGA, 1999), 287-293. In the second half of the eighteenth century, the Austrian Netherlands signed border treaties 
with the principality of Stavelot-Malmédy (1755), France (1769; 1779), the United Provinces (1785) and the 
electorate of Trier. Dubois, Les bornes immuables de l'état, 160. 
506 “une Carte generale, qui exprime et determine bien les Limites en general, et notamment celles qui ont été, et 
vont encore etre changées du coté de la France.” AGR CAPB, box 470, folder D 96 C 11, February 9, 1770, 
Crumpipen to Lederer. 
507 AGR CP, box 1067, July 22, 1771, Crumpipen to Neny. 
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the lines of the Cassini Map of France. For example, in 1773 and 1774, when Ferraris met with 
the prince bishop of Liège and the prince abbot of Stavelot to convince them about the utility of 
extending the surveying work to their dominions he did not act as a representative of the Court of 
Vienna.508 
At the same time, the border negotiations with Liège made it clear to the officials in 
Brussels that they had to find a way to collect reliable information about the contested lands. 
Initially, the Habsburg government had commissioned the Council of Finance to prepare an in-
depth report taking into account the trade and customs aspects of the disputed territories. In their 
answers, the Council complained that they possessed insufficient knowledge about these areas. 
Therefore, government officials hoped to use information from the Ferraris map to assist them in 
their negotiations.509 As the Ferraris map drafts contained significant errors in the representation 
of the borderlines, it became clear that these cartographic documents had to be verified on-site so 
that they could assist the government reliably in its endeavors.  
Even though the correction of the boundary areas on the Ferraris map became a 
governmental priority, the Habsburg authorities rejected the idea of sending governmental 
commissions on-site. Henri Delplancq, member of both the Finance Council and the Giunta of 
Contested Lands, insisted that if the government sent its own agents to correct the map drafts, the 
Ferraris enterprise would become an official document whose representation of borderlines could 
be challenged by the neighboring states. Moreover, sending officials to the border areas, where 
there were disputed lands, would attract the attention of states such as the Bishopric of Liège, 
which could then use this opportunity to send protests and territorial reclamations to Brussels and 
                                                          
508 Dubois, La rectification du tracé des frontières, XIII-XV. To ensure the collaboration of the prince abbot of 
Stavelot, Maria Theresa also issued a declaration stating that any final errors on the map could not be used by either 
the Habsburg Court or the prince of Stavelot as evidence for any territorial pretentions. AGR CP, box 1067, July 6, 
1774. 
509 Dubois, La rectification du tracé des frontières, XVI-XVIII. 
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Vienna. For all these reasons, Delplancq suggested selecting a couple of artillery officers 
working under Ferraris and sending them to the border areas to discuss the map drafts with local 
authorities. Rather than creating an official paper trail, the artillery officers had to collect 
information based on verbal consultations.510 Delplancq contacted officials from the various 
administrative subdivisions of the Austrian Netherlands, including lands in the border areas, and 
asked them to help Ferraris’ officers in their mission.511 
As a result of this request, some of the local officials submitted in-depth reports to 
Brussels on their efforts to fulfill the government’s desire. For example, on January 5, 1778, the 
alderman of the high court of Limburg, La Saulx d’Alsemberg, described his actions to assist the 
artillery officer Lambert de Ruvigny in this enterprise. From the d’Alsemberg report, we learn 
that de Ruvigny carried with him drafts of the maps. After inspecting them for one evening and 
one morning, d’Alsemberg identified mistakes in the names of some of the villages and found 
territories on the map that he considered erroneously marked as belonging to the bishopric of 
Liège instead of the Austrian Netherlands.512  
Hoverlant du Carnois, pensionnaire of the Estates of Tournaisis (one of three 
administrative officers)513 mobilized additional local personnel to review the map drafts and 
offer their opinions regarding the toponymy and the positioning of the borderline. The only 
significant error they identified was in the representation of territories adjacent to the Scarpe 
                                                          
510 AGR CP, box 1067, November 9, 1777, Delplancq. The officers in charge of these verifications were 
Lichtenebert, Lambert de Ruvigny and Peter Wirtz. They were assisted by a corporal and a gunner. Delplancq 
worked alongside the artillery officers in Malines to eliminate as many errors as possible from the manuscript maps. 
Dubois, La rectification du tracé des frontières, XVIII-XIX. 
511 Brussels AGR CP, Box 1067, November 23, 1777, Delplancq to officials from various towns. For a list of the 
local officials that assisted Ferraris’ artillerymen see Dubois, La rectification du tracé des frontières, XX, footnote 
83. 
512 AGR CP, box 1067, January 5, 1778, Alensberg. 
513 For more details about the organization of the Estates of Tournaisis see Erik J. Hadley “Privilege and Reciprocity 
in Early Modern Belgium: Provincial Elites, State Power and the Franco-Belgian Frontier, 1667-1794” (PhD diss., 
University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, 2006), 45.  
 201 
River near the villages of Maulde and Thun.514 The archives of the Giunta of Contested Lands 
have preserved a map of the confluence of the Scarpe and Scheldt, probably prepared to assist 
with the rectification of the Ferraris map. The map, reproduced as Figure 4.5, is very schematic, 
and its main goal is to identify the territories of France and the Austrian Netherlands, while also 
clarifying which sections of the Scheldt were used jointly by the two powers.515 The map also 
denotes the situation of bridges: whereas the bridge over the Scarpe (located in the upper-right of 
the image) belonged exclusively to France, the use of the bridge crossing the Scheldt (positioned 
close to the middle of the image) was shared between the two states. Knowing which parts of the 
Scheldt belonged to one or the other power impacted the customs duties ships had to pay. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Map showing the confluence of the Scarpe and the Scheldt (1777) 
 
                                                          
514 AGR CP, box 1067, December 17, 1777, Hoverlant-Ducarnois. 
515 AGR Jointe des Terres Contestées, box 33C. Bertrand, no date. 
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It is not surprising that the confluence of the Scheldt and the Scarpe attracted a lot of 
attention during the map-verification process. The joint Austrian-French commission that 
implemented the 1769 border treaty had reached an impasse in this same region. As chapter 5 
will show, to clarify the situation of the lands located in the proximity of the confluence of the 
rivers Scarpe and Scheldt, both Vienna’s and Versailles’ representatives commissioned maps of 
the area. In the end, a series of territorial exchanges included in the 1779 border convention 
established a clear borderline. In 1777, du Carnois inspected the Ferraris map and offered a 
temporary solution to avoid any diplomatic incidents: inserting a disclaimer on the published 
map that would state how the tracing of the borderline did not prejudice the property rights of 
any sovereigns or private individuals.516 
Du Carnois’ suggestion was the same solution that the government adopted. Indeed, the 
Cartouche included on the Carte marchande incorporated a paragraph that disavowed any 
responsibility on the part of the Habsburg government with respect to any errors in the 
representation of the borderlines.517 This declaration had a dual purpose: defending the 
pretentions of Vienna over contested territories, while also avoiding diplomatic incidents if the 
Habsburg neighbors disagreed with the position of certain segments of the borders.  
In some cases, the verification of the Ferraris map drafts with the help of local authorities 
offered these officials the chance to submit concrete proposals for the tracing of the borderline. 
The baron of Beelen, auditor at the Chambre des comptes, was assisting artillery officer 
Lichtenebert with the inspection of the borders of Limburg. This official submitted to Brussels a 
list of observations regarding the trade, taxes and economic advantages that the Habsburg state 
could obtain by performing certain territorial exchanges to establish the borders of Limburg and 
                                                          
516 Ibid., December 17, 1777, Hoverlant-Ducarnois. 
517 Dubois, La rectification du tracé des frontières, XV. 
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the Duchy of Guelders.518 Although government officials decided to postpone implementing 
Beelen’s suggestions, they preserved his document in the archive of the Giunta of Contested 
Lands.519 
Writing to Chancellor Kaunitz on February 10, 1778, the plenipotentiary minister of the 
Austrian Netherlands, Starhemberg, commented on the challenges the Ferraris survey faced. The 
minister mentioned that although the general and his employees made all possible efforts to bring 
their work to perfection, the information they collected at local level was not always reliable and 
thus led to omissions and errors that required an additional examination of the map drafts and 
inspections on-site. Starhemberg added that he had to insist on this verification even though the 
map was prepared as a private enterprise, because the project coordinator was a Habsburg officer 
who received support from Maria Theresa; and therefore, if not done properly, the map could be 
used as evidence against the rights and pretentions of the Habsburg Court.520 Starhemberg’s 
assessment of the Ferraris map’s implications denotes why a correct trajectory of the borderlines 
and accurate toponymy was so important for a successful completion of this project. Maps had 
come to represent important evidence during international negotiations and Vienna’s financial 
and logistical support had increased the importance of the Ferraris map as a government-
sanctioned document.  
The survey of the Austrian Netherlands not only helped the government obtain a detailed 
image of the interior of its dominions but also enabled the collection of additional information 
about contested lands in preparation for border treaties. Ferraris had claimed from the first that 
one big advantage of his map over better-known enterprises, such as Cassini’s, would be the 
                                                          
518 AGR CP, box 1067, December 20, 1777, Beelen. 
519 Ibid., Document discussing the letter of Mr. Beelen from December 20, 1777. 
520 AGR CAPB, folder D 101 C 5, February 10, 1778, Starhemberg to Kaunitz. 
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inclusion of the new French-Austrian borderlines as established in 1769.521 In this sense, the 
Ferraris maps proved their utility to the Habsburg government immediately from their 
conception.  
4.4 CONCLUSION 
Overcoming all local, imperial and trans-imperial hurdles, Ferraris completed both his projects 
successfully. The Carte marchande was acclaimed as the highest quality map of the Austrian 
Netherlands and the Bishopric of Liège of its time and as a significant addition to Cassini’s map 
of France. Furthermore, as revealed in chapter 8, the Ferraris printed map became a model that 
Habsburg rulers tried to make use of in other provinces, such as Lombardy. The Carte de 
cabinet, reserved for the eyes of the Viennese decision-makers and the governor of the Austrian 
Netherlands, was equal in its attention to detail to the Great Military Map. Figure 4.6 reproduces 
a fragment from map section 111 showing the university town of Leuven (Louvain).522 The 
mapmakers represented in detail the layout of the town, the main buildings, the walls 
surrounding this settlement, the road network and the cultivated fields in the area.523 Based on its 
details, we can interpret the Carte de cabinet as an extension of the Great Military Map, even 
though the surveyors were not part of the general quartermaster’s staff. The artillerymen 
represented on their maps the same elements that the general quartermaster’s staff officers 
selected for their cartographic work. Moreover, the synchronous implementation of the Ferraris 
survey and the Great Military Map reveal a coherent imperial policy of mapping the empire.  
                                                          
521 Dubois, La rectification du tracé des frontières, 10. 
522 KBR, Carte de Cabinet, section 111, http://belgica.kbr.be/nl/coll/cp/cpFerrarisCarte_nl.html, last accessed on 
February 18, 2015. 
523 For more information about how to interpret the symbols of the map see Coene et al., “Ferraris, the Legend.” 
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Figure 4.6 Leuven (Louvain) on the Ferraris Carte de Cabinet 
 
Despite the synchronous efforts of the general quartermaster’s staff and the artillery corps 
from the Austrian Netherlands to map Vienna’s dominions, the Habsburg government decided to 
support the illusion that the map of the Austrian Netherlands was the private enteprise of 
Ferraris. This decision helped Ferraris obtain the approval of rulers such as the bishop of Liège 
and the prince abbot of Stavelot to extend the cartographic operations on their lands. Moreover, 
in the case of any errors on the Carte marchande, the Habsburg government could not be held 
responsible. Therefore, keeping the Ferraris project apparently separate from the Great Military 
Map served the interests of the Court of Vienna not only because the artillerymen solved the 
shortage of military mapmakers. 
The imperial context of the Great Military Map offers some insight about the production 
context for the Ferraris maps but is insufficient for understanding all factors that influenced the 
mapmaking operations in the Austrian Netherlands. The French astronomic and geodetic 
operations in the territory of this province during the War of the Austrian Succession and the 
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Vienna-Versailles alliance from 1756 encouraged Ferraris to search for cartographic sources 
across the Habsburg border. Even though this officer failed to retrieve French resources useful 
for his project, his attempt underscores the importance of international exchanges for 
cartography. The second element underscoring the importance of a trans-imperial context relates 
to border demarcation efforts. The Habsburg Court’s determination to regulate the position of 
borderlines towards Liège and France encouraged them to take advantage of the Ferraris survey 
in order to gather detailed information about contested borderlands. Last but not least, local 
Habsburg and foreign officials played a crucial role in the implementation of the Ferraris survey 
by offering information not only about the trajectory of the borderlines, but also about the 
toponymy of the province. Therefore, we can state that although the Ferraris maps show mainly 
the territory of one Habsburg province, the Austrian Netherlands, the surveying process emerged 
as a result of the efforts of imperial, provincial and international agents.  
 207 
5.0 SKETCHING IMPERIAL CONTOURS: MAPPING HABSBURG BORDERS IN 
TRANSYLVANIA AND THE AUSTRIAN NETHERLANDS 
In the year 1769 Habsburg military engineers skilled in the art of mapmaking travelled to the 
eastern province of Transylvania to coordinate the first detailed topographic survey of the area 
and the installation of “imperial eagles” on the Monarchy’s eastern border. This same year the 
Habsburgs concluded a border treaty with the French king, and by the end of the 1770s, military 
engineers had started installing standard border markers between the lands of France and the 
Austrian Netherlands. Throughout the 1770s and 1780s the provincial government of Lombardy 
pressured the Duke of Parma to support joint border inspections and prepare maps of the 
contested frontier territories in order to pave the way for a border Congress and the signing of a 
treaty.  
It was no coincidence that provincial authorities from various Habsburg dominions 
labored, under the guidance of the Viennese Court, to demarcate imperial borders in the second 
half of the eighteenth century. As reflected in a series of documents from April 1777, Chancellor 
Wenzel Anton Kaunitz-Rietberg (1711-1794), the most powerful imperial adviser of the 
Habsburgs, submitted a request for a list of all border maps housed in the Aulic War Council’s 
archives, thus revealing his keen interest in the state of cartographic knowledge about the 
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empire’s frontiers.524 The Habsburgs’ increased attention to demarking clear borderlines and 
ensuring their inviolability emerged in the second half of the eighteenth century and led to an 
increase in the production of detailed border maps as essential instruments for negotiations with 
their political neighbors. This transformation in imperial priorities did not occur in a vacuum, but 
stimulated and was at its turn influenced by interactions with other European states, provincial 
authorities and traditions, and inhabitants of frontier areas, who often challenged the Habsburgs’ 
definition of borders.  
The current literature on the creation of international borders argues that in the eighteenth 
century Eurasian states signed treaties that implemented linear, clearly demarcated borderlines, 
enforced by state agents.525 This new desire to regulate the situation of frontiers was not 
accidental. The process of border demarcation emerged at the intersection of two early-modern 
developments: (1) the consolidation of territorial sovereignty and (2) the changes in the 
technology of mapmaking.526 Although we cannot establish a simple deterministic relationship 
between these two historical processes, chapters 5 and 6 will reveal how maps and their 
production greatly influenced the elimination of territorial enclaves and the tracing of 
international borderlines. As mapmakers moved “from the office to the field”527 and military 
engineers skilled in performing geometric measurements and trigonometric calculations 
surveyed states and their borders, cartography emerged as an ally of enlightened governments.528  
                                                          
524 HHStA StK, Noten an den Hofkriegsrat (hereafter Noten an den HKR), box 7, April 28, 1777, Kaunitz to the 
Aulic War Council.  
525 Günter Vogler, “Borders and Boundaries in Early Modern Europe: Problems and Possibilities,” in Frontiers and 
the Writing of History, 1500-1850, eds. Steven G. Ellis and Raingard Eßer (Hannover-Laatzen, Germany: 
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526 Daniel Power, “Introduction. A. Frontiers: Terms, Concepts, and the Historians of Medieval and Early Modern 
Europe,” in Frontiers in Question. Eurasian Borderlands, 700-1700, eds. Daniel Power and Naomi Standen (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 5-6. 
527 Edney, “Cartography’s ‘Scientific Reformation’”, 288. 
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Maps did not merely illustrate political developments. As political decision-makers relied 
on maps, which they considered accurate representations of borderlands, cartographic sources 
influenced diplomatic negotiations and resolutions regarding territorial transformations. Before 
the rise of cartography, written descriptions of boundary areas helped mediate conflicts. 
However, toponyms often modified over time and historical descriptions of borderlines were not 
always identifiable on-site. Therefore, visual territorial representations emerged as a solution to 
establishing the position of borders permanently. Indeed, by the middle of the eighteenth century, 
what came to be considered accurate border maps were the product of engineers and surveyors, 
who combined landscape characteristics with sufficient toponyms to eliminate any doubts 
regarding the location of geographical features marking imperial boundaries.  
In their persistent efforts to ensure a clear demarcation of their states’ borders, Bourbon, 
Habsburg and Ottoman rulers, to name just a few, labored towards transforming into reality the 
plea of famous jurists of the time. As Emmerich de Vattel wrote in his Principles of Natural Law 
(1758), “it is necessary to mark clearly and with precision the boundaries of territories in order to 
avoid the slightest usurpation of another’s territory, which is an injustice, and in order to avoid 
all subjects of discord and occasions for quarrels.”529 Vattel’s words demonstrate that by the 
1750s territorial boundaries were perceived as essential for the territorial identity of a state, and 
thus rulers had to first identify these limits on the ground.530  
                                                          
529 Cited in Peter Sahlins, Boundaries. The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1989), 93. 
530 The word “border” implies a clearly marked and stable line, as long as the context that created it remains 
unchanged. This is in contrast with the word “frontier” that suggests something transient in continuous 
transformation, an undefined area separating two political entities. However, we should not assume that from the 
early modern times to today there occurred a simplistic irreversible transformation of frontiers into borders, as even 
after the demarcation of borderlines and signing of bilateral treaties, these new boundaries expressed more of an 
ideal separation than an actual one. Piero Zanini, Significati del confine. I limiti naturali, storici, mentali (Milan: 
Bruno Mondadori, 2000), 14; Power, “Introduction. A. Frontiers,” 3-4. 
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Although there is no definitive chronological global study of the evolution of early-
modern borders, studies of specific eighteenth-century border regulations and the evolution of 
national territories suggest a synchronous effort on the part of early-modern empires to delineate 
and enforce the protection of their boundaries both at home and in their colonial dominions. The 
Treaty of Madrid (1750) signed between Spain and Portugal determined the mapping and the 
establishment of a borderline between these states’ possessions in South America.531 Just one 
year earlier, the French and the British had convened a joint boundary commission to establish 
the exact limits of Nova Scotia, or Acadia, a region in northeastern North America that 
Versailles ceded to London in 1748.532 In the second half of the eighteenth century, the French 
kingdom also signed almost thirty border treaties with their European neighbors in an effort to 
eliminate territorial enclaves and create a continuous borderline.533  
The French case has attracted a lot of scholarly attention in the past few past decades, 
especially due to Peter Sahlins’s work on the French-Spanish boundary in the Pyrenees and 
Daniel Nordman’s study of the French boundary’s transformation from the sixteenth to the 
nineteenth century.534 Sahlins traces the transformation from jurisdictional to territorial 
sovereignty and reveals the importance of cartography in the process of border delimitation and 
the construction of national territories.535 In another article Sahlins demonstrates that despite 
their apparently natural position on mountain ranges and rivers, French borders were constructed 
                                                          
531 Mário Olimpio Clemente Ferreira, O Tratado de Madrid e o Brasil Meridional: os Trabalhos Demarcadores das 
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entities, negotiated among the central government, provincial authorities and local inhabitants.536 
Although the recent historiography prioritizing the case of France shed light on the impact of 
mapping on the processes of territorialization and the creation of linear borders, this was neither 
the first state to go through such an evolution, nor the model for all other European states.537  
Another reason to be wary of studies claiming the French case as representative is the 
seemingly teleological evolution of this state’s European domains into a nation state. In contrast, 
imperial borders of empires such as the Habsburg Monarchy have become, if still in existence as 
borderlines, defining features of new states formed in most cases after 1918. Although the story 
of eighteenth-century Habsburg border demarcations does not prefigure the emergence of a 
strong national territory, analogous to France, it does anticipate the construction of an alternative 
model.538 During the reigns of Maria Theresa (1740-1780) and Joseph II (1780-1790) the 
Habsburg rulers’ conceptualization of their own dominions started favoring the construction of a 
centralized imperial geo-body over provincial specificity.539 Negotiations over the position of 
borderlines became an integral part of this process. 
                                                          
536 Peter Sahlins deconstructs the concept of French natural frontiers and reveals its history in the context of French 
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The Habsburgs’ determination to establish fixed boundaries impacted and was influenced 
by their diverse political neighbors: powerful rivals such as France, the Ottoman Empire and 
Prussia; second-rate European powers such as the Netherlands or the Kingdom of Sardinia; and 
the less prominent Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, the Duchy of Parma, and the 
Prince-Bishopric of Liège. Regardless of who their negotiating counterpart was, by the middle of 
the eighteenth-century, the Habsburg rulers developed a standard procedure in preparation for 
border demarcations: gathering documentary evidence to support territorial claims, preparing 
maps to show the desired borderline, and using diplomatic negotiations to pave the way for 
internationally recognized boundary treaties.  
Changing our focus from western European states such as Great Britain, France, Spain or 
Portugal allows us to push further back into time the earlier days of international border 
demarcations, as we consider the evolution of the Habsburg-Ottoman borderline and its first 
official demarcation in 1699.540 Scholars have shown that the signing of the Peace Treaty of 
Karlowitz that year, which marked the “closure of the Ottoman frontier” towards Europe, was a 
key moment.541 For the first time, the sultan agreed to a clearly marked border and sent 
representatives as part of a joint border demarcation commission.542 After Karlowitz, the triplex 
confinium emerged at the intersection of three different political traditions - Habsburg, Ottoman 
and Venetian – and predated not only similar developments for the other Habsburg borders, but 
also those within other European states, such as France, Spain and Portugal. The Habsburg and 
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Ottoman authorities’ commitment to resolve all incidents that occurred on this newly demarcated 
border in the first decades of the eighteenth-century proves these two empires’ desire to maintain 
a peaceful relationship and respect a defined borderline.543  
Despite the Habsburg Monarchy’s steady effort to trace imperial borders in the second 
half of the eighteenth century, very few studies investigate the mechanics of boundary 
demarcations and no prior work discusses two or more segments of the Habsburg Monarchy’s 
border in a comparative manner.544 In order to understand the Habsburg rulers’ campaign to 
transform their complex of dynastic lands into a centralized empire we need to analyze their 
border demarcation efforts jointly. Therefore, chapters 5 and 6 bring together stories about 
border conflicts, negotiations and demarcations from three Habsburg provinces: the eastern 
border between Transylvania and the Ottoman-dominated Principality of Moldavia, the western 
border between the Austrian Netherlands and the kingdom of France, and the southern border 
between Austrian Lombardy and the small duchy of Parma.  
Taking cartography as an entry-point into the complex story of the establishment of 
internationally recognized borderlines allows us to isolate the provincial and trans-imperial 
factors that conditioned the success or failure of Habsburg operations for these three border 
segments. At the provincial level, the existence of civil or military institutions responsible for the 
                                                          
543 Jovan Pešalj, “Early 18th-Century Peacekeeping: How Habsburgs and Ottomans Resolved Several Border 
Disputes after Karlowitz,” in Empires and Peninsulas: Southeastern Europe between Karlowitz and the Peace of 
Adrianople, 1699-1829, eds. Plamen Mitev, Ivan Parvev, Maria Baramova, and Vania Racheva (Berlin: Lit, 2010), 
29-42. 
544 Although some scholars have examined the history of border demarcations for some of the Italian states, France 
and Belgium, none of them uses a comparative framework that focuses on disjoint border provinces, despite the 
Habsburgs’ effort to coordinate their border demarcation enterprises in the eighteenth century. Nelly Girard 
d’Albissin, Genèse de la frontière franco-belge; les variations des limites septentrionales de la France de 1659 à 
1789 (Paris: A. & J. Picard, 1970); Dubois, La rectification du tracé des frontières; Antonio Stopani, La production 
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frontiere e confini in età moderna, ed. Blythe Alice Raviola (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2007), 137-162; Raffaello 
Ceschi, “Ricognizioni tra frontiere e confini,” in Confini e Frontiere nell’età moderna: un confronto fra discipline, 
ed. Allessandro Pastore (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2007), 107-116; Veres, “Redefining Imperial Borders,” 3-23. 
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protection and definition of borderlines, the presence of engineers skilled in the art of 
mapmaking, and the existence of historical documentation in local archives influenced the 
Habsburgs’ ability to gather supporting evidence for their territorial claims. Changing the focus 
to the trans-imperial level brings to the forefront the diplomatic negotiations the Habsburgs 
became entangled in as part of their quest for border delimitations. The Monarchy’s neighbors 
reacted to Habsburg pretensions with various degrees of success, depending on their political 
power and the interests of their allies. Whereas France forced Maria Theresa and her advisers to 
pursue border negotiations on equal terms, the Ottomans sacrificed part of the principality of 
Moldavia’s territory in order to ensure Habsburg cooperation in reestablishing peace in the 
region. Lastly, the Duke of Parma used his dynastic affiliation to involve two powerful 
monarchs, the French and the Spanish Bourbon rulers, in his negotiations with Vienna. What 
stands out in all these trans-imperial discussions is the preponderant role maps took on in the 
second half of the eighteenth century, as the negotiators relied on cartographic sources not only 
as a way to present claims, but also to cement the final, agreed-on trajectory of the borderline.  
5.1 IMPOSING AN EASTERN BORDER: THE HABSBURG BORDER 
DEMARCATION BETWEEN TRANSYLVANIA AND MOLDAVIA 
5.1.1 The production of border maps for the Transylvanian-Moldavian frontier 
In 1773 Emperor Joseph II travelled for the first time to the Habsburg province of Transylvania 
and spent a large part of his two-month journey inspecting this province’s borders with 
Wallachia and Moldavia, principalities under Ottoman influence and the main scene of the 
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Russo-Ottoman war between 1768 and 1774. The Emperor’s almost daily documentation of his 
Transylvanian stay reveals his preoccupation with the geography of the province, its cartographic 
representation, and possible ways to improve the trajectory of its mountainous frontier.545 The 
imperial concern with mapping Transylvania’s boundaries and tracing an advantageous 
borderline represented the direct culmination of more than two decades of concerted effort on the 
part of Habsburg authorities to ensure a better defense of their empire. As seen in chapter 4, with 
the help of officers who worked under the supervision of military engineers skilled in the art of 
mapmaking, such as Stephan Lutsch von Luchsenstein, Mihàly Jeney and Dominik Camiotti de 
Fabris, the Viennese authorities had obtained a series of detailed provincial and border maps. 
Together with additional documentation, these cartographic sources proved instrumental in 
defending the Habsburg abusive installation of border markers in the face of foreign challengers.  
As the following pages demonstrate, starting with the early 1750s, the intensification in 
the production of border maps engaged not only the Habsburgs but also their Moldavian 
neighbors and two other empires with strategic interests in the region: the Russians and the 
Ottomans. Although the Habsburgs did not monopolize the cartographic production for the 
Transylvanian-Moldavian borderlands, they gained the upper hand because of their strong 
military presence in the area and their access to sufficient personnel to prepare detailed maps and 
to gather additional documentation that supported Vienna’s territorial pretensions.  
In the first half of the eighteenth century, the border between the Danubian Principality of 
Moldavia and the Habsburgs’ easternmost province, Transylvania, constituted the scene of 
                                                          
545 See for example Joseph II’s journal entries from May 21, May 22, June 6, June 10, and June 14. Bozac and Pavel, 
Călătoria împăratului Iosif al II-lea în Transilvania la 1773, 583-586, 626, 643-644, 647. On May 29, 1773, the 
French ambassador in Vienna, Rohan, wrote to the French Foreign Affairs Minister how “the Emperor [Joseph II] 
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cheval les montagnes et les frontieres de la Transilvanie, et que S.M.J. paroit satisfaite des barrieres que la nature a 
données a cette province.” MAE CP, Autriche, box 321, 367. 
 216 
numerous conflicts. Inhabitants from both territories repeatedly captured their neighbors’ sheep 
and cattle, burned villages and shelters in the border area, and sent memoirs to Constantinople 
accusing each other of territorial violations.546 As the Principality of Moldavia remained under 
Ottoman protection in the eighteenth-century and Constantinople’s foreign policy shifted in the 
direction of stabilizing boundaries and establishing “permanent” peace, the Habsburg rulers 
knew that obtaining the sultan’s accord was essential with respect to the Transylvanian-
Moldavian border.547 The Porte’s cooperative attitude regarding other segments of the Habsburg-
Ottoman border gave Vienna hopes that a long-term agreement could be reached. Indeed, after 
the 1699 Peace of Karlowitz and the first official joint demarcation of part of the border between 
the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires, both Vienna and Constantinople made serious efforts to 
force provincial authorities to respect this section of the borderline and investigate any border 
violations.548 The Treaties of Passarowitz (1718) and Belgrade (1739) included articles regarding 
the regulation of borders between Ottoman and Habsburg dominions, and thus can be seen in this 
sense as a continuation of the Karlowitz accord.549  
However, the border demarcations post-Karlowitz failed to incorporate in the first phase 
the borderline segments separating Transylvania from Moldavia and Wallachia. In 1700 the 
                                                          
546 For example, in January 1723, as a result of a Habsburg complaint, the sultan ordered the Moldavian prince 
Mihail Racovita to ensure that his subjects would not trespass Transylvania’s borders. Hurmuzaki, Documente 
privitoare la istoria românilor, vol. 6, 1700-1750 (Bucharest: Ministerul Cultelor si Instructiunii Publice, 1878), 
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Instructiunii Publice, 1876), 12. 
547 Virginia Aksan, “Whose territory and whose peasants? Ottoman boundaries on the Danube in the 1760s,” in The 
Ottoman Balkans, 1750-1830, ed. Frederick Anscombe (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2006), 76. 
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Peace of Karlowitz from the Habsburg perspective see John Stoye, Marsigli’s Europe, 1680-1730: The Life and 
Times of Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli, Soldier and Virtuoso (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 164-215.  
549 Aksan, “Whose territory and whose peasants,” 75; Harald Heppner, Daniela Schanes, “The Impact of the Treaty 
of Passarowitz on the Habsburg Monarchy,” in The Peace of Passarowitz, 1718, eds. Charles Ingrao, Nikola 
Samardžić, and Jovan Pešalj (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2011), 54. 
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Habsburg plenipotentiary for the demarcation of borders, Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli (1658-1730) 
was very optimistic about the success of negotiating a clear boundary between the Habsburg 
domains and the Danubian Principalities. However, the repeated opposition of the Ottoman 
representative and the refusal of the Moldavian and Wallachian princes to accept as a guiding 
principle for the border demarcations the status quo preceding the beginning of the last 
Habsburg-Ottoman war thwarted Marsigli’s strategy. In the end, the only concession the 
Ottomans offered to the Habsburg representative was to incorporate in the final documents a 
statement indicating that the Carpathian mountains marked the border between Transylvania and 
the lands of Moldavia and Wallachia.550 Indeed, in the case of the border between Transylvania 
and the Principality of Moldavia, even by 1741 the Habsburgs had only sealed a general 
agreement with the Ottomans that fixed the border high in the Carpathian Mountains, on the 
watershed.551 Obviously, such a vague principle did not easily translate into a clear frontier line, 
and it was impossible to enforce a strict separation between the inhabitants of Moldavia and 
Transylvania, who often trespassed into each other’s lands. Moreover, the lack of an official 
bilateral convention supported by cartographic material made it hard to ensure the protection of 
this ambiguous borderline. 
Due to the persistence of border incidents and the nonexistence of one accepted frontier 
between Transylvania and Moldavia, the early 1750s witnessed the creation of competing border 
maps representing the rival interests of the inhabitants of these two areas. In 1750, the Court in 
Constantinople, acting as a representative for the Moldavian prince, sent to Vienna a map of the 
border between Moldavia and Transylvania supporting Moldavian claims.552 Vienna’s reaction 
was prompt: an Imperial Order was sent from Vienna to the General Commander of 
                                                          
550 Luigi Ferdinando Marsili: Relazioni dei Confini, vol. 2, 401-402, 426, 429, 436, 449, 483, 495.  
551 Florian Porcius, “Istoricul Districtului Năsăudean,” Arhiva Someşană 9 (1928): 14. 
552 KA KPS, B IX c 744. 
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Transylvania, Count von Brown, to obtain an accurate survey and border map, together with 
other documentary proofs that would support the Transylvanian pretentions in the border regions 
shared with Moldavia. Brown put in charge of this mission Captain Stephen Lutsch von 
Luchsenstein, a military engineer from Transylvania. Though von Luchsenstein finished the 
required map by 1751, he took six more years to finalize a detailed memoir in which he attacked 
the map sent from Constantinople, while also discussing all the controversial points on the 
border and trying to demonstrate the Habsburg claims in the area.553 
Specifically, Luchsenstein raised serious doubts about the accuracy of the map supporting 
Moldavian claims based on its inaccurate representation of the geography of the area and 
incongruities between the map and on-ground toponyms. Throughout his memoir, Luchstenstein 
gives numerous examples of such incongruities, like his claim on page two, which states that the 
villages Vuolidania, Pitrechun, Karavul Cskivarda and others, and the mountains Tzapaf, Arhir, 
and Kosder cannot be found anywhere in reality except on the Moldavian map.554 In addition to 
erroneous names for villages and geographic features, the Habsburg officer also considered the 
Moldavian map to be closer in style to a painting than to an actual accurate land survey and 
accused the cartographer of having used only oral reports to draw it. Luchsenstein’s assessment 
criteria are congruent with eighteenth-century ideas on what made a map accurate and 
“scientific.”  
The opinions that Luchsenstein presented in his memoir agreed with contemporary 
beliefs about maps. By the second half of the eighteenth century, maps had gained 
epistemological authority as European politicians and bureaucrats accepted topographical 
surveys based on geometrical frameworks of triangulation and the use of special instruments to 
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measure distances as the necessary prerequisites of “good” maps.555 Knowing the represented 
land first-hand had become a necessary condition for the reliability of a cartographic source and, 
as map-making became a science, using symbols to codify the landscape had become the 
norm.556  
To counteract Moldavian pretensions Luchsenstein presented an alternate representation 
of the border by focusing on the landscape and following the mountainous chain as a guideline 
(Figure 5.1). This cartographer includes on his map, The border of the Principality of 
Transylvania and Moldavia (Principatuum Transilvaniae et Moldaviae confiniorum), three 
borderlines: the so-called ancient border between Transylvania and Moldavia, the border 
enclosing the Transylvanian possessions of the time, and the “unlawful Moldavian 
pretensions.”557 The mapmaker marked in different colors the various moments of what he calls 
the Moldavian usurpations from 1727, 1733, 1734, 1735 and 1746.558 Numbers from 1 to 100 
mark points of interest located on the three competing borderlines. These numbers helped 
Luchsenstein organize his exposé, as the Habsburg officer included in the memoir more 
information about all these areas.  
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Figure 5.1 Luchsenstein’s The border of the Principality of Transylvania and Moldavia (1751) 
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Although the Viennese archives do not preserve any copy of the 1751 Moldavian map 
that triggered Luchsenstein’s counter-project, a close scrutiny of the map collections of the War 
Archives brought to light two others maps the Moldavians prepared in the context of the border 
disputes. Though labeled as “Turkish” drawings or maps, the full title and explanation of these 
cartographic sources suggest a Moldavian origin. As the Habsburg authorities considered the 
principality of Moldavia under the Ottoman sphere of influence it is not surprising they used the 
adjective “Turkish” to denote these maps. The first example, dated to 1755, contains a bilingual 
explanation in German and Ottoman Turkish, which suggests that its audience was possibly the 
Habsburg and Ottoman Courts. The map’s explanation indicates that this document is a 
representation of part of the contested border between Transylvania and Moldavia, and the title 
claims that the goal of the mapmakers was to put a stop to the Transylvanians’ abuses in the area 
by clarifying the real position of the border.559  
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Map showing the Moldavian pretensions at the border with Transylvania (1755) 
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On Figure 5.2 I have marked with a red rectangle the peak of the mountains, which the 
Moldavian authorities put at the center of their representation in order to demonstrate their role 
of ancient border between the two states. The mapmaker included a red line in the upper part of 
the image to indicate the extension of the land the Transylvanian inhabitants had infringed into in 
order to graze their cattle, thereby clearly violating the function of the watershed as the 
borderline. Although the Moldavians claimed the watershed as the never-changing border 
between their state and Transylvania, and marked on the map the flow direction of all waterways 
originating in the Carpathian Mountains, by the mid eighteenth-century, the Habsburgs no longer 
accepted this argument. Indeed, in his 1757 memoir, Luchsenstein refuted the principle 
according to which the border should traverse the peaks of the mountains and take into account 
the watershed as a geographical entity dividing the two territories. The Habsburg military’s main 
argument against this standard was the Moldavians’ inconsistency regarding the position of their 
borderline, as the frontier separating Moldavia from Poland and Wallachia did not enforce this 
watershed rule. A section of the Moldavian and Polish border followed the flow of streams, 
while part of the border dividing Moldavia and Wallachia was located on the Jabola Pudna 
River.560  
The second map located in the Viennese archives and illustrating Moldavian claims 
shows a small section of the border, the area of the Oytos mountain pass connecting 
Transylvania and Moldavia.561 The map does not include any documentary appendices, but the 
1782 inventory of the Aulic War Council’s map collection regarding the province of 
Transylvania includes the following explanation for an entry describing a 1768 map: a Turkish 
Border Map showing a contested territory, which the Moldavian ruler sent to the general 
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commander of Transylvania, Count O’Donnell.562 It is plausible that the map reproduced in 
Figure 5.3 was this 1768 map. Compared to the 1755 Moldavian map, this later source includes 
some elements that bring it closer to contemporary Habsburg maps: the cardinal directions and 
explanations for some of the main elements represented. For example, letter A denotes the ridge 
of the mountain named Mageruzi that the Moldavians claimed as the ancient border. The dotted 
line C indicates the borderline that the Moldavians accused the Transylvanian inhabitants of 
trespassing. The map also included an old Moldavian mill (B), a custom station (E) and a so-
called “German” watch point (F), probably a Habsburg guard station.  
A comparison of the Oytos pass area as represented on the 1768 Moldavian map with the 
Luchsenstein map of 1751 makes obvious the contradictory locations for the borderline. As 
shown on Figure 5.4, Luchsenstein accused the Moldavians of having encroached on 
Transylvanian lands by taking over territories in two waves: the blue-shaded domains between 
1710 and 1727, and the green-colored lands between 1733 and 1735. The Transylvanian 
engineer clarified that the yellow line marked the contemporary borderline; however he argued 
that the situation did not reflect the actual right of possession the Habsburgs had in the region, 
and which supposedly extended on Moldavia’s side all the way to the brown borderline.563 
Luchsenstein further explained in the memoir accompanying his 1751 map, that the placement of 
the Custom House inside the mountain pass Oytos did not confirm the ancient location of the 
border, but was simply the result of the authorities’ desire to ease the work of the customs’ 
officers.564  
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Figure 5.3 Map showing the Moldavian pretensions in the area of the pass Oytos (1768) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Detail from Luchsenstein’s The border of the Principality of Transylvania and Moldavia (1751) 
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As shown above, both the Habsburg and the Moldavian side gathered written 
documentation and prepared cartographic material supporting their border claims. However, no 
resolution was reached until the late 1760s, as neither of the two sides would agree to any 
concessions or accept the other side’s arguments.  
5.1.2 The Habsburg imposition of a Transylvanian-Moldavian borderline 
The intensification of border conflicts between the Transylvanian and Moldavian inhabitants 
towards the middle of the eighteenth-century convinced Vienna of the need to search for a 
definitive solution. Therefore, during the 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman war, Vienna took an 
intransigent attitude and occupied strategic positions in the mountains, tracing this borderland 
with the help of boundary markers. Although the Habsburgs did not officially join the military 
conflict in the area, they deployed officers to fight, often undercover, as part of both armies;565 
they relied on a complex network of spies to gather information on the military developments, 
and in 1771, they even signed a short-lived secret convention with the Ottomans promising help 
against the Russians in exchange for monetary and territorial compensations.566 Throughout this 
conflict, Maria Theresa and Joseph II maintained their troops in a state of preparedness and paid 
                                                          
565 HHStA StK, Vortrage, box 104, 302-308 verso. 
566 On July 6, 1771, the Habsburg Court signed an agreement with the Ottomans. Constantinople promised the part 
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this agreement promised that at the end of the war they would establish and enforce the ancient borders between 
Transylvania these provinces. The convention was abrogated in the summer of 1772 as the Habsburgs realized the 
outrage their action would have provoked in St. Petersburg. Karl A. Roider, Austria’s Eastern Question, 1700-1790 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), 124-129. Hurmuzaki, Documente, vol. 7, 86-87. 
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special attention to the province closest to the war theater: Transylvania.567 The French 
ambassador in Vienna wrote on November 16, 1769 to Versailles that “the Court of Vienna did 
not witness with pleasure the success of the Russians, and she [Vienna] would have even 
preferred if the glory of this campaign had been on the side of the Turks. It desires without any 
doubt that these two powers weaken each other equally without acquiring too big advantages one 
over the other. But if one of the two should gain a significant superiority, it is in its [Vienna’s] 
interest that it should be the Ottoman Empire.”568 
 Although the Habsburgs felt threatened by the Russians’ success against Constantinople’s 
army, they still found a silver lining: the political and military turmoil the Russian invasion 
sparked in Moldavia allowed Vienna’s officers to install a system of border markers without 
signing any prior bilateral convention with their neighbors. Already on March 1, 1769, less than 
a year after the beginning of this conflict, the president of the Aulic War Council, Count Frantz 
Moritz von Lacy, had expressed his concern that a lack of clear markers on Transylvania’s 
borders made it vulnerable in the face of the opposing Ottoman and Russian armies, especially in 
the case of a Russian invasion of Moldavia and Wallachia. Neither Transylvania’s Military 
Commander, Count Carl O’Donnell, nor his superior, Lacy, predicted any immediate difficulties 
in positioning these border indicators, but both of them foresaw challenges at the end of the war 
from either the Ottoman or the Russian side. Therefore, Lacy presented a number of scenarios 
contingent on the unfolding of the war. In the case of a Russian invasion of Moldavia, the 
Habsburg troops could position the border markers without any restraint and even occupy earlier 
                                                          
567 For a narrative of the 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman conflict see: Virginia Aksan, Ottoman Wars 1700–1870: An 
Empire Besieged (Harlow: Longman/Pearson, 2007), 138-160; Hochedlinger, Austria’s Wars of Emergence, 349-
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568 La Cour de Vienne n’a pas vu avec plaisir le succés des Russes, et qu’elle auroit même preferé que la gloire de 
cette campagne eut été du coté des Turcs. Elle desire sans doute que ces deux puissances s’affoiblissent egalement 
sans acquerir l’une sur l’autre de trop grands avantages. Mais si l’une des deux doit avoir une superiorié bien 
marquée, il est de son interêt que ce soit plutot l’empire Ottoman. MAE CP, Autriche, box 312, 189 verso.  
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controversial frontier areas. Lacy assumed the Russians would have difficulties in challenging 
this new status quo. However, if the principality remained in the Ottoman sphere of influence by 
the end of the war, the Porte would surely contest the new position of the border markers, and the 
Habsburgs should voice their willingness to name a joint commission to decide on the legitimate 
position of the border.569  
Lacy’s recommendation was rooted in the Habsburgs’ earlier experiences in trying to 
negotiate with the Ottomans. The unfruitful diplomatic confrontations from the early 1750s had 
convinced the Habsburgs that in the case of an official investigation to mark the position of the 
border between Transylvania and Moldavia, their cartographic and detailed documentary 
evidence, supported by their military power, would have a good chance to counteract any 
pretensions from the Ottoman side. The military authorities in Vienna anticipated that a later 
negotiation regarding the final position of the borderline would necessitate presenting updated 
cartographic material. Therefore, on May 22, 1769, in preparation for the boundary demarcation 
operations, Luchsenstein was ordered to include signs for the border markers on his border 
maps.570 This Habsburg maneuver was part of their strategy to argue in front of the Ottoman 
Court that the positioning of the boundary pillars in 1769 was based on documentary evidence, 
as illustrated on Luchsenstein’s earlier border map and his memoirs. 
By the end of June 1769, Emperor Joseph II had decided that the trigger to start 
positioning the border markers should be the Russian invasion of Moldavia. The emperor warned 
his military staff to claim only lands for which the Viennese Court could provide convincing 
evidence of ownership, in order to thwart any counter-claims at the end of the war. Moreover, if 
the fighting sides expressed any misgivings about the Habsburg actions, Joseph II recommended 
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that his men present the act of positioning border markers as a temporary defensive measure, 
simply aimed to protect the Principality of Transylvania from war devastation.571 On August 25, 
1769, the Court and State Chancellery in Vienna officially warned the General Commander of 
Transylvania to start positioning the border markers as soon as the Russian troops gained the 
upper hand over the Ottomans. At the same time, the imperial authorities urged Luchsenstein to 
prepare a detailed memoir detailing the controversies on the Transylvanian-Moldavian 
borderland.572  
By Fall of 1769, the Habsburgs had moved more regiments into Transylvania and had 
reinforced the military cordon to oppose any possible incursion of the Ottoman Empire into 
Transylvania. As the French ambassador in Vienna, the Marquis de Durfort, wrote to the French 
foreign minister in Paris, Étienne François Duke de Choiseul, Chancellor Kaunitz wanted to 
reassure the foreign diplomats in Vienna that this was not an aggressive gesture, but simply a 
precautionary measure.573 However, under the veil of protecting the Transylvanian province 
from an Ottoman or Russian invasion, the Habsburg troops redrew the frontier line through the 
positioning of border markers.574 The officers placed most of the 24 boundary pillars at the 
confluence of streams and rivers, or on certain mountain ridges, in order to ensure their locations 
were not ambiguous.575  
In parallel with the mapmaking efforts and the positioning of imperial border markers, 
the Habsburg authorities started preparations for an official diplomatic negotiation regarding the 
frontier’s position. In order to successfully impose its vision of the borderline, Vienna collected 
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historical documentation such as medieval privileges, earlier peace treaties, testimonies from 
very old locals regarding the accepted position of the border by the local communities, and 
whenever possible, old cartographic representations of the border areas. As part of this effort, on 
May 3, 1769, the Aulic War Council in Vienna ordered Luchsenstein to prepare a detailed 
memoir discussing the Transylvanian-Moldavian border controversies. As a result of this 
imperial commission, Luchsenstein spent part of 1769 gathering documents from various towns 
in Transylvania to support the Habsburg claims.576 On August 10, the Transylvanian engineer 
started a series of trips to Bistritza (Bistriţa), Marusvásárhely (Târgu Mureş), Udvarhely 
(Odorheiu Secuiesc), Clausenburg (Cluj-Napoca) and Carlsburg (Alba Iulia).577 Moreover, he 
also received from the Habsburg authorities a series of original documents or old authentic 
copies from the Military District of Rodna, and obtained access to papers preserved in the War 
Chancellery.578  
On March 7, 1770, Luchsenstein sent to Vienna the final version of his memoir 
discussing the contested border areas between Moldavia and Transylvania.579 Luchsenstein’s 
investigations in the archives failed to bring to the surface documents related to any successful 
border demarcation between Transylvania and Moldavia. Therefore, the military engineer 
suggested that the only way to establish a borderline had to rely on three principles: the peaceful 
occupation of a domain for an indeterminate amount of time (principle also known as uti 
                                                          
576 On May 3, 1769, the Aulic War Council ordered the General Commander in Transylvania to ensure the 
preparation of written memoirs supporting Transylvanian claims in the border areas towards Moldavia and 
Wallachia. AN, Brukenthal, 106/L 1-8, 366, 7. 
577 I am using the toponyms as they appear in Luchsenstein’s memoir. However I am also adding in brackets the 
current name of those towns.  
578 AN, Brukenthal, 106/L 1-8, 366, 7-7 verso. 
579 For the full memoir see Ibid.; for an unsigned summary of Luchsenstein’s memoir see AN, Brukenthal, 106/L 1-
8, 197, 183-207 verso. By December 21, 1771, Luchsenstein finalized a similar memoir for the contested border 
areas between Transylvania and Wallachia. AN, Brukenthal, 106/L 1-8, 367. 
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possidetis), the use of unbiased written documents that contained no contradictions, and the 
presence of uncontested border fortresses, trenches or other boundary signs. 
The memoir incorporated the Moldavians’ position regarding the position of the 
borderline and their arguments so that Luchsenstein could refute all of them. First of all, the 
engineer performed an in-depth analysis of the donation letters supposedly issued by the 
Moldavian princes to monasteries and noblemen and raised serious doubts about their 
authenticity. Secondly, Luchsenstein attacked the validity of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century collections of testimonies from inhabitants from the borderlands, by claiming that these 
witnesses had their own territorial interests and their statements contained numerous 
contradictions. Finally, the Habsburg officer claimed that the failed border negotiations and 
demarcations from 1742 and the early 1750s were symptomatic of the Moldavian rulers’ desire 
to avoid an official convention, because they lacked substantial evidence to support their 
claims.580  
The second part of Luchsenstein’s discussion presented the evidence supporting the 
Habsburg pretensions. Luchsenstein’s argumentation was based on documents from 
Transylvanian archives that gave clues about, and even indicated the trajectory of, certain border 
segments. For example, fifteenth century royal privileges with the signature of the Hungarian 
king Sigismund revealed that the inhabitants of the district of Bistritza controlled land domains 
until the river Golden Bistritz, despite the Moldavians’ attempt to push the border further inside 
Transylvanian territory.581 Other archival documentation included more kingly and princely land 
donations, testimonies gathered from local witnesses on the occasion of territorial disputes, 
contracts signed between Transylvanian authorities and neighboring Polish officials, tax rolls, 
                                                          
580 AN, Brukenthal, 106/L 1-8, 197, 183-189 verso. 
581 Ibid., 190-190 verso. 
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and even Moldavian documents confiscated in 1766 from the abbot of the monastery Soveja on 
the occasion of his attempt to enter Transylvania’s territory. Furthermore, Luchsenstein relied on 
the Peace of Karlowitz’s articles regarding the position of the border. Although the early 1700s 
joint border commissions did not mark the Transylvanian-Moldavian borderline, the official 
documents mentioned that borders possessed justly and peacefully in 1699 would preserve their 
position. Therefore, Luchsenstein argued that the Moldavians’ eighteenth-century annexations of 
Transylvanian domains, such as the one in 1746, should be voided.582  
In addition to written documents, the engineer listed the position of old artificial 
boundary signs and wartime Transylvanian built fortifications, locations that he had clearly 
verified in some cases on the ground.583 Luchsenstein characterized the last set of arguments he 
included in his memoir as “plausible and illustrative” (wahrscheinliche und erklärende) as he 
tried to develop a direct relationship between toponymy and the legitimate owners of contested 
borderlands. The Habsburg officer claimed that mountains and rivers with Hungarian names or 
containing in their name variants of the word Szekler undoubtedly belonged to Transylvania’s 
Szekler counties. His examples include a list of toponyms derived from Hungarian words, 
including Szoros, Magyoros, Kis Havas, Tölgyes and Bálványos.584 
 The memoir took a very strong line against all of the Moldavian arguments and 
documentary evidence, and the author did not betray any feelings of uncertainty regarding the 
Habsburg rights to the lands under disputes. This uncompromising position was a direct result of 
this document’s importance as one of the Habsburgs’ main negotiating weapons. However, in the 
correspondence with his army superiors, Luchsenstein took a more cautious stance regarding the 
                                                          
582 Ibid., 189 verso - 195. 
583 Ibid., 195 verso-196 verso. 
584 Ibid., 199 verso-200; AN, Brukenthal, 106/L 1-8, 366, 118 verso-119. Two of the groups inhabiting 
Transylvania, the Hungarians and the Szeklers, spoke the Hungarian language as their native tongue. Therefore, 
Hungarian-derived toponyms could suggest Hungarian or Szekler control of those areas.  
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validity of the borderline he had suggested on his 1751 map. On February 8, 1770, the engineer 
wrote that the demarcation line he had suggested on his original border map was supposed to 
recommend only a possible solution in a border negotiation planned for 1752. However, he 
stressed in his letter that he had warned his superiors at the time that in order to successfully 
conclude any border convention, the Habsburg authorities would also have to make some 
territorial concessions to the Moldavian prince.585  
Luchsenstein’s 1770 letter is symptomatic not only of one officer’s doubts regarding the 
success of the Habsburg border demarcation operations. The Habsburg military authorities in 
Transylvania knew that the action of installing the border pillars in 1769 would not go 
unchallenged. Based on the incidents the Habsburgs officers reported to Vienna in 1769 and 
1770, it is clear that the imperial authorities were especially weary of the reaction of the most 
recent conquerors of Moldavia: the Russians. With the help of regular border inspections and a 
network of spies active in Moldavia, the general commander of Transylvania kept his superiors 
in Vienna informed of any challenges to the border’s status quo and asked for guidance on how 
to ensure the Russians’ collaboration.  
Approximately a week after planting the “imperial eagles,” officers belonging to the 
military border regiments performed on-site inspections and sent reports about the state of the 
markers. For example, the commander of the first Szekler Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Carato, wrote to his commander on December 26, 1769, that with one exception, all the border 
indicators had maintained their position. The exception was the marker located at Obsina 
Albilor, which Wallach inhabitants from Moldavia had demolished and carried away to the 
village Hank. Carato added in his report that the main instigator of this anti-Habsburg action, 
                                                          
585 AN, Brukenthal, 120/RR 1-68, 21, 101. 
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Szavuka Ioun (or Szavicska Juon), had served for eight years as a Hussar in the Russian army.586 
This small piece of biographical information, deemed worthy enough to be included in the 
report, could have suggested that the Wallach expressed his support of the Russian occupation of 
Moldavia and maybe performed this action at the orders of Russian commanders. However, 
another piece of information Carato included in his letter indicated that other Russian officers 
had taken a cautious stance with respect to the border markers. For example, a Russian sergeant 
and two other men had inspected a boundary indicator positioned next to the stream Köszörükö 
and warned the locally deployed soldiers to ensure that no damage was done to this marker.587 
This decision does not mean the Russian officers accepted the Habsburg imposed status quo. 
Indeed, during the month of December, First Lieutenant Philip von Möller, at the time in 
the service of the Russian Empire, travelled to the mountain pass Rodna and asked the Habsburg 
border guards about the trajectory of the northern borderline segment and the position of the 
newly installed boundary markers. Möller even prepared a small sketch showing some key points 
in the contested borderlands located in the Rodna Valley, reproduced in Figure 5.5. Whereas the 
engineer mentioned in his message that the Moldavians considered point A, namely the 
intersection of the rivers Bistriza (Bistriţa) and Zibu (Țibău), an important boundary feature, he 
did not express any judgments regarding the points B and C, which marked the first houses on 
the border and one of the Habsburg border markers, respectively. Instead, he asked the Habsburg 
officers whether they could indicate on his sketch the trajectory of the borderline not only for the 
area defined by the points A, B, and C, but also continuing from C up on the Dorna river until 
the Moldavian settlement Dorna.588  
                                                          
586 HHStA StK, Noten von dem HKR, box 82, fascicle 1, 23-23 verso.  
587 Ibid. 
588 HHStA StK, Noten von dem HKR, box 82, fascicle 1, 16.  
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Figure 5.5 Philip von Möller’s plan of the Rodna Valley and its surroundings 
 
 
Möller probably hoped to force the Habsburg authorities to bring into the open their 
claims on these contested borderlands. However, in early January, 1770, Emperor Joseph II and 
Chancellor Kaunitz recommended that the military authorities in Transylvania answer all such 
further queries from Russian officers with the following statement: the Habsburg boundary 
pillars marked Transylvania’s exterior border towards Moldavia and Vienna’s army was 
authorized to use force to defend their position.589 This seemingly insignificant incident suggests 
that the Habsburg mapmakers were not the only ones gathering geographic information about the 
Transylvanian-Moldavian borderlands. Although the new master of Moldavia, the Russian 
Empire, had no guarantee it would control this province at the end of the war with the Ottomans, 
it still asserted itself as an important rival in the region. 
The Aulic War Council in Vienna took the defense of the border markers seriously, and 
on January 27, 1770, in addition to regular inspections, ordered the Transylvanian commander to 
build trenches and guard houses (blockhäuser) for the military regiments to use to protect the 
                                                          
589 Ibid., 33 verso-34. 
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“imperial eagles.” In less than a month, O’Donnell sent to Vienna a copy of Luchstenstein’s 
border map, which included the current position of the border markers and the land areas the 
Habsburg troops had reclaimed. Transylvania’s commander agreed with his superiors that 
frequent inspections, guardhouses and trenches would in theory help protect the boundary pillars. 
However, O’Donnell also warned that the rough mountainous terrain and the large distances 
separating villages from the borderline would impede the border regiments from performing 
regular inspections and even from being stationed close to the border markers. Therefore, 
investing resources to build guardhouses and trenches appeared a pointless tactic, especially if 
the later border treaty with the Ottomans did not confirm the current trajectory of the 
borderline.590 O’Donnell wrote this answer to the Aulic War Council based on Luchsenstein’s 
recommendations, proving once again the key role this engineer played in Habsburg policy 
regarding the regulation of the borderline.591  
Even though he did not approve the costly project of building guardhouses to defend all 
individual border markers, the Transylvanian military commander maintained a close watch on 
the situation of the borderline and continued to report all significant news to Vienna. For 
example, as soon as the spring of 1770 came, O’Donnell forwarded to his superiors some 
worrying rumors about the Russian officers’ plans regarding the frontier markers.592 From 
O’Donnell’s report we learn that Corporal Wittibschlager, a Habsburg spy posing as a cattle 
merchant, traveled into Moldavia at the end of April 1770 and met the Russian Corporal in 
charge of the area around the town Campolongo. Wittibschlager found out that the Russian army 
was repairing the road leading from Campolongo to the border markers in the area of Kosnitza. 
As soon as the snow in the mountains started melting, 800 Russian soldiers planned to travel into 
                                                          
590 AN, Brukenthal, 120/RR 1-68, 21, 92-93 verso, February 21, 1770, letter to the Aulic War Council, February. 
591 Ibid., February 8, 1770, Luchsenstein, 99-99 verso. 
592 HHStA StK, Noten von dem HKR, box 82, fascicle 1, 411. 
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the Carpathians to push back the newly installed frontier markers.593 A message coming from 
Peter Szilagyi, another Habsburg spy masquerading as a Russian collaborator, confirmed 
Wittibschlager’s intelligence: the Russians were preparing to displace the border markers and 
challenge Vienna’s pretensions.594 Both spies suggested that this Russian initiative against the 
border markers was a direct response to Moldavian complaints. The Habsburg informers 
commented on the enthusiastic support the inhabitants from the Moldavian border town of Dorna 
had promised the Russian troops in their efforts to get rid of the border markers.595  
Despite the sense of urgency such news raised from Transylvania all the way to Vienna, 
the Russians did not take any actions against the Habsburg border markers, possibly because 
they could not risk infuriating such a key ally for the sake of some border squabbles. As the war 
campaigns continued throughout the early 1770s, the Russian Empire’s military priorities 
changed; the diplomatic negotiations with Prussia and the Habsburgs regarding what came to be 
known as the first partition of Poland and the attempt to extend the Russian Empire’s influence 
over Crimea took center stage.596 Moreover, the concentration of numerous Habsburg troops 
close to Transylvania’s borders convinced St. Petersburg they could not risk a diplomatic rupture 
with Vienna.597 Indeed, by the spring and summer of 1773, when Emperor Joseph II travelled to 
Transylvania and the newly annexed province of Galicia, the Russian forces stationed in 
Moldavia offered their support for Habsburg cartographic projects in the borderland areas. 
 The emperor’s visit to his easternmost provinces was part of Joseph II’s larger effort to 
travel almost every year to some of the Monarchy’s domains and other countries, and Habsburg 
                                                          
593 Ibid., 418-419. 
594 Ibid., 417. 
595 Ibid., 418-419. 
596 Roider, Austria’s Eastern Question, 126-127, 138. 
597 Hochedlinger, Austria's Wars of Emergence, 351-352. 
 237 
scholars have analyzed and published numerous documents related to these journeys.598 In the 
case of Transylvania, the documents Joseph II wrote during his stay in the province, his itinerary, 
the projects he initiated, and the reports of the French ambassador in Vienna all suggest the 
emperor’s interest in systematizing the borderline and implementing large-scale mapmaking 
projects in this area.599  
The emperor’s desire to map not only Transylvania’s borderlands, but also a significant 
territory belonging to Moldavia and Wallachia, could not have become reality without the 
collaboration of the Russian military commanders. Aware of the importance of maintaining good 
relationships with the officers of Catherine the Great deployed in Moldavia, Joseph II 
encountered on the border some of the Russian high officers. On 29 May 1773, Louis René 
Édouard, Cardinal de Rohan, the French ambassador in Vienna, transmitted with evident worry 
to Paris the emperor’s decision to pass incognito for 24 hours into Moldavia to meet the Russian 
army’s commander, Field Marshal Romanzow. Although this encounter might have happened, 
Joseph II’s official diary does not record such a meeting.600 However, for June 14, 1773, the 
emperor recorded a meeting on the border with the Russian General Ingelstroom and a couple of 
other officers, who also transmitted to Joseph II Romanzow’s regards. Additionally, the emperor 
spent time discussing the evolution of the war with the Habsburg officer Barco, who gave him 
insight in the Russian army’s operations and the situation in Moldavia.601 Throughout the war 
                                                          
598 Bozac and Pavel, Călătoria împăratului Iosif al II-lea, vols. I and II; Donnert and Reinalter, Journal der 
Russlandreise Kaiser Josephs II. im Jahre 1780; Hubert, Le voyage de l'empereur Joseph II dans les Pays-Bas; 
Hans Wagner, “Die Reise Josephs II. nach Frankreich 1977 und die Reformen in Osterreich,” in Osterreich und 
Europe. Festgabe fur Hugo Hantsch zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Institut für österreichische Geschichtsforschung und 
von der Wiener Katholischen Akademie (Graz: Verlag Styria, 1965), 221-246; Derek Beales, Joseph II, vol. 1, 242-
271, 359-385, 432-438; Franco Valsecchi, L'assolutismo illuminato in Austria e in Lombardia, vol. 2 (Bologna: 
Nicola Zanichelli, 1931), 318-330. 
599 Veres, “Putting Transylvania on the Map,” 152-155. 
600 MAE CP, Autriche, box 321, 367-369. 
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Barco acted as one of the main informers for the Habsburg authorities, albeit not clandestinely 
but in an official capacity, as Vienna’s representative among the ranks of the Russian troops.602  
 As part of his responsibilities as the official intermediary between the Russian 
commander Romanzow and the Habsburg military authorities in Transylvania and Vienna, Barco 
paid special attention to the process of creating and gathering maps showing the Russian-
occupied lands, including Moldavia. For example, in the first half of 1773, Barco sent through 
First Lieutenant Mutz a map of Moldavia and Wallachia.603 This map was one of the two 
cartographic sources that Joseph II analyzed in July 1773 in order to establish whether they 
showed the Transylvanian-Moldavian borderlands accurately. The emperor’s disappointment 
with the existing maps of Transylvania’s borderlands, which lacked a good representation of the 
road network, motivated him to order a new set of cartographic operations.604  
Indeed, on July 11, 1773, the new general commander of Transylvania, Baron Johann 
Franz Preiss, commissioned Barco to inform the commander of the Russian troops, Romanzow, 
that Habsburg mapmakers would perform surveys in the borderlands and required the Russians’ 
collaboration. In a couple of weeks Romanzow submitted his written agreement to cooperate 
with Vienna, but also warned Preiss that the Moldavian inhabitants might react aggressively to 
these border surveys, especially after the 1769 installation of the Habsburg border markers.605 
Despite this warning, taking advantage of the Russian support and prioritizing speed over 
                                                          
602 During the 1768-1774 Russo-Ottoman conflict, the Aulic War Council in Vienna sent some officers to serve 
under the banners of both belligerent states. The officers fighting alongside the Russian troops could, due to a prior 
agreement between Vienna and St. Petersburg reveal their identity. Barco was probably one of these officers. 
HHStA StK, Vortrage, box 104, 302-308 verso. 
603 KA HKR, 1773 57 64, 1. The 1783 map inventory of the Aulic War Council includes under the category 
“Turkey” entries for two 1773 manuscript maps, one a representation of Moldavia and the other showing Wallachia. 
(“General Karte in 3 Sectionen von dem Fürstenthum Moldau und Besarabien gezeichnet” and “General Karte von 
dem Fürstenthum Wallachey in 3 Sectionen gezeichnet”). It is not possible to establish whether the map of Moldavia 
was the one Barco sent to Transylvania, but the inventory provides further proof that the Habsburg militaty 
authorities were gathering maps of Moldavia during the war. KA HKR, 1783 34 60.  
604 KA HKR, 1773 57 64, 2. 
605 HHStA StK, Noten von dem HKR, box 85, fascicle 2, 38-38 verso; 35-35 verso. 
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accurate geometric surveys, the Habsburg officers under the direction of Jeney finished mapping 
the borderlands of Transylvania with Moldavia and Wallachia by October 19, 1773.606  
Even after the Habsburg officers surveyed part of Moldavia’s territory, Barco continued 
to send additional maps of this province. For example, at the end of 1774, Barco sent to Vienna 
information about the existence of a Russian map, which he called “very precise” (sehr exact). 
According to Barco’s communication, the map included part of Poland, Moldavia, Bessarabia, 
the eastern half of Wallachia and part of Bulgaria, all territory on which the Russian army had 
fought during the conflict with the Ottomans.607 Barco managed to obtain a version of this map 
in German translation from the Russian commander, and the map arrived safely in Vienna at the 
end of March 1775. Joseph II, who had personally travelled through some of the lands, was not 
impressed by the quality of this map and commented that it had insufficient details. Nonetheless, 
the map remained in the Aulic War Council’s archives, as attested by the 1783 inventory.608 This 
instance proves that, whenever possible, the Habsburg military did not hesitate in gathering 
cartographic information from their allies. Moreover, the emperor showed a substantial interest 
in the map collection of the Aulic War Council and was skilled in assessing the value of 
geographic information included on these maps. Joseph II’s attentiveness to enrich his empire’s 
cartographic repository reveals the Emperor’s belief that maps could codify and transmit all the 
way to Vienna the territorial complexity of far-away provinces, and thus assist in decision-
making processes.  
                                                          
606 KA HKR, 1773 57 101. For more details see Veres, “Redefining Imperial Borders,” 15-18.  
607 HHStA StK, Noten von dem HKR, box 86, 950 verso, December 13, 1774, Barco to Hadik.  
608 KA HKR, 1775 57 33 per 1, March 29, 1775, Hadik to the Aulic War Council. The 1783 Protocol lists as part of 
the Turkish section a 1775 manuscript map entitled “General Map in ten sections of Moldavia, Wallachia und 
Bessarabia, next to the border parts of Poland and Bulgaria” (General Karte in 10 Sectionen von der Moldau, 
Wallachey und Bessarabien, nebst angränzenden Theilen von Pohlen und Bulgarien), KA HKR, 1783 34 60. 
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Barco’s messages from Moldavia demonstrate that Vienna’s officers were not the only 
mapmakers in the area; the Russians also used their time as temporary occupiers of Moldavia 
and other nearby provinces to prepare maps of these areas, documents potentially helpful both in 
the eventuality of a political annexation or of a future military conflict with the Ottomans. The 
Russians’ interest in preparing maps during their military campaigns is not surprising and 
reflects this empire’s increased reliance on cartography as a way to centralize its provinces and 
expand its borders, in ways reminiscent of the Habsburg Monarchy.609  
As a trans-imperial process, the mapping of the Transylvanian-Moldavian borderlands 
and the borderline’s demarcation involved not only Vienna and St. Petersburg, but also the 
Moldavian rulers and their Ottoman protectors.610 During the spring of 1770, the president of the 
Aulic War Council decided to notify the Habsburg agent in Constantinople, Johann Thugut, 
about the border marking operations, so that this ambassador could negotiate with the Porte’s 
representatives the final trajectory of the borderline.611 In order to ensure he had sufficient 
information for these high level discussions, Thugut solicited from Vienna detailed maps of the 
Transylvanian-Moldavian borderlands, including a representation of the frontier line before and 
                                                          
609 Two works analyzing the relationship between cartography and the evolution of the Russian empire especially for 
the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries are Kivelson, Cartographies of Tsardom; Seegel, Mapping Europe’s 
Borderlands.  
610 From 1711 and 1716, the Greek Orthodox Christian elite from Constantinople loyal to the Ottoman sultans, 
known as the Phanariots, held the highest positions in the political and administrative hierarchy of Moldavia and 
Wallachia, respectively. For further information on the Phanariots and the influence of their rulership on the 
Danubian Principalities see: Christine Philliou, "Communities on the Verge: Unraveling the Phanariot Ascendancy 
in Ottoman Governance," Comparative Studies in Society and History 51, no.1 (2009): 151-181; Stefania Costache, 
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(1780s-1850s) (PhD diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2013); Vasile Mihai Olaru, Writs and 
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European University, 2013). 
611 HHStA StK, Noten von dem HKR, box 82, fascicle 1, 277-280 verso. Throughout the eighteenth century the 
Habsburg resident in Constantinople played the key role in Habsburg-Ottoman diplomatic discussions. The 
Ottomans presented their messages for Vienna to this ambassador and so did the Habsburgs. For this reason, during 
the negotiations regarding the border between Transylvania and Moldavia, and the cession of Bukovina, Kaunitz had 
to ensure Thugut had all the necessary information, documents and maps, to support the Habsburg claims. Pešalj, 
“Early 18th-Century Peacekeeping,” 30.  
 241 
after the positioning of the Habsburg border markers. Additionally, the Habsburg agent asked for 
a representation of the Moldavian land that remained under the Ottoman influence, and a memoir 
listing all the important toponyms and summarizing the Habsburg territorial priorities in the 
region. Thugut justified his request for all these cartographic sources because of the lack of any 
good quality maps in his possession and his inability to locate most of the geographic sites 
mentioned in his instructions from Vienna.612  
Relying on Thugut’s ability as a negotiator, the Habsburgs desired the discussions take 
place in Constantinople in order to circumvent the Moldavian authorities, possibly because the 
local rulers had a very good knowledge of the historical and geographical situation of this 
province and the borders’ situation. Silencing the voice of the Moldavian representatives became 
even more important from the Habsburg perspective once Joseph II ordered the annexation of the 
northern part of this Danubian principality, known as Bukovina.613 However, this did not stop 
the new Moldavian prince, Grigore III Ghica, from preparing maps of his dominions and sending 
them to Constantinople in order to counteract the Habsburg claims.614 On January 4, 1775, the 
Habsburg representative in Constantinople, Thugut, wrote to Kaunitz that Grigore Ghica had sent 
to Constantinople a map on which he had marked the territory the Habsburgs occupied in the 
borderlands since 1769.615 Furthermore, the Moldavian prince included on this map a possible 
territorial solution to connect the Habsburg lands in Galicia with Transylvania that would have 
not required the cession of Bukovina.616 In the first months of 1775 Ghica sent at least two 
                                                          
612 February 3, 1773, Thugut to Kaunitz, Hurmuzaki, Documente, vol 7, 99. 
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additional maps showing how the Habsburgs had abusively moved the border markers in order to 
take over Bukovina.617  
The Habsburg representative failed to obtain copies of Ghica’s maps but through one of 
his connections in Constantinople managed to view some of these documents and sent brief 
descriptions back to Vienna.618 The efforts of Ghica to support Moldavia’s territorial claims 
followed steps similar to those of the Habsburg side, and included the preparation of 
cartographic material. Thugut warned his Viennese superiors that the Aulic War Council’s 
subordinates implementing the annexation of Bukovina were wrong in assuming that the 
Moldavians were ignorant with respect to the situation of the borderlands and the position of the 
border markers.619 Clearly, the Habsburg eventual success in imposing their claims and annexing 
the northern part of Moldavia was not due to their neighbors’ ignorance or inability to prepare 
cartographic material. Maria Theresa and her advisers prevailed because in the diplomatic game 
of large empires, the interests of small principalities such as Moldavia often suffered.  
The final Habsburg-Ottoman convention, signed on May 7, 1775, confirmed Moldavia’s 
cession of Bukovina and the trajectory of the Transylvanian-Moldavian borderline as desired by 
the Habsburgs.620 The Convention also included under the third article the specification that “the 
inhabitants of Moldavia and Valachia, through their incessant usurpations, had trespassed the 
frontiers and the borders of Transylvania” and only recently had these lands been reunited with 
the Habsburg province through the placement of border markers. Therefore, the sultan ordered 
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618 Ibid., 142, March 4, 1775, Thugut to Kaunitz.  
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the Moldavian and Wallachian princes to respect the borders marked with the imperial eagles 
and represented on the Habsburg map sent to Constantinople.621 
Indeed, the Convention included an official map showing the trajectory of the borderline 
and the position of the boundary markers as installed by the Habsburgs at the beginning of the 
Russo-Ottoman war. Commissaries representing the Habsburg and Ottoman rulers were sent on 
the ground to verify the position of the markers in relationship with the map.622 Figure 5.6 
reproduces a fragment of a copy of this official map.623 The red borderline shows the status quo 
before the Russo-Ottoman war and the land patches illuminated with green represent what the 
Habsburgs occupied in 1769. As shown on this map fragment, the border markers annotated with 
red ovals served the Habsburg expansionist goals and their position helped the Viennese rulers 
claim part of Moldavia’s territory. 
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faite par la Cour impériale, il a été statué sur cet objet, du commun accord des deux parties, qu’il sera adressé de la 
part de la Sublime-Porte aux princes de Moldavie et de Valachie ce qui est nécessaire d’ordres rigoureux pour que 
les limites dans les susdites parties soient observées à perpétuité telles qu’elles sont indiquées et distinguées dans la 
carte qu’a présenté l’internonce et ministre plénipotentiaire de LL. MM. II. Et RR. A., et comme elles se trouvent 
déterminées actuellement par les aigles qu’a fait placer la Cour impériale, et pour que lesdits princes s’abstiennet de 
toute transgression et violation qui seront contraires à ce présent règlement.” Reproduced in Ignaz Testa, Alfred 
Testa, and Leopold Testa, Recueil des traités de la Porte ottomane avec les puissance étrangères, depuis le premier 
traité conclu, en 1536, entre Suléyman I et François I jusqu'à nos jours, vol. 9, Autriche (Paris: Amyot, 1898), 128-
129. 
622 Ibid., 127-128, Article 1 of the May 7, 1775 Convention.  
623 KA KPS, B IX c 756. 
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Figure 5.6 Detail from the map accompanying the 1775 Habsburg-Ottoman Convention 
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Looking for the cartographic sources that influenced the preparation of the 1775 
convention map takes us back to Luchsenstein’s border maps, which the imperial authorities had 
shared with their representative in Constantinople. When Thugut complained in 1773 that he had 
no good map showing the border between Transylvania and Moldavia, Kaunitz sent him all 
required materials.624 Although Kaunitz does not specifically state in his letter that the surveyor 
of the border maps he was sending to Constantinople was Luchsenstein, shortly after the signing 
of the convention, he received back from Thugut detailed reports of Luchsenstein regarding the 
borders of Transylvania with the Danubian Principalities, together with three of Luchsenstein’s 
maps.625 Clearly, the work of the Transylvanian mapmaker had served to establish the borderline 
and the version of the final convention map in favor of the Habsburg rulers.  
In addition to preparing maps and memoirs to support the Habsburg territorial claims in 
Transylvania’s borderlands, Luchsenstein organized a massive collection of legal and historical 
documents that constituted the backbone of his argumentation that traced back in time the border 
incidents and negotiations between Transylvania and the Danubian Principalities. On October 
29, 1781, Luchsenstein wrote a detailed report in which he explained how he organized 851 
documents in 29 fascicles in order to avoid any future confusions or loss of documents.626 It is 
impressive that the archives in Sibiu still have 27 of these fascicles preserved in the same way 
                                                          
624 February 3, 1773, Thugut to Kaunitz, and January 6, 1775, Kaunitz to Thugut, Hurmuzaki, Documente, vol. 7, 
98, 121. 
625 In February and March 1777 the State Chancellery in Vienna returned to the Imperial War Council Archive two 
Luchsenstein memoirs regarding the contentious border areas between Transylvania and the Danubian Principalities, 
34 fascicules with documents defending the Transylvanian pretensions in the contested regions, and three border 
maps. All these documents had been used by the Habsburg representatives during the negotiations with the 
Ottomans regarding the new trajectory of the Transylvanian borders and the Habsburg annexation of the northern 
part of Moldavia, Bukovina. Based on the material I have located in the archives in Sibiu and Vienna I believe the 
two memoirs were the ones Luchsenstein finalized in 1770 and 1771. HHStA StK, Noten an den HKR, box 7, 
February 18, 1777 and March 10, 1777, State Chancellery to the Aulic War Council.  
626 AN, Brukenthal, 106/L 1-8, 216.  
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Luchsenstein arranged them in the early 1780s.627 Luchsenstein’s attention to building a 
documentary archive supporting the position of the Habsburg imperial borderline reveals that 
although maps had become essential during inter-state negotiations as accompanying documents, 
they had to rely on documentary support. However, as revealed by the case of the Habsburg 
annexation of Bukovina in 1775, it was primarily cartographic sources and first-hand knowledge 
of the territory, and not the existence of legal or historical argumentation, that convinced 
Emperor Joseph II of the need to occupy this area. Moreover, Luchsenstein’s superiors did not 
possess an in-depth knowledge of the written documents, but based their decisions on the 
cartographical version of the argumentation as presented on this engineer’s border maps.  
The process of border demarcation for the frontier separating the Habsburg province of 
Transylvania from Moldavia had a happy ending for Vienna because of the unequal power 
relationship between this empire and the weak neighboring Danubian Principality. Additionally, 
the Russo-Ottoman war offered the perfect justification for the Habsburg deployment of 
additional troops in Transylvania and for taking additional measures to protect the imperial 
borderline, such as mapping the area and positioning border markers. However, as shown in the 
last two chapter sections, the Habsburg officers were not the only cartographers in the region. 
The Russian commander and the Moldavian princes understood the power of maps to influence 
the future of a territory and initiated their own cartographic projects. Whereas in the 1750s the 
Habsburg and Moldavian cartographic traditions used different conventions and ways of 
representing the borderlands, the border maps prepared as appendices to the Habsburg-Ottoman 
convention from 1775 had adopted Vienna’s cartographic language as the accepted “scientific” 
method to represent territories.  
                                                          
627 AN, Brukenthal, 108/M 1-5, 1-5 for the borderlands with Moldavia, and AN, Brukenthal, 108/M 1-5, 6 for the 
borderlands with Wallachia. 
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5.2 THE PURSUIT OF PRECISION: THE QUEST FOR TRACING A CLEAR 
BORDERLINE BETWEEN THE AUSTRIAN NETHERLANDS AND FRANCE 
5.2.1 The Habsburg-Bourbon 1769 Border Treaty 
In 1769, the same year that the imperial authorities in Vienna ordered unapologetically and 
unilaterally the installation of border markers on Transylvania’s frontier, Maria Theresa signed a 
bilateral border treaty with French king Louis XV to initiate the regulation of the Austrian 
Netherlands-France borderline. Whereas in the case of Moldavia, the Habsburgs took advantage 
of their strong position in the area to impose a fast denouement greatly advantaging their own 
interests, in their negotiations with France Maria Theresa and Joseph II could not pursue the 
same path. Instead, bilateral commissions ensured the correct implementation of the 1769 border 
treaty and, in the case of conflicting interpretations of the convention’s articles, safeguarded the 
interests of both states. 
As the border demarcation between France and the Austrian Netherlands left behind 
thousands of documents, scholars, especially from France and Belgium, have published 
insightful books and articles analyzing and interpreting the process of this borderline’s 
transformation and its political and economic implications.628 However, although they 
                                                          
628 The most informative works including an in-depth discussion of the Habsburg-Bourbon border negotiations and 
demarcations in the second half of the eighteenth century are d’Albissin, Genèse de la frontière franco-belge; 
Dubois, Les Bornes Immuables de l'Etat. Other works containing useful discussions of the 1769 and 1779 border 
treaties are Firmin Lentacker, La Frontière Franco-Belge. étude géographique des effets d’une frontière 
internationale sur la vie de relations (Lille: le Ministère de l’Education Nationale et la Chambre de Commerce et 
d’Industrie de Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing, 1974); Claire Lemoine-Isabeau, “Limites sur les Cartes Anciennes et 
Cartes des Limites,” in Cartes et plans anciens. Sources pour la géographie historique des Pays-Bas méridionaux 
(XVIe-XVIIIe siècles), eds. H. Van der Haegen, F. Daelemans, and E. Van Ermen (Brussels: Archives et 
Bibliothèques de Belgique, 1986), 277-290; Marcel Watelet, Paysages de Frontieres. Tracés de limites et levés 
topographiques XVIIe-XIXe siècle (Paris: Duculot, 1992). Marcel Watelet also examined in another article how the 
cartographic material prepared in connection with the border treaties of 1769 and 1779 influenced the diplomats in 
their decision-making process by revealing the economic implications of the new borderline in relationship with the 
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sometimes briefly mention the existence of similar border demarcation enterprises in Europe at 
the time, all of these specialists analyze the case of the French-Austrian Netherlands frontier in 
isolation. In contrast to these earlier studies, I analyze the formation of this borderline in the 
larger context of Habsburg attempts in the second half of the eighteenth century to regulate their 
imperial frontiers. It is outside the scope of this chapter section to perform an exhaustive 
discussion of all territorial changes that occurred between the Austrian Netherlands and France 
as a result of the 1769 and 1779 treaties, especially because other historians have devoted in-
depth studies to this topic. Instead, the next pages bring to the forefront a series of instances 
revealing the importance of cartography for both negotiating parties during preliminary 
discussions and post-treaty border demarcations. As with the already discussed delimitation of 
the Transylvanian-Moldavian boundary, the Viennese authorities prepared maps in order to 
defend their border claims and gain the upper hand in the negotiations.  
In her survey of the evolution of the French-Belgian border between 1659 and 1789, 
Nelly Girard d’Albissin demonstrates that the 1769 and 1779 treaties signed between Versailles 
and Vienna consecrated the trajectory of a continuous borderline and eliminated enclaves in the 
borderlands. D’Albissin argues that for the first time in the history of Habsburg-Bourbon border 
settlements, the negotiations preceding these two bilateral agreements and the treaties’ 
implementation relied heavily on the work of professional mapmakers.629 D’Albissin 
underscores the chronological juxtaposition between new developments in the field of what she 
calls “cartographic science” and the establishment of a linear border with a precisely determined 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
road network for three cases: the road from Sedan to Liège, the road from Givet to Dinant, and the transit over the 
domains of Chimay and Beaumont. Marcel Watelet, “Production cartographie et enjeux diplomatiques le probleme 
des routes et de la frontiere entre les Pays-Bas autrichiens et la France (1769-1779), Imago Mundi: The International 
Journal for the History of Cartography 50, no.1 (1998): 84-95. 
629 D’Albissin, Genèse de la frontière franco-belge, especially chapter 5, “Les Traités de Limites Franco-Autrichiens 
et Franco-Liégeois au XVIIIe siècle,” 299-363. 
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trajectory. Although taking a cautious stance and claiming that “the existence of maps was far 
from being indispensable for a precise delimitation [of the borders],” d’Albissin acknowledges 
that “the evolution of the borders’ conceptualization and the evolution of the cartographic 
science reinforced each other and helped each other progress.”630 Indeed, the time frame between 
1760s and the 1780s marked an increased interest in both Versailles and Brussels in using maps 
as an essential accessory for border negotiations.  
The existence of sufficient surveyors and engineers trained in the art of mapmaking was a 
significant factor that allowed the two Courts the luxury of commissioning numerous 
cartographic representations of the boundary areas. As shown in chapter 2, during the eighteenth 
century, both Versailles and Vienna developed educational establishments for the training of 
civil and military engineers, who were then organized in special engineering corps. Therefore, it 
is not surprising that many of the authors of border maps for the Austrian Netherlands-France 
frontier belonged to the military engineering brigade of the Austrian Netherlands or the French 
corps of the Ponts et Chaussées. Whereas in the case of Transylvania the figures of Stephan 
Lutsch von Luchsenstein and Mihály Lajos Jeney dominated the cartographic production for the 
province’s borderlands, the Austrian Netherlands had a more numerous corps of highly skilled 
mapmakers. For example, a 1772 muster list of the Austrian Netherlands engineering brigade 
contained 31 individuals, including Nicolas Bergé, Claude Fisco, Philippe Mahieu, and François 
Weess, who each signed at least one map used during the border negotiations and 
demarcations.631  
                                                          
630 “l’existence de cartes était loin d’être indispensable à une délimitation precise;” “l’évolution de la conception des 
frontières et l’évolution de la science cartographique se sont prêtées un mutuel concours et se sont fait progresser 
l’une l’autre.” Ibid., 314. 
631 KA GHA, 1772 23 1. 
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 In addition to having numerous military engineers capable of drawing maps based on 
geodetic measurements, the Austrian Netherlands also had an institution devoted to addressing 
border conflicts. Created in 1740, the Giunta of Contested Lands (Jointe des Terres Contestées) 
was in charge of preparing and preserving documentation to support the Austrian Netherlands’ 
cause in cases of territorial controversies. This institution included functionaries that already 
occupied key positions in the provincial administration, such as the president of the Privy 
Council or the chancellor of Brabant. For example, in 1749, Patrice-François de Neny, president 
of the Privy Council between 1758 and 1783, and one of the most significant voices in the border 
negotiations with France during the 1760s and 1770s, joined this institution.632 Additionally, 
Henri Delplancq, in charge of customs’ policies and member of the Finance Council, entered the 
Giunta in 1769, and thus contributed to a better understanding of the economic implications of 
territorial exchanges.633 Whereas in the case of Transylvania, military officers like Stephan 
Lutsch von Luchsenstein, and the general military commanders of the province took charge of 
the border demarcation and the preparation of supporting material to justify the Habsburg 
actions, the Austrian Netherlands had a more complex institutional structure for addressing such 
issues.  
For the borderline between Transylvania and Moldavia we encountered the first detailed 
maps in the early 1750s. However, although the cartographic tradition for the Austrian 
Netherlands-French frontier was seemingly richer, the maps prepared prior to the 1760s offered a 
misleading image of the borderline. Indeed, printed maps originating both in Paris and Brussels 
in the first part of the eighteenth century and including the frontier between France and the 
                                                          
632 Etienne Hélin, Jozef Grauwels, Marie Rose Thielemans, Inventaire des archives de la Jointe des Terres 
Contestées (Brussels: Archives générales du Royaume, 1952), 7-8. For a biography of Patrice-François Neny see 
Bruno Bernard, Patrice-François de Neny (1716-1784). Portrait d’un Homme d’Etat (Brussels: Editions de 
l'Université de Bruxelles, 1993). 
633 Watelet, “Production Cartographie et Enjeux Diplomatiques,” 89. 
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Austrian Netherlands grossly simplified the situation by showing a linear borderline and ignoring 
the existence of numerous enclaves.634 Even the 1777 printed version of the first detailed 
topographic survey of the Austrian Netherlands directed by Ferraris included a disclaimer 
warning the viewer that any errors in the representation of borderlines were due to the negligence 
of the mapmaker and did not prejudice in any way the rights and pretensions of the Habsburg 
rulers or of their political neighbors.635  
The simplification on paper of the complex situation of the borderlands did not reflect the 
disinterest of Vienna and Versailles, but the Courts’ desire to avoid a diplomatic incident, 
especially as after the early 1750s they became seriously involved in negotiating border treaties 
and demarking a clear trajectory of the frontier. The discussions about reaching a borderline 
settlement had started shortly after the Viennese Habsburgs took over the Austrian Netherlands 
in 1714, but no agreement could be reached for decades, especially because Versailles and 
Vienna confronted each other in various wars.636 The 1756 alliance between Vienna and 
Versailles marked a watershed in the Habsburg policy towards France and also eased the way for 
the success of a border treaty between these two powers.  
Indeed, after the end of the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) negotiations were accelerated 
as both sides agreed that instead of discussing each small conflict separately, they would adopt 
some general principles in retracing their common borderline and would strive to eliminate all 
enclaves through territorial exchanges.637 Already in 1760, Georg Adam von Starhemberg, at the 
                                                          
634 The most famous examples include the maps of Eugène-Henri Fricx (printed in Brussels) and Nicolas de Fer 
(printed in Paris). Lemoine-Isabeau, “Limites sur les Cartes Anciennes et Cartes des Limites,” 278.  
635 Dubois, Les Bornes Immuables de l'Etat, 290. 
636 D’Albissin, Genèse de la frontière franco-belge, 292-297; Lentacker, La Frontière Franco-Belge, 14-16. A 
memoir prepared on March 12, 1752 in the Austrian Netherlands summarizes the failed attempts from the first half 
of the eighteenth century to reach a border convention with France. AGR SEG, box 1407, 32. For more documents 
related to border negotiations between 1716 and 1750 see AGR SEG, box 1406.  
637 A French memoir, probably written in 1768, summarizes the evolution of the negotiations between Vienna and 
Versailles and credits part of the progress of the discussions to the Habsburg ambassador in France, Count Mercy 
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time Habsburg ambassador in Paris and from 1770 plenipotentiary minister of the Austrian 
Netherlands, had transmitted his Court’s hope to eliminate all enclaves from the borderlands in 
order to eradicate all future contestations and establish a stable frontier.638 The Habsburg 
overtures had the full support of Étienne-François Duke de Choiseul, who combined in his 
person the positions of French Minister of War and of Foreign Affairs.  
Before rising to the top of the Versailles political hierarchy, Choiseul had served as 
French ambassador in Vienna and had cultivated a friendly relationship with Maria Theresa and 
her advisers.639 Therefore, in January 1768, when the Habsburgs approached the new French 
ambassador, Durfort, with a proposal to implement a clear border demarcation between Austrian 
Netherlands and France, Choiseul offered his full support.640 Replying to Kaunitz’s proposal 
from February 8, 1768 to resume the discussions for a border convention, Choiseul reconfirmed 
the French king’s desire to shorten the negotiations by refraining from discussing each 
contestation independently. Instead, the French Minister suggested using a map of the area so 
that the two sovereigns could agree on the new trajectory of the borderline, and later phrase the 
articles of the treaty based on this newly established frontier.641 It is significant that the Court of 
Versailles agreed to replace a discussion based on juridical arguments with one taking into the 
account the political interests of the two sides and that Choiseul envisioned a border map a 
necessary prerequisite for the negotiation.642  
The Habsburg side disagreed with Choiseul’s approach to simply draw a straight 
borderline on a map and then figure out the details of the treaty, as each section of the frontier 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
[full name], and his ability to persuade Kaunitz and Maria Theresa of the necessity of concluding a border treaty. 
MAE Limites, Pays Bas, box 97.  
638 D’Albissin, Genèse de la frontière franco-belge, 301.  
639 Ibid., 300. 
640 MAE CP, Autriche, box 309, 11, January 6, 1768, Durfort to Choiseul. 
641 AGR CAPB, box 687, February 8, 1768, Kaunitz to Choiseul; Ibid., February 25, 1768, Choiseul to Kaunitz. 
642 MAE Limites, Pays Bas, box 97, French memoir, 1768[?].  
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encompassed settlements and valuable land.643 However, Kaunitz, Maria Theresa and Joseph II 
most likely agreed with the idea of preparing cartographic material to help with the negotiations, 
as they had used this approach successfully for some of their other imperial borders. Also, the 
president of the Austrian Netherlands’ Privy Council, Neny, complained in 1766 that the Giunta 
of Contested Lands had no suitable maps that could help with the negotiations.644 Clearly, the 
Habsburg authorities understood the urgency of commissioning a border map for the Austrian 
Netherlands’ southern frontier.  
Although, to our knowledge, no official order commissioning such a map has survived, 
the archives in Vienna and Paris house at least four copies of a map entitled Map to use for the 
negotiation of a border treaty between France and the [Austrian] Netherlands (Carte pour servir 
à la negotiation d’un traité de Limites entre la France et les Pays-Bas).645 None of this map’s 
copies include the date of their production, but other archival documents suggest the time 
interval to be 1766 to 1769.646 Moreover, if we consider this map the result of the exchange of 
letters between Kaunitz and Choiseul, we can assume a production date of some time after 
February 1768 and before May 1769, when the two Courts signed the border treaty. Military 
engineers belonging to the Austrian Netherlands’ brigade signed three of the copies of this map. 
Therefore, on one hand, it would be plausible to argue that the original map was a Habsburg 
creation, and that Vienna sent a copy to Paris so that both Courts were on the same page 
regarding the status quo of the borderlands before signing a treaty. However, on the other hand, 
                                                          
643 AGR CAPB, box 687, March 24, 1768, Kaunitz to Mercy. 
644 Dubois, Les Bornes Immuables de l'Etat, 286. 
645 Copy signed by Claude Fisco: KA KPS, BVc050-01a. Copy signed by François Weess: Paris, Archives 
Nationales (hereafter AN), N III Pays-Bas, 2. Unsigned copy: SHD, J 10 C 647. Copy signed by Philippe Mahieu, 
AGR CAPB, box 687. 
646 I compared the ranks of the authors of this map’s copies with information about their careers from a 1772 muster 
list of the Austrian Netherlands engineering brigade. KA GHA, 1772 23 1. Claire Lemoine-Isabeau mentions the 
Weess map and dates it at some point between 1766 and 1769, Lemoine-Isabeau, “Limites sur les Cartes Anciennes 
et Cartes des Limites,” 285. Marcel Watelet dated the Fisco and the Weess maps date to 1766. Watelet, Paysages de 
Frontieres, 50. 
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these three replicas could have been based on a French original, especially as the fourth copy of 
the map included no signature and is preserved in Paris today.647 Moreover, a document 
forwarded by the Austrian Netherlands’ government to the French representative in Brussels in 
November 1769 mentioned the existence of a French map, whose title started with the words 
Map to use for the negotiation (Carte pour servir à la negociation).648 
A closer look at the map used to help during the negotiation process between Versailles 
and Vienna reveals the complexity of the borderlands situation. Not only were some of the 
Habsburg and French lands surrounded by their neighbors’ territories, but the boundary areas 
also included domains belonging to the Bishopric of Liège, the Duchy of Bouillon, and a series 
of neutral and controversial terrains. Figure 5.7 shows two details from Claude Fisco’s copy of 
this map that illustrate the difficulty of establishing a clear borderline without performing 
territorial exchanges. The left-side fragment includes a small section of the border showing only 
domains belonging to Versailles and Vienna; the color red marks French territories, whereas 
green denotes Habsburg lands. The right-side image brings to the forefront an even more 
intricate situation. In addition to the two negotiating Courts’ territories, the mapmaker marked 
with blue the domains of the Bishopric of Liège, and with yellow the lands contested between 
the Habsburgs and the Electorate of Trier.649  
                                                          
647 Unsigned copy: SHD, J 10 C 647. 
648 The document states that the map omitted the inclusion of the village Rumel, in the proximity of villages 
Neufmanil, Cons-la-Grandville, and Gernel. An examination of the Fisco and Weess maps confirms the omission of 
the village Rumel. MAE Limites, Pays Bas, box 110, 125 verso, November 23, 1769, the Austrian Netherlands’ 
government to de Bon.  
649 KA KPS, BVc050-01a. 
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Figure 5.7 Details from Claude Fisco, Map to use for the negotiation of a border treaty between France and the 
[Austrian] Netherlands 
 
 
These two small fragments reproduce only a small section of the borderline, and, as 
revealed during the implementation of the 1769 border treaty, failed to encompass all the 
settlements and enclaves in the borderlands. Nonetheless, the “Map to use for the negotiation” 
influenced significantly the phrasing of the articles included as part of the May 13, 1769 border 
treaty.650 The map most likely helped decide a series of territorial exchanges that simplified the 
tracing of the borderline.651 Moreover, the visualization of the high number of enclaves in the 
boundary areas between France and the Austrian Netherlands probably encouraged the 
negotiators’ commitment to eradicating both already identified and unknown enclaves.  
Indeed, article 27 consecrated the two Courts’ desire to extinguish all possible territorial 
controversies by creating a continuous, linear borderline and eliminating all enclaves. As per the 
treaty’s wording: “The intention of the two high signatories being to eliminate all enclaves from 
their possessions, from Moselle to the Sea, they have decided, in addition to what was stipulated 
regarding this issue by articles VII, IX, XIV and XVIII of this Convention, that they will 
                                                          
650 D’Albissin, Genèse de la frontière franco-belge, 301. 
651 SHD, A. 3685, document 42. 
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reciprocally yield to each other, by means of exchanges, the enclaves unknown until the present, 
which might be located in their territories, outside the borderline as fixed by the above 
mentioned four articles.”652 This article implied that commissaries sent by the two sides to 
implement the exchanges of territories in the border area had to look for all enclaves unknown 
prior to the 1769 treaty and had to find the best way to exchange them without prejudicing the 
interests of any of the two Courts. 653  
This article represented a turning point in the Versailles-Vienna negotiations regarding 
fixing the borderline between France and the Austrian Netherlands, as it made clear the two 
powers’ desire to eliminate all territorial overlaps, even if that meant exchanging jurisdictional 
rights for some of the communities. As Sahlins shows for the case of the border between France 
and Spain in the eighteenth century, the early modern states in this period were moving away 
from a jurisdictional to a territorial understanding of sovereignty.654 Ideally, the commissaries 
should have also ensured the exchange of unknown enclaves. However, as the situation was 
more problematic on the ground and an easy understanding could not be reached, the two Courts 
reopened the negotiations and signed an additional treaty in 1779. Still, the work of these 
commissaries was important for the negotiations as they helped prepare multiple maps of the 
border areas, which then influenced the course of the trans-imperial discussions. 
                                                          
652 “L’intention des Hautes Parties Contractantes étant de ne laisser subsister aucun enclavement dans leurs 
possessions respectives, depuis la Moselle jusqu’à la Mer, Elles sont convenues expressément outre ce qui est 
stipulé à cet égard par les articles VII, IX, XIV et XVIII de la présente Convention, qu’elles se céderont 
réciproquement, moyennant des échanges, les enclaves jusqu’à présent inconnues, qui pourroient se trouver dans les 
territoires respectifs, hors de la ligne des limites, fixée par les quatre Articles susdits.” cited in D’Albissin, Genèse 
de la frontière franco-belge, 302. 
653 The Habsburg government in Brussels delegated four commissaries for the treaty implementation: Gerden, the 
president of the Council of Luxembourg, for Luxembourg; Martin de Müllendorff, the president of the Council of 
Hainaut, for Hainaut; Louis François Vandergracht, great bailiff of Tournay and Tournaisis, for Tournaisis and Jean 
François Dierix, fiscal counsellor, for Flanders. September 15, 1769, the Austrian Netherlands’ government to 
Versailles, MAE Limites, Pays Bas, box 108, page 30. The French team of commissaries included Antoine Louis 
François le Fevre de Caumartin, Louis Gabriel Taboureau des Réaux, and Charles Alexandre de Calonne, each in 
charge of ensuring the implementation of the 1769 border treaty for the French administrative subdivisions. MAE 
Limites, Pays Bas, box 107, 410-410 verso, August 20, 1769, Choiseul. 
654 Sahlins, Boundaries, 3-4 
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The official orders for the imperial commissaries included some instructions regarding 
land surveys for the implementation of the treaty. For example, Minister Choiseul ordered the 
French commissaries that in addition to tracing on-site the new trajectory of the borderline, they 
had to prepare topographic maps and eliminate all other possible contestations in the 
borderlands. 655 Throughout his assignment, Louis Gabriel Taboureau, the French commissary 
for the province of Hainaut, had access to the services of engineers and geometers deployed in 
the province to help him prepare with the survey and mapmaking of the boundaries. 
Additionally, the king authorized Taboureau to identify any enclaves unknown before the 
signing of the 1769 treaty and execute territorial exchanges in collaboration with the Habsburg 
representative.656  
In the first stage of the treaty’s implementation, though the French commissaries had full 
power to implement the exchange of unidentified enclaves, the Habsburg representatives had no 
such authority.657 However, on November 20, 1769, after pressure from Versailles, Maria 
Theresa finally agreed to confer on the Habsburg commissaries full authority to implement 
article 27 of the 1769 treaty.658 Despite the large prerogatives given to their commissaries, by the 
end of 1769 both Courts understood that article 27 was insufficient to ensure the establishment of 
an uncontested borderline and eliminate all enclaves. For a while, the French government still 
hoped to use the reports, including maps and plans that the commissaries had prepared during the 
treaty’s implementation, to draft an addition to the border convention encompassing the new 
exchanges of territories without having to reopen the negotiations at top level.659 However, the 
                                                          
655 MAE Limites, Pays Bas, box 107, 410-410 verso, August 20, 1769, Choiseul. 
656 Ibid., 408-409 verso, August 20, 1769, Royal commission for Taboureau. 
657 MAE Limites, Pays Bas, box 108, 221-221 verso, October 15, 1769, Choiseul to Mercy; MAE CP, Pays-Bas, box 
167, 326-327, October 23, 1769, de Bon to Choiseul. 
658 AGR CAPB, box 680, 196-199, November 20, 1769.  
659 MAE CP, Pays-Bas, box 167, 359-359 verso, December 22, 1769, Choiseul to de Bon. 
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Viennese Court remained adamant in refusing to perform new territorial modifications simply 
based on a discussion between the commissaries in charge of the 1769 treaty’s implementation. 
Instead, the Habsburgs managed to persuade Versailles of the importance of signing an 
additional border convention stipulating the exchange for newly identified enclaves.660 
5.2.2 The implementation of the 1769 Border Treaty and the discovery of new enclaves 
In order to understand the reasons for which the two Courts agreed to resume the diplomatic 
negotiations at the highest level regarding their shared border, we need to explore some of the 
situations the commissaries encountered on-site during the 1769 Treaty’s implementation phase. 
The next pages explore two such cases, one from the borderlands of the Austrian Netherlands’ 
region of Flanders, and one from the region of Tournaisis. These two examples illustrate how 
cartographic material prepared on-site influenced the development of inter-governmental 
discussions in Brussels between the French representatives in this Habsburg province and the 
ministers of the Austrian Netherlands.661  
On the borderlands of Flanders, the Habsburgs controlled some enclaves within the 
French territory in the area of Warneton. Looking at Figure 5.8, which shows a detail of the 
Fisco copy of the map used to prepare the 1769 treaty, and on which the color green marks the 
Habsburg domains and red denotes the French possessions, we can see the Warneton enclaves in 
the bottom left of the image. Versailles had been trying to obtain control of this land since at 
                                                          
660 D’Albissin, Genèse de la frontière franco-belge, 303-304 
661 As archival material from Brussels and Paris reveals, the most significant negotiators that influenced the shape of 
the articles encompassed in the 1779 border treaty were on one side, the French representatives in Brussels (the 
Baron de Bon until 1774, Jean-Balthazar d'Adhémar from 1774 until the signing of the treaty in 1779) and until 
1772 the jurisconsulte of the French king Christian-Frédéric Pfeffel, and on the other side, the president of the 
Austrian Netherlands’ Privy Council, Patrice-François de Neny. These individuals worked under the tight 
supervision of the French foreign minister and the Habsburg Chancellor Kaunitz.  
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least 1716, but it took more than half a century to agree on a proper compensation to offer to 
Vienna. Articles 12 and 13 of the 1769 border convention finally established that in exchange for 
all the enclaves of Warneton, Vienna would receive the parish of Dranoutre, the town of Neuve-
Église and part of the town of Nieppe. Through this exchange, the French Court attained its goal 
of preserving full control of the road connecting Dunkerque with Lille in order to improve the 
repression of contraband.662  
 
 
 
Figure 5.8 Detail from Claude Fisco, Map to use for the negotiation of a border treaty between France and the 
[Austrian] Netherlands 
 
 
In the Fall of 1769, a joint commission under the direction of Jean François Dierix for the 
Habsburg side and Antoine Louis François Lefevre de Caumartin on the French Court’s side, 
travelled to this area to implement the articles of the convention. As part of their work, these 
high commissaries hired surveyors and mapmakers who then measured and created 
                                                          
662 D’Albissin, Genèse de la frontière franco-belge, 316-318. For the original text of these articles see SHD, A. 
3685, document 42, 12-13. 
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representations of the new borderline.663 The surveyors finalized on March 13, 1770 a general 
map of the area showing the segment of the frontier Dierix and Caumartin were responsible for 
implementing between Austrian Flanders and the French state.664 The commissaries also detailed 
in the minutes accompanying the map the situation of all 23 pieces of land whose situation had 
been impacted by the new direction of the borderline.665  
In addition to the general map of the borderline the team of surveyors prepared more 
detailed cartographic material for certain enclaves that underwent a change in sovereign. For 
example, article 13 of the 1769 treaty specified that a portion of the parish of Nieppe would pass 
from France to the Austrian Netherlands. Figure 5.9 reproduces a detail of the map drawn as a 
result of the surveyors’ measurements in the area, showing the position of two of the eight border 
markers installed, denoted with the letters G and H.666 The map includes details about the 
location of all newly installed boundary stones and describes how each marker included on one 
side a representation of the imperial double-headed eagle, and on the other the French monarch’s 
heraldic symbol showing three lilies (fleur-de-lis). As per the pre-established convention 
incorporated in most of the official cartographic material associated with these border 
demarcations, the color green marked the Habsburg dominions, whereas red denoted the French 
lands. The surface colored with yellow represents in this map’s case the part of the parish of 
Nieppe incorporated into the Austrian Netherlands.  
                                                          
663 On November 23, 1769, Dierix wrote to Neny that the surveyor Jean François de Coninck was working with the 
French surveyor to prepare a plan of all enclaves from the area of Neuve Église and Dranoutre. AGR CAPB, box 
680, 253. The team of surveyors consisted of Jean François de Coninck for the Habsburg side, and Jean François 
Ignace Tournemine (surveyor of the Lordship of Bailleul) and Thomas François Joseph Gombert (general inspector 
for Ponts et Chaussées) as the French representatives. AGR T 459, 228. 
664 AGR I 012, 2187. 
665 MAE Limites, Pays Bas, box 126, 165-174. 
666 AGR T 459, 228. 
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Figure 5.9 Detail from the de Coninck, Tournemine, Gombert map of part of the parish of Nieppe 
 
 
In the case of the borderlands of Flanders, the commissaries executed the territorial 
exchanges without incident. However, the work of Dierix and Caumartin in the borderlands in 
1769 consisted not only of implementing the Border Treaty, but was expanded to include 
suggestions for some new territorial exchanges. The importance of maps was again demonstrated 
here by that fact that both Courts requested from their on-site representatives detailed geographic 
representations of the area in order to formulate proposals for additional land swaps. For 
example, the Estates of Lille insisted with French foreign minister Choiseul that France would 
benefit from annexing the piece of land known as Le Gué de la Motte.667 Therefore, Choiseul 
and de Bon asked Caumartin to send, if possible, a map of this domain.668 On February 13, 1770, 
Caumartin answered the order by sending a plan of Gué La Motte and also providing his own 
opinion about the odds of success for the annexation. Although Caumartin saw the advantages of 
                                                          
667 MAE CP, Pays-Bas, box 167, 359 verso, December 22, 1769, Choiseul to de Bon. 
668 Ibid., 361, December 29, 1769, de Bon to Choiseul. 
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occupying the territory, he did not believe that the 1769 Border Treaty offered enough 
justification for such a claim, especially as the domain paid taxes to Warneton, an integral part of 
the Austrian Netherlands.669 In the instance of Gué La Motte, the decision-makers in Versailles 
refrained from making any decision before consulting what they perceived of as accurate 
representations of the territories under discussion.  
The French Court was not alone in requesting more maps. On June 13, 1771, Habsburg 
commissary Dierix sent to Brussels his opinion about further territorial exchanges in the area of 
Flanders. In his report, Dierix made multiple references to maps of the region prepared together 
with the French commissary or solely by the Habsburg surveyor Coninck, and he even attached 
geographic plans of the various interest points.670 The negotiators in Brussels relied on this rich 
cartographic material as revealed by the case of the villages Watou and Steenvoorde.  
Figure 5.10 reproduces a fragment of a Dierix map showing part of the parish Watou that 
the French hoped to annex. In exchange, Versailles offered some of the domains of Steenvoorde, 
neighboring Watou. Two vertical black lines and one diagonal black line divide the three 
territorial subunits France requested from the Austrian Netherlands. Dierix included in an 
accompanying table an assessment of these lands’ value.671 Based on Dierix’s plan, the French 
negotiators in Brussels insisted that this exchange was not advantageous for Versailles and 
identified computational errors in the accompanying table estimating the value of these lands.672 
In the end, the two sides reached a consensus rendered official in the 1779 border treaty; the 
French annexed the domains of Gué de la Motte and Watou.673  
                                                          
669 MAE Limites, Pays Bas, box 126, 81-86, February 13, 1770, Caumartin to Choiseul. 
670 AGR CAPB, box 680, 352, June 13, 1771, Gand, Dierix. The maps are located in Ibid., 440, 444, 445, 456.  
671 Ibid., 440-442. 
672 On October 7, 1771, Neny, Pfeffel and de Bon met to continue the discussions. Ibid., 495. 
673 Articles XIV and XV, “Ratification of the Convention concluded between Its Majesty and the General 
Government of the [Austrian] Netherlands] regarding the borders of their states” (“Ratification de la Convention 
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Figure 5.10 Detail from the map of the parish Watou 
 
 
The case of Flanders shows how in addition to the successful execution of the 1769 
articles, sending commissaries on-site triggered a new set of territorial exchanges. However, 
things did not always proceed uneventfully when it came to the implementation of this treaty. In 
the case of Tournaisis, Habsburg commissary Vandergracht and French representative 
Taboureau reached an impasse regarding the lands close to the confluence of the rivers Scarpe 
and Scheldt. The 1769 treaty had decided that France would maintain control of the land between 
these two rivers and the left bank of the Scarpe, whereas the Austrian Netherlands would 
preserve most of the right bank of the Scheldt until the confluence point and both banks of this 
river after this site.674 However, in October 1769, once the two commissaries arrived on-site, 
they could not agree on the dimensions of the domains that had to change hands. Therefore, in 
November 1769, the French representative in Brussels, de Bon, sent an official complaint to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
conclue entre Sa Majesté et le Gouvernement Général des Pays Bas relativement aux limites des états respectifs), 
December 29, 1779. SHD, A. 3767, document 54, page 9. 
674 Control of the banks was essential not so much because of the intrinsic value of those lands, but because of the 
access to the rivers, which constituted important communication and trade outlets. D’Albissin, Genèse de la 
frontière franco-belge, 324-325.  
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Austrian Netherlands’ government, claiming that defying the first six articles of the 1769 Treaty, 
Vandergracht had refused to implement the cession of two areas: the village and domains of 
Wihers, and part of the village of Maulde, on the bank of the Scarpe.675 Both Brussels and 
Versailles asked for detailed maps of the area to further clarify the incident.676 
The map prepared in 1769 under the direction of Claude Lamoral and Joseph Delannoy, 
both in the service of the Austrian Netherlands, displayed the lands situated on the left bank of 
the Scarpe and included a dotted line to indicate the suggested borderline.677 Figure 5.11 
reproduces the fragment of this map that showed the new border, which I have annotated with a 
red rectangle. The map’s legend informs us that the French commissary imposed a new 
trajectory of the borderline, extending from the confluence of the Scarpe with the Scheldt until 
the lands of the farm Chocque, belonging to the parish of Le Celle. However, rather than 
simplifying the situation, this segment of the borderline divided the five territories belonging to 
the village of Maulde between Vienna and Versailles, without taking into account that these five 
territories’ domains were not clearly separated one from the other.678 The complicated situation 
on the ground proved a drawback to drawing an artificial line on a map as the boundary.  
                                                          
675 AGR CAPB, box 680, page 172. Taboureau’s royal commission ordered him to take over the village of Thun and 
the part of Maulde adjacent to the river Scarpe. MAE Limites, Pays Bas, box 107, 426, August 20, 1769, royal 
Commission for Taboureau. 
676 AGR CAPB, box 680, 180, November 16, 1769, Neny to Vandergracht. MAE Limites, Pays Bas, box 110, 156-
158 verso, November 28, 1769, Taboureau to Choiseul. 
677 AGR I 012, 2198. 
678 In April 1770, the Estates of Tournasis sent a memoir to Brussels in which they explained how the village of 
Maulde was composed of five territories: Rongies, d’Espain-Blaheries and part of Mortagne belonging to the 
Austrian Netherlands and Thun and Mortagne belonging to France. MAE CP, Pays-Bas, box 168, 44-44 verso, April 
18, 1770, de Bon to Choiseul. 
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Figure 5.11 Detail from the map of Claude Lamoral and Joseph Delannoy showing the left bank of the Scarpe 
(1769) 
 
 
The maps of the area surrounding the confluence of the rivers Scheldt and Scarpe 
influenced the flow of the discussions in the Austrian Netherlands between Neny and de Bon. In 
April 1770, as soon as the French commissary Taboureau and the Estates of Tournaisis sent their 
documentation to Brussels, the two statesmen compared the Estates’ memoir with the Taboureau 
map in order to understand better the situation of the domains of Maulde.679 As the negotiators in 
Brussels inspected the topographic plan of the areas located on the left bank of the Scarpe they 
had to acknowledge the existence of more enclaves than they had expected, including the village 
of Thun belonging to France, the domain of Ponthoir dependent on the Austrian Netherlands, and 
a domain belonging to the village Rongies but forming an enclave within Ponthoir, the last two 
enclaves noticeable on Figure 5.12.680 Therefore, the statesmen realized they had to identify 
                                                          
679 In addition to using the map to convey a good understanding of the geography of this contested area, Taboureau 
also took the liberty of suggesting a possible trajectory for the borderline. Ibid., 44-45 verso, April 18, 1770, de Bon 
to Choiseul. 
680 AGR I 03, 12. 
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some fixed geographic features that would supersede the importance of jurisdictions and ease the 
imposition of a new border. Two alternatives emerged: the commissaries could start from the 
confluence of the Scarpe and Scheldt and simply draw the boundary in a straight line to the 
West, or the new borderline could follow the stream known as “of the wolves” (de Loups) and 
the main road connecting Valenciennes with the confluence of the two rivers.681  
 
 
 
Figure 5.12 Detail from Havez’s map of the border between the Austrian Netherlands and France in the area of the 
Scarpe and the Scheldt rivers 
 
 
After French commissary Pfeffel travelled to Tournay and discussed the situation with 
the Estates of Tournaisis, he managed to obtain from them an agreement regarding the territories 
of Maulde and Mortagne. The Estates agreed to cede Maulde’s domains and to accept the stream 
Rongies, also known as “of the wolves,” as a natural border dividing the two empires, in 
exchange for an equivalent amount of land taken from the French domains at Léers. In addition, 
                                                          
681 MAE Limites, Pays Bas, box 127, 22-33. 
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the Estates yielded Mortagne in order to obtain the village of Wihers.682 The actual 
implementation of this decision had to wait until the signing of the second border treaty between 
Vienna and Versailles in 1779. And whereas the 1769 convention reflected a poor understanding 
of the local geography and led to on-site conflicts between the two empires’ commissaries, the 
1779 articles regarding the territories in the area of the Scheldt-Scarpe confluence were the result 
of detailed cartographic representations.  
The first six articles of the 1779 treaty not only stipulated the territorial exchanges, but 
also required that both sides name surveyors to mark the new borderline, measure the amount of 
land belonging to the village Léers ceded to the Austrian Netherlands, and prepare a series of 
plans representing their operations.683 Indeed, the commissaries implementing the border treaty 
in 1780 prepared maps as per the articles’ instructions.684 Figure 5.13 shows fragments from the 
December 1780 execution map of article five, showing the domains of Léers that France ceded to 
Vienna, together with the location of twenty two boundary markers and the owners of all pieces 
of land located in the proximity of this border segment.685  
                                                          
682 Ibid., 115-118 verso, May 12, 1770, Taboureau to Choiseul; Ibid., 138-143 verso, May 14, 1770, Pfeffel to 
Choiseul.  
683 “Ratification of the Convention concluded between Its Majesty and the General Government of the [Austrian] 
Netherlands] regarding the borders of their states,” SHD, A. 3767, document 54, pages 3-6. 
684 For example, they prepared a plan of the new borderline dividing the domains of Maulde from the Austrian 
Netherlands. The letters included on this map mark different segments of the border as described in articles 
corresponding to the ones mentioned in article 1 of the 1779 treaty. SHD, A. 3767, document 67.  
685 AN, N II Jemappes, 3. 
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Figure 5.13 The domains of Léers on the execution map of the 1779 Border Treaty, article 5 (1780) 
 
 
The cases presented above illustrate in detail some of the mechanics of the 1769 border 
treaty implementation and reveal the increasing role of maps in shaping the borderlines’ 
trajectory. These instances were only two of a longer list of on-site conditions that triggered a 
new set of intergovernmental negotiations. Indeed, by the spring of 1770 it became obvious to 
the representatives of Versailles that they had to seal a new accord with Vienna if they were to 
obtain a clear frontier, without any enclaves. 
Therefore, on April 22, 1770, in an official memoir to the governor of the Austrian 
Netherlands, French representative de Bon reiterated the reasons for the 1769 convention, which 
included eliminating territorial contestations, encouraging the development of trade, and 
simplifying the administration of borderland provinces. However, de Bon added that due to some 
misunderstandings caused by the governments’ lack of knowledge with respect to the detailed 
geography of the boundary areas, an addition to the treaty had become necessary. In some cases, 
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such as we saw for the area around the confluence of the Scheldt and Scarpe, a detailed 
topographic plan had revealed to the political authorities in Brussels and Versailles that the 
region contained more enclaves than had been previously assumed. De Bon listed in his memoir 
a series of proposed exchanges that in the French Court’s opinion would strengthen the stability 
of the borderline.686 After consulting with the Habsburg commissaries for the implementation of 
the 1769 Treaty, Neny agreed in principle with de Bon’s proposal to pursue a new series of 
territorial exchanges in the borderlands.687  
As shown in the previous pages, the French side was not a passive spectator to the 
Habsburg ambitions in the borderlands after the signing of the 1769 convention. French 
commissaries and engineers prepared maps of the contested areas and gathered evidence from 
locals, which they then shared with their superiors in Versailles and Brussels. Moreover, French 
representatives in Brussels, such as de Bon, convened in long sessions with the ministers of the 
Austrian Netherlands, in order to defend Versailles’ rights. However, no one was more 
influential between 1770 and 1772 than Christian-Frédéric Pfeffel, one of the legal experts of the 
French king (jurisconsulte du Roi). The archives in Paris preserve the rich correspondence 
between Pfeffel, the French foreign minister, and the other commissaries involved in the border 
demarcation and negotiations. These documents underscore the importance of analyzing the 
process of boundary delimitation from the perspective of more than one of the states involved. 
Additionally, Pfeffel’s contribution to the negotiations and the examples presented in the 
following sub-section reveal yet again the ascension of cartography as an essential element in the 
process of this borderline’s evolution.  
 
                                                          
686 MAE Limites, Pays Bas, box 127, 22-33, April 22, 1770, de Bon to Prince Charles de Lorraine. 
687 MAE CP, Pays-Bas, box 168, 73-73 verso, May 21, 1770, de Bon to Choiseul. 
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5.2.3 Christian-Frédéric Pfeffel and negotiations for a second Border Treaty 
Although the work of mapmakers had a significant role in influencing the work of the 
negotiators in this second phase of the Bourbon-Habsburg border deliberations, no military 
engineer played a leading part in the actual top-level discussions in Brussels, Vienna or 
Versailles. Engineers in the service of the Bourbons and the Habsburgs had firsthand knowledge 
of the local situation and sent both maps and memoirs to help diplomats in their negotiations. 
However, they did not surpass their position of mere technical experts and had no decisional 
power. This is not surprising when compared with what had occurred in other Habsburg areas. 
Even in the case of Transylvania, although Luchsenstein was probably the most knowledgeable 
Habsburg agent of the borderlands situation, he did not travel to the negotiations in 
Constantinople that sealed the trajectory of the imperial borderlines for this province. Instead, his 
maps and legal-historical memoirs justifying the Habsburg claims served to instruct Vienna’s 
representative in Constantinople, Thugut.  
Although starting as a military engineer especially skilled as mapmaker, Luchsenstein 
had extended his expertise to the collection and analysis of historical and legal documents. 
Luchsenstein’s case found a French equivalent in the person of Christian-Frédéric Pfeffel, who 
combined in his person the same knowledge of the Austrian Netherlands-France borderlands as 
Luchsenstein possessed for the Habsburg province of Transylvania. Whereas Luchsenstein had 
started as a military engineer expert in cartography and expanded his skills to incorporate a good 
knowledge of historical context and documents, Pfeffel followed the reverse course. What both 
these cases reveal is that by the second half of the eighteenth-century, individuals like 
Luchsenstein and Pfeffel, with a good knowledge of local geography, the capacity to prepare and 
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use maps, and the ability to employ historical and legal documents to further their employers’ 
interests, were crucial in the negotiations preceding boundary line demarcations.  
Pfeffel started his diplomatic career as the French counselor in Regensburg, the seat of 
the Holy Roman Empire’s Imperial Diet, and then as minister of the Duke of Deux-Ponts in 
Munich.688 Later, he advanced to the rank of law counselor for the French king (jurisconsulte du 
Roi). As he became more involved in the border negotiations with the Austrian Netherlands, 
Pfeffel started preparing maps to illustrate his argumentation and justify the French claims. In his 
own words, “necessity and an excess of zeal transformed me into an ingénieur geographe [...] a 
talent acquired with difficulty at my age.”689 
De Bon, the French representative in Brussels, was an enthusiastic supporter of Pfeffel, 
from the time of his arrival in the Austrian Netherlands at the end of 1769. Initially, Pfeffel’s 
royal commission had only been to supervise the reciprocal extradition of documents as per the 
1769 Treaty’s article 38.690 But soon after his arrival in Brussels, he proved to have a flair for the 
negotiations regarding the territorial exchanges in the borderlands. In de Bon’s own words, he 
decided to “take him [Pfeffel] as a guide,” and the jurist’s extensive knowledge of both the local 
situation and the historical context and documents for each particular situation proved 
indispensable. Moreover, in 1770, once the Courts of Versailles and Vienna agreed on the need 
to open negotiations for more territorial exchanges, Pfeffel travelled to Flanders, Tournasis, 
                                                          
688 Nordman, Frontières de France, 301. 
689 MAE Limites, Pays Bas, box 128, 205 verso, March 5, 1771, Pfeffel. 
690 Article 38 of the 1769 Convention ordered the reciprocal restitution of papers and documents referring to 
territories belonging to the other Court’s domains. This category included documents such as the documents carried 
from the Austrian Netherlands to France during the War for the Austrian Succession. The role of this article was to 
mark the intrinsic link between a monarch’s possession of a territory and the documents associated with it. Pfeffel 
and the Habsburg representative, Jean-Baptiste, Count of Wynants, spent approximately two years supervising the 
exchange of documents. Both of them travelled to various archives in the cities of Lille, Brussels, Namur, 
Luxembourg, Metz, Nancy, Ghent, Mons, Tournai and Douai, prepared inventories of documents, commissioned 
copies for some of them, and orchestrated the reciprocal extradition of papers. Nordman, Frontières de France, 407-
412.  
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Hainaut and Luxembourg to discuss on-site preliminary proposals with those provincial 
Estates.691 As part of this mission he also gathered and prepared cartographic material, and in the 
case of Luxembourg, “he surveyed himself the whole territory.”692 Even Chancellor Kaunitz in 
Vienna noticed that negotiating directly with Pfeffel rather than with de Bon ensured a faster 
approval from Versailles of the preliminary agreements, as Pfeffel had the full trust of the French 
foreign minister Choiseul.693  
The Map of the [French] Kingdom’s border towards the [Austrian] Netherlands to help 
with the negotiation of the Second Border Treaty with the Empress Queen and the Final Treaty 
with the Bishopric of Liège (Carte de la Frontiere du Royaume vers les Pays Bas pour servir à la 
negociation du Second Traité de Limites avec l’Impératrice Reine et du Traité definitif avec 
l’Évéché de Liege) exemplifies how Pfeffel incorporated maps as part of his arsenal as a 
negotiator.694 Finalized at some point in the early 1770s, the map made visible to the decision-
makers in Versailles both the already agreed upon territorial exchanges and the domains still 
under discussion with Vienna. By learning how to fulfill the function of a mapmaker, Pfeffel had 
acknowledged the power of maps to convey arguments about border negotiations.  
Figure 5.14 reproduces two fragments showing the result of Pfeffel’s parleys with the 
Estates of Tournaisis and Hainaut. Pfeffel colored with yellow and marked with a red contour the 
patches of land the French Court offered to the Austrian Netherlands in exchange for territories 
painted with red and surrounded with yellow contours.  
                                                          
691 MAE CP, Pays-Bas, box 168, 212-216, June 28, 1771, Bon to Aiguillon. 
692 Ibid., 214. 
693 AGR CAPB, box 680, 408-408 verso, November 28, 1770, Kaunitz to Starhemberg. 
694 SHD, J 10 C 623.  
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Figure 5.14 Details from Pfeffel’s Map of the [French] Kingdom’s border towards the [Austrian] Netherlands 
 
 
In May 1770 Pfeffel travelled to Tournay and had a series of meetings with the Estates of 
Tournaisis to settle the border controversies there. The French representative managed to obtain 
for his king all the domains of Maulde and the establishment of the border on the stream of 
Rongies, in exchange for an equivalent quantity of land from the domains of the French village 
Léers. The second exchange Pfeffel orchestrated was relinquishing to the Habsburgs the village 
of Wihers in exchange for the domains of Mortagne.695 The left-side detail from Figure 5.14 
identifies the position of the territories involved in these exchanges.  
Pfeffel greatly influenced the results of the negotiations regarding territorial exchanges in 
the borderlands of Tournaisis because of his first-hand knowledge of both the geography and the 
legal-historical context of the area. However, the French representative could not simply impose 
his Court’s desire and had to negotiate a result satisfactory for both sides, especially as the 
Habsburgs had also gathered detailed information about these lands. On November 27, 1770, 
when Kaunitz sent Vienna’s final approval regarding the arrangement for the borderlands of 
Tournaisis, he also mentioned that he had made the decision with the help of a “figurative map” 
                                                          
695 MAE Limites, Pays Bas, box 127, 138-143 verso, May 14, 1770, Pfeffel to Choiseul. 
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(Carte Figurative).696 Kaunitz’s comment suggests that by 1770, the two Courts made no 
significant decision regarding territorial exchanges in the borderlands without a prior 
consultation of maps.  
The second map detail included on Figure 5.14 shows the controversial lands of Roisin 
and Meaurain, located in the borderlands of Hainaut. However, although Pfeffel’s representation 
suggested that Vienna had accepted the cession of Roisin and Meaurain, this information was 
misleading and represented the French commissary’s desire and not the reality, as explained 
below. Although the 1769 treaty did not include any modifications for this border segment 
located between Mortagne and Sambre, the commissaries sent on-site discovered a significant 
number of smaller enclaves. Moreover, as Habsburg commissary Martin de Müllendorff wrote to 
his superiors in Brussels, the borderline was very sinuous and many roads in the area were 
shared between the two states, thus facilitating the actions of contrabandists and other criminals. 
The situation of the forest Roisin was particularly worrying for the French Court. Enclosed 
between two French roads, the Habsburg domains of Roisin formed a respite island for criminals 
on the run from Versailles’ justice. However, the French Court’s desire to acquire this forest 
clashed with the Estates of Hainaut’s need to preserve control of the land as it was the only 
source of wood for a large area.697  
During a meeting on May 22, 1770, Neny mentioned to de Bon the Estates of Hainaut’s 
attempts to disrupt the negotiations for the border of their province, as they claimed their 
interests did not match with imperial priorities. However, Neny reassured the French 
representative that Vienna would not tolerate any insubordination from the Estates of Hainaut 
                                                          
696 AGR CAPB, box 680, 408, November 28, 1770, Kaunitz to Starhemberg.  
697 D’Albissin, Genèse de la frontière franco-belge, 330-332. 
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and that once agreed on by the two Courts, the territorial exchanges would happen.698 In his 
letter to Choiseul, Pfeffel who had travelled to meet with the Estates of Hainaut’s 
representatives, also referred to the recalcitrant behavior of these provincial authorities, but 
reassured the French minister that the Austrian Netherlands’ provincial government would not 
tolerate such actions.699 However, despite the Austrian Netherlands’ minister’s assurances, the 
Estates of Hainaut continued to resist the territorial exchanges. In 1771 these provincial 
authorities even sent a memoir supporting their refusal to accept the cession of Roisin and 
Meaurain.700 The memoir of the Hainaut’s Estates convinced Neny of the economic necessity for 
the province to preserve control of at least part of the wooded area.701  
The archives in Brussels have preserved an undated map entitled Map to use for 
clarifying the project of exchange of Roisin and Meaurain on the border of Hainaut (Carte pour 
servir d'éclaircissement au projet d'échange de Roisin et de Meaurain sur la frontière de 
Hainaut).702 It is plausible that the Habsburg authorities ordered the preparation of this 
cartographic document so that they could make an informed decision regarding the French 
Court’s request. The fragment of this map reproduced in Figure 5.15 clearly reveals the situation 
of the forest Roisin as a Habsburg enclave between two French roads, but also its importance as 
the only wooded area for a significant number of Hainaut’s villages. Therefore, due to the 
economic importance of the Habsburg territory of this forest, it is not surprising that Versailles 
                                                          
698 The Estates wanted to give up Angre, Angreau, Voisin and Miaurin but requested Tarnieres, Hon, Herchies and 
Malplaque. However, the Habsburg government only desired to acquisition Bousignies and Malplaque, as 
Bousignies was considered a priority. MAE CP, Pays-Bas, box 168, 74-75, May 23, 1770, de Bon to Choiseul. 
699 MAE Limites, Pays Bas, box 127, 171-172, May 25, 1770, Pfeffel to Choiseul. 
700 MAE CP, Pays-Bas, box 168, 260 verso, September 1, 1771, de Bon to Aiguillon. 
701 In early December, Neny informed de Bon of the government’s refusal to cede the villages Roisin and Meaurain, 
because of the high number of houses and the fertility of their domains. MAE CP, Pays-Bas, box 168, 361-361 
verso, December 8, 1771, de Bon to Aiguillon. 
702 AGR I 012, 2205. 
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only managed to obtain a small section of the area parallel to the two roads.703 In the case of the 
borderlands of Hainaut, the map Pfeffel sent to his superiors in Versailles failed to reveal the 
accurate stage of the negotiations and expressed a mere aspiration.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.15 Detail from Map to use for clarifying the project of exchange of Roisin and Meaurain on the border of 
Hainaut 
 
 
As demonstrated by the two examples of the borderland negotiations of Tournaisis and 
Hainaut, rather than pursuing a frontier settlement with France that would consider the whole 
borderline of the Austrian Netherlands as one unit, the government in Brussels had to take into 
account the interests of the four provinces with interests in the area, namely Flanders, Tournaisis, 
Hainaut and Luxembourg. Therefore, to obtain a secure agreement, the French government had 
to ensure that their offers would satisfy the Estates of all these four provinces. Indeed, French 
                                                          
703 Articles 20 and 21 of the 1779 border treaty stipulated that Maria Theresa ceded 70 “bonniers” from the forest of 
Roisin in exchange for the same amount of land from domains of the French village Flamengrie. “Ratification of the 
Convention concluded between Its Majesty and the General Government of the [Austrian] Netherlands] regarding 
the borders of their states,” SHD, A. 3767, document 54, page 12. D’Albissin, Genèse de la frontière franco-belge, 
332. 
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commissary Pfeffel, travelled sequentially to all four provinces and tried to reach preliminary 
agreements with their representatives.704 His undated map “to help with the negotiation of the 
Second Border Treaty with the Empress Queen” was probably prepared at the end of this border 
tour to synthesize the result of his work.  
Although due to Pfeffel’s efforts, on December 7, 1771, Neny and de Bon signed a 
preliminary agreement regarding the articles for Flanders and Tournaisis, and it looked like an 
agreement over Hainaut would also be reached, the province of Luxembourg raised serious 
problems for the two negotiating sides.705 In the fall of 1769, both Habsburg commissary Gerden 
and French representative Calonne started gathering information about Luxembourg’s enclaves 
unidentified in the 1769 Treaty and prepared topographic maps and exchange projects.706 From 
the beginning of the discussions, Neny received with distrust the first set of French proposals 
issued on December 4, 1769. The Austrian Netherlands’ minister accused the Court of Versailles 
of trying to take over Habsburg villages rich in iron ores, such as Halanzy, and even of going 
against the principle of enforcing natural borders by claiming Torgny. Additionally, Neny 
claimed he had no knowledge of some of the enclaves mentioned in de Bon’s memoir and asked 
for more time to obtain additional information by sending an engineer to prepare detailed maps 
of the borderlands of Luxembourg.707 
To ease the Estates of Luxembourg’s and Neny’s suspicions, French commissary Pfeffel 
travelled to the province in December 1769, and had a series of discussions with Gerden and the 
                                                          
704 For example, on March 5, 1771, Pfeffel sent a report about the result of his discussions with the Estates of 
Tournaisis and Hainaut. MAE Limites, Pays Bas, box 128, 205-207. 
705 MAE CP, Pays-Bas, box 168, 359-359 verso, December 8, 1771, de Bon to Aiguillon. On October 19, 1771, 
Kaunitz notified Starhemberg, the plenipotentiary minister of the Austrian Netherlands, that Maria Theresa would 
ratify in the future the articles for the borderline of Flanders and Tournaisis, as established as a result of Neny’s 
discussions with de Bon and Pfeffel. AGR CAPB, box 680, 512.  
706 AGR CAPB, box 680, 254, November 23, 1769, Gerden to Neny; Ibid., 256, November 27, 1769, Neny to 
Gerden; MAE Limites, Pays Bas, box 110, 208-208 verso, November 30, 1769, Calonne to Choiseul,. 
707 AGR CAPB, box 680, 267-267 verso, December 9, 1769, Neny to Gerden. 
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local Estates to convince them to approve the cession of the villages located on the Semois river. 
Although the first mission of Pfeffel in the province of Luxembourg did not yield promising 
results, it gave this commissary a chance to establish contacts with some of the Luxembourg 
Estates’ deputies.708 Indeed, by March 12, 1770, Pfeffel received from Gerden, who was also the 
President of Luxembourg’s Council, memoirs and tables detailing the value of the revenues of 
the lands under discussion for a possible exchange.709 However, no conclusion to negotiations 
could be reached for a while, because the decision-makers in Brussels refused to continue any 
discussions until the Habsburg engineers surveyed and mapped Luxembourg’s borderlands.  
In February 1771 the French Court decided to make another attempt at reaching a 
consensus with Vienna regarding Luxembourg’s frontier. Minister Choiseul ordered Pfeffel to 
travel to Luxembourg and resume the border negotiations with Gerden. However, the French 
representative argued that whereas the provincial authorities in Luxembourg had employed 
engineers who had spent more than eight months surveying and preparing detailed maps of the 
area, he had not received any in-depth information from the French authorities in charge of the 
borderland territories.710 Pfeffel drew his superiors’ attention to the importance of having 
accurate maps and descriptions of the areas under discussion, and was hesitant to pursue any 
official negotiations simply based on the Habsburg engineers’ work.711 
De Bon supported Pfeffel’s request and insisted that in order to counteract the high 
amount of information that Gerden possessed in the forms of cadastral registers and maps, 
Pfeffel needed documentation from the French representative Calonne and from the local 
                                                          
708 MAE Limites, Pays Bas, box 110, 265-267, December 10, 1769, Pfeffel to Choiseul. 
709 MAE Limites, Pays Bas, box 126, 153-153 verso, March 12, 1770, Pfeffel. 
710 MAE Limites, Pays Bas, box 128, 176-177, February 3, 1771, Pfeffel. 
711 Ibid., 205-207, March 5, 1771, Pfeffel. 
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authorities in Mons, Sedan and Metz.712 The approval of this request ensured that by the time 
Pfeffel arrived in Luxembourg he would be better equipped with respect to the local 
geographical knowledge and the value of the domains considered for the territorial exchange.713 
Pfeffel’s reports to Paris regarding his time in Luxembourg reveal how the negotiation 
took place with the help of numerous cartographic sources. The Habsburg side presented at least 
seven maps and Pfeffel acknowledged their high quality and accuracy. However, the French 
commissary could not obtain copies of all these sources and had to resort to deceptively copying 
fragments whenever the opportunity arose.714 By August 22, 1771, the Habsburg maps of 
Luxembourg’s borderlands done under the supervision of Gerden, had arrived in Brussels, and 
Neny started consulting them in preparation for the next stage of the negotiations.715 The maps 
the engineers from the Austrian Netherlands brigade had prepared under the direction of Nicolas 
Bergé, member of the engineering corps of this Habsburg province, impressed the French 
negotiators with their level of precision and constituted the basis of the discussion.716 
                                                          
712 Ibid., 178-178 verso, February 3, 1771, de Bon. 
713 Ibid., 214-215 verso, March 18, 1771, Pfeffel. 
714 Ibid., 229, April 2, 1771, Pfeffel, Mezieres. 
715 MAE CP, Pays-Bas, box 168, 256-256 verso, August 22, 1771, de Bon to Aiguillon. 
716 AGR SEG, box 1350, 157, August 21, 1773, Neny to Crumpipen.  
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Figure 5.16 Detail from the Bergé map showing the area of the Semois River (1770) 
 
 
Figure 5.16 reproduces a fragment from a copy of one of the Bergé maps showing the 
domains located in the area of the Semois River.717 The mapmaker marked with red the 
borderline of the Habsburg dominions, with blue the lands of France, and with yellow the 
frontier of the Duke of Bouillon’s domains. Bergé’s drawing also contains 86 numbers that 
correspond to certain geographical features, both natural and artificial, that are further explained 
in the map’s legend. Some of the numbers refer to the location of specific villages, roads, 
domains, mills, forests, chapels, or streams. For example, the instance of number 20 shown on 
Figure 5.16 identify the flow of the stream Mort Bon-homme; number 21 marks the position of 
the village Pusmange; and 22 indicates the location of a forest belonging to the county of 
Orchimont. All of these features helped the negotiators identify possible areas for territorial 
exchanges and the new trajectory of the borderline.  
                                                          
717 AN, NN, 156, 130. 
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The Bergé maps of Luxembourg’s borderlands fostered the flow of the discussions in 
Brussels until the rise of a new diplomatic obstacle. On September 1, 1771, de Bon wrote to 
Versailles that the refusal of the Habsburg government to accept the cession of the villages 
located on the left bank of the Semois River had put a stop to the negotiations.718 Although the 
decision-makers in Vienna would have been ready to accept the French proposals and yield those 
territories, they were forced to take into account the desires of the Estates of Luxembourg, strong 
opponents of this territorial modification. As at the time the Habsburgs had initiated the 
mobilization of their troops in the eventuality of an intervention in the Russo-Ottoman war 
(1768-1774), they relied on financial help from the Austrian Netherlands, including the province 
of Luxembourg. Therefore, Vienna could not infuriate the provincial Estates of one of their 
richest dominions.719 Despite this diplomatic impasse, by early November 1771, the two Courts 
reached a compromise and drafted twelve preliminary articles for Luxembourg. In one of his 
final reports regarding this negotiation, Austrian Netherlands’ minister, Neny expressed his 
satisfaction that French representative Pfeffel had acknowledged the better quality of the 
Habsburg maps even when compared to the Cassini maps of these borderland areas and had 
agreed to take them as starting point for the negotiations.720 In his reports to Versailles, Pfeffel 
confirmed Neny’s comment, thus making clear the superiority of Habsburg cartography for this 
particular section of the frontier.  
 At the end of 1771 it looked like Pfeffel had successfully fulfilled his function of 
negotiating most of the preliminary articles for a second border treaty with the Habsburg 
representatives. However, this treaty was not signed until in 1779 because of changes in 
Versailles’ leadership. By the end of 1771, the Duke of Choiseul, who had combined the 
                                                          
718 MAE CP, Pays-Bas, box 168, 260 verso, September 1, 1771, de Bon to Aiguillon. 
719 MAE Limites, Pays Bas, box 128, 307 verso, May 3, 1771, de Bon. 
720 AGR CAPB, box 679, 60, April 15, 1779, Bruxelles, Neny.  
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functions of war and foreign minister, had fallen out of favor with the king. His successors, 
Emmanuel-Armand de Richelieu Duke d’Aiguillon as Foreign Affairs Minister, and Louis 
François de Monteynard as War Minister failed to follow a coherent line with respect to the 
border negotiations and disagreed on the priorities the government should pursue. Indeed, 
Monteynard tried to obtain the king’s approval for a new trajectory for France’s northern 
borderline, which although greatly advantageous from a military point of view, would have 
harmed the Habsburg interests in the area and could never have been accepted by Vienna.721 To 
complicate the situation even further, Calonne, the French commissary in charge of negotiations 
in Luxembourg’s borderlands, accused the Habsburg representatives of having submitted 
erroneous evaluations of the territories under negotiation. By 1777 the Court of Versailles 
officially abandoned the border negotiations and the discussions were only seriously resumed in 
1779, when the the second Border Treaty was finalized.722 
 The efforts of both Versailles’ and Vienna’s representatives to eliminate all enclaves in 
the borderlands and to create a stable frontier greatly relied on the cartographic work of 
surveyors, military engineers, and even legal specialists such as Pfeffel. The visual language of 
maps brought a simplified version of the geographical reality of the Austrian Netherlands-French 
boundary domains into the ministerial rooms in Brussels, Versailles, and Vienna. Putting 
forward the interests of the newly emerging territorial French and Habsburg state, diplomats and 
ministers felt empowered to make decisions leading to a series of territorial exchanges and the 
establishment of what they hoped to be a long-lasting borderline. Commenting on the final 
                                                          
721 Monteynard’s project was based on the reports of Marshall Grandpré and prioritized the military interests of the 
French kingdom, without acknowledging the impossibility of convincing the Habsburgs to ratify the trajectory for 
this borderline, which would have assigned a disproportionate amount of land to France. D’Albissin, Genèse de la 
frontière franco-belge, 304-305. 
722 AGR CAPB, box 679, 60 verso-63, April 15, 1779, Neny; MAE CP, Pays-Bas, box 171, 372-372 verso, July 15, 
1779, Vergennes to Adhemar.  
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version of the 1779 treaty, Kaunitz stated that the biggest advantage of the new borderline was 
that the possession of the contested borderlands was determined not based on legal documents 
but in a way mutually beneficial (based on convenances réciproques).723 In Kaunitz’s 
understanding the two main beneficiaries were Versailles and Vienna, and not necessarily the 
provincial authorities of the Austrian Netherlands or France. Imperial interests triumphed over 
provincial particularisms and history. 
5.3 CONCLUSION 
 In 1771, during the time he spent in Luxembourg to negotiate a border arrangement 
agreeable for both Versailles and Vienna, Pfeffel travelled to some of this region’s areas to 
compare their actual state with their representation on Habsburg maps. Pfeffel went as far as to 
identify on-site minor elements such as an indicator known as the “cross of Lorraine.”724 In his 
opinion, the value of the Habsburg maps consisted in the accurate manner they represented the 
landscape. At the opposite side of the Habsburg Monarchy, in the province of Transylvania, 
Luchsenstein also valued characteristics such as precision and accuracy in his evaluation of 
Moldavian maps, and his own surveys and representations of the borderlands. For example, the 
military engineer travelled into the Carpathian Mountains separating Transylvania from 
Moldavia to verify Moldavian claims about the existence of old boundary stones, as he believed 
that maps and geographic descriptions had to convey an exact image of a territory’s situation.725 
                                                          
723 AGR CAPB, box 679, 196 verso-197, December 11, 1779, Kaunitz to Maria Theresa.  
724 MAE Limites, Pays-Bas, box 128, 231, April 2, 1771, Pfeffel to d’Aiguillon. 
725 The Moldavians claimed the existence of a stone located on the Borda Mountain, and which had been incised 
with a Moldavian coat of arms. However, Luchsenstein describes the signs as the mere doodles of idle herdsmen, 
and in no way reminiscent of an official coat of arms KA KPS, B IX c 744. 
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 These two instances demonstrate that state agents, such as Pfeffel and Luchsenstein, 
envisioned maps as an ideal medium for transposing the complexity of geographical features 
onto a manageable surface. These maps, understood as reduced-scale mirrors of reality, then 
traveled to political centers, such as Versailles, Vienna, Constantinople or Brussels, and helped 
emperors and ministers to decide the faith of their territories. In this sense, cartography allowed 
for the accumulation of geographical knowledge, which then encouraged imperial centralization 
and integration of the various provinces.726  
 As the Habsburg cartographic gaze turned to its frontiers, the Viennese rulers put the 
existing mapping practices and institutions in the service of border demarcations. In their effort 
to eliminate all enclaves and contestations from imperial borderlands, Vienna used negotiation 
tactics adapted to each political neighbor. In the case of Transylvania, Habsburg officers marked 
the borderline unilaterally and then managed to obtain the international recognition of their 
actions. However, to regulate the Austrian Netherlands’ southern frontier, Vienna had to spend 
years negotiating with their powerful French ally. In both situations, military engineers surveyed 
and prepared detailed maps of the borderlands, which then served to promote the Habsburg 
territorial pretensions.  
These cartographic sources seemingly transformed an ever-changing geography of the 
borderlands into fixed, clearly demarked frontiers. However, this illusion did not last long. One 
decade after the 1779 border treaty signed between Versailles and Vienna, the outbreak of the 
French Revolution and the wars that followed impacted the geography of the area, leading to the 
occupation of the Austrian Netherlands by the French army. In their easternmost provinces, 
together with their Russian allies, the Habsburgs waged a war against the Ottoman Empire, 
                                                          
726 Here I rely on Bruno Latour’s argument that technologies that allow for the collection and transmission of 
knowledge from distant lands to political centers make imperial domination at a distance feasible. Latour, Science in 
Action, 223-224.  
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which led at the end of 1780s, to Vienna’s brief occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia. As these 
political developments from the end of the eighteenth-century show, linear and fixed Habsburg 
imperial borderlines only survived on maps, but not in reality. 
The story of the Transylvanian and Austrian Netherlands borderlines’ demarcation had a 
happy ending, even if not an everlasting one. On the other hand, the Habsburgs were not always 
successful in their desire to reconstruct imperial frontiers and impose fixed border markers. As 
the next chapter shows, in the Habsburg province of Lombardy, the second half of the eighteenth 
century witnessed decades long negotiations between Vienna and Parma that failed to materialize 
into a bilateral border treaty.  
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6.0 AN ELUSIVE BORDER: CARTOGRAPHIC PROJECTS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
THE LOMBARDY-PARMA BORDER INSPECTIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS 
In the beginning of 1779, Empress Maria Theresa ordered Carlo Firmian, plenipotentiary 
minister of Lombardy, and Francesco Belcredi, general commissary for the borders of the State 
of Milan, to prepare a list of people who could notify the government of any sudden changes to 
the imperial frontiers in Lombardy.727 In his final plan, Belcredi divided the borderline into 
fifteen segments and wrote that in selecting the personnel “I managed to restrict [the choice] as 
much as possible to appraisers or engineers, or at least surveyors, because in my opinion these 
are the most suitable for such responsibilities, and capable to prepare a more detailed report, also 
containing a map, making [the report] more conclusive.”728 Maria Theresa’s request and 
Belcredi’s answer suggest that, by the end of the 1770s, the Viennese Court had managed to 
build a system of fixed imperial borders for their lands in Lombardy and relied on maps to 
ensure the preservation of the status quo. Furthermore, the presence of a border commissary, 
engineers and surveyors, implies the existence of an advanced institutional framework capable of 
inspecting borderlines and preparing reports and geographic plans regarding any changes. 
Indeed, from the 1750s onwards the imperial court in Vienna prioritized settling clear borderlines 
with their neighbors and successfully negotiated a series of border treaties with states such as the 
                                                          
727 ASM Confini p.a., box 3, Firmian to Belcredi, February 9, 1779.  
728 “Nella scelta hò procurato di attenermi più che mi sia stato possibile a periti o Ingegneri, o almeno Agrimensori, 
perche questi a mio credere sono più atti, a tali incombenze, e capaci all’occasione di fare una relazione più 
dettagliata anche con tipo, e perciò piu concludente.” Ibid., Belcredi to Ferdinand, August 7, 1779.  
 287 
Republic of Venice, the Kingdom of Sardinia or the Duchy of Modena. However, despite their 
vast experience in demarking boundaries not only in the Italian Peninsula, but also in provinces 
extending from Transylvania to the Austrian Netherlands, the Habsburgs repeatedly failed to 
close Lombardy’s borderline towards the Duchy of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla.  
The discussions over the position of the Parmesan-Lombardy boundary referred 
cartographic representations of the disputed area, as both the Infant and the Habsburg rulers 
considered maps essential in illustrating their rivals’ territorial violations and constructing a 
strong case for promoting their own agenda regarding the border’s position. As the case of the 
Habsburg negotiations with Parma exemplifies, in the second half of the eighteenth century, the 
debate regarding the rights of sovereignty over contested borderlands relied increasingly on 
territorial representations. Maps made clear in the eyes of Vienna that most disputed border 
segments involved either the banks or the islands of the River Pò, geographic features 
continuously evolving because of erosions, alluvial deposits, and changes in the river’s 
trajectory. Therefore, in the early 1780s, the topography of the Lombardy-Parmesan border as 
captured on maps and in geographic descriptions influenced Emperor Joseph II’s commitment to 
impose the flow of the Pò as a definitive borderline between the two states. However, Vienna’s 
determination to eliminate all enclaves, promote a series of territorial exchanges, and impose a 
fixed border on the Pò River alarmed the Infant of Parma, who feared that the Habsburgs desired 
to eventually engulf his small young state. Relying on his Bourbon protectors, the kings of 
France and Spain, the Infant managed to transform what was supposed to be a straightforward 
bilateral negotiation between Parma and Vienna, into a neverending trans-imperial diplomatic 
discussion involving four rulers. 
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 Additionally, as the case of the border negotiations with Parma during the second half of 
the eighteenth century reveals, Lombardy’s precarious centralization and subordination to 
Vienna greatly slowed down the transposal of orders from the imperial center to local level. 
Although maps helped Maria Theresa, Joseph II and Chancellor Kaunitz familiarize themselves 
with the geography of Lombardy’s borders, they could not replace the lack of an efficient local 
administration machine that could have actually implemented the Habsburgs’ borderline policies. 
Local authorities did not always report to their superiors border incidents; multiple provincial 
institutions shared responsibilities for preserving the status quo in the border areas and this led to 
inter-institutional rivalries; and finally, the sluggish communication lines between, on one hand, 
Lombardy’s governor and plenipotentiary minister, and on the other, the imperial authorities in 
Vienna, further complicated the situation. Therefore, as shown in this chapter, the astonishing 
fiasco of the Habsburg-Parmesan negotiations from 1748 until 1790 exposes how provincial and 
trans-imperial factors sometimes did not facilitate, but actually conspired against Habsburg 
imperial interests. 
In his masterwork on Habsburg Lombardy, Carlo Capra states: “the turning points in the 
history of Lombardy do not correspond to the succession of sovereigns, but with the changes of 
those in charge directly of Lombardy’s affairs, with the replacement of bureaucrats and 
administrators and with the diffusion of new models and ideas among these people.”729 Although 
not addressed in Capra’s book or other works devoted to the impact of the Habsburg enlightened 
reforms on their possessions in Lombardy during the eighteenth century, the influence of 
cartography on the province’s territorial reorganization and definition constituted one of these 
                                                          
729 “I momenti di scansione e di svolta non coincidono con gli avvicendamenti dei sovrani, ma piuttosto con quelli 
dei responsabili diretti degli affari lombardi, con il ricambio dei quadri burocratici e amministrativi e con la 
diffusione tra le loro file di idee nove e di nuovi modelli),” Capra, La Lombardia Austriaca Nell’Età delle Riforme, 
6. 
 289 
new ideas that pervaded the different governmental levels. In the second half of the eighteenth 
century the emergence of provincial institutions proficient in mapmaking, a new 
conceptualization of imperial borders, and the production of border maps all influenced 
Lombardy’s centralization and integration into the Monarchy. As the new provincial bureaucrats 
and administrators relied more on maps to make decisions regarding border negotiations but also 
to prepare the province’s administrative reorganization, cartography contributed both to the 
incorporation of Habsburg Lombardy as an essential component of the Monarchy and its 
territorial separation from other political neighbors located in the Italian Peninsula.  
This chapter pays special attention to Lombardy’s border with the Duchies of Parma and 
Piacenza, a dividing line that bordered both subunits of this Habsburg province: the State of 
Milan and the Duchy of Mantua. In 1748, the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle and the Congress of 
Nice specified that after Philip of Bourbon took over the Duchies of Parma and Piacenza, he 
would negotiate amicably with his Habsburg neighbors the situation of contested lands in the 
proximity of the border.730 However, this seemingly easy goal remained unfulfilled for more 
than fifty years. In the following pages I explore the reasons why one of the most powerful 
European empires, the Habsburg Monarchy, failed to demarcate the border segment towards one 
of its weakest neighbors, the Duke of Parma. This outcome is even more puzzling if we take into 
account the strong cartographic tradition and trained personnel present in the Italian Peninsula in 
the eighteenth century. 
Section one explores the Habsburg efforts in Lombardy to organize special institutions 
dedicated to marking the province’s borders and signing bilateral treaties with all neighboring 
foreign states. The Monarchy’s desire to accelerate the border regulation process by creating 
special border commissaries clashed with the province’s traditional administrative organization, 
                                                          
730 ASM Confini p.a., box 76, January 1, 1777, Kaunitz to the Spanish ambassador in Vienna. 
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which had its own mechanisms for addressing these types of issues. Vienna’s attempt to infringe 
on the Senate of Milan’s authority over incidents regarding jurisdiction in the border areas faced 
significant resistance. The border commissaries found themselves caught between the provincial 
government directly subordinate to Vienna, and the Milanese Senate who refused to cooperate 
with these officials. This institutional hurdle impacted the pace of border negotiations, as 
reflected in the case of abortive attempts to settle the frontier with Parma.  
 The Habsburg border-negotiation template, as shown in chapter 5 for the cases of 
Transylvania and the Austrian Netherlands, relied on cartography to help support imperial claims 
during official border negotiations. And despite his halfhearted agreement to collaborate, the 
Infant of Parma had no chance of eliminating a procedure consecrated by various European 
powers, or at least not without being accused of ill will.731 Section two explores the unfolding of 
two joint border inspections along the Habsburg-Parmesan borderline and reveals the importance 
of cartography for such missions. Military and civil engineers, together with provincial 
administrators who had a thorough knowledge of Lombardy’s history and geography, played an 
instrumental role in furthering Habsburg interests during the discussions preceding and 
accompanying the inspections. Whereas the 1775 inspection failed miserably due to the two 
Courts’ different scope for this mission, the 1779 border examination produced an official map 
showing all the domains the two states agreed to consider contested lands. However, the 1779 
inspection did not preclude a successful negotiation, as the Habsburg Monarchy changed its 
territorial goals once Joseph II took over the throne from Maria Theresa in 1780.  
                                                          
731 Some other famous mid-eighteenth-century treaties that led to border demarcations, signed by other European 
states than the Habsburgs, include the Treaty of Madrid (1750; provisions regarding the border of Portuguese and 
Spanish possessions in South America) and the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748; specifications regarding the border 
between British and French possessions in Nova Scotia), Ferreira, O Tratado de Madrid e o Brasil Meridional; 
Pedley, “Map wars.”  
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The final section explores the extension of the Habsburg-Parmesan negotiations into a 
quadrilateral discussion involving the most powerful Bourbon monarchs of Europe: the French 
and the Spanish kings. As Joseph II insisted on his desire to impose the border on the Pò River, 
which would have led to a significant loss of land for the Infant of Parma, the Parmesan ruler 
requested the help of his more powerful relatives. The diplomatic discussions involved 
ambassadors and ministers from Vienna, Milan, Parma, Madrid and Versailles. In this way, the 
negotiation over the Habsburg-Parmesan borders became a truly trans-imperial process, and the 
two sides directly interested in the final result relied on cartographic material to defend their 
claims and arguments. Despite the acceleration in the production of borderlands’ maps, the 
Habsburg failure to establish a clear demarcation line between Lombardy and Parma proves that 
maps were a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the success of such projects.  
6.1 THE GENERAL COMMISSARY FOR THE BORDERS OF THE STATE OF 
MILAN 
The War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) and the subsequent treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle 
(1748) constituted a turning point not only for the Habsburg Monarchy’s possession in Italy, but 
for the geography of the whole Peninsula.732 As shown in Figure 6.1, by 1748 the Habsburg 
Monarchy had lost control over Naples, Sicily, the Lombard territories across the Po and Ticino 
rivers, and the Duchies of Parma and Piacenza. However, during this same period Maria 
Theresa’s husband, Francis Stephen, had become Grand Duke of Tuscany (5), and the Habsburgs 
had also consolidated their hold on the two territorial units composing Austrian Lombardy: the 
                                                          
732 For a survey of the War of the Austrian Succession see Browning, The War of the Austrian Succession. 
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State of Milan (1-a) and the Duchy of Mantua (1-b).733 Therefore, although the size of the 
Habsburg possessions significantly decreased, these lands were also more compact and in closer 
proximity to Vienna.  
The seemingly provincial unity of Austrian Lombardy eluded the Habsburg authorities 
until the 1780s. Indeed, it took the Habsburgs most of the eighteenth century to centralize their 
possessions in Lombardy under the authority of Milan, because the Duchy of Mantua had a 
strong institutional tradition and preserved a key strategic position for the Monarchy.734 
Therefore, Vienna had to tread gently in the direction of integrating Mantua with the State of 
Milan.735 Only after 1780, when Joseph II took fully the reigns of power in his hands, was the 
emperor able to create a unified administration for the whole of Lombardy.736  
                                                          
733 Carlo Capra, "Habsburg Italy in the age of reform," Journal of Modern Italian Studies 10, no. 2 (2005): 218-219; 
Ingrao, The Habsburg Monarchy, 147.  
734 Simona Mori’s work on the Duchy of Mantua in the eighteenth century complements Carlo Capra’s work on 
Austrian Lombardy. Mori focuses on the Duchy of Mantua and its evolution throughout the eighteenth century, 
whereas although Capra discusses Austrian Lombardy as a unit, he focuses especially on the State of Milan. Capra, 
La Lombardia Austriaca Nell’Età delle Riforme; Simona Mori, Il Ducato di Mantova nell’età delle riforme (1736-
1784). Governo, amministrazione, finanze (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1998). 
735 For a brief period, between 1744 and 1749, Maria Theresa strived to reform the administration of Mantua in 
order to integrate this Duchy better into Austrian Lombardy. However, as the Mantua proved loyal during the War 
of the Austrian Succession, and Maria Theresa knew she had to rely on this Duchy’s financial help for the post-war 
reconstruction, she decided to revive Mantua’s distinct administration in 1749. Silvia Cuccia, La Lombardia in età 
Teresiana e Giuseppina (Florence: Sansoni, 1977), 34-35; Mori, Il Ducato di Mantova, 58-59; 93.  
736 Ingrao, The Habsburg Monarchy, 204. Despite the separate administration and political institutions in the State of 
Milan and the Duchy of Mantua, many scholars analyzing the evolution of Austrian Lombardy under the Habsburgs 
excluded Mantua from most of their analyses. That is, although they use the term ‘Lombardy’, some historians only 
discuss developments in the State of Milan. See for example, Alexander Grab, “Enlightened Despotism and State 
Building: The Case of Austrian Lombardy,” Austrian History Yearbook 19-20 (1983-1984): 44-45. 
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Figure 6.1 Map of Italy after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) 
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In 1748, after the War of the Austrian Succession, Maria Theresa and her advisers 
prioritized the empire’s financial recovery in order to increase military expenditure and defend 
the Monarchy. In an effort to gather more revenue from the State of Milan, Governor Gian Luca 
Pallavicini spearheaded the reform of the provincial institutions and the taxation system.737 As 
part of this institutional renewal, in an effort to limit the authority of provincial elites dominating 
the Senate, Maria Theresa also created the function of General Commissary for Borders 
(Commissario Generale dè Confini).738 This imperial decision demonstrates Maria Theresa’s 
commitment to defining and preserving the province’s borders. Due to the political 
fragmentation of the Italian Peninsula in the second half of the eighteenth century, Austrian 
Lombardy neighbored numerous political entities, including the Kingdom of Sardinia’s domains 
in Piedmont, the Republic of Venice, some of the Swiss cantons, the Papal States, the Duchy of 
Modena and the Duchies of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla. Establishing border treatises with all 
of Lombardy’s neighbors became a priority for the Habsburgs starting in the 1750s and initially, 
the imperial authorities in Vienna hoped that the General Commissary for Borders would prove 
instrumental in the process of borders’ delimitation. 
 However, creating this new official clashed with the long institutional history of the 
State of Milan, especially the traditional role of the Senate regarding borders. Indeed, until the 
1749 reforms, the Senate had reserved the authority to make decisions on how to retaliate to 
border violations, how to negotiate with neighboring states the position of the frontier, and how 
                                                          
737 In 1749, Maria Theresa ordered the fusion of the two institutions in charge of financial matters, the Magistrato 
delle entrate ordinarie and the Magistrato delle entrate straordinarie, into one body, the Magistrato Camerale. 
Pallavicini supervisied the unification of all tax collection in one body, the Ferma Generale, and ensured the smooth 
completion of the Milanese cadaster (Censimento). Grab, “Enlightened Despotism and State Building,” 46-49; 
Capra, La Lombardia Austriaca Nell’Età delle Riforme, 128-130. 
738 ASM DR, box 219, Maria Theresa to Harrach, July 26, 1749; Capra, La Lombardia Austriaca Nell’Età delle 
Riforme, 137.  
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to solve other border related issues.739 However, the customary practice of naming arbiters 
whenever a border controversy arose proved ineffective; out of the 60 frontier incidents 
occurring between 1550-1700, arbiters successfully settled only seventeen.740 Border incidents in 
the 1730s reconfirmed the Senate’s inability to keep up with all the modifications in the border 
areas and to solve territorial conflicts in a satisfactory matter.741 Additionally, the Treaty of Aix-
la-Chapelle (1748) reconfigured the political configuration of the Italian Peninsula. Therefore, it 
became necessary in the eyes of Vienna to create the institution of a border commissary. On July 
26, 1749, Maria Theresa named Count Arconati as the first border commissary, and chose 
Giovanni Mario Andriani as his adjunct and automatic successor.742  
Unfortunately, the overlap of responsibilities between this new officer and the Senate 
paralyzed the work of Andriani. For example, the border commissary was excluded from the 
preparatory work for the 1752 treaty of Varese regulating the borders of Lombardy with the 
Republic of Venice. Moreover, throughout the early 1750s, Arconati complained repeatedly to 
the government that the Senate and the government of Lombardy did not share with him any 
border maps, border treaties or lists of territorial controversies.743 Under these conditions, 
Arconati’s and Andriani’s titles conferred on them no real responsibilities.  
 Despite the inefficiency of Arconati and Andriani, Maria Theresa tolerated the situation 
as she relied on another important official from Lombardy to orchestrate the signing of numerous 
                                                          
739 Lombardy’s situation was not unprecedented in the Italian lands. The Republic of Venice had a similar Senate-
centered system for dealing with border problems. By the second half of the eighteenth century, the person filling 
the initially purely consultative function known as border-chamber inspector (“sopraintendente alla camera dei 
confini”) acquired more authority over frontier conflicts and negotiations. For a discussion of the Venetian 
Republic’s institutions in charge of border matters, see Mauro Pitteri, “I Confini della Repubblica di Venezia. Linee 
generali di politica confinaria, 1554-1786,” in Alle Frontiere della Lombardia. Politica, Guerra e Religione nell’età 
moderna. ed. Claudio Donati (Milan: FrancoAngeli, 2006), 259-288. 
740 Vittorio Adami, “La magistratura dei confini dello Stato di Milano,” Archivio Storico Lombardo 40 (1913): 131. 
741 In his article discussing the development of institutions in charge of border regulations in Lombardy, Vittorio 
Adami offers some examples about the failure of the Senate to disentangle complex border controversies. Ibid., 128-
133. 
742 ASM DR, box 219, Maria Theresa to Harrach, July 26, 1749.  
743 Adami, “La magistratura dei confini dello Stato di Milano,” 139-140. 
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border treaties: Beltrame Cristiani, who occupied from 1753 until his death in 1758 the office of 
Plenipotentiary Minister of Lombardy. On October 22, 1750, Maria Theresa informed Governor 
Pallavicini that she had decided to commission Cristiani with the secret mission of pursuing a 
policy to sign border treaties with neighboring states.744 Throughout the 1750s Cristiani 
successfully concluded commercial and border treaties with Habsburg neighbors including the 
Swiss cantons, the Kingdom of Sardinia, and the Duchy of Modena. The only political ruler with 
which Cristiani did not manage to reach a consensus was the Infant of Parma, who controlled the 
Duchies of Parma and Piacenza.745 After Cristiani’s death in 1758, the government in Vienna 
had to rely again on the inefficient border commissary and his adjunct.  
As Derek Beales, Carlo Capra and Franz Szbo have already established, the early 1760s 
was a propitious time for the imperial authorities in their fight against Lombardy’s provincial 
elites and imposing centralizing reforms.746 After becoming the new plenipotentiary minister of 
Lombardy in 1759, Carlo Firmian ensured the successful reform of the taxation system based on 
the Milanese cadaster, and remained Chancellor Kaunitz’s loyal voice in the province for the 
next decades.747 During his time as plenipotentiary, Firmian strived to transform Vienna’s orders 
into reality, fighting the conservative stance of traditional Milanese institutions such as the 
Senate with the help of newly hired functionaries, originally from areas other than Lombardy, 
and thus loyal firstly to the Habsburg dynasty.748 It is in this favorable context for the imperial 
authorities in Vienna that we have to analyze Maria Theresa’s attempt to revitalize the powers 
                                                          
744 ASM DR, box 222, Maria Theresa to Pallavicini, October 22, 1750.  
745 For a detailed list of these treaties see Capra, La Lombardia Austriaca Nell’Età delle Riforme, 157-159. 
746 In 1757 Chancellor Kaunitz increased his authority over the Netherlands and the Italian-Spanish Council by 
replacing them with Belgian and Italian Councils subordinated directly to the State Chancellery. Kaunitz’s 
correspondence with the governors and plenipotentiary ministers in Lombardy remains one of the main sources for 
understanding the Habsburg policy in this province. Beales, Joseph II, vol. 2, 494; Capra, "Habsburg Italy in the age 
of reform," 223; Szabo, Kaunitz and Enlightened Absolutism, 50-51. 
747 Grab, “Enlightened Despotism and State Building,” 55. 
748 Capra, La Lombardia Austriaca Nell’Età delle Riforme, 190-193, 217-220. 
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and responsibilities of the border commissary and his adjunct. In her April 30, 1761 imperial 
order, the Habsburg monarch decreed that Arconati and Adriani should pursue their activity as 
formulated in the 1749 decree. The empress tried to eliminate any institutional overlap of duties 
with respect to borders by stating that the Senate remained the institution responsible for 
examining the legal arguments for border disputes, whereas the border commissary addressed 
actual incidents. Furthermore, Maria Theresa ordered the border commissary to prepare monthly 
reports about the state of the borders both for the government and for the Senate.749  
Encouraged by this new imperial interest in his office, Arconati prepared two memoirs 
with complaints against the Senate and suggestions for improving his position.750 Arconati based 
his argumentation on Maria Theresa’s decrees from 1749, 1753, and 1761, which enforced the 
border commissary’s subordination to both the government and the Senate. In these imperial 
orders, the empress had urged the Senate to solicit the opinion of the border commissary and had 
encouraged forwarding all local reports regarding border incidents to this official.751 In addition 
to his plea for the implementation of Maria Theresa’s decrees, Arconati requested from the 
government access to cartographic material prepared for Lombardy’s borders, including maps 
drawn as result of international treaties.752 The border commissary was aware that obtaining 
copies of the latest border maps would offer him leverage against other institutional rivals, such 
as the Senate, as he could monitor border disputes and suggest to the central government 
solutions to preserving the integrity of the borderline. Arconati’s request for access to border 
maps prepared as part of the border demarcation operations also endorses the contractual value 
the Habsburg government and Lombardy’s neighbors conferred to these cartographic documents. 
                                                          
749 ASM DR, box 234, Maria Theresa’s order, December 25, 1777; ASM Confini p.a., box 16, Kaunitz to Firmian, 
December 25, 1777. 
750 ASM Confini p.a., box 16, Arconati to Firmian, June 20, 1761.  
751 Ibid.  
752 Ibid.  
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Despite Maria Theresa’s interest in the position of border commissary and Arconati’s 
memoirs, the official’s efforts failed, and his death in 1763 led to another wave of governmental 
documents trying to regulate the position of his successor.753 Although in theory Andriani 
continued to occupy the function of border commissary, his inefficiency in addressing urgent 
issues, especially regarding the territorial conflicts with the Court of Parma, forced the 
government to look for an alternative institution.754 On June 30, 1768, Kaunitz sent to Firmian 
his thoughts about the qualities an ideal border commissary should have, including an in-depth 
topographical and historical knowledge of the province and a familiarity with the province “inch 
by inch.” Based on these criteria, Kaunitz recommended Counsellor Giuseppe Pecis as the future 
lieutenant of the border commissary. Moreover, the Chancellor suggested combining this 
position with similar responsibilities for the inspection of waterways and roads.755 
Although flattered by this nomination, Pecis warned Firmian about the risks of conferring 
so many responsibilities and honors on one person’s shoulders and recommended ways to 
improve Andriani’s position as general border commissary.756 Firmian agreed with Kaunitz on 
the importance of putting in charge of borders a subject with a good knowledge of the province, 
its history, customs, and the evolution of its borders throughout time. The plenipotentiary 
                                                          
753 Rather than eliminating the office of border commissary, Kaunitz reminded Firmian that Maria Theresa had 
selected Arconati’s successor in the person of Andriani, already in 1749. The Chancellor urged Firmian to ensure the 
Senate’s cooperation with Andriani in order to avoid a direct intervention from Vienna. ASM Confini p.a., box 16, 
Kaunitz to Firmian, June 20, 1763; Kaunitz to Firmian, June 23, 1763.  
754 After almost two decades of failing to empower first Arconati and then Andriani, in a letter to Firmian dated 
November 12, 1767, Kaunitz explored the reasons for this debacle. The Chancellor identified two main obstacles: 
the refusal of the Senate to share its border-related responsibilities, and the Treasury’s denial to pay for the 
commissary’s operations. ASM Confini p.a., box 16, Kaunitz to Firmian, November 12, 1767.  
755 ASM Confini p.a., box 17, Kaunitz to Firmian, June 30, 1768.  
756 Pecis suggested adding another person to help the commissary prepare a report of the evolution of the borders’ 
situation from earlier times until current events. The report could be based on treaties signed throughout time with 
Lombardy’s neighbors, other reports, undecided issues and current problems. Also, Andreani and this second person 
should maintain a regular correspondence with Habsburg ministers residing in the neighboring states and even with 
ministers of foreign states in order to gather information on border controversies and help prepare Congresses to 
negotiate border issues. Additionally, the border commissary would correspond with provincial authorities to collect 
news about any local incidents. ASM Confini p.a., box 3, Pecis to Firmian, July 11, 1768.  
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envisioned that such an official would devote full time to studying treaties with neighboring 
states, would perform local border inspections, and would maintain the government and the 
Senate informed. They would also have full access to the archives and would correspond with 
local authorities from border settlements. However, Firmian warned Kaunitz that in order to 
avoid the failure of this new official, he should be directly dependent on the government, and not 
subordinate to the Senate.757  
By the end of August 1768, Kaunitz and Maria Theresa decided that the creation of a new 
Minister combining attributions over borders, waterways and roads might lead to the jealousy of 
the provincial elite.758 Therefore, they suggested composing an ad-hoc committee (Giunta) under 
Pecis’s coordination. This committee would discuss Pecis’s reports and would send instructions 
to the border commissary and the institutions in charge of waterways and roads. Between 1764 
and 1769 the government of Lombardy found ad-hoc commissions the best solution to address 
urgent issues and circumvent the slow bureaucratic process of Lombardy’s institutions.759 
Therefore, Kaunitz’s suggestion to create an ad-hoc commission in charge of borders, waterways 
and roads was not unprecedented. In addition to Pecis, who was in charge of setting the agenda 
of the commission and ensure its legitimacy and efficient functioning, this group included 
representatives from a variety of key provincial institutions: senator Filippo Muttoni, counselor 
Giuseppe Wilczek, questor Alessandro Ottolino, count Francesco d’Adda, and border 
commissary Giovanni Mario Andriani.760  
Although abolished by 1770, the short-lived Giunta for roads, waterways and borders, 
had set a pattern for bringing together provincial experts on borders to address the controversies 
                                                          
757 ASM Confini p.a., box 17, Firmian to Kaunitz, July 12, 1768.  
758 ASM Confini p.a., box 17, Kaunitz to Firmian, August 29, 1768.  
759 Capra, La Lombardia Austriaca Nell’Età delle Riforme, 273-275. 
760 ASM DR, box 241, Maria Theresa’s order, October 6, 1768. Also mentioned in Capra, La Lombardia Austriaca 
Nell’Età delle Riforme. 
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with Parma, which continued to persist in the 1770s. On July 7, 1770, Kaunitz ordered Firmian 
to delegate government consultant Paolo de la Silva to convene twice a week the following 
group of border experts: Senator Muttoni, Counselor Pecis, the fiscal officer Bonacina (soon 
replaced with Martignoni due to his precarious health), and Secretary Remigio Fuentes. This 
group of specialists, who met regularly for the next decades, had as their first priority helping the 
government negotiate with the Court of Parma regarding the border contestations.761 Kaunitz 
preferred summoning a commission with no actual decisional power in order to prevent a 
negative reaction from the Senate.762 However, although this Giunta could not issue any 
governmental decrees, these advisors’ reports and suggestions greatly influenced Vienna’s 
attitudes and policies with respect to the border negotiations with Parma for most of the 1770s 
and 1780s. It is striking that Andriani, the border commissary, was not even included as part of 
this assembly. Indeed, the Habsburg authorities gave up for a while any chance to revitalize the 
position of border commissary and officially eliminated this function in 1772.763  
As illustrated by the convening of this new border commission, in their effort to 
collaborate fruitfully with Lombardy’s institutions and regulate the border with Parma, Kaunitz 
and Firmian relied on the work of Paolo de la Silva, government consultant (consultore di 
governo) between 1763 and 1782.764 De la Silva distinguished himself with his knowledge of the 
legal system and his ability to write memoirs combining historical and legal arguments to defend 
                                                          
761 ASM Confini p.a., box 73, volume containing the minutes of the ad-hoc committee meetings regarding border 
controversies with Parma, entry for the meetings from January 30, 1772 and January 31, 1772. ASM Confini p.a., 
box 73, Firmian to de la Silva, January 30, 1772.  
762 In a letter to Firmian, Kaunitz expressed the hope that the work of these ministers would not infuriate the Senate, 
as they only analyzed arguments and clarified facts, without having the right to take actual decisions. ASM Confini 
p.a., box 73, Kaunitz to Firmian, January 16, 1772. 
763 In October 1774, Count Don Giovanni Mario Andreani died and the Habsburgs eliminated the position of 
“luogotenente generale dé confini” with the 1772 Plan of Reform of Lombardy’s administration anyway. ASM 
Confini p.a., box 16, Kaunitz to Firmian, October 20, 1774; Kaunitz to Firmian, April 9, 1772.  
764 The role of the government consultant was advising the plenipotentiary minister. Before 1763 de la Silva had 
been the president of the Council of Justice of Mantua, and the head of the committee fulfilling the role of the 
Vicegovernor of Mantua. Mori, Il Ducato di Mantova, 173-174. 
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Habsburg claims against the Duke of Parma.765 As part of his responsibilities to ensure the 
success of the border negotiations with Parma, de la Silva prepared instructions for Lombardy’s 
engineers involved after 1775 in border inspections and advised Firmian regarding the 
correspondence with the Parmesan minister.  
However, Vienna quickly realized that de la Silva’s knowledge and understanding of the 
legal and historical framework was not sufficient to allow such a low-rank official to negotiate at 
the highest level with the Court of Parma. Therefore, in 1777, when the Governor of Lombardy, 
Archduke Ferdinand, recommended the reinstatement of the function of general commissary for 
borders and the promotion of Marquis Francesco Belcredi in this position, Maria Theresa and 
Kaunitz agreed.766 As shown in the next sections, Belcredi took the lead in preparing for the 
border negotiations with Parma, and this is an example of the Habsburg success in finally 
transforming the function of border commissary into reality. The reforms of the early 1770s had 
strengthened Vienna’s authority over Lombardy and as directly subordinate to the imperial 
central authorities Belcredi was in a stronger position than Arconati and Andriani had ever 
been.767  
To ease the work of this new border commissary, Maria Theresa ordered him to supervise 
the creation of a special archive where documents, drawings and plans of the border areas could 
be amassed and stored.768 Under Belcredi’s management, the governmental official Vincenzo 
Molinari performed the systematization of this border archive, starting with the documents and 
                                                          
765 ASM Confini p.a., box 74, Paolo de la Silva’s 1775 memoir “Presentation of the borders of the Duchy of Milan 
and Mantua with Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla” (Dimostrazione de Confini del Ducato di Milano e di Mantova con 
Parma, Piacenza, e Gustalla). 
766 ASM Confini p.a., box 16, Kaunitz to Firmian, December 22, 1777; ASM DR, box 256, Maria Theresa’s order 
from December 25, 1777.  
767 The reforms of 1771 separated the administrative and judicial competencies between the Magistrato Camerale 
and the Senate, and added a control institution, the Camera dei Conti; the process of bureaucratization intensified 
and Vienna took over the process of indirect taxation Capra, La Lombardia Austriaca Nell’Età delle Riforme, 281, 
296-303; Grab, “Enlightened Despotism and State Building,” 61-64. 
768 ASM Confini p.a., box 16, Kaunitz to Firmian, December 25, 1777. 
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maps related to Lombardy’s frontier with Parma.769 The laborious process of collecting 
documentary material from all of the provincial archives related to Lombardy’s borders revealed 
that important cartographic material had been lost and encouraged the Habsburg government to 
pay closer attention to the preservation of border maps.770 Maria Theresa’s decision to create a 
border archive and the material included in this repository illustrate the role of maps as 
significant documentary sources to support territorial claims and prepare for intergovernmental 
negotiations.  
 By 1780, the State of Milan finally possessed a solid institutional framework in charge of 
solving border controversies and defending the territorial integrity of the province. The Senate 
was responsible for examining and maintaining information about controversial border segments; 
the border commissary was in charge of investigating new border incidents and representing the 
Habsburg government in international border negotiations. The provincial counselor attached to 
the Magistrato Camerale, an institution running almost all financial matters,771 made regular 
border inspections and sent reports to the government, who shared them, based on their content, 
with the Senate, the Magistrato Camerale or the border commissary.772 This complex system 
involving all the major institutions of the State of Milan, namely the provincial government, the 
Senate and the Magistrato Camerale, reveals the centrality of border affairs for the provincial and 
imperial Habsburg policy. The efforts of the central government in Vienna to integrate 
                                                          
769HHStA Italien-Spanischer Rat, Lombardei Korrespondenz, Kaunitz to Firmian, April 20, 1780. ASM Confini p.a., 
box 3, Firmian’s order from July 1, 1780.  
770 In October 1780, Belcredi suggested ways for better preservation of original border maps and reported the 
disappearance of three maps prepared after the 1773-1774 inspection of the frontier between the Province of 
Cremona and the Republic of Venice. Belcredi recommended asking for additional copies of the lost maps from the 
government of Venice. ASM Confini p.a., box 14, Belcredi to Ferdinand, October 16, 1780. The government of 
Lombardy agreed with Belcredi’s suggestions. ASM Confini p.a., box 14, Firmian to Belcredi, November 11, 1780. 
771 For an in-depth discussion of the Magistrato Camerale see Cesare Mozzarelli, “Magistrato Camerale della 
Lombardia Austriaca (1771-1786),” Römische Historische Mitteilungen 31 (1989): 377-396. 
772 The border commissary also maintained correspondence with local authorities and representative of the Census 
Office in order to be informed of any border novelties. The provincial counselor also had to first consult the border 
commissary before raising an issue to the government. ASM DR, box 258, Maria Theresa’s order from April 20. 
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Lombardy into the Monarchy by eliminating or at least curtailing the authority of some of its 
traditional institutions led to the creation and the transformation of the border commissary from 
an inefficient bureaucrat into an agent of imperial power in Lombardy.  
The inability of Vienna to reach a consensus regarding the borderline with the Infant of 
Parma since 1748 forced the Habsburg rulers to continue to improve the institutional provincial 
mechanism in charge of defending Vienna’s claims in the border areas. In their effort to reach an 
agreement with Parma, the Habsburgs relied substantially not only on the border commissary, 
but also on the cartographic production of engineers and surveyors, as the next section illustrates.  
6.2 THE ROLE OF ENGINEERS AND MAPS IN SETTLING BORDER DISPUTES 
On October 13, 1777, in a letter to Firmian, Kaunitz expressed his opinion on how border 
inspections should occur: “generally, it is advisable that the engineers chosen for tasks of this 
nature know well the origin, progress and current state of territorial issues, and that they are 
informed on the arguments and documents not only supporting their side, but also, as much as 
possible, for the opposing side. Such notions help observing in the field any critical circumstance 
and point that would support our arguments in the face of opposing pretensions.”773 As shown in 
the chapter 5, the chancellor’s formula for frontier reconnaissance had been applied successfully 
in at least two other provinces: Transylvania during the border mapping and demarcation in the 
1750s and 1760s, and the Austrian Netherlands after the 1769 border treaty with France. Even in 
                                                          
773 Original: “Generalmente conviene che gli Ingegneri per commissioni di questa natura sieno ben instruiti dè fatti 
dell’origine, progresso e stato attuale delle questioni teritoriali, come pure che si trovino prevenuti dè fondamenti, e 
titoli non solo della loro Parte, ma ancora, per quanto riesca possibile, di quelli dell’avversa Parte. Tali nozioni 
servono in sulla faccia del luogo a rilevare ogni critica circostanza, e di punto d’appoggio alle nostre ragioni a fronte 
delle pretensioni avversarie.” ASM Confini p.a., box 76, Kaunitz to Firmian, October 13, 1777.  
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the case of Lombardy, starting with the early 1750s, engineers and surveyors had inspected and 
marked all the province’s borders except the one towards Parma. This section explores Habsburg 
attempts in the second half of the 1770s to organize, together with the Infant of Parma, border 
inspections in preparation for a Congress that would decide on the definitive trajectory of the 
borderline between Lombardy and Parma. Although the Congress never materialized, these joint 
inspections produced rich cartographic material that later influenced the Habsburg efforts to 
integrate better the two sub-units of Lombardy: the State of Milan and the Duchy of Mantua. 
Moreover, once the decision-makers in Vienna obtained access to a clearer image of Lombardy’s 
geography towards Parma, their expectations regarding the ideal trajectory of the borderline 
changed, and the Pò River emerged in the cartographic representations as a possible long-term 
frontier line.  
The history of the failed Lombardy-Parma border demarcations offers a counterpoint to 
the successful Habsburg operations in Transylvania, the Austrian Netherlands, and the other 
borders of Lombardy. Although the Habsburg commitment to eliminate territorial enclaves and 
establish fixed borderlines relied on the work of mapmakers and jurists in all these three border 
provinces, the success of border demarcations depended in equal part on Vienna’s political 
neighbors’ determination to reach an agreement.  
In 1775, the government of Milan and the Court of Parma agreed for the first time to send 
two engineers, one for each side, to inspect the border between the two states and prepare maps 
and detailed reports for all the controversial areas.774 The two engineers chosen for this mission, 
Colonel Nicolò Baschiera for the Habsburg side, and Lieutenant Colonel Gian Andrea Boldrini 
for Parma, failed to finalize the inspection due to an incompatibility between the two courts’ 
understanding of the meaning of contested lands and the engineers’ contradictory instructions, as 
                                                          
774 ASM Confini p.a., box 74, Sacco to Firmian, February 17, 1775. 
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discussed below.775 An examination of governmental documents discussing the guidelines for 
Baschiera’s mission, the diplomatic correspondence between Milan and Parma, the reports of 
Baschiera after the beginning of this inspection, and the additional suggestions of Lombardy’s 
experts on border issues discloses the Viennese Court’s reliance on cartographic material both to 
prepare this inspection and to capture its final results. Additionally, these archival documents 
reveal that although Parma was far from being a serious political rival to Vienna, the Infant and 
his advisers had access to skilled mapmakers and jealously guarded access to geographic 
information about their domains.  
Almost half a year before the beginning of the inspection, Chancellor Kaunitz inquired 
from Lombardy’s plenipotentiary minister about the location of “some papers or topographic 
charts already prepared, even if not through the collaboration of both sides, which could 
meanwhile help understand the state of the disputes.”776 Kaunitz believed these older maps could 
educate Baschiera regarding the geographic situation of some of the controversial sites, prior to 
his inspection.777 Although the Chancellor’s plan seemed sensible, it quickly became clear that 
the provincial archives housed neither a drawing of the flow of the river Pò, nor a list of all the 
border controversies along the river.778 De la Silva suggested that the Census Office was the only 
institution capable of preparing a map of the river, together with banks and islands.779  
The provincial institutions’ inability to locate a general map of the border with Parma 
must have been puzzling to the authorities in Vienna, who were aware of the strong surveying 
and mapmaking tradition of Lombardy. As the borderline along the Pò passed through both the 
                                                          
775 Ibid. and Ibid., Firmian to Baschiera, February 28, 1775. 
776 “Vi esisteranno pure alcune Carte o Tavole topografiche già fatte, benchè non in concorso d’ambe due Parti, che 
possano frattanto servire per comprenderne lo stato delle questioni.” Ibid., Kaunitz to Firmian, early March 1775. 
777 Ibid., Kaunitz to Firmian, April 10, 1775. 
778 Ibid., Fuentes to Paolo de la Silva, April 11, 1774. 
779 Ibid. 
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poorly integrated State of Milan and the Duchy of Mantua, this is not surprising. Each of these 
sub-units of Lombardy prioritized their own border disputes and did not exchange cartographic 
information with each other, unless ordered by the central government. Even the Census Office’s 
large repository of local maps encompassed only information regarding the State of Milan.780 
Throughout the spring and summer of 1775 employees working for the Senate, the 
Chancellery and the Census Office, searched through archival papers to help Baschiera,781 who 
considered that although existing geographic maps “were not accurate and therefore were useless 
for the assignment,” they could still provide guidance in understanding some of the 
controversies. 782 Based on the lists of maps sent to Baschiera to help him with his mission, we 
can recreate an inventory of the cartographic material regarding the border between Lombardy 
and the domains of the Infant of Parma, reflecting the state of these sources in 1775.783 
  
                                                          
780 The Habsburgs only extended he cadastral measurements and taxation reforms performed in the State of Milan in 
the middle of the eighteenth-century to the Duchy of Mantua in the 1780s. Mori, Il Ducato di Mantova, 106. 
781 ASM Confini p.a., box 74, De la Silva’s instructions for Baschiera, April 17, 1775. 
782 “Ordina VE di non servirsi di Carte Geografiche cosa ottima, quantunque a tutti sia noto, che tali Carte non sono 
esatte ed in conseguenza inutili per la commissione che si ha a fare.” Ibid., Baschiera to de la Silva, April 24, 1775. 
783 Ibid., list of maps and plans from the Secret Chancellery, dated July 12, 1775; list of the maps from the Royal 
Archive of the Castle, July 16, 1775; list of maps from the Census Office, July 19, 1775; list of maps from the 
Senate, July 17, 1775.  
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Table 6.1 List of maps related to the Parmesan-Habsburg border located in archives of Lombardy (1775) 
Institution 
Sending the Maps 
Map Details Date 
Secret 
Chancellery 
 
Drawing prepared at the order of the chief 
magistrate from Codogno (podestà) by Giovanni 
Francesco Cigognini, surveyor from Lodi, showing 
parts of the river Pò that include the forests and 
alluvial deposits at Vojera and Regona. 
 
September 4-5, 1773 
Unsigned drawing showing the borders with 
Retegno, part of Lodi’s territory, and with 
Piacenza’s domains. 
No date 
Plan prepared by engineer Pietro Martire Aglio, 
showing the segment of the Pò including the waters 
belonging to Cremona 
June 28, 1772 
Drawing extracted from a report of Colonel 
Baschiera, showing the embankment built by the 
inhabitants of Guastalla 
No date 
Drawing prepared by Marco Zavatini showing the 
embankment built by the inhabitants of Guastalla 
September 29, 1770 
Plan sent by the chief magistrate in Codogno, 
prepared by surveyor Giovanni Pietro Francesco 
Cigognini, and showing the alluvial deposits of 
Lodi’s Vojera. 
September 22, 1774 
Similar plan to the one above, but in a larger 
version  
No date 
Royal Archive of 
the Castle 
Drawing of the island Ballottino across Martignana, 
contested with Parma 
1752 
Drawing of the domain contested by the 
communities of Corno Giovine, Lodi, and the 
family Casati, Piacenza 
1754 
Drawing prepared by Pavia’s engineer, architect 
Giulio Francesco Veneroni, showing the island 
Boscone, recently united to Pavia’s territory and 
contested by count Lottario Scotti from Piacenza. 
Includes copy of the engineer’s report. 
February 10, 1756 
Drawing of the modifications done by Marquis 
Arcelli, from Piacenza, to the tributary Ancona, 
territory of Guardamiglio, damaging the interests of 
Count Antonio Somaglia and the monastery 
Ospitaletto. Includes a report prepared by engineer 
Francesco de Coutelet 
February 25, 1761 
Drawing of the island Fossa Caprara and 
Roncadello, jurisdiction of Casalmaggiore, attacked 
by Parmesan inhabitants. Includes a description of 
October 2, 1761 
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engineer Giuseppe Meneghetti, working for the 
City of Cremona and surveyor of Casalmaggiore 
Drawing of the modifications the inhabitants of 
Piacenza did on the border segment from Porto 
Morone, domain of Pavia, by destroying a wooden 
channel erected by family Anselmi in order to 
irrigate their possessions in Cassina Perranchera. 
Includes the original report of judge Pietro 
Morosini from Pavia. 
May 27, 1764 
Senate Archives Plan of domains controversial between Count 
Camillo Stanga from Castel Nuovo, Bocca d’Adda, 
domain of Cremona, and the commune of 
Roncarolo, domain of Piacenza. Includes a report 
of surveyors Pietro Lissa and Marc Antonio 
Smeraldi 
July 11, 1624 
Drawing prepared by engineer Giacomo Muttoni, 
showing the island between the Pò river’s branches 
across from Colombarola, together with the banks 
of the river 
1716 
Five plans regarding the construction of a wall done 
by the inhabitants of Rivarolo next to the waters of 
Delmoncina, belonging to Cremona. Prepared by 
engineers Guerrino and Combiaghi from Cremona, 
and Moschatelli from Rivarolo 
1716 
Plan showing the modifications done by the 
inhabitants of Bozzolo to change the course of a 
channel’s waters 
1722 
Plans made at the discovery of the island Gerolo, 
close to the dam of Casalmaggiore 
1724 
Two drawings prepared by engineer Piretti, 
showing the attack supposedly committed by the 
court of Casalmaggiore and usurping Parmesan 
jurisdiction, when transporting the body of Paolo 
Piapa.  
1732 
Two plans prepared by engineers Duci and 
Malatesta, showing the territorial violation 
committed by Pietro Provaglio and other 
inhabitants of Piacenza, in the province of 
Cremona. 
1733 
Plan done by engineer Tocchi, showing the 
modifications done by inhabitants of Castel Bocca 
d’Adda, domain of Cremona and prejudicing the 
territory of San Nazaro 
1739 
Plan prepared by engineers Brignoli and Boldrini, 
showing usurpations committed by Marquis Stanga  
1741 
Plan prepared by engineer Boldrini of a 1742 
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construction done on the Pò by Marquis Stanga, 
prejudicing the jurisdiction of Piacenza 
Plan prepared by engineer Duci, showing the 
controversies between Marquis Stanga and the 
Jesuits of Piacenza 
1744 
Three plans of the island Fossa Caprara made in 
1722 and rectified in 1751 
1722/1751 
Plan by engineer Verdelli showing the 
modifications done by the Parmesans to the island 
of Balottino 
January 14, 1752 
Plan showing the Parmesan modifications to the 
forest known as Voiro 
1757 
Plan prepared by engineer Aglio to show the sites 
in need of repair after the corrosions caused by the 
Pò  
1759 
Plan showing the island of Fossa Caprara at the 
moment when the Parmesans occupied it 
October 15, 1761 
Plan prepared by engineer Costa showing the banks 
of the Pò contested between Parma and Mantua  
1772 
Plan prepared by engineer Dosi at the time of the 
arrest of four men by the Parmesans, in the place 
known as Bescacino 
1772 
Plan prepared by engineer Costa in 1773 showing 
the modifications done to the Pò by the Parmesans 
against the Mugnai of Cremona, forcing the 
Mugnai to cede grain mills 
1773 
Three drawings showing territorial controversies 
with respect to the forests Baratt, Barattino and 
other sites along the Pò, on the border between 
Pavia and Monticelli, domain of Piacenza 
1643 
Drawing of engineer Francesco Guerenzi showing 
the border usurpations caused by the inhabitants of 
Piacenza to the island Bottarona, on the territory of 
Court Santa Andrea Ducato 
1669 
Plan prepared by engineer Monti showing Mortizza 
di Caselli and Chignolo, domains of the State of 
Milan, and Monticelli, domain of Piacenza 
1728; modified in 
1731 
Plan formed when the inhabitans of Piacenza 
caused problems on the territory of Court Santa 
Andrea Ducato and Court Olona Pavese 
1730 and 1733 
Two drawings prepared by engineer Veneroni 
showing the controversies between Lombardy and 
Piacenza regarding some mills on the Pò, on the 
bank of Schiafonata towards Chignolo 
1751 
Plan by engineer Capsone showing the need to 
repair the dams on the Pò on the domains of Pavia, 
1752 
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claimed by Monticelli from Piacenza 
Three plans showing the 1756 violent attack of the 
inhabitants of Piacenza to take over the alluvial 
deposit of the Pò on the island of Boscone, 
belonging to Mezzano 
1757 
Two plans by engineer Bossi showing the 
usurpation of Piacenza inhabitants cased on the site 
Alberone, territory of Chignolo, Pavia, when 
arresting two deserters 
1759 
Three plans, among which one prepared by 
engineer Rossi from Cremona, showing the attack 
of armed Piacenza inhabitants on the domains of 
inhabitants from the commune Pieve Porto Morone 
1760 
Plan done by engineer Ghisalberti from Pavia 
showing the 1763 controversy regarding the mills 
on the Pò attached to the banks of the Porto 
Morone, Pavia, claimed by the inhabitants of 
Piacenza 
1763 
Plan showing the usurpation caused by the 
inhabitants of Piacenza on the Cassina 
Pezzanchera, belonging to the community of Porto 
Morone, Pavia.  
1764 
Plan by Milanini showing the Piacenza inhabitants’ 
usurpations on the alluvial deposits of the Pò, 
attached to the banks of the Pieve Porto Morone, 
Pavia. Includes a 1756 plan. 
September 21, 1771 
Census Office Map of the River Pò’s flow which contains the 
1720 controversial banks inspected in 1750, and 
including some modifications from 1766  
1775 
Four plans surveyed by engineer Carcano as part of 
an inspection along the Pò in the domains of 
Cremona, including: Motta Baluffi, Torricella del 
Pizzo, Motto Capriola, and Gerre dè Caprioli 
1766 
Copy of a report of engineer Carcano discussing the 
domains controversial in 1720 
1766 
Plan of part of the territory of Spinadesco located 
on the right side of the Pò, surveyed by the 
engineer Giambattista Costa and inspected by the 
engineer Carcano. Domain possessed by Habsburg 
subjects, but not taxed, as discussed in Carcano’s 
report from 1766  
December 1, 1751 
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A closer look at this list of more than 50 maps (Table 6.1) reveals that, with the exception 
of the 1775 map of the River Pò and its banks that the Census Office prepared at the request of 
imperial authorities, all plans and drawings show very small segments of the border area. The 
maps were generally prepared in connection with specific local incidents and were the product of 
engineers working either for provincial and municipal authorities, or for the Census Office. The 
inexistence of plans showing the entirety of the border between Lombardy and the Duke of 
Parma’s domains discloses the preeminence of provincial and local interests over Habsburg 
imperial goals. Moreover, it reveals how the Habsburg Monarchy for most of the eighteenth 
century, similar to other European states, continued to prioritize jurisdictional over territorial 
sovereignty. The existence of a map showing a clearly demarked boundary line in Lombardy’s 
archives would have signaled the existence of a state defined as encompassing a fixed territory 
and not being merely a sum of jurisdictions.784  
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Detail from the Plan showing the modifications done by the inhabitants of Bozzolo to change the course 
of a channel’s waters (1722) 
                                                          
784 See for the case of France Sahlins, Boundaries, 28. 
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For example, Figure 6.2 shows a map from 1722 displaying modifications done by the 
inhabitants of Bozzolo to a small segment of the Pò in order to divert some of its waters into a 
separate channel.785 The plan is very schematic and does not pay close attention to the 
geographic features of the two banks, as its goal is only to reveal the old flow of the Pò’s channel 
and the modified trajectory. This map probably served to settle a local dispute between the 
inhabitants of Bozzolo and Casalmaggiore, whose revenue depended on access to the river’s 
waters.  
With one exception, all the maps display small segments of the border showing land 
patches or river sectors contested between neighboring communities. Preponderantly from the 
eighteenth century, the maps and their brief descriptions expose the widespread use of surveyors 
and engineers to document border incidents, as small as the destruction of a wooden channel, the 
contested position of a couple of mills or disputes over some forest patches. Because this 
cartographic material is representative for local interests and cannot offer a comprehensive image 
of the Habsburg imperial border, they could not satisfy Kaunitz’s desire for a map grounded in 
an imperial territorial vision of the Habsburg lands in Lombardy.  
The only attempt to show more than a local snapshot is the 1775 Census Office 
representation of the Pò and its banks.786 This map was the most comprehensive image of the 
border with Parma, as this river actually formed the frontier for the most part. In the document 
accompanying the map, the Census Office employees revealed the shortcomings of their work, 
and claimed that although they had used all the territorial maps they had, the final map only 
displayed a “plausible flow of the Pò.”787 The Census Office was not able to prepare an accurate 
map of the whole length of the Pò because the segment from Cremona to Casalmaggiore 
                                                          
785 ASM Confini p.a., box 74. 
786 Ibid. 
787 “un corso verosimile del Po”. Ibid., unsigned document, July 19, 1775. 
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included Parmesan lands on both banks. Moreover, the map ends abruptly in the vicinity of 
Casalmaggiore, without encompassing the Mantovan lands. Therefore, this plan of the Pò only 
offered a partial image of Lombardy’s border with the Parmesan domains. As the 1750 cadaster 
of Milan did not extend to the duchy of Mantua until 1785, the Census Office at this time could 
not have access to local maps of this territory.788 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Detail from the map of the Pò and its banks (1775) 
 
 
Other than the trajectory of the river and its various islands, as seen in the detail 
reproduced in Figure 6.3, the map shows the location of settlements and the territories occupied 
by the Duke of Parma, unjustly from Lombardy’s point of view. Both the red-color patches and 
the yellow contours mark territorial subdivisions that the Census Office claimed should pay taxes 
to the Habsburgs; however, as the inhabitants of Parma and Piacenza had occupied them, 
                                                          
788 Lombardy’s engineers surveyed most of the Duchy of Mantua in preparation for the next taxation reform only in 
the early 1780s. Mori, Il Ducato di Mantova, 280-291. 
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Lombardy could not claim any revenue. The map does not offer any idea about the evolution of 
border contestations and with very few additions it reflects the situation of the river’s banks and 
islands as it had been in 1750.  
The inexistence of cartographic material that could have helped pave the way for a border 
Congress constituted the main motivation for the joint inspection of Milanese and Parmesan 
engineers. To ensure a fast progress of the operation, additional personnel accompanied the two 
leading engineers. Lombardy’s representative, Baschiera, travelled with at least two servants, a 
scribe and First Lieutenant Engineer Ranger.789 The Parmesan Court initially delegated Boldrino 
as their representative, but on November 1775 they replaced him with his prior adjunct, Captain 
Gian Pietro Regalia, who continued the work with the help of Gian Pietro Sardi.790 The plane 
table constituted the most essential piece of equipment for the surveys. For the first month of the 
1775 inspection Ranger and Boldrino used only one plane table to survey the banks of the Pò. 
However, on October 8, 1775, Baschiera requested an additional such instrument from Milan in 
order to speed up the operation, and his supervisors granted his request immediately.791 In order 
to ensure the efficient unfolding of the inspection the Habsburg Court did not hesitate to approve 
any necessary personnel and instruments. However, this proved insufficient to guarantee the 
success of the engineers’ mission.  
The irreconcilability of the two courts’ conceptualization of the goals of this joint 
inspection contributed to its failure in less than four months. The Habsburg authorities claimed 
that the entirety of the Pò belonged to Lombardy, and in consequence the engineers had to 
                                                          
789 ASM Confini p.a., box 74, Baschiera, September 7, 1775.  
790 ASM Confini p.a., box 73, volume containing the minutes of the ad-hoc committee meetings regarding border 
controversies with Parma, entry for the meeting from November 13, 1775.  
791 ASM Confini p.a., box 74, Baschiera, October 8, 1775; De la Silva[?] to Baschiera, October 12, 1775.  
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inspect and survey both banks of the river, even in areas currently under Parma’s dominance. 792 
Baschiera’s instructions stated he should not “allow [the use of] toponyms contrary to our 
undertaking, such as Parmesan Pò, Piacentine Pò.”793 From the Lombardy’s authorities point of 
view it was sufficient for their side to prove the existence of prior pretensions regarding a 
territory in order to transform it in a contested land. On the other hand, Parma asserted that the 
status quo at the time of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was incontestable. To counteract their 
neighbor’s statement, the Habsburg authorities claimed that the documents of the Congress of 
Nice, convened to execute the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, clearly stated that the Infant received 
as part of his state only the lands “that the Dukes of Parma possessed legitimately.”794  
Based on this incompatibility, it is not surprising that on November 18, 1775, Firmian 
complained to the Court of Parma about the behavior of their engineers, Boldrino and Regalia, 
during the border inspection. The main accusation Firmian brought was the refusal of the 
Parmesan engineers to allow the inspection of all controversial domains thus leading to the 
“unhappy state of this inspection, which can be said had barely, or not even, started.”795 Parma’s 
definition of “contested” lands excluded the segments of the Pò that flowed between the Infant’s 
domains. Therefore, the Parmesans remained suspicious of every attempt from Lombardy’s side 
to obtain plans of these areas under the excuse of the inspection and perceived the Habsburg 
desire to map these areas as a preliminary step to territorial claims.796  
                                                          
792 Ibid., De la Silva’s report of the inspection, December 30, 1775.  
793 “Si starà lontano dall’ammettere denominazioni opposte al nostro assunto, come sarebbe Pò Parmigiano, Pò 
Piacentino.” Ibid., Instructions from de la Silva to Baschiera, April 17, 1775. 
794 “que legitimamente possesseron los Duques de Parma.” See for example de la Silva’s memoir from December 
30, 1775, which lists again controversies dating from before 1749, and which had not be solved by the time of that 
Treaty. Ibid.. 
795 Ibid., Firmian to Sacco, November 18, 1775. 
796 Ibid., Firmian to Baschiera, September 20, 1775. In a later letter, on July 8, 1788, the Parmesan minister Ventura 
wrote to the French ambassador in Vienna, that Lombardy’s minsters had tried to obtain a map of the area ever since 
the time of the 1775 joint border inspection. MAE CP, Autriche, box 355, 19, July 8, 1788, Ventura to Noailles. 
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The Habsburg Court’s foreign policy in other provinces such as Transylvania, justify the 
Parmesans’ distrust. As shown in chapter 5, mapping had implications for future territorial 
expansion. A survey of border areas between Transylvania and the Danubian Principalities 
produced cartographic evidence used in political negotiations that led to the Habsburg 
annexation of part of Moldavia and Wallachia. Even for the case of Lombardy, although 
Baschiera received official instructions from Milan to “restrain himself to the simple action of 
description,”797 he also received secret guidelines. Firmian ordered the engineer to use the 
inspection to estimate the value of land in the case of a future territorial exchange negotiation.798 
Clearly, the Parmesans were correct in doubting Lombardy’s representatives.  
In addition to conflicts between the two engineers regarding the object of their survey, 
the persistence of border incidents constituted another significant obstacle in the way of their 
mission. Parma’s representatives refused to cooperate for almost a third of September because of 
a territorial controversy between the community of Corno Giovine, Province of Lodi, belonging 
to Lombardy, and the Duchy of Piacenza, in a forest belonging to an alluvial deposit of the Pò 
known as Vojara or Vojera. In early September 1775, a storm toppled numerous poplars from 
this forest, and inhabitants from the neighboring states hurried to collect the tree trunks. The 
incident degenerated into a diplomatic conflict, as both Habsburg and Parmesan authorities 
blamed the other side for having trespassed into a controversial domain.799 At the order of their 
governments, the engineers hurried to the site to prepare a detailed plan of Vojera.800  
                                                          
797 “si contenesse nel puro fatto delle delineazioni.” ASM Confini p.a., box 73, volume containing the minutes of the 
ad-hoc committee meetings regarding border controversies with Parma, entry for the meeting from October 6, 1775. 
798 ASM Confini p.a., box 74, Firmian to Baschiera, October 6, 1775. 
799 Ibid., Kaunitz to Firmian, October 2, 1775; Firmian to Baschiera, October 3, 1775; De la Silva’s report of the 
inspection, December 30, 1775. ASM Confini p.a., box 73, volume containing the minutes of the ad-hoc committee 
meetings regarding border controversies with Parma, entry for the meeting from September 29, 1775. 
800 On September 26, 1775, Baschiera reported that the map of Vojera was almost finalized. ASM Confini p.a., box 
74, Firmian to Baschiera, October 3, 1775. 
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The state archives in Milan preserve a map from September 27, 1775, signed by 
engineers Ranger and Sardi, the seconds in command to Baschiera and Regalia (Figure 6.4).801 
The mapmakers represented two competing borderlines on this plan, separating the commune of 
Regona, Province of Lodi, and the community Caselle Landi, belonging to the Duchy of 
Piacenza. AA shows the frontier from Lombardy’s perspective, and BB marks the Parmesan 
counterclaim. Three elders from the community Caselle Landi claimed the government of Milan 
used military force, many years ago, to move the original borderline BB to the position AA, by 
digging a trench.802 Based on the engineers’ map, Lombardy’s minister ordered the Habsburg 
subjects to return all tree trunks and arrested the people who refused to comply. The Parmesan 
Court also arrested the Piacentine instigator who had first started gathering the fallen poplars.803 
The map and the evidence gathered on-site helped solve this incident in a satisfactory manner for 
the two governments and revealed yet again the importance of preparing cartographic material 
prior to a border negotiation.  
                                                          
801 Ibid., the 1775 Ranger and Sardi map of the border between Regona and Caselle Landi  
802 The three elders, Domenico Tussi, Giuseppe Andermani, e Giaccomo Corradi, were all more than 80 years old. 
Ibid. 
803 Ibid., De la Silva’s report on the engineers’ inspection, December 30, 1775. 
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Figure 6.4 The border between Regona and Caselle Landi on the Ranger and Sardi map (1775) 
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By the end of the Fall the engineers had only managed to survey some contested lands on 
the segment of the border dividing the Province of Lodi, Lombardy from the domains the Duchy 
of Piacenza controlled on the left bank of the Pò, namely Nosedo, Mezzano, S Rocco, Fombio, 
Retegno, Guardamiglio, Minuta and Botto.804 Moreover, Baschiera’s insistence that the whole 
flow of the Pò and its islands were controversial areas infuriated the Parmesan Court and 
prevented the recommencement of the project in 1776.805 Lombardy’s engineer was simply 
representing the position of his superiors in Milan, who continued to insist in their 
correspondence with Chancellor Kaunitz that they had significant evidence for their claims.  
In conjunction with the engineers’ mission, the Habsburg authorities commissioned de la 
Silva to prepare a detailed memoir to support Lombardy’s claim to the entirety of the Pò River. 
The documents de la Silva used to support these claims and listed in his memoir’s appendix did 
not include cartographic material. However, that does not mean the counselor did not appreciate 
the importance of maps -- quite the contrary. De la Silva considered his memoir complementary 
to the already existing plans or those currently under development being prepared by engineers 
to support the Habsburg claims in the upcoming border Congress with Parma.806 Kaunitz 
remained unconvinced of the strength of de la Silva’s evidence and warned Firmian that claiming 
possession of lands without documentation was a futile strategy, especially seeing as the Infant 
of Parma controlled both banks of the Pò in some areas.807  
Lombardy’s authorities proved unable to continue the bilateral border inspection in 1776. 
The Habsburg representatives insisted in their letters to Parma that the only function of the 
engineers was the “physical inspection and description of sites over which controversies arose 
                                                          
804 Ibid., Sacco to Firmian, December 8, 1775; ASM Confini p.a., box 76, Kaunitz to Firmian, August 15, 1776.  
805 ASM Confini p.a., box 74, Sacco to Firmian, December 8, 1775. 
806 Ibid., “Dimostrazione presentata dal Segretario Consultore Silva de Confini del Ducato di Milano e di Mantova 
con Parma, Piacenza, e Guastalla,” 1775. 
807 Ibid., Kaunitz to Firmian, November 13, 1775.  
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between the two Courts.”808 But by claiming that the maps prepared as a result of this border 
examination would constitute the starting point for future negotiations, Milan had no chance of 
convincing Parma to support such a mission. The Parmesan Minister made it clear in his letters 
that his Court refused to resume the work until they received assurance from Milan that 
Lombardy’s engineers would not attempt to map the segments of the Pò that flowed between the 
Infant’s domains or those river banks.809  
The situation escalated as the Infant requested help from his uncle, the King of Spain, and 
his other Bourbon relative, the King of France. The Infant of Parma had wanted to involve the 
Bourbon Courts even before this moment, but was only fully successful in his efforts in 1776.810 
The report sent from Parma to the French and Spanish ambassadors in Vienna summarized the 
failed border inspection of 1775 and put the blame on the shoulders of Lombardy’s government, 
which persisted in claiming Parmesan and Piacentine lands on the left bank of the Pò in order to 
subvert Parma’s rights of navigation over the river. The Court of Parma attached to their report a 
map signed by Gian Pietro Sardi showing those territories. Moreover, to create a true sense of 
urgency, the report claimed that in a recent visit to Parma, Lombardy’s governor, Archduke 
Ferdinand, persisted in his desire to survey and map the entirety of Pò’s flow together with its 
banks.811 As it seemed that the Habsburgs would not give up on their claims, the Court of Parma 
asked for assistance from France and Spain.  
                                                          
808 “doversi gli Ingegneri contenere nella materiale visita, e descrizione de luoghi, sù quali sono cadute controversie 
fra le due Corti” ASM Confini p.a., box 73, volume containing the minutes of the ad-hoc committee meetings 
regarding border controversies with Parma, entry for the meeting from June 21, 1776. 
809 ASM Confini p.a., box 76, Sacco to Firmian, June 11, 1776. 
810 On December 8, 1775, Sacco wrote to Firmian insisting that the border controversies should be discussed with 
the participation of the guarantor powers, namely Spain and France. ASM Confini p.a., box 74, Sacco to Firmian, 
December 8, 1775. ASM Confini p.a., box 73, volume containing the minutes of the ad-hoc committee meetings 
regarding border controversies with Parma, entry for the meeting from December 14, 1775. 
811 MAE CP, Autriche, box 329, 63-69, 70-71, Breteuil, July 27, 1776.  
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Figure 6.5 Detail from the Sardi map of the border between the State of Milan and the Duchies of Parma and 
Piacenza (1776) 
 
 
Figure 6.6 Detail from the Census Office map of the Pò and its banks (1775) 
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A closer examination of Sardi’s map, a detail of which is reproduced in Figure 6.5, shows 
striking similarities with the 1775 map prepared by the State of Milan’s Census Office.812 Both 
geographic representations paid special attention to the topography of the Pò River, and the 
position and names of settlements located on its banks. Although the Habsburg provincial 
authorities complained they did not possess accurate detailed information about the state of 
Parma’s domains located on Lombardy’s bank of the Pò, Sardi’s map seems to confirm the 
correctness of most of their geographic knowledge with respect to the settlements’ toponymy and 
location. However, if we compare the same area as represented on Sardi’s work (Figure 6.5) and 
the Census Office’s map (Figure 6.6) we notice a lower density of settlements on the map the 
Habsburg authorities had in their possession. Places like Colombara, Castello, S. Benedetto, or 
Gorghetto, to name just a few, appear only on Sardi’s representation. Moreover, whereas the 
Census Office mapmakers failed to suggest a clear hierarchy based on the size of the settlements 
included on their work, Sardi used a varying number of red rectangles and square to suggest the 
size of the various villages and towns. The Sardi map, which the Parmesan Court shared with the 
French and Spanish ambassadors in Vienna, proves the Habsburgs did not have the monopoly 
over cartographic production with respect to the borderlands. The Infant of Parma and his 
advisers astutely used geographic representations of their domains adjacent to the river Pò to 
convince their Bourbon allies that Habsburg expansionism in the Italian Peninsula constituted a 
real threat for the balance of powers in the area.  
In response to the Infant’s cry for help, the Spanish ambassador in Vienna, Count 
Demetrio O'Mahony, wrote a declaration to defend Parma’s territorial integrity in the face of 
Habsburg pretensions. The Spanish Ambassador suggested that the Habsburg engineer’s 
                                                          
812 The Sardi map: MAE CP, Autriche, box 329, 70-71. The State of Milan’s Census Office’s map: ASM Confini 
p.a., box 74. 
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insistence to map Parmesan territory could be equaled to a hypothetical request of the Bavarian 
Court to map the Danube all the way to Vienna or even Bratislava (Pressburg) in order to settle 
the Danubian border with the Habsburgs.813 O’Mahony’s gross exaggeration suggests that even 
European powers who shared no borders with the Habsburgs kept a close eye on Vienna’s 
attempts to further its territories in any direction. And although not stated in this memoir, the 
1775 Habsburg annexation of the northern part of Moldavia, Bukovina, preceded by cartographic 
operations, could be interpreted as a template for Vienna’s actions in Italy. 
In preparing his reply to O’Mahony’s memoir Kaunitz relied again on Counselor de la 
Silva’s expertise.814 The Chancellor argued that the State of Milan had never given up on their 
rightly possessions and had unsuccessfully claimed Pò’s islands and alluvial deposits ever since 
the 1556 concession to the House of Farnese. However, in order to resume the negotiations, 
Kaunitz offered a compromise: restricting the border inspection and the negotiations to the post-
1748 contestations.815 Maria Theresa confirmed this decision in an order sent on January 13, 
1777 to her son, Ferdinand.816 The conciliatory approach of the Habsburg Court arose probably 
not only due to the Court of Parma’s able diplomatic game, but also because the evidence in 
Lombardy’s favor was not so convincing. Maria Theresa expressed her hope to “reestablish 
                                                          
813 ASM Confini p.a., box 76, Kaunitz to Firmian, August 15, 1776.  
814 By early 1777, the counselor finalized another report defending the government of Milan’s claim to the entirety 
of the Pò. The main narrative, supported by documents included in the appendix of this report, claimed that in 1396, 
an imperial investiture conferred to Gian Galeazzo Visconti his domains in Lombardy, including the Pò and its 
banks. In 1556, the Spanish King Philip II transferred some of these lands to the House of Farnese, but de la Silva 
claimed this transfer did not include the rights over the Pò. The counselor attacked the Infant’s assertion that for 
certain segments the Pò flows between domains belonging to the Infant of Parma, by stressing that the Farnese 
princes had occupied those lands abusively. In the second part of his report, de la Silva offered evidence to show 
that Lombardy’s authorities had never given up on any domains, and that both the Senate and the Government had 
repeatedly sent complaints against Parmesan usurpations. ASM Confini p.a., box 76, De la Silva to Ferdinand, 
October 24, 1776.  
815 Kaunitz tried to underscore how throughout the first half of eighteenth-century, during peace negotiations and 
treaty signings, Charles VI and Maria Theresa always referred to the importance of clarifying border controversies, 
and the Habsburg Court never gave up on territories under controversy before 1748. Ibid., Kaunitz to the Spanish 
ambassador in Vienna, January 11, 1777.  
816 ASM DR, box 256, Maria Theresa to Ferdinand, January 13, 1777. 
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among neighbors the peace disturbed by recent contestations due to the uncertainty of the 
dividing line.”817 However, the empress’s order is not an expression of defeatism in the face of 
the Infant of Parma’s stubbornness, as she also authorized the use of violent acts against any 
Parmesan aggressions.818 This decision is reminiscent of Joseph II’s determined approach in 
January 1770 to defend the position of border markers dividing Transylvanian and Moldavian 
land at all costs, even if the Habsburg troops had to use violence to achieve this goal. Both in the 
case of Lombardy and Transylvania, the imperial decision to take an intransigent attitude with 
respect to the trajectory of the borderline is symptomatic of the Habsburg rulers’ reimagining of 
their dynastic lands into a clearly defined territory that had to be defended at all costs.  
The determined position of the Habsburg empress and Vienna’s concessions made an 
impact in Parma. By the summer of 1777, the Infant agreed to resume the engineers’ border 
inspection to mark all domains that became controversial after 1748.819 However, the Parmesan 
ruler also expressed his desire to base the engineers’ inspection on a pre-established list of 
contested territories.820 In this way, the Infant hoped to pressure the Habsburg Court to agree on 
a common list of controversies before the actual Congress.821 De la Silva’s first version of this 
document went through a series of revisions due to Parmesan pressure, as the Infant desired to 
keep the number of controversies as low as possible.822 The discussions almost reached a 
                                                          
817 “ristabilire la tranquillità tra i Confinanti, turbata dalle recenti Contestazioni per l’incertezza della Linea 
divisoria.” Ibid..  
818 Ibid. 
819 ASM Confini p.a., box 76, Sacco to Firmian, June 10, 1777; Firmian to Sacco, July 8, 1777. 
820 Ibid., Sacco to Firmian, July 15, 1777. 
821 The numerous disputes caused by Parmesan inhabitants at a time when the State of Milan did not have sufficient 
armed forces motivated the Habsburg authorities to pursue this project with determination, even though that might 
lead to more concessions on their part. Kaunitz recommended that Firmian suggest to Sacco that the engineers were 
only inspecting and mapping disputed sites, but the actual decision regarding the ownership of those lands was 
reserved for a ministerial discussion. HHStA Italien-Spanischer Rat, Lombardei Korrespondenz, box 131, Kaunitz to 
Firmian, July 16, 1778.  
822 Paolo de la Silva divided the controversial lands into five groups, based on Lombardy’s provinces: Pavia, Lodi, 
Cremona, Casalasco, and Mantua. ASM Confini p.a., box 76, de la Silva to Ferdinand, August 8, 1777; Firmian to 
Kaunitz, September 29, 1777, Some of the documents exchanged between Milan and Parma regarding the list of 
 325 
standstill when de la Silva insisted that it was impossible to limit the list to post-1748 
controversies, as many of these disputes had roots in earlier times. Additionally, the counselor 
stressed the importance of surveying the whole trajectory of the river Pò for a fruitful 
negotiation.823 Predictably, the Infant of Parma refused to accept even most of the domains under 
controversy after 1748 from de la Silva’s list and claimed that as the Border Archives of Parma 
held no documentation, those domains could not be under dispute.  
In the face of Parma’s stubbornness about pursuing the engineers’ inspection, Kaunitz 
had to resort to urgent measures and involve the empress. The Chancellor ordered Firmian to 
share with the Parmesan minister a copy of Maria Theresa’s letter from November 2, 1778, in 
which the Habsburg monarch expressed her disappointment in the face of the negotiations’ 
standstill and revealed her determination to continue pursuing the engineers’ inspection and the 
mapping of the contested domains before any negotiation could ensue.824 At the same time, 
Kaunitz’s son, the Habsburg ambassador in Madrid, presented to the Spanish secretary of state 
Count José Moñino Floridablanca a memoir justifying the Viennese position regarding the 
border negotiations with Parma.825  
By January 1779, after the intervention of Maria Theresa and the agreement of the 
Spanish ruler with Vienna’s request, the Court of Parma agreed to the inspection of controversial 
domains as described in Lombardy’s list from February 14, 1778.826 Parmesan minister Giuseppe 
Pompeo Sacco conditioned the beginning of the operations on receiving an answer from Milan to 
some observations he had made almost a year ago regarding the list of contested domains.827 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
contested domains include Ibid., Sacco to Firmian, December 9, 1777; Firmian to Kaunitz, February 14, 1778; 
Sacco to Firmian, March 24, 1778. 
823 Ibid., de la Silva’s report on Sacco’s letter, April 28, 1778.  
824 Ibid., Kaunitz to Firmian, November 2, 1778.  
825 HHStA Italien-Spanischer Rat, Lombardei Korrespondenz, box 131, Kaunitz to Firmian, November 26, 1778. 
826 ASM Confini p.a., box 76, Sacco to Firmian, January 22, 1779.  
827 Ibid., Firmian to Kaunitz, February 6, 1779.  
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Kaunitz confirmed to Firmian that even though Sacco wanted more explanation, that should not 
impede the initiation of the engineers’ inspection and mapping project. 828 The Habsburg 
Chancellor had successfully used the Bourbon connection to force the Infant of Parma to resume 
the negotiations in order to avoid the wrath of the Spanish king.  
The final instructions prepared for the engineers made it clear that their mission was 
restricted to sites that became contested only after 1748. The engineers had to mark with 
different lines on the final maps the ancient and newer controversies. Regarding the flow of the 
Pò, Parma managed to impose its viewpoint: the segments of the river flowing between banks 
belonging to the same state were excluded from the final report. In addition to the controversial 
domains included in their instructions, the engineers had to gather from local communities 
information about other existing disputes. To avoid the fate of the fruitless 1775 inspection, the 
instructions prohibited the engineers from debating the territorial rights of their rulers and 
constrained their work to an accurate description of contested areas.829  
On June 17, 1779, after the Courts had finally reached a consensus, the two engineers, 
Cesare Quarantini representing the Habsburg side and Gian Pietro Regalia from Parma, met and 
started the inspection from the border between the provinces of Pavia and Piacenza.830 From 
Quarantini’s reports to Milan it emerges that the work progressed at a swift pace.831 The survey 
lasted approximately three months and one week, and on October 25, 1779, Quarantini and 
Regalia finalized both the border description and the maps attached to it. The engineers marked 
                                                          
828 HHStA Italien-Spanischer Rat, Lombardei Korrespondenz, box 131, Kaunitz to Firmian, February 18, 1779.  
829 MAE CP, Parme, box 41, 182 verso. 
830 Quarantini was not a military engineer like Baschiera, but a member of the Milanese Collegio who worked for 
the Census Office. ASM DR, box 259, Maria Theresa’s order from August 17, 1780; ASM Confini p.a., box 76, 
Quarantini to Firmian, June 17, 1779. The inspection could not start earlier because of Cesare Quarantini’s 
unexpected sickness. HHStA Italien-Spanischer Rat, Lombardei Korrespondenz, box 131, Kaunitz to Firmian, June 
17, 1779.  
831 See for example: HHStA Italien-Spanischer Rat, Lombardei Korrespondenz, Kaunitz to Firmian, September 23, 
1779; ASM Confini p.a., box 76, reports from Quarantini to Firmian, July 20, 1779 and August 18, 1779.  
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on the plans with different colors the border segments they had agreed on and the contested ones, 
using red to mark Lombardy’s pretensions, and yellow for the Infant of Parma’s domains. For 
uncontested segments, the red and yellow borderlines coincided. However, although at first 
glance the engineers’ mission was a whopping success, its scope had been greatly reduced. Even 
though most of the territorial controversies were connected to the waters of the Pò, its islands, 
channels, and alluvial deposits, the engineers did not discuss the trajectory of the borderline in 
those areas, as the two Courts still had to make a decision regarding the Habsburg claim to the 
entirety of the river.832 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7 Detail from the Quarantini and Regalia map, showing the border between the Duchy of Mantua and the 
Duchy of Guastalla (1779) 
 
 
Each number on the map referred to a segment of the border discussed in detail in the 
accompanying description. For example, the instructions of the Courts for the two engineers 
ordered them to inspect a small terrain named Gonzaghetto and establish, if possible, which state 
                                                          
832 The War Archives in Vienna preserve a copy of part of this 1779 map. KA KPS, B VII C 132-10. 
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it belonged to.833 Figure 6.7 includes this contested land between numbers eight and nine, but 
does not offer a resolution. Instead, the engineers drew two possible border trajectories: red for 
Lombardy’s claim and yellow for Parma’s. The engineers also identified on the ground older 
border markers and made special note of them in their description. For example, numbers ten and 
eleven correspond to fragments of terracotta pillars. From number eleven to twelve the 
uncontested borderline ran through a trench until it met the main road. The engineers mentioned 
in their description that the small road intersecting the border in the spot marked eleven and 
running parallel to the borderline from number twelve to thirteen belonged to Mantua, as 
supported by a 1631 document. This instance shows how the engineers combined on-site 
inspection with documentary evidence to produce a cartographic representation of these 
boundary lands.834 These border maps transformed into a static representation, agreed-on by both 
negotiating parties, the transient situation of the borderlands. Additionally, the preparation of 
such cartographic sources envisioned to serve as starting point for the intergovernmental 
discussions, reduced the scope of the negotiations to the sites drawn on the maps.  
The work of Quarantini and Regalia was the first successful joint inspection of the border 
between Lombardy and Parma, and therefore essential for the preparation of the future Congress. 
Even after the Congress preparations failed again, the Quarantini-Regalia collaboration remained 
the only border inspection both parties agreed upon throughout the 1780s, and therefore 
remained essential in discussing any territorial controversies between Lombardy and Parma. 
Additionally, this 1779 map and accompanying report shaped the way authorities in Vienna 
defended Habsburg claims in the area. On February 5, 1780, Firmian forwarded to Vienna the 
report of Quarantini and Regalia, together with a de la Silva analysis of the inspection results. 
                                                          
833 Instructions for the engineers, MAE CP, Parme, box 41, 187 verso. 
834 Ibid., 174-174 verso. 
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However, as the maps were missing from this package, Kaunitz complained he could not make 
any good use of the reports.835 The Chancellor’s reliance on cartographic material to analyze the 
status of the border confirms that maps were no longer mere accessories to such negotiations, but 
essential preparatory steps. Indeed, three month later, as soon as the border maps arrived in 
Vienna, Kaunitz was planning to “compare [the maps] with the list of controversial sites.”836  
After this initial success, the Habsburgs remained optimistic regarding the establishment 
of the border congress with Parma. On March 20, 1780, the chancellor ordered Lombardy’s 
border commissary, Francesco Belcredi, to start preparing for the congress under the guidance of 
de la Silva. Meanwhile, Kaunitz asked Firmian to obtain from Parma information about their 
deputy to the congress and to make a decision on the location for this event.837 Although 
formally open to the idea of convening a congress, the Court of Parma continued to stall the 
discussions. The Infant refused to confer full decisional power to his representative and planned 
to send instructions from Parma for each controversial point. Kaunitz considered the Infant’s 
request detrimental to a speedy negotiation and argued that the commissaries should have 
enough decisional power to prepare a convention project that the sovereigns could approve or 
reject.838 Kaunitz suggested this approach based on the Habsburg Court’s earlier experience in 
negotiating border treaties, such as with other neighbors of Lombardy, or with France in 1769 
and 1779.  
Despite the Parmesans’ uncooperative attitude, the preparations for the congress 
progressed at a good pace during 1780. The Court of Parma agreed on the town of 
                                                          
835 HHStA Italien-Spanischer Rat, Lombardei Korrespondenz, box 132, Kaunitz to Firmian, March 20, 1780.  
836 “riservandomi di confrontarli coll’Elenco dè siti controversi” Ibid., Kaunitz to Firmian, May 18, 1780.  
837 Ibid., Kaunitz to Firmian, March 20, 1780.  
838 Ibid., Kaunitz to Firmian, May 22, 1780.  
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Casalmaggiore as the future site of the negotiation839 and selected Count Anton Camillo 
Marazzani Visconti as their representative.840 Meanwhile, in Lombardy, Belcredi asked for a 
couple of months to familiarize himself with the border controversies in preparation for the 
congress. He relied on help from the vice secretary Pietro Bellari, the engineer Cesare 
Quarantini, and the laywer Giuseppe Maroni.841 During their meetings, Belcredi, Maroni, 
Quarantini and Bellari examined in detail the reports and maps of Quarantini and Regalia and 
gathered supporting documentation from Lombardy’s archives. Belcredi prepared a list of 
general guidelines he planned to follow during the negotiations and sent it to Firmian for 
approval. Additionally, Maroni wrote a memoir containing all the border controversies related to 
Piacentine and Parmesan domains on the left bank of the Pò and tried to demonstrate the 
Habsburg claims in the area.842 The materials gathered in preparation for the Congress with 
Parma parallels similar efforts that preceded the negotiation over the borderline trajectory in 
Transylvania and the Austrian Netherlands. Relying on a similar strategy, which had proved 
successful during the past decades, the Habsburg agents constructed their arguments both with 
the help of historical documents and maps of the area. Whereas in the case of the Transylvanian-
Moldavian boundary the Habsburgs imposed their own cartographic representations as the 
                                                          
839 ASM Confini p.a., box 77, Sacco to Firmian, April 28, 1780.  
840 Ibid., Sacco to Firmian, June 16, 1780. After they chose Marazzani as their representative, the Parmesan Court 
insisted that Lombardy’s agent, Belcredi, would have the upper hand during the negotiations because of his position 
as border commissary. Therefore, the Infant requested that his representative Count Marazzani, should receive help 
from another Parmesan minister. Although Chancellor Kaunitz agreed to Parma’s request, he also made it clear that 
the Habsburgs would not accept including on the final documents the signatures of any other representatives than the 
two commissaries, Belcredi and Marazzani, on the example of the border regulations with Venice. Sacco agreed 
with this. HHStA Italien-Spanischer Rat, Lombardei Korrespondenz, box 133, Kaunitz to Firmian, October 2, 1780; 
ASM Confini p.a., box 77, Sacco to Firmian, September 1, 1780; Sacco to Firmian, November 17, 1780.  
841 ASM Confini p.a., box 77, Belcredi, June 16, 1780; Giuseppe Maroni to Ferdinand, June 22, 1780. 
842 ASM Confini p.a., box 78, Belcredi’s report, June 8, 1782. As the organization of the border archive under the 
coordination of Molinari advanced, Belcredi used the document inventories to solicit specific papers from local 
archives in order to gather solid evidence for the future congress. For example, on October 7, 1780, Belcredi asked 
Ferdinand to order the archive of Lodi, to send him the survey and map of the site known as Mortizza Lodigiana, 
across the territory of Corno Giovine. Additionally, Belcredi required from Lodi any documents created after earlier 
inspections of the Roads Crocile and Vallone, near Mirandola. ASM Confini p.x., box 77, Belcredi, October 7, 
1780.  
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benchmark for the negotiations, both the French and the Parmesan Court refused to proceed with 
the discussions without a commonly agreed on map of the contested borderlands.  
After studying in detail the preparatory material for the Congress, Belcredi requested 
more guidelines from Kaunitz. Examining the Chancellor’s answer helps elucidate how the 
Habsburg Court planned to approach the border regulation with Parma during the congress. 
Kaunitz acknowledged that for a fruitful conclusion of a border treaty, the discussion had to be 
limited to the controversial domains described in the 1779 Quarantini-Regalia materials. In 
answer to Belcredi’s concern that many recent contestations had roots in the pre-1748 period, the 
Chancellor offered guidelines on how to use the 1748 status quo as a reference. For domains 
possessed peacefully in 1748, any later change was illegal. However, for sites controversial in 
1748, each court had to provide documentation to establish which side had controlled the domain 
for a longer time in a peaceful manner. For lands contested incessantly, the state presenting 
stronger arguments and original documents would prevail. If a consensus was impossible to 
establish, the domain could be divided or become part of a larger territorial exchange 
arrangement. 
 Kaunitz stressed in his answer to Belcredi the instability of the Pò’s flow and therefore 
the importance of trying to transform this watercourse into the border. The Chancellor also 
warned Belcredi of Lombardy’s inability to obtain such an arrangement because of Parma’s lack 
of cooperation. Therefore, the Chancellor suggested to Belcredi that his priority should remain 
obtaining the upholding of common rights for trade and navigation on the river.843 Kaunitz’s 
insistence that transforming the Pò into the borderline between Lombardy and the Duchies of 
Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla was the most desirable option for the empire foreshadowed the 
official imperial policy from 1781 onwards, as discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
                                                          
843 HHStA Italien-Spanischer Rat, Lombardei Korrespondenz, box 133, Kaunitz to Firmian, November 27, 1780.  
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 Instead of furthering Habsburg interests in the borderlines, as happened in the case of 
Transylvania and the Austrian Netherlands, the engineers’ inspections of the Lombardy-Parma 
border proved to the Viennese rulers the impossibility of reaching a profitable arrangement with 
the Infant if they had to address every small dispute. Moreover, the Parmesan engineers 
repeatedly denied access to their Habsburg counterparts to contested domains, and the Dukes of 
Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla refused to accept the pre-1748 documentation as valid. The 
futility of these discussions had a significant role in convincing Kaunitz and Joseph II in the 
early 1780s that rather than addressing each individual territorial dispute, the Habsburg 
authorities should develop a radical solution that would eliminate both present contestations and 
the risk of future ones. Also, as the decision-makers in Vienna obtained access to maps of these 
contested boundaries, they identified the flow of the River Pò as the most viable enduring 
borderline. In this sense, cartography influenced the shape of the negotiations during Joseph II’s 
reign, as the emperor insisted on the need to establish the Pò as Lombardy’s border. However, 
the decision to promote a drastic approach to the border regulation infuriated the Infant of Parma 
and the fear of Habsburg expansionism transformed a bilateral negotiation into a quadrilateral 
one, involving the Courts of France and Spain.  
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6.3 JOSEPH II’S CAMPAIGN TO CLAIM THE FLOW OF THE PÒ 
The death of Maria Theresa at the end of 1780 and the change in leadership in Vienna created a 
major impediment in the convening of the Congress, as Emperor Joseph II insisted on the need to 
transform the Pò into the imperial border.844 The Habsburg authorities in Lombardy felt the wave 
of change from Vienna in the first months of 1781. On February 8, 1781, Kaunitz informed the 
border commissary that rather than supporting the elimination of border controversies as 
discussed in the official instructions for the Casalmaggiore Congress, the Habsburg Court now 
desired the development of a plan that would transform the Pò’s flow into the border.845 
Indeed, by the end of the Spring of 1781, Kaunitz ordered Firmian and Governor 
Ferdinand to prepare a list of territories and amounts of money the Infant of Parma might accept 
in compensation for his domains located on the Pò’s left bank. Kaunitz and Firmian knew a 
similar plan had failed during the negotiations that led in 1748 to the Peace of Aix-la-Chappelle. 
However, at the time, the Duchy of Mantua had been in a stronger position and had successfully 
refused to sacrifice its domains on the right side of the river just so the State of Milan could 
round up their possessions on the left bank.846 Mantua’s argumentation in the 1740s was 
characteristic to a fragmented Lombardy, in which provincial interests prevailed. During Joseph 
II’s reign, Lombardy moved on a fast track towards integration and centralization.847  
                                                          
844 A couple of months after inheriting the throne, Joseph II studied information regarding the border controversies 
between Lombardy and Parma with the help of maps and reports, such as the 1779 work of Quarantini and Regalia, 
the 1775 de la Silva memoir, and the explanations Kaunitz sent to Belcredi to help him prepare for the Congress. 
Joseph II was not content that the Congress discussion was restrained to the contested domains described by 
Quarantini and Regalia and hoped that in the near future other controversies would also be approached. HHStA 
Italien-Spanischer Rat, Lombardei Korrespondenz, box 134, Kaunitz to Firmian, February 8, 1781.  
845 Ibid. 
846 With his letter from Anvers dated June 19, 1781, Joseph II approved the idea of preparing this exchange plan 
instead of continuing with the preparations for a border congress. HHStA Italien-Spanischer Rat, Lombardei 
Korrespondenz, box 133, Kaunitz to Firmian, July 5, 1781.  
847 In the 1780s Joseph II expanded the cadastral survey and the reform of the taxation system of the Duchy of 
Mantua, merged the administration of Mantua with Milan’s, eliminated traditional institutions such as Mantua’s 
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Therefore, it is not surprising that in the early 1780s, the emperor and Kaunitz became 
interested in obtaining detailed cartographic representations and economic information about the 
Duchy of Mantua’s lands on the right side of the Pò, domains they planned to offer to the Infant 
of Parma.848 For example, on February 1, 1783, Wilczek ordered the vice president of the 
Mantua’s Magistrato Camerale, Johann de Saint Laurent to use an older memoir from July 4, 
1748 and its attached plan, in order to prepare an updated assessment of the land surface that the 
Habsburgs hoped to offer to Parma. Wilczek expected Saint Laurent to provide an estimate of the 
land’s value, the types of crops and amount of taxes it could yield, and the amount of livestock it 
could maintain.849 From 1783 until 1786 the Mantovan authorities shared with Lombardy’s 
minister various maps and economic data regarding more or less the same territory: the districts 
of Suzzara and Gonzaga. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8 Detail from the Corniani map (1786) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Supreme Council of Justice, and divided Lombardy into eight territorial subunits without any respect for local 
traditions. Mori, Il Ducato di Mantova, 280-291, 301-307; Capra, La Lombardia Austriaca Nell’Età delle Riforme, 
369-372. 
848 HHStA Italien-Spanischer Rat, Lombardei Korrespondenz, box 133, Kaunitz to Ferdinand, July 5, 1781.  
849 ASM Confini p.a., box 78, Wilczek[?] to Saint Laurent, February 1, 1783.  
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In January 1786, the superintendent of the Chamber of Commerce (sovrintendente 
camerale) of Mantua, Carlo Ottavio Colloredo,850 sent to Wilczek a map prepared by Michele 
Corniani showing the districts that the Habsburgs planned to offer to the Parmesan Infant.851 The 
plan, a detail of which is reproduced in Figure 6.8, shows the position of the main settlements, 
the borders of all the administrative sub-divisions for each of the districts (marked with red), and 
the borders of the two districts (marked with yellow to indicate a limit with other Mantovan 
territories, and black to show the border with the Duchy of Parma and the Duchy of Modena). 
Once in Milan, Corniani’s map and the accompanying statistical table he compiled 
underwent an evaluation process. Maroni and Pecis, the uncontested experts on the borders 
between Lombardy and Parma, criticized this map harshly and contrasted the representation with 
an earlier map, which they considered more reliable because of the experience of its recently 
deceased author, Gaetano Landi. In his report to Wilczek, Maroni argued that Corniani’s 
borderlines did not correspond to Landi’s drawing of the districts and increased the size of the 
districts erroneously. Moreover, Maroni argued against the principles Corniani used to calculate 
the value of the lands.852 Although we cannot establish whether Corniani’s or Landi’s map and 
statistical information were more accurate, it is clear that Maroni’s preference for the work of 
Landi stems from his role as one of the key members of the Census Giunta, the institution in 
charge of assessing the value of land and reforming taxation for the Duchy of Mantua in the 
early 1780s. As such, Gaetano Landi had been involved firsthand in surveying this territory.853 
The fact that so much discussion revolved around Corniani’s map reveals the desire of Habsburg 
                                                          
850 On November 5, 1784, Joseph II replaced the “Magistrato Camerale” and the Chamber of Accounts with the 
position of superintendent of the chamber of commerce, directly subordinated to the Milanese “Magistrato 
Camerale.” Mori, Il Ducato di Mantova, 306  
851 ASM Confini p.a., box 79, Carlo Ottavio Colloredo to Wilczek, January 16, 1786.  
852 Ibid., Giuseppe Maroni, March 27, 1786.  
853 Mori, Il Ducato di Mantova, 280; ASM Confini p.a., box 78, Odoardo Zenetti, January 8, 1784.  
 336 
authorities during the 1780s to finally familiarize themselves with the geography of the Duchy of 
Mantua, especially the lands they prepared to offer to the Infant of Parma in exchange for the 
domains adjacent to the State of Milan.  
Rather than waiting for their Parmesan neighbors to share information about the lands 
they coveted on the banks of the Pò, the Habsburg authorities started their own investigations. 
Based on preliminary information describing the Duchy of Mantua and the State of Milan, the 
royal deputy inspector (regio vice-visitatore), Carlo Bellerio, prepared an in-depth description of 
the Parmesan domains on the Habsburg bank of the Pò.854 Bellerio considered himself perfect for 
this assignment due to the useful personal connections he had formed in Parma in 1773 during 
his time there as a Habsburg representative. In addition to reading documentation sent from 
Mantua and using his Parmesan informants, because of his function as royal deputy inspector, 
Bellerio had gathered material from local archives in the border areas and had supervised the 
work of the royal overseers (regi cancellieri). To complement his description of Parmesan 
domains from the left bank of the Pò, Bellerio worked with Belcredi and some geometers to 
prepare a topographic and hydrographic map of those territories.855  
This map, like the examples discussed in the previous sections, was not based on a 
detailed topographical survey, but simply showed the approximate position of settlements and 
the contours of controversial domains located on the left bank of the Pò. The lack of detail is not 
unexpected if we take into account Parma’s efforts to prohibit Habsburg access to their domains, 
as shown during the 1775 border inspection. The Infant and his ministers prohibited any agents 
working for Lombardy’s Census Office to trespass their borders, and whenever surveyors 
entered contested domains, Parma issued official protests. For example, on April 15, 1783, the 
                                                          
854 ASM Confini p.a., box 78, Carlo Bellerio to Ferdinand, February 15, 1784.  
855 Ibid.  
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Minister of Parma complained that Habsburg surveyors violated the Infant’s domains in October 
1782 and early April 1783.856 Border commissary Belcredi coordinated an official investigation 
and concluded that the accused surveyors, Ciocca, Bonfante, Torrelli and Pianca, all working for 
the Census Office, had been extremely cautious and had limited their operations to the Habsburg 
borderline as marked on the 1779 Quarantini-Regalia map. Belcredi admitted that in some cases 
the surveyors had extended their work to include some of the islands on the Pò, but he claimed 
that these domains belonged to Lombardy.857 In the face of what they perceived as Habsburg 
transgressions of the border and attempts to inspect and map their territories, the Parmesan Court 
cannot be faulted for its vigilant attitude.  
The Infant displayed the same cautious behavior regarding the circulation of sensitive 
cartographic information. In 1788, the Minister of Parma sent a general map of the borders 
towards Lombardy to the French ambassador in Vienna, warning him about the risks of showing 
this document to any Habsburg representatives.858 Therefore, Bellerio’s inability to do on-site 
inspections in preparation for his report and map was a direct consequence of Parmesan official 
policy.  
                                                          
856 Ibid., Belcredi to Ferdinand, May 6, 1783.  
857 The only action the border commissary considered as potentially disruptive was the decision of the surveyor 
Torrelli to cross the Pò and investigate the situation of some domains that supposedly paid taxes to the commune 
Spinadesco, part of Austrian Lombardy’s province of Cremona. Despite Torelli’s impulse, Belcredi praised the 
surveyor for his decision to describe lands across the Pò, as they had not been included on the 1750 general map of 
the Census Office. This surveying campaign might have been part of the Census Office’s effort to update their 
records known as the “Gallarati rectification.” Gian Giuseppe Gallarati was an engineer working for the Census 
Office in Milan. Ibid., Belcredi to Ferdinand, May 6, 1783; Memoir from December 23, 1783. ASM DR, box 259, 
Maria Theresa’s order from August 17, 1780.  
858MAE CP, Autriche, box 355, Ventura to Noailles, July 8, 1788, 19; MAE CP, Parme, box 44, 390, Ventura to 
Noailles, September 5, 1788.  
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Figure 6.9 Detail from the Bellerio map of the Pò and its banks (1784) 
 
 
Bellerio’s map, together with its complementary memoir, shows the location of 
Parmesan-controlled and controversial domains on the left bank of the Pò, neighboring the State 
of Milan. The map distinguishes between domains Parma controlled in a peaceful manner 
(marked with purple), contested territories (colored with green), the old and the new trajectory of 
the Pò (marked with brown and blue, respectively), and new alluvial deposits identified in 1782 
and claimed by Lombardy.859 The 37 numbers included on the map corresponded to sections of 
the memoir, and for each of these territorial units, Bellerio included information about the 
landowners, the main products, the quality of the land, the population and any additional 
elements that helped assessed their value. For example, number twenty shown on Figure 6.9 
refers to a group of lands neighboring the Province of Cremona, State of Milan under the 
                                                          
859 HHStA Italien-Spanischer Rat, Lombardei Collectanea, box 75, 547. 
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authority of Marquis Pallavicini, and facing erosion because of the river. Bellerio compared 
contemporary tonopyms with the ones on an “ancient plan,” which probably was the plan of the 
Pò river preserved in the Census Office since 1722, modified in 1750, and shared with engineer 
Baschiera before his border inspection in 1775.860 The memoir included all possible resources 
Lombardy could obtain from these sought-after domains, such as wood, cattle, population, arable 
land, forests, and so on. The green patch surrounding number twenty-one marked the community 
Gerrolo Sommi’s lands, a domain that had used its controversial status to evade paying taxes to 
either of the two states at least until the 1780s.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.10 Detail from the Bellerio map of the Pò and its banks (1784) 
 
 
Figure 6.10 shows one of the most dynamic segments of the river, which had led to 
numerous contestations and violent conflicts between the Habsburg subjects from Gussola, and 
the Parmesan inhabitants of Coltara. The patches colored with red represent new islands and 
                                                          
860 ASM Confini p.a., box 78, memorandum from December 23, 1783.  
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alluvial deposits that Lombardy’s Census Office hoped to add to their revenue base. Such land 
fragments had always been some of the most controversial territories between Milan and Parma. 
In the summer of 1778, after the first major modification of the Pò’s trajectory, the waters 
separated a significant part of Coltara’s domains from the mainland and transformed them into 
what became a contested island.861 Changes to the Pò’s course continued in 1780, and the 
waterbed was displaced significantly from its ancient position, marked with brown on Figure 
6.10. The issue had not been resolved by 1788, when Kaunitz received from Milan a package 
with plans and documents supporting Cremona’s cause in yet another conflict between the 
inhabitants of Gussola and Coltara.862 Clearly, the Habsburg intention to stabilize the Lombardy-
Parma border by moving it on the Pò River, regardless of future changes in the waters’ 
trajectory, would have eliminated a significant number of interstate disputes.  
Bellerio’s memoir and map provided the Habsburg Court with sufficient preliminary 
documentation to prepare a plan for a possible territorial exchange. However, Vienna’s desire to 
support the radical territorial modification of transforming the Pò into an imperial border had no 
chance of success unless the Infant of Parma agreed, which seemed impossible in 1784. This 
year the number of border incidents intensified and included violent clashes, arrests, accusations 
of contraband and other unpleasant occurrences.863 Both courts blamed each other, and as neither 
admitted the other’s claims to the contested borderlands, no resolution could be reached.  
Additionally, in 1784, Parma continued to pursue the involvement of the Spanish and the 
French kings as mediators in the process of border settlement. The French representative in 
Parma, Count Flavigny, championed the Infant’s position in his letters to the Foreign Minister in 
                                                          
861 HHStA Italien-Spanischer Rat, Lombardei Korrespondenz, box 131, Kaunitz to Firmian, August 17, 1778.  
862 HHStA Italien-Spanischer Rat, Lombardei Korrespondenz, box 153, Kaunitz to Wilczek, September 5, 1788, 
107-108. 
863 ASM Confini p.a., box 79, Wilczek to Manara, January 15, 1785; Manara to Wilczek, November 11, 1785.  
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Versailles. In May 1784, Flavigny claimed that with the Habsburg government’s support, the 
inhabitants of Lombardy had intensified their aggressions against Parma.864 On October 23, 
1784, to convince the French Court of the justness of their cause, the Parmesan Minister Manara 
sent to Versailles a chronological list of border disputes between Lombardy and Parma, blaming 
the Habsburg subjects for all of them. Manara claimed that the Infant’s territorial rights arose 
from the Treaties of Aix-la-Chapelle and Nice, and that the Habsburg side had refused for almost 
half a century to respect that status quo and to convene a border congress.865 The Parmesan 
strategy proved successful in alarming the Bourbon Courts because of the Habsburg foreign 
policy over the previous decade. 
Indeed, even Kaunitz realized the dangerous implications of having the French Court 
believe that Lombardy’s authorities were unjustly infringing onto Parmesan territory, and he 
warned Lombardy’s minister that “the current political circumstances demanded caution now 
more than ever.”866 The Chancellor’s words could have been a direct reference to the Habsburg 
Monarchy’s open conflict with the Netherlands. At the end of the summer of 1784 the emperor 
had demanded from the Dutch the opening of the Scheldt estuary, blocked for two centuries, and 
by October it looked like a war was inevitable between the Habsburgs and the Netherlands.867 
Although Joseph II counted on his French ally’s support against The Hague, his expectations 
were not met. However, at the same time, the emperor hoped to convince the Court of Versailles 
to sustain his attempt to exchange the Austrian Netherlands for Bavaria; opening the Scheldt 
                                                          
864 MAE CP, Parme, box 43, 87, Flavigny, May 23, 1784.  
865 Ibid., 130-162, Manara, October 23, 1784. I dated this document based on another letter from Manara, from 
November 20, 1784. Ibid., 186. For border incidents from 1784 and 1785 see Ibid., 416-421 verso, Manara to 
Vergennes, May 28, 1785.  
866 “Le presenti circostanze politiche essigono ora più che mai la circospezione.” ASM Confini p.a., box 79, Kaunitz 
to Wilczek, December 6, 1784. 
867 The blockade of the Scheldt had curtailed the development of trade through the Austrian Netherlands port of 
Antwerp. Ever since his visit to the Austrian Netherlands in 1781 Joseph II had decided to put a stop to this 
situation. Bernard, Joseph II and Bavaria, 144-145. Ingrao, The Habsburg Monarchy, 206. 
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estuary would have served to increase the value of this Habsburg province, making Joseph II’s 
exchange offer more attractive.868 In a memoir sent in May 1784 to Kaunitz, Joseph II confessed 
he desired Bavaria not only to increase the cohesiveness of his empire or to increase 
communication, but also to pave the way for future expansion in Italy or Silesia.869 The 
emperor’s foreign policy and his declared goals confirmed the Infant of Parma’s fears. 
The Parmesan Court used Joseph II’s reputation as an ambitious emperor interested in 
expanding his domains to convince the French king of the necessity of his intervention in the 
Parma-Lombardy border conflict. The emperor’s actions against the Netherlands and his 
scheming to obtain Bavaria convinced France and Spain that Joseph II might have similar 
expansionistic projects in Italy. These worries were fueled by news from Parma. On December 3, 
1785, the French representative in Parma contacted the French foreign minister and warned him 
that Joseph II planned to obtain the Infant’s lands on the left bank of the Pò through a 
disadvantageous territorial exchange.870 Flavigny speculated that the intensification of border 
disputes after Joseph II became the sole Habsburg ruler in 1780 had as its main goal convincing 
the Infant of Parma to agree to this detrimental arrangement. Flavigny warned that Joseph II’s 
ambitions constituted a threat to the balance of powers in the Italian Peninsula.  
The ambassador presented Joseph II’s project as an integral part of a comprehensive 
system of Habsburg expansionism that would enslave Italy. In Flavigny’s words: “This Prince 
[the Infant of Parma] and his Council are truly convinced [...] that the project of its Imperial 
Majesty is not limited to private interests, but belongs to an expansion system, which could be 
disastrous for Italy’s freedom, if the powers which have possessions and have the interest to 
                                                          
868 Beales, Joseph II, vol. 2, 393. Paul Bernard discusses in detail Joseph II’s schemes to obtain Bavaria during the 
1770s and 1780s. Bernard, Joseph II and Bavaria. 
869 Beales, Joseph II, vol. 2, 394. 
870 MAE CP, Parme, box 43, 434-437 verso, Flavigny, December 3, 1785.  
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maintain the balance [of power] do not give this issue serious attention.”871 Flavigny continued 
to support the Parmesan cause in December 1786, when he reported on Habsburg military 
actions against the Parmesans and urged the French government to support Parma against the 
Habsburg desire to impose Pò as the border.872 
Meanwhile, on the other side of this contested border, Lombardy’s ministers claimed the 
Parmesans were continuing to usurp Habsburg lands and encouraged Joseph II to adopt an 
uncompromising attitude. Therefore, on June 26, 1786, as per the emperor’s orders, Kaunitz 
instructed Wilczek to endorse the use of armed force whenever necessary to defend Lombardy’s 
territory. As a result of these imperial instructions, Wilczek asked the general commander of 
Lombardy to dispatch troops to the domains neighboring Parmesan territories.873 Moreover, the 
minister instructed local authorities to pay attention to any novelties and usurpations in the 
border areas, and report to the provincial authorities such instances. 
The imperial orders were implemented at a brisk pace. By July 1786, the districts of 
Viadana, Gonzaga and Suzzara had performed inspections of their borderlines and sent detailed 
reports to Milan, some including maps.874 Figure 6.11 reproduces one of the two plans Francesco 
Antonio Carli, royal overseer of Viadana, prepared as a result of his border inspection in 1786.875 
Carli travelled on-site and met with the mayor and consul of the district of Viadana to gather 
accurate information on Parmesan actions violating Lombardy’s territory. After he performed the 
                                                          
871 “Ce prince et son Conseil sont intimement persuadées, Mr le Comte, que le projet de SM Imple ne se borne pas à 
des vues privées, et qu’elles tiennent à un systême d’agrandissement, qui pourroit devenir funeste à la liberté de 
l’Italie, si les puissances, qui y ont des possessions, et qui ont intérêt à conserver sa balance, n’y faisoient pas la plus 
sérieuse attentions.” Ibid., 437. 
872 MAE CP, Parme, box 44, 90-92, 99-99 verso, Flavigny, December 10, 1786; Flavigny to Vergennes, December 
31, 1786.  
873 HHStA Italien-Spanischer Rat, Lombardei Korrespondenz, box 153, Kaunitz to Wilczek, June 26, 1786; ASM 
Confini p.a., box 79, Kaunitz to Wilczek, June 26, 1786; Wilczek to Kaunitz, July 8, 1786. 
874 ASM Confini p.a., box 79, Antonio Simoni’s report and map, July 20, 1786. 
875 Ibid., plan and report by Francesco Antonio Carli, July 26, 1786. 
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inspection and reconnaissance of the segment of the river, islands and banks of Viadana, Carli 
prepared two plans, on which he marked past incidents and recent Parmesan actions. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.11 Detail from Carli’s map of Viadana (1786) 
 
 
For example, Carli reported that on July 24, 1786 approximately ten Parmesan subjects surveyed 
the island marked Q, included on Figure 6.11. Although the Infant’s men did not try to occupy 
the island, their action might have preceded an official act of taking possession, as it occurred in 
the Fall of 1785 with respect to the island marked P.876 Carli’s plans are just one example of 
many similar documents sent from local communities to Milan in order to keep provincial 
authorities informed of the borders’ situation.  
Once all preparations to defend Lombardy’s territory were in place, Wilczek contacted 
his Parmesan counterpart and insisted on the need to convene a border congress, while also 
                                                          
876 Ibid. 
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suggesting, as a more expedient action, simply transforming the Pò into the frontier.877 
Immediately after Wilczek sent this dispatch to Parma, the Habsburg troops supported the 
inhabitants of Lombardy in a series of border conflicts, thus demonstrating that Joseph II’s 
warnings had not been a mere facade.878 Vienna’s hardline approach forced the Parmesan 
Minister to ask for more details about the Habsburg plan to eliminate border contestations.879 
However, the Infant also appealed again to his Bourbon relatives for support.880 Regardless of 
Joseph II’s real plans vis-à-vis a possible expansion in the Italian Peninsula, the military force he 
used against the Parmesans in the disputed borderlands confirmed in the eyes of the European 
diplomats the rumor that the Habsburg emperor hoped to annex land in the vicinity of Lombardy. 
 The more Parma tried to transform the border negotiations from bilateral into 
quadrilateral ones and to move them from Italy to Vienna, the more strongly Kaunitz stressed in 
his letters to Wilczek the necessity of avoiding such a course.881 Lombardy’s governor even 
conducted a surprise visit to Parma to convince his Parmesan counterpart there was no need to 
involve the other Bourbon crowns in the negotiation.882 However, as reported by the French 
minister in Parma, the Infant refused this proposal and persevered in his decision. However, 
despite Parma Court’s efforts to involve France and Spain in the negotiations, the two Bourbon 
Courts delayed taking any diplomatic action.883  
                                                          
877 Ibid., Wilczek to Manara, November 29, 1786.  
878 Ibid., documents from Manara to Wilczek reporting incidents in the area of Torricella, Cremona on November 
29, 1786, and in the Giarolo del Marghei, Cremona, from December 2, 1786, and December 4, 1786. The Habsburg 
court maintained this forceful line in 1787, as reflected in an imperial order from January 5, 1787 and the number of 
garrisons maintained in the border areas in places such as Porto Morone, S Steffano al Corno, Gussola and 
Casalmaggiore. Ibid., fragment from Joseph II’s order dated January 5, 1787. Pecis requested more money for the 
maintenance of the garrisons on January 8, 1787. ASM Confini p.a., box 80. 
879 ASM Confini p.a., box 79, Manara to Wilczek, December 4, 1786.  
880 MAE CP, Parme, box 44, 87-88 verso, Manara to Vergennes, December 9, 1786. 
881 HHStA Italien-Spanischer Rat, Lombardei Korrespondenz, box 153, Kaunitz to Wilczek, January 8, 1787, 7.  
882 MAE CP, Parme, box 44, 164-164 verso, Flavigny, June 17, 1787. 
883 By the end of 1787 it seemed as if France and Spain preferred to keep their distance from the Lombardy-Parma 
negotiations, and Kaunitz was certain they would only intervene if the future congress were to reach a standstill. 
HHStA Italien-Spanischer Rat, Lombardei Korrespondenz, box 153, Kaunitz to Wilczek, 157-157 verso. 
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It is plausible that the two monarchs wished to consult with their ministers before 
infuriating their Habsburg ally, to determine the best way to broach the issue with Vienna. In 
early February 1788, the Spanish foreign minister José Moñino Floridablanca informed Parma 
that the king had agreed to help the Infant. To ensure the success of their intervention, the 
Bourbon Courts asked the Infant to provide detailed memoirs and a topographic plan showing 
the controversial domains, additional evidence to support Parma’s claims, a border demarcation 
proposal, and a list of disadvantages for the Infant if the Pò became the borderline.884 That same 
month, the French representative in Parma (Flavigny) reported to his superior in Versailles that 
the Parmesans were preparing a border map to help the Bourbon ambassadors in Vienna during 
the negotiations.885 Flavigny also mentioned in his letter the existence of another small atlas 
containing plans of the Parmesan borders, submitted to Versailles on October 23, 1784.886 These 
instances confirm again that Lombardy’s engineers were not the only mapmakers in these 
borderlands and that both sides understood the importance of cartographic material to impose 
one’s vision on the ground.  
Once the Bourbon kings reached a consensus in early 1788, they delegated their 
ambassadors in Vienna to contact Chancellor Kaunitz offering to help mediate the controversies 
between Parma and Lombardy.887 The Bourbon ambassadors claimed in their joint memoir that 
as the aggressors were Habsburg subjects, it was Joseph II’s responsibility to intervene and 
reestablish the status quo in the border areas. Additionally, the ambassadors promised to present 
topographic maps and other evidence to show why the Infant “could not agree to the claimed 
                                                          
884 MAE CP, Parme, box 44, 303-303 verso, Florida Blanca to Ventura, February 3, 1788. The Parmesan Minister 
transmitted this decision to Milan. ASM Confini p.a., box 80, Ventura to Wilczek, February 26, 1788. 
885 MAE CP, Parme, box 44, 313-314, Flavigny, February 24, 1788. 
886 Ibid.  
887 MAE CP, Autriche, box 354, 182-183 verso, the ambassadors of Spain and France to Kaunitz, March 1, 1788.  
 347 
disintegration.”888 The letters from the Parmesan ministers and the French representative in 
Parma influenced the ambassadors’ choice of words regarding the Habsburg plan for a territorial 
exchange. In his report to Joseph II, Kaunitz expressed his displeasure at the expression 
“disintegration” and blamed it on the Parmesan Court’s distortion of the Habsburg offer and 
actions in the border areas.889 Kaunitz explained the Infant’s desire to involve the Bourbon 
Courts and move the negotiation to Vienna as an attempt to obtain more leverage against the 
Habsburgs and also as a way to avoid expenses that a Border Congress convened in Italy would 
entail. 890 
 Although the Chancellor accused the Infant of distortion and defamation of the emperor’s 
character, the Parmesan Court was right in their assumption regarding Joseph II’s determination 
to impose his imperial vision. On February 11, 1788, Kaunitz transmitted to Wilczek verbatim 
Joseph II’s resolution regarding the official policy towards Parma:  
If, after we transmitted to them the compensation we planned to offer to ensure that the 
River Pò forms the border between the two states, the Court of Parma does not agree to 
start the negotiations, then we will declare formally that we contemplate not only the 
border issues born after the treaties of Aix-la-Chapelle and Nice, but also all those that 
were controversial before [...]; and if this preliminary is not accepted, all negotiations will 
be suspended, and we will support our rights with determination and will extend our 
possessory actions as much as possible.891  
 
A small state like Parma would not have had any chance to prevail against the Habsburg 
Monarchy’s forces, so the Infant’s diplomatic move seems entirely justified. Although the 
French and Spanish ambassadors intervened in favor of the Bourbon ruler of Parma, these 
                                                          
888 “Son Altesse ROyale ne peut pas consentir aux demembrements qu’on pretens.” Ibid, 183 verso. 
889 ASM Confini p.a., box 80, Kaunitz to Joseph II, 1788 (wrote between March 1 and April 10).  
890 Ibid. 
891 “Se la Corte di Parma, dopo averle comunicato li compensi da offrirsi per ottenere che il Fiume Pò faccia i limiti 
fra i due stati, non acconsentisce ad entrare in negoziazione, allora si dichiarerà formalmente, che noi consideriamo 
non solo le questioni dé Confini nate dopo li trattati d’Aquisgrana, e di Nizza, ma anche tutte quelle, ch’esistevano 
prima litigiosi, e da decidere; e poi se non si riconosce questa prima base, si finirà ogni trattativa, sostenendo al 
meglio i nostri diritti con dimostrazione risoluta, e stendendo i nostri atti possessorj, quanto si potrà.” HHStA 
Italien-Spanischer Rat, Lombardei Korrespondenz, box 153, 17, Kaunitz to Wilczek, February 11, 1788.  
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diplomats did not rely only on the Infant’s reports and tried to obtain additional information both 
from Vienna and Parma. In this context, the French ambassador in Vienna, Noailles, sent 
Versailles a report about the Habsburg attitude regarding the Lombardy-Parma border.892 
Noailles presented Kaunitz as very knowledgeable about the border controversies and genuinely 
interested in reestablishing peaceful relations with Parma. Kaunitz convinced Noailles that 
topographic plans sent to Vienna could not replace actual local knowledge.893 Even though 
cartography was crucial as a preparatory step for a border negotiation, ministers and 
administrators with a thorough knowledge of the local geography were indispensable.  
As the discussion intensified, the governments in Milan and Parma prepared complaints 
against each other to convince the Bourbon Courts of the justness of their actions. For example, 
on September 16, 1786, Giuseppe Maroni prepared a list of Parmesan violations against 
Lombardy after the September 10, 1773 convention to preserve the status quo.894 Maroni’s list 
received Kaunitz’s praise, and the Chancellor ordered the extension of this report back in time, 
until 1748.895 When in the spring of 1788, the French and Spanish ambassadors in Vienna 
forwarded to Kaunitz the Parmesan version of all border incidents from 1786 onwards, the 
Chancellor shared Maroni’s memoir with the two diplomats.896  
Additionally, Kaunitz ordered Wilczek to obtain as soon as possible a list of territorial 
violations caused by the Parmesan side from 1786 until 1788.897 Complaints and counter-
complaints quickly followed without any resolution, and an exasperated Kaunitz encouraged 
                                                          
892 MAE CP, Autriche, box 354, 190-192, Noailles to Montmorin, March 5, 1788. 
893 On April 16, 1788, Noailles wrote to the French Foreign Minister that these issues “can only be discussed by 
commissaries on site.” “Il est évident que les intérets en question ne peuvent être discutés que par des commissaires 
sur les lieux.” Ibid., 288, Noailles to Montmorin, April 16, 1788.  
894 ASM Confini p.a., box 79, Maroni, September 16, 1786.  
895 HHStA Italien-Spanischer Rat, Lombardei Korrespondenz, box 153, Kaunitz to Wilczek, February 11, 1788, 
pages 18 verso-19. 
896 A copy of this list is located in MAE CP, Autriche, box 354, from 385 onwards.  
897 HHStA Italien-Spanischer Rat, Lombardei Korrespondenz, box 153, Kaunitz to Wilczek, May 19, 1788, pages 
58-59.  
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Wilczek to negotiate with the Parmesan minister a convention for the preservation of the status 
quo. The Chancellor recommended that Lombardy’s minister compile the list of contested 
domains based on the 1779 Quarantini-Regalia map and report and the 1784 Bellerio plan and 
memoir.898 Cartographic material was essential in shaping diplomatic negotiations. 
By the end of 1788 the discussions progressed to the nomination of commissaries.899 
Soon afterwards, the negotiations reached another standstill due to the death of the Spanish 
monarch, Charles III.900 And after the change in leadership in Madrid, the Court’s position with 
respect to the Parma-Lombardy border controversies altered. When the Spanish court finally 
submitted their guidelines to Parma, they made it clear that the two commissaries should do the 
following: first, inspect the border together to claim and mark on-site the various borderlands; 
secondly, work independently to establish the evidence and documentation of their respective 
rulers and afterwards send their final reports to Vienna for the actual negotiations.901 The 
negotiations stopped shortly afterwards, due to the beginning of the French Revolution and the 
death of emperor Joseph II in January 1790. More than four decades proved insufficient to 
regulate the Habsburg imperial border with the small duchies Parma and Piacenza.  
                                                          
898 ASM Confini p.a., box 80, Kaunitz to Wilczek, May 4, 1789.  
899 Ibid., Kaunitz to the French and Spanish ambassadors, December 18, 1788. The Habsburg side nominated as their 
representative Giuseppe Pecis, who had a long experience with border controversies. Because of his advanced age, 
Wilczek and Kaunitz considered a possible replacement for Peccis in the person of Baron Trechi (general vice-
intendant of finances). Additionally, the Habsburg Court planned to send Maroni as secretary to help Pecis with the 
negotiations. The Parmesan side nominated as their commissary counselor Antonio Bertioli, president of Parma’s 
Supreme Council of Justice. Ibid., Wilczek to Kaunitz, January 6, 1789; MAE CP, Parme, box 45, 74, Flavigny, 
May 3, 1789. 
900 MAE CP, Parme, box 45, 14-14 verso, Flavigny, January 25, 1789.  
901 Ibid., 65-65 verso, Flavigny, April 19, 1789.  
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6.4 CONCLUSION 
Shortly after the death of Joseph II, the French representative in Parma, Count Flavigny, 
expressed his opinion about the Emperor’s policy in a letter to Versailles, by stating that Joseph 
II’s “ambition in Italy manifested after the reign of the deceased Empress [Maria Theresa], 
through his recurring voyages [to Italy], the military roads he built, the [territorial] exchanges he 
suggested and his pretensions, reinforced by violence, against all his neighbors.”902 Although 
clearly biased, Flavigny’s appraisal of Joseph II’s foreign policy had influenced the Courts of 
Spain and France in their readiness to champion the cause of the Duke of Parma against what 
they perceived as Vienna’s expansionist tendencies.  
 Despite the Habsburg Court’s experience in regulating borders and their strong political 
position as one of the most powerful European states, the small Duchy of Parma, Piacenza and 
Guastalla became the proverbial tail that wagged this imperial dog. Relying on his Bourbon 
dynastic alliances, the Infant incessantly complained about each action directed against his 
domains and portrayed the provincial government of Lombardy as an unjust neighbor that 
eagerly waited for the first opportunity to annex neighboring territories.  
Although the Habsburgs failed to settle Lombardy’s border with Parma, the half-a-
century long negotiations left behind rich cartographic material and historical and juridical 
memoirs, and influenced the creation of new institutions such as the border commissary. 
Analyzing the production and use of border maps revealed that Vienna was not the only center 
relying on cartographic material to further its territorial claims. The Infant of Parma and its 
advisers, together with the French and Spanish ministers, used maps to establish the range and 
                                                          
902 “Joseph II, dont l’ambition sur l’Italie s’est manifestées dés le régne de feue l’Impératrice, par les voyages 
réitérés qu’il y a fait, par les chemins militaires qu’il y a fait construire, par les échanges qu’il a proposé, et par les 
prétentions, soutenues de violence, qu’il a formées contre tous ses voisins,” Ibid., 292, Flavigny, May 23, 1790.  
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value of the disputed borderlands, and to analyze the political consequences of establishing a 
borderline on the Pò River. Additionally, Joseph II’s and Kaunitz’s readiness to sacrifice 
Mantovan provinces in exchange for the enlargement of Milanese lands discloses an important 
step in the centralization of Lombardy and the province’s integration into the imperial fabric: the 
union of the Duchy of Mantua and the State of Milan in more than name. 
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7.0 SCRUTINIZING THE HEAVENS, MEASURING THE EARTH: ASTRONOMERS 
IN THE SERVICE OF THE HABSBURG MONARCHY 
Early modern science and technology developed in large measure within a limited set of 
localized sites that ranged from state-supported scientific academies and observatories to 
botanical gardens, aristocratic collections, and apothecary shops [...] Yet it is equally true 
that local knowledge was very often embedded in geographically extended networks of 
communication and exchange. These multiple, often overlapping networks directly 
facilitated the gathering of information and natural objects as well as the dissemination of 
the natural knowledge produced at those sites.903  
 
In 1766, the director of the University Observatory in Vienna and the founder of the Observatory 
in Milan made plans for a scientific expedition sponsored by the Royal Society of London to the 
Spanish dominions in California. Although the plan did not materialize in the end, its conception 
was a reflection of the emergence of science as a global enterprise. The two astronomers, Joseph 
Liesganig and Roger Boscovich, both members of the Jesuit order, were at the time in the service 
of the Habsburg Monarchy. However, they also corresponded with and even joined scientific 
institutions outside the Habsburg borders. As Steven Harris suggests in the above quote, when 
analyzing the development of early modern scientific practices we need to pay attention both to 
the local sites of knowledge and to networks connecting these places. Consequently, in this 
chapter, I investigate the activity of scientists who contributed to the development of astronomy 
and mapmaking in the Habsburg lands by giving attention to a multi-scale context: provincial, 
                                                          
903 Steven J. Harris, “Networks of Travel, Correspondence, and Exchange,” in The Cambridge History of Science, 
eds. Katharine Park and Lorraine Daston, vol. 3, Early-Modern Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 341. 
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imperial and trans-imperial.904 By analyzing the contribution of Habsburg astronomers affiliated 
with specific provincial centers in a larger context, I show how these scientists contributed to the 
development of Habsburg imperial cartography. Additionally, I reveal how astronomers in the 
service of the Habsburg monarchs connected imperial cultural sites with the wider world and 
contributed to the development of astronomy and geography on a global scale.  
When discussing the eighteenth century Republic of Letters and networks of scientific 
institutions, scholars are tempted to prioritize the role of the Royal Society in London and the 
Academy of Sciences in Paris.905 Although Vienna lacked an Academy of Sciences during the 
reigns of Maria Theresa and Joseph II, this was not symptomatic of a disinterest in promoting 
scientific initiatives. Actually, with the encouragement of the Habsburg monarchs, during the 
eighteenth century, at least four plans were prepared to organize an Academy in Vienna, which 
reveals the existence of an active intellectual community.906 The author of one of those proposals 
was the Jesuit Maximilian Hell, director of the Imperial Observatory in Vienna and a world-
renowned astronomer.907 Hell’s example suggests the existence of other fully operational sites of 
                                                          
904 Charles Withers suggests to “consider both the movement of the Enlightenment’s ideas above and beyond 
national contexts, and also explore their regional, local, and social manifestations within the nation.” Withers, 
Placing the Enlightenment, 41. 
905 James McClellan III, historian of scientific institutions in the eighteenth century, states that “learned societies 
modeled after the Royal Society of London and the Académie Royale des Sciences in Paris formed the backbone of 
organized and institutionalized science in the eighteenth century.” James McClellan III, “Scientific Institutions and 
the Organization of Science,” in The Cambridge History of Science, ed. Roy Porter, vol. 4, Eighteenth-Century 
Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 90. Such an assessment downplays the scientific 
contribution of states who did not prioritize the same type of institutionalized scientific knowledge. A 
disproportionate scholarly attention to France and Great Britain overshadowed the Habsburg contribution to the Age 
of Enlightenment. See, for example, the following works devoted to the Academy of Sciences in Paris and the Royal 
Society in London: Palmira Fontes Da Costa, The Singular and the Making of Knowledge at the Royal Society of 
London in the Eighteenth Century (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009); Roger Hahn, The 
Anatomy of a Scientific Institution: the Paris Academy of Sciences, 1666-1803 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1971); Marie Boas Hall, Promoting Experimental Learning: Experiment and the Royal Society, 1660-1727 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
906 James E. McClellan III, Science Reorganized: Scientific Societies in the Eighteenth Century (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1985), 139. Joseph Feil discusses in detail the attempts to found an Academy of 
Sciences during Maria Theresa in Joseph Feil, Versuche zur Gründung einer Akademie der Wissenschaften unter 
Maria Theresia (Vienna: C. Gerold's Sohn, 1860). 
907 Per Pippin Aspaas shows how Maximilian Hell’s plan would have incorporated many ex-Jesuits in the new 
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knowledge production. Indeed, the observatories in Vienna and Milan, and the Academy of 
Sciences in Brussels are some examples of learned institutions that transformed the Habsburg 
territories into active contributors to the intra-European and even global scientific dialogue. 
Additionally, astronomers and scientists working in the Habsburg Monarchy became foreign 
correspondents or even members of prominent European Academies, and were engaged in global 
scientific enterprises.  
The Republic of Letters reached its heyday during the eighteenth century with the 
expansion of the network of scientific institutions and the intensification of correspondence 
uninterrupted even by military conflicts. Academies of sciences and observatories published 
memoirs and observations for an international audience, and joint scientific projects became the 
norm, also impacting the fields of astronomy and geography.908 Eighteenth century geographers 
were engrossed in developing a “language of location” and describing the world they 
inhabited.909 As no single man could travel and measure the whole world, collaboration was 
essential for what scientists perceived as the improvement of geographical knowledge. Indeed, 
the quest for precision and accuracy in identifying the shape of the Earth and calculating the 
distance between Earth and the Sun encouraged two worldwide enterprises in the eighteenth 
century: measuring meridian arcs and observing the transits of Venus. In both cases, observers 
travelled all over the world and shared their results with the larger scientific community.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Academy, such as the ones who used to be directors of observatories in Graz, Vienna and Prague. However, Hell’s 
proposal to give this Academy the right to control the production of calendars, a big source of revenue at the time, 
infuriated the famous publisher Joannes Thomas de Trattner. It seems the book dealer persuaded Maria Theresa to 
refuse Hell’s plan. In her rejection letter the empress also revealed her distrust in the capacity of the ex-Jesuit to 
organize an Academy: “I find the Abbé Hell not strong enough; an accademie that is worse than the already existing 
ones would be worth neither the costs nor the effort.” Per Pippin Aspaas, “Maximilianus Hell (1720-1792) and the 
Eighteenth-Century Transits of Venus. A Study of Jesuit Science in Nordic and Central European Contexts” (PhD 
diss., University of Tromsø, 2012), 141-146. 
908 Lorraine Daston, “The Ideal and Reality of the Republic of Letters in the Enlightenment,” Science in Context 4, 
no. 2 (1991): 376-378; Withers, Placing the Enlightenment, 45-46. 
909 Godlewska, Geography Unbound, 3. 
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The debates about the shape of the Earth materialized in the first half of the eighteenth 
century in two expeditions organized by the French Academy of Sciences: one to Peru and one to 
Lapland. The goals of these missions were to measure two arcs of meridian - one on the Equator 
and one as far away as possible from this line - compare their lengths, and, based on the 
difference, infer the shape of the Earth.910 In his study of the Peru expedition and its 
implications, Neil Safier showed the intricacy of the web involving exchanges between various 
centers of collection and codification, all contributing to the creation of knowledge.911 The 
pursuit of establishing the shape and size of the Earth without any doubt continued in the second 
half of the eighteenth century, and this phase also included Habsburg scientists, such as Joseph 
Liesganig. Historians of science also studied how the 1761 and 1769 transits of Venus motivated 
an unprecedented effort of scientists to coordinate observations and exchange their results.912 It 
is in this context that Cassini de Thury travelled to Vienna and worked with Hell and Liesganig 
on a variety of astronomic and geodetic projects.913 The global network included scientists 
serving the Habsburg monarchs in Vienna, Milan and Brussels.  
Joseph Liesganig organized two expeditions to measure degrees of meridians; 
Maximilian Hell travelled from Vienna all the way to Lapland to observe the 1769 transit of 
Venus; and eighteenth-century Habsburg observatories collaborated with a network of sites of 
knowledge production outside the empire. Some of these scientific contributions have been 
analyzed in biographies, in studies devoted to particular institutions such as the Brera or the 
                                                          
910 Numa Broc, La Geographie des philosophes, geographes et voyageurs français au XVIIIe siecle (Paris: Editions 
Ophrys, 1974), 37-41.  
911 Safier reveals the importance of local knowledge in carrying out scientific experiments far away from sites of 
knowledge such as European academies of science or observatories. Additionally, he traces the results of the 
scientists’ work in the field and their impact on the reading public back in Europe. Safier, Measuring the New 
World, 8-15. 
912 Harry Woolf, The Transits of Venus: A Study of Eighteenth-century Science (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1959), vii.  
913 Ibid., 65. 
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Viennese Observatories, or in the context of the Cassini family’s scientific impact.914 However, 
no prior work brings together the impact of Habsburg sites of knowledge production in different 
imperial provinces on the development of mapmaking. Therefore, this chapter focuses on 
contributions of scientists working in observatories in Vienna and Milan, and in the Academy of 
Sciences in Brussels, within the context of the Habsburg rulers’ preoccupation with mapmaking.  
The first part of the chapter discusses the impact of Viennese observatories on the 
development of astronomy and mapmaking. The Jesuit fathers Hell and Liesganig, the top 
Viennese astronomers in the second half of the eighteenth century, were deeply involved in 
trans-imperial scientific collaborations. Whereas Hell focused more on performing and 
publishing numerous astronomic observations, Liesganig devoted his career to combining 
astronomic and geodetic measurements in order to create what his patrons perceived of as more 
accurate maps. In both cases, the dissolution of the Jesuit order did not put a stop to their 
scientific career, as the Habsburgs understood the importance of maintaining such experts in the 
service of the crown.  
Moving from Vienna to Lombardy, the second section examines the key role the Jesuit 
Roger Boscovich played in the development of another astronomic center: the Brera Observatory 
in Milan. A scientist affiliated with the top European academies, Boscovich refused to sacrifice 
his international career to satisfy Vienna’s interests. His years in Lombardy and his conflicts 
                                                          
914 Histories of observatories: Die Geschichte der Universitätssternwarte Wien. Dargestellt anhand ihrer 
historischen Instrumente und eines Typoskripts von Johann Steinmayr, eds. Jürgen Hamel, Isolde Müller, and 
Thomas Posch (Frankfurt am Main: Harri Deutsch, 2010); M. Ludovic Drapeyron, “Project de géométrie géodésique 
de la France et de L’Italie en 1776, par Cassini de Thury,” Association Français pour l’avancement des Sciences, 
Compte rendu de la 27e session, Nantes, 1898 (Paris, 1899), 795-797; Carlo Monti, Luigi Mussio, “L’Attività 
Geodetico Astronomica, topografica, Cartografica degli Astronomi di Brera dal 1772 al 1860 studiata attraverso gli 
Atti Ufficiali dell’Osservatorio,” Memorie dell’istituto Lombardo-Accademia di Scienze Lettere. Classe di Scienze 
Matematiche e Naturali 27, no. 5 (1980): 189-308; Francesco Zagar, L’Osservatorio Astronomico di Milano nella 
Storia (Milan: Arti Grafiche E. Milli, 1963). Some biographical studies: Gerhard Geissl, Joseph Liesganig - die 
Wiener Meridianmessung und seine Arbeiten im Gebiet von Wiener Neustadt (Wiener Neustadt: Verein Museum 
und Archiv für Arbeit und Industrie im Viertel unter dem Wienerwald, 2001); Germano Paoli, Ruggiero Giuseppe 
Boscovich Nella Scienza e Nella Storia del ‘700 (Rome: Accademia nazionale delle scienze detta dei XL, 1988); 
Aspaas, “Maximilianus Hell.”  
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with the central political authorities reveal the challenges Habsburg rulers faced in the process of 
institutionalizing and centralizing scientific knowledge. After Boscovich’s departure in the mid-
1770s, Vienna brought the group of astronomers active in Brera into alignment with imperial 
interests regarding the development of cartography in Lombardy.  
The last section traces the development of astronomical knowledge in the context of the 
Academy of Sciences created in Brussels in the early 1770s. Local scientists used their 
international contacts to obtain astronomical data and the provincial government also tried to 
obtain access to information that could have improved imperial mapmaking projects. 
Notwithstanding the Habsburg rulers’ interest in obtaining good maps of their lands, and their 
belief that astronomic observations could increase the accuracy of geodetic measurements, 
financial limitations curtailed institutional expansion. As Boscovich reported, during one of his 
meetings with Joseph II, the emperor confessed that “having to observe so much on the Land, he 
did not have much time to observe the sky and the stars” or, in this case, to offer more financial 
assistance to the development of astronomy.915 Despite its persistent pleas, the Brussels 
Academy did not obtain an Observatory in the eighteenth century.  
In France, the Academy of Sciences and its affiliated institutions, such as the Observatory 
in Paris, fostered the interests of their monarch.916 Similarly, the Viennese rulers also used sites 
of knowledge such as the observatories in Vienna and Milan, and the Academy of Sciences in 
Brussels, to improve imperial cartography. As military engineers provided the manpower for on-
ground surveying operations, scholars educated in the Jesuit tradition, and often members of this 
order, wrote theoretical treatises and even trained some of the Habsburg officers on how to make 
                                                          
915 Joseph II made this remark to Roger Boscovich after the Jesuit invited him to visit the Observatory in Milan 
during the emperor’s visit to Italy in the summer of 1769. ASM Autografi, box 115, folder 40 (Boscovich Ruggero), 
June 8, 1769, Boscovich to Firmian, 24. 
916 Hahn, The Anatomy of a Scientific Institution, 14. 
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maps. Moreover, these scholars built international collaborations that served a double purpose: 
learning from the experience of other scientists and gaining access to their published materials or 
unpublished results while also bolstering the reputation of the Habsburg monarchs as promoters 
of science.  
7.1 JESUITS AND OBSERVATORIES IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY VIENNA 
On the morning of May 18, 1761, César-François Cassini de Thury, one of the most famous 
astronomers and mapmakers of his time, arrived in Vienna. Shortly after leaving the boat that 
had taken him down the Danube from Ulm, Cassini de Thury encountered the Jesuit Maximilian 
Hell and spent most of his first day in the Habsburg Monarchy’s capital inspecting the two 
observatories in Vienna: the Imperial Observatory under the direction of Hell and the University 
Observatory under the care of another Jesuit, Joseph Liesganig. As Cassini de Thury wrote after 
his meeting with Hell: “I already knew him from his work; but he made me feel, through his 
thoughtfulness, how much one gains by seeing and listening to the savants whom we only know 
by their reputation.”917 The French academician considered Hell an intellectual equal, and 
presented the trip to the Habsburg lands and his encounters with local scientists as an important 
step towards the development of astronomy and geography.  
Cassini de Thury travelled to Vienna with the approval of both French Foreign and War 
Minister Choiseul and the Habsburg Monarchy’s Chancellor, Kaunitz. His visit is not an 
example of the diffusionist model of Enlightenment, radiating from France to the darker corners 
                                                          
917 “Je le connoissois déjà par ses ouvrages; mais il me fit sentir, par ses prévenances, combien l’on gagne à voir et à 
entendre les sçavans, que l’on ne connoît que par leur réputation.” Cassini de Thury, Relations de deux Voyages faits 
en Allemagne par ordre du Roi, 23. 
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of Central and Eastern Europe. On the contrary, during this journey, Cassini de Thury enriched 
his own knowledge and collaborated with astronomers active in the Habsburg dominions. Many 
of these astronomers belonged to the Jesuit order and remained active men of letters and 
Habsburg agents even after the suppression of the Society of Jesus in 1773.918  
The role of the Jesuits in the development of eighteenth century science was influential 
not only in the Habsburg Monarchy but also in the French, Portuguese and Spanish empires.919 
The members of the Jesuit order had access to a global network of resources, and “the missions 
of the Society of Jesus were the globalizing institution par excellence.”920 The Society’s 
scientific activity, as expressed through their teaching inside and outside the classroom, their 
correspondence and their publications, was not divergent from the science of the time. Jesuits 
were active members of the Republic of Letters and trained some of the main intellectuals of the 
eighteenth century, such as Descartes, Laplace, Diderot, Turgot, Voltaire and Gian Domenico 
Cassini.921 As Mordechai Feingold contends, “by and large, the scholarly activities and 
aspirations of Jesuits were indistinguishable from those of other contemporary savants, secular or 
ordained, irrespective of denomination.”922 This is certainly true in the case of Maxmilian Hell, 
Joseph Liesganig and Roger Boscovich, some of the leading figures in the fields of astronomy 
and cartography in the Habsburg Monarchy.  
                                                          
918 Richard Evans mentions the “continuing prominence of priests in the intellectual life of the Monarchy” during 
the eighteenth century as a striking characteristic of Enlightenment in this empire. Richard J. W. Evans, “The 
Origins of Enlightenment in the Habsburg Lands,” 50-53. 
919 See for example Science in the Spanish and Portuguese Empires 1500-1800, eds. Daniela Bleichmar, Paula De 
Vos, Kristin Huffine, and Kevin Sheehan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); El saber de los jesuitas, 
historias naturales y el Nuevo Mundo, eds. Luis Millones Figueroa, and Domingo Ledezma (Madrid: 
Iberoamericana, 2005); Florence C. Hsia, Sojourners in a strange land: Jesuits and their scientific missions in late 
imperial China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
920 Luke Clossey, Salvation and globalization in the early Jesuit missions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 257. 
921 Mordechai Feingold, “Jesuits: Savants”, in Jesuit Science and the Republic of Letters, ed. Mordechai Feingold. 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 23-38. See also: The Jesuits. Cultures, Sciences and the Arts 1540-1773, eds. 
John W. O’Malley, S.J., Gauvin Alexander Bailey, Steven J. Harris, T. Frank Kennedy, S.J., 2 vols. (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1999-2006). 
922 Feingold, “Jesuits: Savants,” 2. 
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Whereas France, Naples, Portugal and Spain abolished the order in the 1760s, the 
Habsburg monarchs waited until 1773 and only reluctantly implemented the papal directive that 
year. As Derek Beales argues, “it was the pope and the other Catholic Powers who imposed on 
Maria Theresa and Joseph II the suppression of the Jesuits.”923 Moreover, even after the official 
suppression of their organization, ex-Jesuits working in the Habsburg dominions received 
pensions and employment from Maria Theresa and Joseph II.924 The Habsburg rulers’ reluctance 
to banish Jesuits from their lands was an obvious reaction to the important functions the monks 
fulfilled in the domains of religion, education and scientific development.925  
This section will demonstrate the key role Jesuits played in the development of the two 
main observatories in Vienna in the eighteenth century and how these sites of knowledge became 
important nodes in the network of the Republic of Letters. The association between the Society 
and astronomic observatories was common in the eighteenth century, when around thirty such 
institutions developed in connection to Jesuit colleges all over Europe.926 However, we should 
not assume that all astronomic observatories were affiliated with the Jesuit order. For example, 
the first private Observatory in Vienna, a short-lived creation, was not a Jesuit establishment. In 
1730, Gian Giacomo Marinoni (1676-1755), who had been one of the main instructors at the first 
Engineering Academy in Vienna discussed in chapter 2, established on the roof of his home a 
small observatory. Marinoni’s interests reveal the strong connection between astronomy and 
mapmaking; the promoter of the plane table, a key instrument in mapping the Habsburg lands 
                                                          
923 Derek Beales, “Joseph II and the monasteries of Austria and Hungary,” in Enlightenment and reform in 
eighteenth-century Europe, 237. Also see Derek Beales, “Maria Theresa, Joseph II and the Suppression of the 
Jesuits,” in Ibid., 207-226. 
924 Szabo, Kaunitz and Enlightened Absolutism, 244-245. 
925 Despite the acceptance of Jesuits as important reformers, scientists and educations, the Habsburg state slowly 
reduced the Society’s control over universities and censorship. Beales, “Maria Theresa, Joseph II and the 
Suppression of the Jesuits,” 213-214. 
926Agustin Udias Vallina, Searching the Heavens and the Earth: the History of Jesuit Observatories (Dordrecht, 
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 1-10. 
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throughout the eighteenth century, was also one of the first supporters of institutionalizing 
astronomic observations in observatories. Shortly after transforming his rooftop into an 
observatory equipped with the latest instruments, Marinoni guided the Jesuits during the 
planning and building phases of their own astronomic institution.927 By 1733, the Society had 
built an Observatory affiliated to the Jesuit College in Vienna. 928  
The international scientific community reacted with a lot of enthusiasm to the founding 
of a Jesuit observatory in Vienna. Soon after the first observations in 1736, French and English 
scientists requested data from Vienna and maintained an active correspondence with the Jesuits 
throughout the eighteenth century. Also, in 1741, the Ottoman representative in Vienna spent one 
day visiting the observatory and thoroughly enjoyed trying the various instruments and 
conversing with the astronomers.929 The University Observatory remained unrivaled in Vienna 
only for a couple of decades, as the Habsburg government increased their control over education 
and sites of knowledge production.  
In 1744, in the context of Maria Theresa’s educational reforms, the Jesuits lost control of 
the University in Vienna and only preserved their authority over the fields of philosophy and 
theology. Additionally, a new building for the university was erected. One decade later after this 
reorganization, Marinoni died, leaving all his astronomic instruments to the Habsburg 
government; Maria Theresa donated this collection to a newly created Imperial Observatory.930 
The empress chose Maximilian Hell, a Jesuit, as director of this institution and bestowed upon 
                                                          
927 Marinoni described his observatory in Giovanni Jacopo de Marinoni, De Astronomica Specula Domestica et 
Organico Apparatu Astronomico Libri Duo (Vienna: Kaliwoda, 1745).  
928 Johann Steinmayr, “Die erste Jesuiten-Sternwarte in Wien. Vortrag im Verein Freunde der Himmelskunde am 9. 
März 1932 mit späteren Ergänzungen,” in Die Geschichte der Universitätssternwarte Wien, 169-170.  
929 Ibid., 174-177. 
930 To avoid confusion I will refer to the first Jesuit observatory as the University Observatory and to the second 
Jesuit observatory as the Imperial Observatory.  
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him the function of Imperial and Royal Astronomer.931 In addition to his responsibilities to keep 
the observatory equipped with all required instruments and to perform astronomic observations, 
Hell was commissioned to hold lectures, open the doors of the observatory to all interested 
people and correspond with other observatories outside the Habsburg borders.932 Hell 
implemented the imperial orders successfully and preserved his position until his death in 1792. 
Creating an Imperial Observatory did not eliminate the importance of its older 
counterpart, however. At the end of 1754, Joseph Liesganig was named the director of the 
University Observatory in Vienna and continued working here until the dissolution of his order. 
In 1761, during his visit to Vienna, Cassini de Thury visited both observatories and commented 
on the quality of their instruments. Whereas in the case of the Imperial Observatory the French 
astronomer considered the instruments from Marinoni’s legacy as outdated and unreliable, he 
admired Liesganig’s inventory and was happy to find in the collection a quadrant similar to the 
ones from the Paris Observatory.933 Liesganig incessantly strived to improve the instrumentation 
of his institution and employed correspondence to foster exchanges with scientific institutions 
from other states. With the help of his friend and Jesuit colleague, Roger Boscovich, whom he 
probably met in the early 1760s, Liesganig sent a request to the Secretary of the Royal Society in 
London for a number of instruments and also shared with this institution the results of his 
work.934 
                                                          
931 Steinmayr, “Die erste Jesuiten-Sternwarte in Wien,” 175-176.  
932 Aspaas, “Maximilianus Hell,” 67-74. 
933 Cassini de Thury, Relations de deux Voyages faits en Allemagne par ordre du Roi, 24. 
934 For example, on April 3, 1765, Liesganig wrote a letter to Bevis to request a number of instruments for his 
observatory; he also sent a number of astronomic observations to prove his credentials. “A Letter from John Bevis, 
M. D. to the Rev. Thomas Birch, D. D. Secretary to the Royal Society; Containing Astronomical Observations, 
Made at Vienna, by the Rev. Father Joseph Liesganig," Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 55 (1765): 
130-138. From this letter we know that by 1764 Liesganig’s collection of instruments included: two mural quadrants 
each with a nine feet radius, a six feet quadrant, a ten feet sector constructed in the style of the Jesuit Roger 
Boscovich, a four feet quadrant, a moveable quadrant of two and a half feet radius, a transit instrument of six and a 
half feet, several fixed telescopes, a gnomon 14 feet high, micrometers and other instruments. Two years later, on 
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While the University Observatory might have been the best equipped in Vienna by the 
second half of the eighteenth century, the international scientific community knew the name of 
imperial astronomer Maximilian Hell better than they knew that of Liesganig. The recent work 
of Aspaas per Pippin demonstrates the key role Hell played during the 1760s investigation of the 
transits of Venus. Pippin describes Hell as a “nodal astronomer” and “networker” who gathered 
astronomic observations from the various Habsburg dominions and shared them with scientific 
centers in places such as London, Padua, Paris, St. Petersburg and many others.935 As the editor 
of the  Ephemerides for the Meridian of Vienna (Ephemerides Astronomicae ad Meridianum 
Vindobonensem) for 35 years, and through his participation in the Vardø expedition to Lapland 
between 1768-1770 to observe the 1769 transit of Venus, Hell became very well known to 
European scientists.936  
In addition to maintaining active international correspondence in order to foster 
astronomic observations in the Habsburg Monarchy, Hell encouraged the establishment of new 
observatories. In the case of the astronomical observatory at the Jesuit University in Tyrnau 
(Trnava, Nagyszombat), finalized in 1755, Hell served as a consultant. From 1752 to 1755, Hell 
taught mathematics at the Jesuit College of Cluj (Kolozsvár, Klausenburg) in the province of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
April 4, 1767, Liesganig also sent to Bevis a short account of the measurement he did of three degrees of latitude 
under the meridian of Vienna. “Extract of a Letter, Dated Vienna April 4, 1767, from Father Joseph Liesganig, 
Jesuit, to Dr. Bevis, F. R. S. Containing a Short Account of the Measurement of Three Degrees of Latitude under the 
Meridian of Vienna,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 58 (1768): 15-16. 
935 Aspaas, “Maximilianus Hell,” 13-15, 37-3. Hell’s publication of observations connected to the transit of Venus in 
1761 proved invaluable for the Academy in Paris, as stated by Lalande. Correspondance de Ferenc Weiss, 
Astronome Hongrois du XVIIIe siècle, ed. Magda Vargha (Budapest: Bibliothèque de l’Université, 1990), 42-43. 
936 In 1762, The Academicians from Paris tried to encourage Maximilian Hell’s publication of the Ephémerides by 
contacting the president of the Vienna University, van Swieten and other Habsburg representatives, and trying to 
ensure Hell would obtain an assistant to help him with his work. As the great astronomer Lalande wrote with 
optimism: “La Cour de Vienne protege trops et les Sciences et Ceux qui les cultivent, pour ne pas reconnoître 
bientôt l’importance d’une semblable secours.” Vargha, Correspondance de Ferenc Weiss, 40-41. 
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Transylvania and laid the foundation for another observatory. This project remained unfinished 
in the eighteenth century due to Hell’s recall to Vienna and the dissolution of the Jesuit order.937 
Although Hell did not himself contribute to the implementation of Habsburg cartographic 
projects, his astronomic work and correspondence with famous mapmakers and astronomers put 
Vienna on the map as one of the important European astronomic centers. Hell also maintained a 
regular correspondence with the Academy of Sciences in Paris, becoming in fact a corresponding 
member. Hell’s example reveals scientific connections between Vienna and Paris, which were 
probably instrumental in encouraging Cassini de Thury and his son Cassini IV to plan and also 
implement collaborations with other Habsburg astronomers and mapmakers.938 In 1761 Hell 
pursued the observation of the transit of Venus from his observatory in Vienna. However, in 
1769 he was able to observe this phenomenon from an island close to the northeastern coast of 
Norway, with a commission from Christian VII, King of Denmark and Norway. Even though no 
Jesuits were allowed to enter Protestant Denmark, an exception was made for Hell, and his 
journey from Vienna through Prague, Dresden, Lepizig, Hamburg and Lübeck allowed him to 
meet and establish connections with other leading astronomers of the age.939 
During his trip to Vienna in 1761 Cassini de Thury met first with Hell, but he ended up 
observing the transit of Venus from the University Observatory and also did extensive geodetic 
measurements with Liesganig. Less known to scholars today than Hell,940 Liesganig played an 
                                                          
937 Aspaas, “Maximilianus Hell,” 61-65. 
938 A large part of Hell’s correspondence is in the archive of the Observatory in Vienna. Vienna, Wiener 
Universitätssternwarte (hereafter WUS). 
939 For the diary of the expedition see: Karl Ludwig Littrow, P. Hell's Reise nach Wardoe bei Lappland und seine 
Beobachtung des Venus-durchganges im Jahre 1769 (Vienna: C. Gerold, 1835). 
940 Two recent works that focused on Hell’s career are Nora Pärr, Maximilian Hell und sein wissenschaftliches 
Umfeld im Wien des 18. Jahrhunderts (Nordhausen: Bautz, 2013) and Aspaas, “Maximilianus Hell.” Additionally, 
Laszlo Kontler recently published more articles discussing Maximilian Hell’s expedition to Lapland and the impact 
of the main by-product of the expedition, the Demonstratio. Idioma Ungarorum et Lapponum idem esse. László 
Kontler, "Distances celestial and terrestrial: Maximilian Hell's Arctic Expedition of 1768-1769: Contexts and 
Responses," in Scholars in Action: The Practice of Knowledge and the Figure of the Savant in the 18th Century, eds. 
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important role in the development of cartography in the Habsburg lands.941 His projects included 
surveys of meridian arches, the development of a methodology on how to represent large 
territories on maps, and the survey and mapping of the part of Poland annexed to the Habsburg 
Monarchy in 1772. Although limited geographically to the Habsburg dominions, Liesganig’s 
career brought him into contact with scientists from all over Europe. After he had to officially 
shed his Jesuit identity in 1773, Liesganig continued serving the Viennese rulers, and his 
cartographic and administrative work contributed to the integration of the newly acquired 
province of Galicia into the empire.942  
Historians of cartography and astronomy often mention the meeting between Cassini de 
Thury and Liesganig in Vienna and the work they did jointly in 1761 as an important result of 
the newly signed Habsburg-Bourbon’s alliance and as a turning point in the history of Habsburg 
cartography. However, the impact of Cassini de Thury’s visit to Vienna on Liesganig’s career 
and approach to surveying should not be overestimated. Liesganig’s dedication to contributing to 
the quest of identifying the shape of the Earth and his admiration of the French Academy of 
Sciences’ methodology were only reaffirmed after Cassini de Thury’s journey to Vienna. In July 
1759, Liesganig had already started surveying an arc of meridian between Vienna and Brunn 
with support from Maria Theresa and as a result of Boscovich’s suggestion. From the start 
Liesganig had planned his meridian arc survey as part of a series of earlier operations such as the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
André Holenstein, Hubert Steinke, and Martin Stuber (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 721-750; László Kontler, “Politicians, 
Patriots and Plotters: Unlikely Debates Occasioned by Maximilian Hell’s Venus Transit Expedition of 1769,” 
Journal of Astronomical Data 19, no. 1 (2013): 83-93. 
941 Joseph Liesganig (1719-1799) joined the Jesuit order in 1734 and was educated in Vienna. From 1742 he taught 
mathematics in Graz, and from 1744 he taught rhetoric in Linz. After his ordination to priesthood in 1748, he went 
to Komorn in 1749 as a German preacher and to Kaschau in 1751 as a mathematics professor. 1752, he received the 
title of historian and mathematician of the Jesuit Order and started working at the Observatory affiliated with the 
Jesuit College in Vienna. From 1756 until 1773 he was the prefect of this Observatory. In 1752 he started teaching 
mathematics at the University of Vienna. Walther Fischer, “Liesganig, Joseph”, in Neue Deutsche Biographie, vol. 
14 (1985), 540-542, http://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd118998153.html, last accessed on July 20, 2013. 
942 Seegel, Mapping Europe’s Borderlands, 136. 
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measurements of La Condamine in Peru, Roger Boscovich in the papal states, and Louis de la 
Caille at the Cape of Good Hope. La Caille even sent to Liesganig an iron copy of the French 
measurement unit, the toise, used by the Academy in their measurements. In this way, the Jesuit 
could compare his results with the French scientists’ work.943 Cassini de Thury’s arrival in May 
1761 provided an opportunity for Liesganig to continue his project while also learning from and 
exchanging information with this renowned mapmaker.  
From the point of view of the French scientist, the trip to Vienna was an opportunity to 
encounter future patrons and further some of his scientific projects. Cassini de Thury met in 
Vienna the leading decision-makers in the state: Kaunitz and the members of the imperial 
family.944 The French scientist observed that year’s transit of Venus at the University 
Observatory in the company of Liesganig and the future emperor Joseph II. We cannot speculate 
on what Cassini de Thury talked about with the inheritor of the Habsburg throne, but in his report 
to the Academy of Sciences in Paris the astronomer wrote “this Prince looked several times to 
Venus and asked me various questions which proved the range of his knowledge.”945 It is clear 
that the Habsburg rulers looked on Cassini de Thury’s mission with benevolent eyes and 
encouraged his collaborations with local astronomers.  
Empress Maria Theresa received the French astronomer with honor not only because he 
was a famous scientist, but also because he was a representative of the Habsburgs’ new ally, the 
                                                          
943 Sven Widmalm, “Accuracy, Rhetoric, and Technology: The Paris-Greenwich Triangulation, 1784-88,” in The 
Quantifying Spirit in the 18th Century, 182; Ernst Bernleithner, “Oesterreichs Kartographie zur Zeit des Grafen 
Ferraris,” 140. 
944 The day after his arrival, Kaunitz promised governmental support to Cassini for the success of his mission. MAE 
CP, Autriche, box 282, 208-208 verso. Regarding his audience with the empress, Cassini writes that he had been so 
overwhelmed by the honor Maria Theresa lavished on him, that he could barely hear and reproduce what she had 
told him. In original: “Je fus si occupé de tout ce que l’Impératrice me fit l’honneur de me dire, qu’à peine je 
pouvois l’entendre, & qu’encore moins je pourrois le rendre,” in Cassini de Thury, Relations de deux Voyages faits 
en Allemagne par ordre du Roi, x-xi. 
945 “ce Prince regarda plusieurs fois Vénus & me fit plusieurs questions qui prouvoient l’étendue de ses 
connoissances.” Cassini de Thury, “Observation du passage de Vénus sur le Soleil, faite a Vienne en Autriche,” in 
Mémoires de l’Académie Royale des Sciences année 1761 (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1763), 410. 
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French king Louis XV. Cassini de Thury was aware of his double role. In his written account he 
stated: “What circumstances could be more favorable to execute such a useful geographical 
project than the union of interests between France and the princes of the empire and the House of 
Austria?”946 The French geographer linked the project for measuring Vienna’s longitude with the 
signing of the 1756 Bourbon-Habsburg alliance. Even more, he underlined how the project 
would not have been possible without the existence of this treaty as the Seven Years’ War did 
not end until 1763.947 Cassini de Thury suggested that his project was possible despite the war. A 
closer examination of his published books, however, suggests the project might have happened 
because of the war. The decision-makers in Versailles supported the astronomer’s enterprise in 
order to improve the accuracy of maps displaying the war theater in the German lands, while 
Maria Theresa ensured that at least one of her experts in the art of surveying, Liesganig, worked 
together with Cassini de Thury and learned from the experience of France’s mapmaker.  
 The French scientist overtly declared in his work that for a very long time French military 
maps of foreign territories lacked precision, as they were not based on geometric measurements. 
However, the Duke of Choiseul, occupying both the positions of Foreign and War Minister, 
commissioned the ingénieurs géographes to prepare new maps using instruments such as 
compasses and plane tables in the hope that their work “will never have to be corrected again.” 
Unfortunately for the French crown, such a vast project would have required years until 
completion. Therefore, Cassini de Thury suggested that astronomic observations along the 
perpendicular on the meridian of Paris, traversing Europe from Strasbourg to Vienna, and the 
correct identification of the location of more than 40 known cities and towns along the way 
                                                          
946 “En effet, quelle circonstance plus favorable pour exécuter un projet aussi utile à la Géographie, que celle où la 
France était unie d’intérêt avec la Princes de l’Empire & la Maison d’Autriche?,” in Cassini de Thury, Relations de 
deux Voyages faits en Allemagne par ordre du Roi, vi. 
947 Ibid., 5-6 
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would help correct and ensure the reutilization of older maps.948 Cassini de Thury had used the 
opportunity offered by military conflicts to expand his cartographic work before, in the lands of 
the Austrian Netherlands during the war for the Austrian Succession (1740-1748).949 However, 
in the early 1760s the French troops did not control the German lands the French scientist 
planned to travel through and the Habsburgs had become important allies only recently. 
Therefore, Maria Theresa and her husband, Francis Stephan, would not have supported a French 
attempt to prepare detailed topographic maps of the German and Habsburg dominions.  
The imperial couple did not encourage Cassini de Thury’s mission only out of altruism 
and deference for their Bourbon allies. As shown in the previous chapter, Maria Theresa and her 
advisers benefitted during the Seven Years’ War from the help of French military officers. 
Furthermore, the Habsburg political elites adopted some elements from the training and 
organization of French military engineers. Also, it probably was no coincidence that in 1763, a 
little over a decade after Cassini de Thury started working on a detailed topographic map of 
France, Maria Theresa ordered the mapping of the Habsburg Monarchy.950  
Just as Cassini de Thury was not solely an academician in the service of science, but also 
a French subject, Liesganig was both a Jesuit and a Habsburg agent. This connection suggests 
that the bilateral pact furthered the interests of both empires in the field of mapmaking. In 
addition to observing together the transit of Venus, the Cassini-Liesganig collaboration extended 
                                                          
948 Ibid., 3-6. 
949 Between 1746 and 1748, after the French troops had invaded the Austrian Netherlands, Cassini de Thury 
surveyed and constructed a triangulation network for a significant part of this Habsburg province. Cassini 
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950 For a detailed presentation of Cassini’s “Map of France” see Konvitz, Cartography in France; Monique Pelletier, 
Les cartes des Cassini: la science au service de l’état et des regions (Paris: CTHS, 2002). For more details on the 
Habsburg “Josephinische Aufnahme” see Paldus, Die militärischen Aufnahmen im Bereiche der habsburgischen 
Länder aus der Zeit Kaiser Josephs II.  
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over more months to include construction of a triangulation network for the area surrounding 
Vienna. At the order of Maria Theresa and Francis Stephan, Liesganig had already done some 
preliminary work for the measurement of Vienna’s meridian. There is no clear evidence of how 
the international team of scientists interacted during their work, whether Cassini de Thury or 
Liesganig had more knowledge, or whether there were any contradicting points of view. Based 
on the French scientist’s account, published in 1765, the reader is led to perceive this joint 
project as a work done by equals. The astronomer acknowledged that before his arrival in 
Vienna, Liesganig had already measured a basis of 4000 toises in the area of Vienna with the 
help of an iron toise sent from Paris by Condamine and de la Caille. This measurement unit had 
been adjusted on the model of the unit used in Peru. Shortly after the arrival of the French 
mapmaker, Liesganig showed to Cassini de Thury the best existing map of the area surrounding 
Vienna and revealed a plethora of faults.951 The Jesuit believed building a triangulation network 
for the area around Vienna would improve the accuracy of cartographic representations.  
Indeed, the measurements and the triangulation network Liesganig established in 
collaboration with Cassini de Thury served this purpose. The captain from the engineering 
brigade, Jean Baptiste d’Avrange, represented on a manuscript map the results of the Cassini-
Liesganig collaborative work: Map of Triangles used to determine the position of more sites in 
the area of Vienna (Carte des Triangles qui sont servis à déterminer la Position de plusieurs 
Lieux aux environs de Vienne).952 Cassini de Thury planned to use this map to convince Holy 
Roman Emperor, Francis Stephan, to associate astronomic operations with mapmaking work.953 
                                                          
951 Cassini’s remark that he had already noticed the faulty representation of the flow of the Danube serves the 
purpose of establishing the academicians’ authority. Cassini de Thury, Relations de deux Voyages faits en 
Allemagne par ordre du Roi, xi. 
952 Dörflinger, Die Österreichische Kartographie, vol. 1, 61; Bernleithner, “Oesterreichs Kartographie zur Zeit des 
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953 WUS, “Manuscripte von Hell, Chr. 90,” Band 3 (Manuskripte von Hell 2), Mappe 3, July 1, 1761, Hell to 
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Figure 7.1 Vienna and its surroundings on the Map of Triangles used to determine the position of more sites in the 
area of Vienna (1761) 
 
 
Figure 7.1 shows a fragment from the manuscript map prepared by d’Avrange in 1761.954 
In addition to the main settlements, the engineer represented the triangulation network measured 
by Cassini de Thury and Liesganig. The map includes not only the meridian and parallel passing 
through Vienna, but also the perpendicular to the meridian of Paris, thus connecting the 
Habsburg and Bourbon domains. In the bottom left corner the scientists listed distances from 23 
settlements to the meridian and parallel passing through Vienna. D’Avrange incorporated in the 
top corners a schematic plan of the imperial palaces at Schönbrunn and Laxenburg, as seen in 
Figure 7.2.955 The presence of these imperial residences reminded the viewer that the Habsburg 
patronage made this project possible. Cassini de Thury’s Map of the Surroundings of Vienna 
(Carte des environs de Wienne) published in 1763 is very similar to d’Avrange’s.956 
                                                          
954 ÖNB, Kartensammlung, AB 7 B 1.  
955 Ibid. 
956 This map is reproduced in Dörflinger, Descriptio Austriae, 32. ÖNB, Kartensammlung, Alb. 180-14; Paris, 
Bibliothèque nationale de France (hereafter BNF), GE C – 11362. 
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Figure 7.2 Schönbrunn and Laxenburg on the Map of Triangles used to determine the position of more sites in the 
area of Vienna (1761) 
 
 
The Cassini-Liesganig team served at the time as an example of cooperation across 
borders, fostered with the help of the Bourbon and Habsburg dynasties. Cassini de Thury took 
great care in his published work to emphasize the generosity of the Habsburg rulers and their 
wide knowledge and interest in his work. The French scientist strived to satisfy his Viennese 
patrons not only as a sign of gratitude, but also in the hope of receiving future commissions for 
himself and his other relatives, as described in the next chapter.  
During his time working with Cassini de Thury we can infer that Liesganig learned more 
about the methodology on which the Academy in Paris based the construction of the Map of 
France. Indeed, in 1762, shortly after Cassini de Thury’s departure, Maria Theresa ordered 
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Liesganig to resume his arc measurement operations. The Jesuit surveyed the area between 
Sobieschiz, close to Brunn in Moravia and Warasdin in Croatia, and measured two bases of 
around 12 kilometers each: Wiener Neustadt-Neukirchen and Seyring-Raasdorf-Glinzendorf. 
Some of the students attending the courses at the Engineering Academy participated in the 
survey operations at Kahlenberg close to Vienna and learned from the Jesuit the mechanics of 
such measurements. In the end, Liesganig managed to survey three degrees on the Vienna 
meridian.957 The measurement of a meridian’s degrees and the training of military engineers in 
the art of geodetic measurements could have been meant to serve as preparatory steps in ordering 
a survey of the Habsburg Monarchy based on the French model.  
On June 21, 1763, two years before publishing any part of his journey, Cassini de Thury 
submitted to Maria Theresa a narrative of his travels as a sign of gratitude for the empress’s 
“protection for the Sciences.” Moreover, it seems he proposed to Maria Theresa a project to 
improve the maps of her lands and even offered his services.958 The mere existence of such an 
offer suggests Cassini de Thury’s awareness that the Habsburg monarchs desired a cartographic 
representation of their lands. However, by the time Maria Theresa actually ordered the mapping 
of her lands in 1763, she was aware of the Cassinis’ failure to adopt a brisk pace in surveying the 
lands of France and she chose a different approach for her dominions, prioritizing fast mapping 
over a combination of geodetic and astronomic measurements.959 Moreover, the Habsburg 
                                                          
957 Bernleithner, “Oesterreichs Kartographie zur Zeit des Grafen Ferraris,” 140-141; Dörflinger, Die Österreichische 
Kartographie, vol. 1, 61-62; Geissl, Joseph Liesganig, 13-20. 
958 HHStA StK, WKL, box 5, folder Cassini de Thury und P. Luskanik(?), folio 2. As Cassini’s narrative was not 
located in the Viennese archives we cannot discuss his project. We can infer that his plan would have been based on 
the project for the Map of France. 
959 Although Cassini estimated the completion of the project for 1768, he had serious difficulties in recruiting trained 
personnel, and the French monarchy cut all funding during the Seven Years’ War. Therefore, the French 
cartographer had to continue the enterprise as a share company. Luckily, he benefitted from substantial financial 
support from the political elite of the time, and even the king allowed him to keep all existing materials, instruments, 
maps, and other working documents. However, the map was far from being finalized when the French Revolution 
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central political elites had no interest in publishing detailed topographic representations of their 
territories, preferring to keep the results secret from the prying eyes of allies, enemies and even 
provincial political elites. Therefore, Habsburg military engineers used older maps and fast 
geometric surveys without resorting to astronomic measurements. Chapter 3 includes an in-depth 
discussion of the mapping of Transylvania as part of this imperial cartographic project and 
reveals details about the Habsburg strategy to obtain a representation of their lands at a swift 
pace.  
Even though the Cassini Map of France did not serve as a guideline for the first military 
mapping of the Habsburg Monarchy, Maria Theresa supported Liesganig’s future projects and 
was receptive to the Jesuit’s suggestions on how to map large territories. On July 15, 1769, 
Liesganig proposed to Maria Theresa another meridian arc measurement in the Hungarian plain, 
in the neighboring area of Szeged. In his effort to convince the empress of the importance of 
such a venture, Liesganig mentioned how scientists from France, England and Italy all waited for 
this new measurement as a crucial step in establishing the true shape of the earth. Moreover, 
Liesganig insisted that his work in Hungary would also contribute to the improvement of the 
geographical knowledge about this Habsburg province. In exchange for imperial patronage, the 
astronomer offered to take with him a military engineer and train him in the French mapmaking 
technique. Here, Liesganig most probably referred to the methodology used for the Cassini Map 
of France.960 Maria Theresa approved Liesganig’s request and gave him 1,000 guldens for his 
efforts with a condition: the Jesuit had to prepare a short document describing a method to 
represent large territories on a map based on mathematical principles.961  
                                                          
960 HHStA StK, Vortrage, box 104, folder 1, 41-41 verso. 
961 Ibid., 39; HHStA StK, WKL, box 5, folder Liesganig, P.  
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Although Maria Theresa had already ordered in 1763 the detailed surveying of her 
dominions, that project was far from being finished by 1769, and the empress was interested in 
exploring ways to improve its implementation. Maria Theresa’s desire to learn about how to 
construct a map starting from “true mathematical principles” (wahren mathematischen 
Grundsätzen) demonstrates her conviction that mathematics was one of the pillars of good map-
making. This point also clarifies the reason why the empress chose the engineers that she did, the 
military officers with the strongest background in mathematics, to prepare detailed maps of her 
dominions.  
After finalizing the meridian arc measurements, Liesganig prepared a thorough report and 
sent it to Maria Theresa by early November.962 This report is a window into the mechanics of 
such an expedition, offering information about the personnel working with Liesganig, the 
instruments they used, their methodology and other obstacles they had to surpass as part of their 
work. Liesganig started his expedition on August 7, 1769, and took with him three assistants: the 
engineer-lieutenant Leopold Unterberger, the sapper lieutenant Hippolytus Verité, and another 
Jesuit, the mechanic Joseph Rämspöck. All of them, with the exception of Verité, who followed 
the team a couple of days later, travelled from Vienna to Buda on the Danube.  
Liesganig transformed the boat he travelled on into a site for scientific experiments: 
during his journey down the Danube he used a compass to record the accurate flow of the river. 
However, the Jesuit was unsuccessful in these attempts and blamed his failure on the unreliable 
flow of the water and the quality of the shores. He also argued that only a geometrical survey 
could determine the exact trajectory of the Danube. In this case, having a trained scientist 
perform the observations was as important as using the proper methodology and instruments. 
The rise of the scientific expert is typical for what came to be seen in the eighteenth century as 
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the basis for correct maps: figures and tables synthesizing the result of astronomic and geometric 
measurements replaced narrative tales and geographic descriptions as the raw data from which a 
map was built.963 
After a brief stay in Buda to make all the necessary arrangements for their trip, Liesganig 
and Unterberger resumed their journey down the river, arriving in Peterwardein on August 18. 
Liesganig had left his instruments and his assistant Rämspöck in Buda to wait for Verité. The 
two of them caught up with Liesganig in Peterwardein on August 24, and the team started on-
ground measurements. Liesganig combined the geodetic measurements with astronomic 
observations. Among the obstacles that slowed down his work the Jesuit mentioned the rainy 
weather and the scarcity of wood for preparing artificial signs to mark the triangulation network. 
Liesganig also had to hire a military guard for protection, but he does not provide any further 
details about the reasons for this decision. After laying down the triangulation network and a 
second base line, Liesganig finalized the astronomic measurements by October 29, 1769.  
Taking the time and effort to record his every step reveals the Jesuit’s belief that both the 
actual experiment and its codification mattered in equal measure. Similar to the leaders of other 
eighteenth century expeditions to measure arcs of meridian, such as those who undertook the 
French-Spanish journey to Quito, Liesganig strived to execute, codify and demonstrate the 
accuracy of his scientific labor.964 Before making his measurements from the early 1760s and 
1769 available to a wider public, Liesganig had to convince his patrons in Vienna about the 
reliability of his work. The journal of the expedition partially fulfilled this need. Additionally, 
Liesganig prepared a cartographic representation of his work.  
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The map complemented the information included in Liesganig’s written report and 
showed the area between the rivers Tisa and Danube, where the Jesuit constructed his 
triangulation network.965 The point where the structure known as the Roman entrenchment 
(Römerschanze) touched the bank of the Tisa represented the starting point for the 
measurements. This entrenchment connected the river Tisa with the Danube and served as an 
organizing line for Liesganig for his triangulation network. Point A on Figure 7.3 represents the 
village Czurock’s inn, transformed by the astronomers into a temporary observatory for which 
they calculated the latitude. The fragment also shows parts of some of the triangles’ edges and 
the angles between them. In the end, Liesganig and his team measured a small segment of the 
Peterwardein meridian between the tower of the Peterwardein fortress and the parallel going 
through the inn in Czurock. Based on these measurements the Jesuit deducted the value of one 
degree of meridian in the Hungarian lowlands. He published his calculations and results in 
1770.966 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3 The Village Czurock’s inn on the Map of the Roman entrenchment located at Peterwardein between the 
Danube and Tisza 
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966 Joseph Liesganig, Dimensio graduum meridiani Viennensis et Hungarici (Vienna: Augustinum Bernardi, 1770). 
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Liesganig could not have finalized his measurements in just two months without the help 
of his assistants. In the final report the Jesuit praised the two engineers, Unterberger and Verité, 
for their hard work and their ability to do all mathematical calculations and to use instruments 
such as the quadrant.967 Liesganig’s compliments suggest the two engineers already had a strong 
background in mathematics and the use of geodetic instruments a result of their education in the 
Viennese schools.  
As requested by the empress in July 1769, in exchange for financial support to complete 
the measurement of the meridian arc in the Hungarian, Liesganig prepared a short description of 
a method to map large territories based on mathematical principles.968 From the opening 
paragraph, the Jesuit denied any claims to originality and named the Academy of Sciences in 
Paris and their project for a Map of France as inspirations for this methodology. Liesganig’s 
report discussed all the steps necessary to survey a large territory, including creating a 
triangulation network and using trigonometric rules to calculate the sides and angles of triangles. 
The Jesuit decried the lack of preparation of most military engineers with respect to theoretical 
geometry and criticized the surveying work they did to create representations of the Habsburg 
dominions.  
Liesganig’s statements attacked the principles adopted by the general quartermaster’s 
staff for the production of the Great Military Map (Josephinische Aufnahme). Nonetheless, 
Liesganig did not consider the work of military engineers pointless, and insisted that already 
finished maps could be improved with the help of his method. The scientist praised the ability of 
engineers to build a triangulation network and brought as an example the high quality work that 
Leopold Unterberger and Hippolytus Verité performed in 1769. In Liesganig’s opinion, the real 
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obstacle in the way of good mapmaking was a lack of instruments, especially quadrants, and the 
absence of proper surveyors who could combine geodetic and astronomic measurements.969  
As a preliminary step to creating a map for the Monarchy, Liesganig suggested starting 
from the arches of meridian he had measured in the early 1760s and in 1769, and extending those 
triangulation networks north and south. He also recommended measuring another network from 
east to west along the 47th parallel north, thus connecting the Principality of Moldavia and 
Transylvania at one end with the Swiss cantons at the other. Additionally, Liesganig wanted to 
compute two triangulation networks organized around two perpendiculars to the two meridians: 
one starting from Prague and covering Bohemia, the other going through Vienna and including 
Austria and Upper Hungary. In the Jesuit’s opinion, a good engineer could calculate values for 
the two meridians and three perpendiculars in three years. At the end of his report, Liesganig 
volunteered to do a trial for a large territory in order to demonstrate the superiority of his 
method.970  
On May 4, 1770, shortly after Liesganig submitted this project proposal, Maria Theresa 
ordered that the Jesuit should undertake a general survey of Lower Austria with the help of 
quadrants and triangles, namely by doing astronomic measurements and building a triangulation 
network.971 Obviously by issuing this order Maria Theresa was signaling her acceptance of 
Liesganig’s offer to demonstrate the viability of his mapmaking methodology.  
By mid-May, Liesgang announced his eagerness to start the project once the construction 
of the quadrant was completed. The Jesuit promised the conclusion of the survey by the fall of 
1770 and asked for 2,000 guldens to subsidize his travel- and survey-related expenses. Liesganig 
claimed he required no assistants for the measurements. Nonetheless, he offered to train some 
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military engineers during the survey of the surroundings of Vienna.972 Liesganig had trained 
military engineers during his 1769 arc measurements in Hungary, so he knew the benefits of 
such a system. This arrangement was not unheard of before Liesganig’s proposal. In the early 
phases of his map of France, Cassini de Thury also trained engineers on the job in an area 
between Paris and Versailles.973 During the French scientist’s trip to Vienna, he might have 
discussed with Liesganig the challenge of instructing good mapmakers, which may have led to 
Liesganig’s willingness to train others.  
As a result of Liesganig’s proposal, Kaunitz ordered the Aulic War Council to contact the 
Jesuit and decide which engineers to send to work with him when the survey reached the 
surroundings of Vienna.974 Unfortunately I could not locate any trace of reports of Liesganig’s 
survey of Lower Austria; the latest archival trace, dated June 28, 1770, documents Liesganig’s 
decision to replace the on-the-job training of engineering students on how to conduct geometric 
survey operations with classroom instruction.975 Therefore, until more evidence resurfaces, we 
can infer this project was never finalized.976  
Even though Liesganig’s survey of Lower Austria was probably unsuccessful, the Jesuit 
remained valuable to the Habsburg rulers as an expert in the art of mapmaking. One year later, 
on August 9, 1771, a new imperial order stated Liesganig would train a group of students from 
the Engineering Academy in Vienna in the science of astronomy. Prior to Liesganig’s arrival, 
officers from the engineering brigades had to prepare a select subgroup of students in the fields 
of theoretical geometry and trigonometry; moreover, the students had to possess a good grasp of 
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Josephs II., 24. 
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surveying based on trigonometric operations.977 Clearly, the imperial leaders in Vienna hoped to 
prepare a new generation of mapmakers, experts in the fields of both geodetic and astronomic 
measurements.  
The dissolution of the Jesuit order in 1773 did not interrupt Liesganig’s work in the 
service of the Monarchy. In 1772, Maria Theresa had already deployed him to Galicia, the part 
of Poland that the Habsburgs had annexed that same year. During the following decades 
Liesganig prepared maps and a cadastral survey of this region and continued his astronomical 
observations at the Observatory in Lviv, the capital of the province.978  
As the examples of Hell and Liesganig show, Jesuits serving the Habsburg monarchs in 
the eighteenth century as astronomers and mapmakers had careers that kept them moving 
between geographic areas and institutional settings.979 As members of the Jesuit Austrian 
province, Hell and Liesganig served the Society as educators and scientists, especially in Vienna, 
but also in Transylvania, Hungary and Galicia; as Habsburg agents, these two astronomers 
consulted political rulers on geodetic and other scientific projects impacting the whole of the 
Monarchy; and as representatives of the Republic of Letters, these Jesuits fostered trans-imperial 
connections with states such as France and Denmark. The examples of Hell and Liesganig 
demonstrate the importance of applying a multi-level analysis to the contribution of Habsburg 
scientists to the development of astronomy and mapmaking in the eighteenth century.  
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7.2 ROGER BOSCOVICH AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ASTRONOMY IN 
LOMBARDY 
In the same way the king of Denmark sought out Maximilian Hell’s help, Habsburg political 
elites also made efforts to recruit scholars from other parts of Europe. One such example is 
Roger Boscovich, one of the most famous scientists of the second half of the eighteenth 
century.980 This section explores Boscovich’s relationship with the Habsburg Monarchy, first as 
a visitor to Vienna, then as a professor at the University of Pavia and the College of Brera. 
Boscovich inspired the meridian arc measurements of Liesganig and made consistent efforts to 
institutionalize astronomic observations in Milan. This scientist successfully planned and 
ensured the foundation of an astronomic observatory as part of the Jesuit College of Brera, which 
became an important site for astronomic and mapmaking knowledge in the Habsburg Monarchy.  
Similar to the two observatories in Vienna, the one in Brera created close correspondence 
connections with other scientific centers in Europe, as well as almost contributed to a second 
collaboration between Cassini de Thury and Habsburg scientists, and at Kaunitz’s orders, laid the 
ground for an improved map of Lombardy based on both astronomic and geodetic 
measurements. Moreover, some of the Jesuits working in Brera, including Boscovich and 
Francesco Luino, prepared reports on how to improve the education of engineers and surveyors 
working in Lombardy. Like Liesganig, Jesuits active in Lombardy were not isolated in an ivory 
tower, but worked in the service of the Habsburg government to further its priorities. Therefore, 
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in order to understand Habsburg cartography, we need to supplement the overview of military 
engineers with a discussion of the astronomers from Milan working at the Brera Observatory.  
Boscovich’s interest in two of the main scientific adventures of the eighteenth century, 
namely establishing the shape of the Earth and observing the transit of Venus, influenced the 
trajectory of his career. In 1750, when Michel Angelo de Blasco, the military engineer discussed 
in chapter 2, transferred into the service of the Portuguese king, John V, he almost had 
Boscovich as one of his colleagues. The Jesuit had expressed his interest in traveling to Brazil 
and measuring a meridian arc in the area while also working for the Portuguese ruler and helping 
with the implementation of the Treaty of Madrid.981 However, as Boscovich was a figure known 
to many in Rome, the State Secretary of the Papal States, Cardinal Valenti-Gonzaga, convinced 
pope Benedict XIV to present the Jesuit with a counter-offer: sponsorship for an expedition to 
measure a meridian arc of two degrees from Rome to Rimini. Boscovich accepted the offer and 
together with the English Jesuit Christopher Maire they finalized this project and also prepared a 
highly acclaimed new map of the Papal States. Prior to this project, Boscovich requested from 
the Academy of Sciences in Paris a copy of the toise used by the French in their Peru and 
Lapland measurements; sadly the copy of the toise reached too late for him to utilize it. Still, 
Boscovich’s methodology directly influenced Liesganig and his measurements in Austria and 
Hungary discussed in the previous section.982  
Boscovich’s approach to measuring meridian arcs spread not only through example. The 
Jesuit made active efforts to convince some of the crowned heads of Europe to sponsor similar 
projects in their lands. The editor of the 1770 French edition of Boscovich’s work Voyage 
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Astronomique et Geographique dans l’Etat de l’Eglise mentioned how the scientist pleaded with 
Maria Theresa to order the measurement of meridian arcs in Moravia, Austria, Styria and the 
plains of Hungary. Moreover, Boscovich convinced the King of Sardinia to command similar 
operations in Piedmont, and during his trip to England, he persuaded the Royal Society to 
complete a meridian arc measurement in America.983 As illustrated by Liesganig’s career, 
Boscovich was also successful in convincing the Habsburg rulers of the importance of 
contributing to this global enterprise.  
During his stay in Vienna between 1757-1758 and the first months of 1763, Boscovich 
met with members of the imperial family, their main advisors, and other scientists, including 
Liesganig, numerous times. Moreover, he taught courses in mathematics and physics and 
received permission from Emperor Francis Stephen to work in the Natural History Museum. 
Additionally, in 1763, he took part in the meridian arc measurements that Liesganig and his team 
executed in Austria.984 Convinced of Boscovich’s value as a scientist, Maria Theresa and 
Chancellor Kaunitz recruited him to teach at the University of Pavia starting at the beginning of 
the academic year 1764. It is during this time that the first disagreements between Boscovich and 
his Habsburg employers arose. In only a couple of years after Boscovich’s arrival in Pavia, 
Kaunitz became convinced the Jesuit was prioritizing his own scientific ambitions rather than 
contributing to the development of university education. Kaunitz’s discontent only increased 
when he found out the Jesuit planned to join an international scientific expedition under foreign 
sponsorship to travel to California.  
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In the years leading up to 1769, scientists all over Europe prepared to send expeditions to 
to observe the transit of Venus.985 In this context, the Royal Society of London, which Boscovich 
had officially joined in 1761,986 invited the Jesuit to lead a group of scientists to the Spanish 
dominions in California. Flattered by the offer, the astronomer lost no time in informing 
Lombardy’s plenipotentiary minister, Count Firmian, of his desire to accept the commission and 
asking for a leave of absence from his position at the University of Pavia.987  
Despite Firmian’s optimism that the imperial leaders in Vienna would surely approve 
Boscovich’s request, things turned sour by the end of the summer; Kaunitz refused to allow 
Boscovich to leave his post and expressed his displeasure with the Jesuit’s frequent trips away 
from Pavia.988 Despite this rebuff, Boscovich persevered in his desire to accept the Royal 
Society’s assignment. By October 1766 he received the official invitation and claimed in letters 
to his collaborators that he had obtained all necessary permissions from his spiritual and 
temporal superiors.989 Why would Boscovich make such a claim despite the Habsburg 
authorities’ true position? Firstly, the Jesuit had Firmian’s support and believed this minister 
would intercede for him with Kaunitz. Secondly, the scientist hoped the Habsburg rulers would 
not want to appear as narrow-minded monarchs who were hindering scientific progress and not 
contributing to the 1769 expeditions to observe the transit of Venus.990 Boscovich aggravated his 
position when he tried to recruit his friend and collaborator Liesganig to the expedition.991  
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The director of the University Observatory in Vienna, Liesganig, had proven himself 
valuable to his Habsburg patrons and Kaunitz wanted to keep the scientist in the imperial capital, 
far from the dangers of a trans-Atlantic expedition. Liesganig’s efforts to convince Chancellor 
Kaunitz to allow him and Boscovich to travel across the Atlantic were fruitless. According to 
Liesganig’s account, Kaunitz’s rejection to allow the two Jesuits to participate in the expedition 
to California was not open to any debate. During one of Liesganig’s audiences in 1766 Kaunitz 
told him: “What is this I hear about you also wanting to engage in the same foolishness as 
Boscovich, crossing the ocean and perhaps not seeing anything there?” The Chancellor made it 
clear he hoped Liesganig would not persist in his desire to go to California.992 In the face of 
Boscovich’s stubborn persistence to plan for this long trip sponsored by the Royal Society, 
Liesganig wrote to Boscovich again on May 28, 1767. The Viennese astronomer listed the 
drawbacks such a trip would entail for Boscovich’s career, especially the disappointment and 
possible wrath of the empress and her trusted advisor Kaunitz. The Spanish government’s 
dissolution of the Jesuit order in 1767 removed Boscovich’s dilemma, as he could no longer 
travel safely to any Spanish territories.993  
As illustrated by the Boscovich plan to travel to California, the Habsburg rulers appear to 
have gone against the greater interest of global science. However, we saw in the previous section 
that in 1768, Maria Theresa approved Hell’s request to travel with the sponsorship of the Danish 
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king to Lapland to observe the transit of Venus. Therefore, we cannot make generalizing 
statements about the Habsburg attitude towards the promotion of scientific knowledge on an 
imperial or global scale. In each case we need to take into account the role of diplomatic 
connections, the credibility of the scientists making the request with the Court, and the potential 
value that the Habsburg rulers saw in diverting the energy of their scientists from imperial 
projects.  
 The incident over Boscovich’s plans to travel to California negatively impacted the 
scientist’s relationship with Vienna. The Habsburg government no longer saw maintaining him 
as a professor in Pavia as feasible, especially as Boscovich repeatedly complained about the lack 
of proper facilities and preferred to spend his holidays in Brera working at the astronomical 
observatory.994 Therefore, it should not be surprising that in 1770, Boscovich was transferred to 
Milan as professor of optics and astronomy in the Palatine Schools.  
 The Jesuit’s move to Milan coincided with the Habsburg government’s efforts to reform 
the engineering education in Lombardy. As discussed in chapter 2, in 1771, the government in 
Vienna requested proposals for reforming the licensing process of engineers in the State of Milan 
from a group of experts in teaching mathematics and astronomy. Similar to how Liesganig 
trained military engineers from Vienna to improve their mapmaking skills, Jesuits from 
Lombardy offered their suggestions on how to improve the education of engineers. Francesco 
Luino, one of the astronomers in Brera, submitted one of the reports.995 Luino decried what he 
called the decadence of the Collegio and the presence of numerous engineers who were 
engineers in name only, with no real knowledge about the art of surveying. The Jesuit proposed 
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creating a professorship and a public school for engineers that would be the only institution to 
license engineers. Luino volunteered himself for the position of teacher for young engineers.996 
Probably in this same context Boscovich wrote a project for a School of Geodesy to train 
surveyors and engineers on how to survey and prepare maps of territories.997 In the plan, 
Boscovich criticized the existing system of internship, during which engineers or surveyors in 
training did not learn the essential aspects of the profession, but only served as copyists, scribes 
or even servants for their mentors. Moreover, Boscovich condemned the lack of theoretical 
training for future surveyors and their inability to use the latest instruments such as the newer 
plane table. The Jesuit proposed appointing one of the astronomers from the Milanese 
observatory as a geodesy professor at the Brera College, as this group of scientists had a lot of 
practical experience with using surveying instruments and possessed both theoretical and 
practical knowledge. Boscovich recommended that only graduates of this course of geodesy 
should be allowed to apply to join the Collegio of engineers and the duration of their practical 
training under a licensed engineer should be reduced by one year.998 
 In addition to teaching at the Palatine Schools and acting as a consultant for the 
government after his relocation to Milan, Boscovich dedicated a large part of his working time to 
the observatory, the establishment of which he considered a personal achievement.999 Shortly 
after the transfer, the astronomer made it clear he refused to recognize any of his new colleagues 
at the observatory in Milan as intellectual equals. Boscovich’s attitude was insulting to the local 
                                                          
996 ASM Autografi, box 138, folder 20 (Luino Francesco), November 22, [1771], Francesco Luino to Firmian. 
997 ASM Autografi, box 115, folder 40 (Boscovich Ruggero), undated document, probably written after Boscovich 
started his professorship in Brera in 1770. 
998 Boscovich’s proposal for a School of Geodesy was not his first suggestion on how to improve the educational 
system in Lombardy. In another undated proposal for reforming the teaching of mathematical and physical sciences 
at the University of Pavia, the Jesuit discussed details such as the number of teachers and the notions they should 
teach to various groups of students based on their specialization. ASM Autografi, box 115, folder 40 (Boscovich 
Ruggero), undated document with the title “Progetto di una Scuola di Geodesia.” 
999 Paoli, Ruggiero Giuseppe Boscovich Nella Scienza e Nella Storia del ‘700, 205.  
 388 
scientists, especially seeing as prior to Boscovich’s coming to the Habsburg province of 
Lombardy, a group of astronomic observers was already living and working as part of the Jesuit 
College of Brera. With the support of the College’s rector Federico Pallavicini, the professors 
Giuseppe Bovio and Domenico Gerra had pursued astronomic observations at least since 1760 
and had purchased the first astronomical instruments. In the early 1760s, Pallavicini also invited 
Luigi Lagrange, an experienced astronomer from the Observatory of Marseilles, to relocate to 
Milan and train a new generation of astronomers.1000 After his arrival in Pavia in 1764, 
Boscovich started spending his holidays in Brera and Pallavicini expressed his interest in 
building an observatory. Boscovich had already prepared a project for a possible Observatory in 
Rome and had studied in detail this type of institution in Greenwich, so he eagerly took over the 
commission. The Observatory was finalized by 1765 and Boscovich emerged in the European 
scientific community’s eyes as the founder of institutionalized astronomy in Milan. 1001 
Even after his transfer to the Palatine Schools in Milan, a move which should have 
satisfied Boscovich’s desire to spend more time working at the Observatory, he continued to 
infuriate the main political figures in Vienna. In 1769, Kaunitz ordered Boscovich to start a 
series of “Efemeridi Astronomiche,” a publication of astronomic observations related to the 
observatory’s meridian.1002 This suggestion was most certainly modeled on the work of 
Maximilian Hell in Vienna and his analogue publication of such observations. However, 
Boscovich immediately contacted two of his main protectors, Count Firmian and the Habsburg 
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ambassador in Paris, Mercy-Argenteau, to obtain their help in lifting this responsibility from his 
shoulders. The Jesuit refused to perform the observations necessary for the publication of the 
Ephemerides as he considered them a tiresome routine activity that would have taken his time 
away from more interesting projects.1003 Additionally, the Jesuit became entangled in an 
irreconcilable conflict with the other astronomers working in Brera. All these factors led to 
Boscovich’s dismissal from Habsburg service in 1773.1004 In Kaunitz’s words: “It is in no way 
necessary to have a sublime genius in order to be a good observer; as there are numerous things 
to verify in astronomy, tireless work and long observations are necessary; in this manner the 
Brera Observatory could become one of the best in Europe.”1005  
 The new regulation governing the Observatory issued in the summer of 1772, confirmed 
the success of what we can describe as an anti-Boscovich faction.1006 A new director was 
appointed, Lagrange, who worked in Brera with Francesco Reggio and Angelo Cesaris. The 
astronomers started publishing the Ephemerides in 1775, coopted to their team another talented 
astronomer, Barnaba Oriani, in 1776 and became deeply involved in preparing a map of 
Lombardy based on astronomic and geodetic operations, the project discussed in chapter 4.1007  
The Habsburg rulers encouraged the astronomers in Brera to establish links with other 
astronomic centers. Specifically, the 1772 Regulation stated that the director of the Observatory 
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should establish regular correspondence with the main observatories in Europe, such as the ones 
in Greenwich, Paris and Bologna.1008 And just as the Jesuits from Vienna encountered the 
renowned astronomer Cassini de Thury and worked together on astronomic observations and 
geodetic measurements, the Observatory from Milan was also involved in an international 
collaboration.  
 Lombardy, a border province of the Habsburg Monarchy, had its own strong scientific 
tradition. However, the Viennese decision-makers meddled repeatedly in the process of scientific 
institutionalization and tried to model the activity of the Milanese Observatory on its counterpart 
from the imperial capital. Additionally, the Habsburg rulers tried to regulate the ambitions of 
scientists in their service whenever such ambitions collided with imperial interests. At the same 
time, in order to foster an international reputation as a patron of arts and sciences, Kaunitz 
encouraged the Observatory of Brera to become an important contributor to international 
scientific enterprises.  
7.3 THE ACADEMICIANS FROM BRUSSELS AND ASTRONOMIC PROJECTS IN 
THE AUSTRIAN NETHERLANDS 
Although Vienna did not have an Academy of Sciences until the mid-nineteenth century, a 
similar venture arose earlier in the western-most province of the Habsburg Monarchy: the 
Academy of Sciences and Letters in Brussels. The project was first proposed in the 1760s, when 
plenipotentiary minister in the Austrian Netherlands, Cobenzl, together with Patrice Count of 
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Neny, chief-president of the Private Council, and other intellectuals from Brussels began 
lobbying intensely for the establishment of an Academy of Sciences. To encourage the central 
authorities’ willingness to approve the foundation of a scientific institution, on June 16, 1768, 
Cobenzl sent a project to Kaunitz for founding a Literary Society of Brussels (Société littéraire 
de Bruxelles), which would focus on promoting both literature and science.1009 Although this 
institution was not proposed as an Academy, its promoters envisioned it as a first step in that 
direction. Early in 1769, Maria Theresa signed the constitutive document of this society, but it 
took some years for this organization to become recognized by other European scientific 
institutions of the time. For example, when Roger Boscovich visited Brussels in the fall of 1769, 
he mentioned the existence of a Literary Society coordinated by Needham although, as he stated, 
he “did not know even what this society consists of.”1010  
With support from the provincial and central government, in the early 1770s the Society 
underwent an institutional transformation. On December 16, 1772, the organization became the 
Imperial and Royal Academy of Sciences and Letters (Académie Impériale et Royale des 
Sciences et des Belles-Lettres) and benefited from the personal patronage of Maria Theresa.1011 
From its foundation, the Habsburg government desired the Academy in Brussels to foster 
connections with academies and other scientific institutions all over Europe, in a way similar to 
the observatories in Vienna and Milan. Article 23 of the Academy’s regulation stated that the 
institution should establish regular correspondence with both national and foreign savants in 
                                                          
1009 For a brief summary of the first proposals for creating an Academy in Brussels and the first stage this institution 
went through as a Literary Society, see Jacques Lavalleye, L’académie Royale des Sciences, des lettres et des beaux-
arts de Belgique, 1772-1972. Esquisse Historique (Brussels: Palais des Académies, 1973), 13-20; Hervé Hasquin, 
“L’Académie impériale et royale de Bruxelles,” in L’Académie impériale et royale de Bruxelles. Ses académiciens 
et leurs réseaux intellectuels au XVIIIe siècle, ed. Hervé Hasquin (Brussels: Académie Royale de Belgique, 2009), 
5-19.  
1010 ASM Autografi, box 115, folder 40 (Boscovich Ruggero), September 22, 1769, Boscovich to Firmian, folio 28.  
1011 André Molitor, “La Création de l’Académie Royale de Belgique,” in Études sur le XVIIIe siècle. XV Unité et 
Diversité de l’Empire des Habsbourg à la fin du XVIIIe siècle, eds. Roland Mortier and Hervé Hasquin (Brussels: 
Université de Bruxelles, 1988), 12-13. 
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order to take advantage of their knowledge and discoveries. The scientists who would prove 
more apt at establishing this “literary trade” were to be preferred when electing new 
academicians.1012  
In order to establish a wider network, the Academy in Brussels tried to attract foreign 
members to join her ranks.1013 In contrast to the French Academy of Sciences, which jealously 
guarded the right to choose its own members,1014 the Academy in Brussels depended more on the 
government’s approval for any such decision.1015 Another method to cement international 
connections and to increase the visibility of the institution on an international scale was 
exchanging published memoirs with other academies, such as the Academies of Science in Paris, 
Mannheim, Zélande, Besançon, and Strasbourg, the Royal Society and the Antiquarian Society 
from London, the Bologna Institute, the Academy of Inscriptions from Paris, and the Academies 
from Saint Petersburg and Berlin.1016 
Becoming part of an international network was a way for the Brussels Academy to try 
and overcome some of its weaknesses, as an examination of their efforts in the fields of 
astronomic observations and mapmaking demonstrate. From the first stages of the existence of 
the Academy, its members desired the presence of an experienced astronomer. As no qualified 
person could be found among the intellectual community of the Austrian Netherlands, the 
academicians contacted the Academy of Sciences in Paris, asking for an astronomer; because the 
                                                          
1012 Mémoires de l’Académie Impériale et Royale des Sciences et Belles-Lettres de Bruxelles, vol. 1 (Brussels: J.L. 
de Boubers, Imprimeur de l’Académie, 1777), xxix. 
1013 In 1787, the Academy included 23 members from the Austrian Netherlands and 15 foreigners. Lavalleye, 
L’académie Royale des Sciences, 22. 
1014 See, for example, the strong opposition the members of the French Academy displayed against the election of 
Roger Boscovich. Pappas, "R.J. Boscovich et l'Académie des Sciences de Paris," 406-407. 
1015 Molitor, “La Création de l’Académie Royale de Belgique,” 13. In practice it seems the Academy had most of the 
times free choice in choosing its members and even rejecting candidates proposed by the government. For examples, 
see Michèle Galand, “Le cercle des académiciens de Bruxelles: proximité et ouverture internationale,” in 
L’Académie impériale et royale de Bruxelles, 41-42. 
1016 Lavalleye, L’académie Royale des Sciences, 38-39. 
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French institution asked for an exorbitant compensation, the scientists in Brussels looked for an 
alternative. They found a solution in the person of Nathaniel Pigott, a fellow of the Royal 
Society, who had travelled to the Austrian Netherlands in 1772 to retrieve astronomic 
instruments sent from England.1017  
The English representative in Brussels presented Pigott and his son, Edward, to governor 
Charles of Lorraine, who also acted as the protector of the Academy, in April 1772. A couple of 
months later, as Pigott was passing through Brussels on his way to Spa, the director of the 
Academy, Needham, approached him with a proposal: measuring the geographical coordinates 
of the main towns of the Austrian Netherlands.1018 An official request by the director of an 
Academy of Sciences, even though not a renowned one, probably flattered a scientist like Pigott, 
who had collaborated in the past with such institutions. At the time the Habsburg government 
was supporting a survey of the territory of the Austrian Netherlands under the leadership of 
Count Joseph Ferraris. Therefore it is not implausible to assume that the local authorities called 
Pigott to help with this massive cartographic undertaking.1019 Indeed, in 1772 and 1773 the two 
Pigotts and the director of the Brussels Academy, Needham, undertook a scientific journey 
throughout the province. Equipped with an impressive array of instruments, the team travelled 
through Namur, Luxembourg, Antwerp, Ostend, Tournay, Brussels and Louvain.1020  
                                                          
1017 Pigott claims he was contacted in early 1772 to help improve the maps of the Austrian Netherlands but he does 
not give details about who reached out to him, whether it was the Academy in Brussels or the government. As the 
government controlled the Academy closely, regardless of who contacted Pigott, the Habsburg authorities were most 
likely the ones who made the decision. “Observations Astronomiques, faites aux Pays-Bas Autrichiens en 1772 et 
1773, par M. Pigott, Gentilhomme Anglois, de la Société Royale de Londres, et associé etranger des Académies de 
Caen et de Bruxelles,” in Mémoires de l’Académie Impériale et Royale, 5. 
1018 “Nathaniel Pigott (1725-1804)”, in L’Académie impériale et royale de Bruxelles, 251. 
1019 As Claire Lemoine-Isabeau states, it is not possible based on archival evidence to demonstrate whether Ferraris 
used Pigott’s observations when preparing the map of the Austrian Netherlands. Lemoine-Isabeau,  
“L’élaboration de la carte de Ferraris,” 42.  
1020 Anita McConnell and Alison Brech, “Nathaniel and Edward Pigott, Itinerant Astronomers,” Notes and Records 
of the Royal Society of London 53, no. 3 (1999): 307. Lavalleye, L’académie Royale des Sciences, 32. During the 
meeting on May 25, 1773, the academicians discussed the astronomic observations made by Pigott in the Austrian 
Netherlands and decided to admit him into the Academy as a foreign member. This decision could only have been 
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As McConnell and Brech stated, “the account of the [Ferraris] cartographic survey is 
silent on the Pigotts’s contribution, nor has any report to the Austrian authorities been 
traced.”1021 However, hints suggesting the government’s direct interest in Pigott’s work can be 
retrieved from the correspondence between the Academy’s president, Joseph de Crumpipen, and 
the Habsburg ministers in the Austrian Netherlands. During Pigotts’ and Needham’s travels, the 
scientists addressed a number of requests to Crumpipen, who forwarded them to provincial 
authorities. For example, Needham asked for housing in the various towns they travelled, 
passports for customs and other papers to ease the journey.1022 However, the government refused 
to approve any additions to the 800 florins he had initially received. Crumpipen transmitted to 
Needham the government’s disappointment regarding the quality of the observations they had 
received and the group’s inability to “produce exact and precise knowledge” for all the sites.1023 
The work of the English astronomers clearly had a higher stake for the Habsburg authorities than 
mere scientific curiosity. 
The direct interest of the government in the expedition’s success is also revealed in 
Pigott’s memoirs and reports, published by the Academy in Brussels and the Royal Society in 
London. In the memoir “Astronomic Observations done in the Austrian Netherlands in 1772 and 
1773” Pigott included as the main justification for the expedition the need to determine locations 
with the help of astronomic observations in order to improve geographical maps for the Austrian 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
possible with the support of the government, who in this way rewarded Pigott for his scientific contribution. 
Brussels, Archives de l’Académie royale des Sciences, des Lettres et des Beaux-Arts de Belgique (hereafter AARS) 
Academy of Sciences Brussels, Archives Anciennes (hereafter AA), ARB 39, 58. 
1021 McConnell and Brech, “Nathaniel and Edward Pigott, Itinerant Astronomers,” 307. In 1773, Nathaniel Pigott 
presented to the Plenipotentiary Minister of the Austrian Netherlands a booklet containing the astronomic 
observations he had made in the province. This report was forwarded to the president of the Academy in Brussels, 
Crumpipen. AARS, AA, ARB 16.  
1022 AGR SEG, box 1496, Crumpipen to Neny, August 10, 1772. 
1023 “Je vous avouerai cépendant, qu’on s’etoit flatté ici, que le resultat de vos observations et de vos recherches, 
auroit produit sur toute cette partie des connoissances exactes et sures, tandis qu’il paroit par votre lettre, que 
l’operation ne sera pas complette, et qu’à differens egards on devra se contenter de calculs d’approximation, sur 
lesquels il n’est guere possible de tabler avec certitude.” AARS, AA, ARB 15, November 17, 1772, Crumpipen to 
Needham.  
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Netherlands.1024 In the summary of the observations Pigott sent to London in 1775 he wrote how 
“this astronomical journey was undertaken at the request of the government here. They expressed 
a desire that the situation of some of their towns, at least, should be determined by 
observations.”1025  
Moreover, if we look at this enterprise in a larger imperial context, the hypothesis that the 
Habsburg government supported astronomic observations in order to gather additional data for 
the Ferraris map receives extra support. As discussed in the previous sections, Maria Theresa and 
Kaunitz had showed interest in Liesganig’s work and his mapping methodology. Whereas there 
is no surviving evidence of Liesganig’s survey of Lower Austria, throughout the 1770s and 
1780s we know the astronomers in Brera did a series of observations to improve the maps of 
Lombardy. Their contribution will be discussed in chapter 8.  
Throughout the eighteenth century one of the main complaints of the Brussels 
academicians remained the lack of an observatory.1026 As a temporary solution for their 
institutional deficiency, the academicians in Brussels decided to recruit international colleagues 
with access to the latest instruments for astronomic observations. One such individual was 
Charles Messier, member of the French Academy of Sciences and other similar European 
organizations. In the 1770s, Messier sent to the director of the Brussels Academy, Needham, a 
series of astronomic observations which could be used in conjunction with Pigott’s work. Shortly 
                                                          
1024 “Observations Astronomiques, faites aux Pays-Bas Autrichiens en 1772 et 1773, par M. Pigott,” 3-5. Early in 
1775, when the academicians decided which of the memoirs presented to the Academy throughout the past years 
should be published, one of the evaluators, Nelis, wrote that not only was Pigott’s project useful but it had used 
money from the government and the Academy, so it was in their interest to publish it. AARS, AA, ARB 539. 
1025 Nathanael Pigott, "Astronomical Observations Made in the Austrian Netherlands in 1772 and 1773. By 
Nathanael Pigott, Esquire, F. R. S. Foreign Member of the Academies of Brussels and Caen. In a Letter to the 
Reverend Nevil Maskelyne, Astronomer Royal, F. R. S.," Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of 
London 66 (1776): 183. Pigott’s report discusses the instruments he used and all the observations he made, together 
with a summary of his calculations. 
1026 Pigott decried a lack an Observatory in the Austrian Netherlands: “while in Germany, France, England we are 
multiplying the astronomic observations, they have been completely neglected in the Austrian Netherlands, where 
until now there has not been a single observatory constructed.” “Observations Astronomiques, faites aux Pays-Bas 
Autrichiens en 1772 et 1773, par M. Pigott,” 4. 
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after sharing his results, Messier became a foreign member of the Academy of Sciences in 
Brussels. The French astronomer received this honor not only because of the quality of the 
shared observations but also because he had access to a fully equipped Observatory in Paris.1027  
The academicians in Brussels were surely aware of the governmental support offered for 
the observatories in Vienna and Milan. Therefore, they had a strong foundation to believe their 
Academy would also receive approval for constructing such a structure. During a meeting on 
November 16, 1774, the Academicians discussed a memoir about the current state of the 
Academy, put together by Needham, the secretary of the Academy Georges Joseph Gerard and 
Jean-François Marci. The scientists hoped to obtain the government’s approval and financial 
support to enlarge their Academy with a cabinet of physics, a chemistry laboratory, an 
observatory, a natural history cabinet and a botanical garden. The report insisted that without an 
observatory “it is not possible to make astronomical or meteorological observations, which 
would be very useful for this province, and which are absolutely necessary if we want to 
maintain a profitable correspondence with the other academies, which know how to use all these 
notions for the profit or great advantage of their country and of navigation.”1028 Although the 
provincial political authorities agreed to forward the Academy’s request to Vienna, their efforts 
were in vain.1029  
Not only were these requests not granted, but the central government even refused to 
approve simpler requests such as the purchase of instruments that would ease astronomical 
observations. For example, during a meeting on January 18, 1776, Needham informed his 
                                                          
1027 The abbé Chevalier evaluated Messier’s observations and during the meeting from May 25, 1773, he presented a 
report to his colleague academicians recommending Messier’s election as member of the Academy. AARS, AA, 
ARB 39, 60-61.  
1028 “Un Observatoire sans lequel il n’est pas possible de faire des observations astronomiques ou meteorologiques, 
observations qui seroient fort utiles pour ces provinces, et qui sont absolument necessaires si l[on veut entretenir une 
correspondance fructueuse avec les autres academies qui savent mettre toutes ces choses a profit au grand avantage 
de leur pays et de la navigation.” AARS, AA, ARB 39, 152.  
1029 Lavalleye, L’académie Royale des Sciences, 32-33. 
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colleagues that Pigott planned to sell the instruments he had used during his astronomic journey 
between 1772 and 1773 in the Austrian Netherlands for around 1200 florins. Pigott had offered 
his instruments to the Academy as he was aware of their acute need for an observatory and 
hoped the government would support such a project.1030 The astronomer Jean-Baptiste Chevalier 
also insisted on the importance of having good instruments to make astronomic observations and 
encouraged Needham to talk with the plenipotentiary minister about this possible purchase.1031 
However, the government rejected the proposal.1032 Therefore, even though the Academy had 
some personnel able to do astronomical and meteorological observations, they could not use their 
abilities at full capacity during the eighteenth century.1033  
While the Academy of Sciences in Brussels contributed in a very limited manner to the 
first topographic survey of the Austrian Netherlands, the scientists served as governmental 
consultants on other issues such as mining, agriculture, or navigation, to name just a few.1034 
Moreover, the foreign members of the Academy and the extensive correspondence of its 
members with other sites of scientific knowledge ensured the vitality of the Austrian Netherlands 
as an important node in the network of enlightenments.  
                                                          
1030 In a letter sent by Pigott to the Royal Society and read in the meeting on May 7, 1778, the astronomer expressed 
the belief that the Habsburg government would soon support the building of an observatory in Louvain and the 
supplying of it with proper instruments. I have not retrieved any further archival information regarding such a 
project. Nathaniel Pigott, "Astronomical Observations Made in the Austrian Netherlands in the Years 1773, 1774, 
and 1775. By Nathaniel Pigott, Esq. F. R. S. Foreign Member of the Academies of Brussels and Caen, and 
Correspondent of the Royal Academy of Sciences at Paris," Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of 
London 68 (1778): 638. 
1031 AARS, AA, ARB 39, 196.  
1032 “Nathaniel Pigott (1725-1804),” in L’Académie impériale et royale de Bruxelles, 252. 
1033 On December 3, 1787, the academicians prepared another memoir that included elements they deemed 
necessary to obtain in order to pursue high quality scientific work. One of their main requests was the building of an 
observatory, but it seems the government did not approve the project. AARS, AA, ARB 41, 268.  
1034 On April 13, 1777, the plenipotentiary minister Starhemberg ordered the Imperial Academy to refrain from 
publishing the memoir of Dom Mann on the topic of rivers, channels and methods for water drainage. A possible 
reason for this order was the government’s interest in this issue. AARS, AA, ARB 40, 125. In 1777, the government 
ordered the academicians to evaluate the project of the engineering officer Du Val for a water dam. AARS, AA, 
ARB 40, folios 158, 164, 176, 178. For a list of memoirs submitted to the Academy see AARS, AA, ARB 771. 
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7.4 CONCLUSION 
In 1774, when asked about the establishment of an Academy of Sciences in Vienna, 
Maria Theresa stated, “I could not possibly decide to set up an accademie des sciences [sic] with 
three ex-Jesuits and one professor of chemistry, however worthy; we should be a laughing-stock 
in the world.”1035 As Richard Evans suggested, and this chapter demonstrates, we should not take 
the empress’s declaration as indicative of intellectual apathy within her dominions. Maria 
Theresa’s assertion might have been influenced by the dispersal of scientists in various 
provincial centers, such as Milan and Brussels. The size and structure of the Habsburg Monarchy 
discouraged the development of a dominant intellectual pole and promoted a decentralized 
imperial network of sites of knowledge. And although Maria Theresa did not sponsor the 
creation of an institution to rival the French Academy of Sciences or the Royal Society of 
London, she encouraged the development of science as part of other institutional frameworks, 
such as the observatories in Vienna and Milan and the Academy of Sciences in Brussels.  
Throughout the eighteenth century, the Viennese rulers strived to control Jesuit scientific 
institutions and to encourage the formation of secular sites of knowledge. As part of their 
mapmaking efforts, the Habsburgs used and encouraged the astronomic knowledge produced in 
Vienna, Milan and Brussels. However, the activity of Jesuits and academicians in the Habsburg 
realm was subordinated to the dynasty’s political and economic priorities. Therefore, “localized 
sites” such as the observatories in Vienna, the observatory in Brera, and the Academy of 
Sciences in Brussels should be studied as part of the same political entity and not as isolated 
scientific communities. Each site of knowledge became a node in “overlapping networks” that 
                                                          
1035 Evans, “The Origins of Enlightenment in the Habsburg Lands,” 50. 
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encouraged the circulation of personnel, artifacts and information.1036 The correspondence 
networks of these Habsburg centers of scientific knowledge allowed Vienna to benefit from the 
experience of astronomers such as Boscovich, Cassini de Thury, the Pigotts and Messier. The 
implementation of these experts’ proposals depended on other contextual factors such as the 
political status quo, financial constraints and even the personality of the scientists involved in the 
discussions. However, one common element emerges from the examples presented above: 
eighteenth-century scholars need to approach the production and circulation of scientific ideas 
from a triple perspective: provincial, imperial, and trans-imperial.  
                                                          
1036 Harris, “Networks of Travel, Correspondence, and Exchange,” 341. 
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8.0 AN INTERNATIONAL NETWORK OF ASTRONOMERS AND THE MAPPING OF 
LOMBARDY 
In 1769, Maria Theresa ordered the director of the Observatory of the University of Vienna, 
Joseph Liesganig, to prepare a memoir describing the technique of mapping large territories 
based on mathematic principles.1037 This memoir, discussed in chapter 7, offered an alternative 
to the methodology that the general quartermaster’s staff employed to create the Great Military 
Map of most of the Habsburg provinces. Whereas the military engineers working in provincial 
settings such as Transylvania performed no astronomic measurements, Liesganig believed in the 
importance of coordinating geodetic and astronomic observations. This astronomer put his ideas 
into practice when surveying the Habsburg province of Galicia, acquired in 1773 by the 
Habsburgs as a result of the first Polish partition. To implement his project, Liesganig measured 
three baselines and built a triangulation network that covered 1,400 square miles. In addition, he 
performed astronomic observations from the Observatory of Lviv.1038 Liesganig’s memoir and 
his map of Galicia show that the Habsburg rulers were not opposed to the idea of using 
astronomic observations to obtain maps of their dominions.  
This chapter adds to larger themes introduced in chapter 7, such as the contribution of 
Habsburg astronomers to global geographic enterprises through trans-imperial cooperations and 
                                                          
1037 KA KPS, K VII a 6-5. 
1038 Apunevych, “First Astronomical Observatory in Lviv,” 270. Walther Fischer, “Liesganig, Joseph,” in Neue 
Deutsche Biographie 14 (1985), 540-542. http://www.deutsche-biographie.de/pnd118998153.html, last accessed on 
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the development of scientific centers in Vienna, Milan and Brussels. Taking as a unit of analysis 
Lombardy, I explore Habsburg cartographic projects in this province from the 1720s to the 1790s 
in connection with the drawing of an accurate map of the province. In contrast to chapters 2 to 6, 
that mainly explored the cartographic work of military engineers, the next pages analyze the 
work of astronomers and reveal the importance of international connections for the success of 
mapping projects.  
During the second half of the eighteenth century, Habsburg political elites in Vienna 
believed that, if properly designed and surveyed, maps could assist the government in diplomatic 
negotiations, internal reforms and war waging. Indeed, by 1777, Habsburg military engineers and 
artillerymen had surveyed numerous imperial provinces as part of the Great Military Map project 
and had almost finalized the Ferraris map of the Austrian Netherlands. Maria Theresa’s efforts to 
reform the education of engineers and to organize these technical experts into special army corps 
had yielded satisfactory results and had created an efficient Habsburg mapmaking machine.  
Astronomic measurements were not used in creating the Great Military Map for most 
Habsburg provinces not due to lack of knowledge, but most likely because the Aulic War 
Council prioritized speed over the perfect combination of all map sheets. As the Great Military 
Map was preserved in manuscript form and never circulated widely in an engraved version, the 
imperial authorities probably considered geodetic measurements sufficient to gather in-depth 
geographic knowledge of their dominions for the use of Habsburg officials. If engraved versions 
of the Great Military Map at a smaller scale had been prepared, as was done for the Ferraris map 
of the Austrian Netherlands, the Habsburgs would have had to take into account the international 
reception of such works. Astronomic measurements were considered essential not only for a 
map’s accuracy but also in order to connect key points on this map with a global grid of 
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coordinates. Therefore, non-Habsburg experts would have most likely dismissed the Great 
Military Map as flawed.  
By the second half of the eighteenth century, Cassini’s map of France, which combined 
astronomic and geodetic observations, had established its fame throughout Europe. Ferraris’s 
success in emulating Cassini’s work and finalizing a publishable version of the map of the 
Austrian Netherlands encouraged Chancellor Kaunitz to support a similar project for Lombardy. 
Highly trained civil and military engineers populated government departments in Lombardy, 
such as the Census Office, the special border demarcation commissions and the Magistrato 
Camerale (Lombardy’s institution in charge of financial matters). Nonetheless, until the end of 
the 1780s, the Habsburg provincial government had still failed to prepare a map of this province 
satisfactory for the Viennese rulers. This oversight is even more striking considering that 
Lombardy possessed a large observatory populated with expert astronomers interested in 
combining geodetic and astronomic operations in order to improve the geographic knowledge of 
this province. 
If, in the case of Transylvania and the Austrian Netherlands, military personnel played 
the leading role in the mapping enterprises, the discussion and the production process 
surrounding the topographic map of Lombardy offers an alternate story. During peacetime, 
Lombardy’s military engineers were involved in preparing border maps, economic surveys for 
the Census office and plans to improve the irrigation and canal system. But they did not take part 
in the extension of the Great Military Map to Lombardy. Instead, Chancellor Kaunitz prioritized 
the preparation of a publishable topographic map for Lombardy, relying on the knowledge of the 
astronomers, who combined astronomic and geodetic observations to complete this work.  
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After the establishment of the Brera Observatory in 1765, the resident astronomers 
obtained access to necessary instrumentation for calculating longitudes for the main cities of 
Lombardy.1039 Moreover, they expressed vivid interest in coordinating the measurement of a 
triangulation network for Lombardy, as a preliminary step for preparing a precise map. Both 
these projects would have put Milan on the map of leading astronomic centers and would have 
offered valuable geographic information about this province both to the Habsburg government 
and the international scientific community. Despite this initial enthusiasm, it took a couple of 
decades for the astronomers working at the Observatory of Brera to gain the support of the 
imperial authorities and to obtain the required funds to acquire instruments necessary for their 
measurements. By 1791, the Brera astronomers had finalized the geodetic measurements and had 
successfully combined them with astronomic calculations. Because of these scientists’ 
methodology, the Habsburg authorities considered the map of the Brera astronomers (Carta degli 
Astronomi di Brera) the first accurate cartographic representation of this province. 
In 1930, Maria Combi published the first monograph discussing the map of the Brera 
astronomers, executed between 1788 and 1796 under the direction of Angelo de Cesaris, 
Francesco Reggio and Barnaba Oriani.1040 In her work, Combi discusses seventeenth and 
eighteenth century maps that incorporated parts of Lombardy and analyzes the 1770’s attempts 
of the Habsburg government to obtain a detailed cartographic representation of Lombardy. She 
also narrates in detail the successful astronomic and geodetic operations from the late 1780s that 
constituted the basis for a revised map of Lombardy. Combi indicates the involvement of foreign 
mapmakers such as César-François Cassini de Thury and Giovanni Antonio Rizzi Zannoni in the 
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1040 Combi Maria, Una carta topografica della Lombardia del secolo XVIII (Milan: F. Combi, 1930). 
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production process of the map of Lombardy. She mentions how the Brera astronomers ordered 
scientific instruments in London and reveals Chancellor Kaunitz’s desire to obtain a map of 
Lombardy modeled on the Ferraris map of the Austrian Netherlands. Nonetheless, Combi’s 
primary focus throughout remains Lombardy, and she neither connects this cartographic 
enterprise with similar projects occurring in other Habsburg provinces nor gives full-fledged 
attention to the international scientific networks that the Brera Observatory was integrated into. 
Therefore, this chapter explores the discussion accompanying the production process for 
the map of the Brera astronomers and situates the story of this cartographic enterprise in two 
larger contexts: that of the Habsburg Monarchy and that of the transimperial scientific 
community. I argue that the efforts of the Brera astronomers to transform their observatory into 
an important scientific node of the larger European network motivated these scientists to prepare 
a map of Lombardy. The astronomers’ correspondence networks and Barnaba Oriani’s trip to 
London ensured the acquisition of first-class geodetic instruments and conveyed to Lombardy 
information about similar European projects. Therefore, the Brera astronomers had a twofold 
goal in mapping Lombardy: fulfilling the desire of the Viennese rulers in order to ensure the 
government’s support for the Observatory and raising the profile of their Observatory on the 
scientific map of Europe.  
The following pages also show that the Habsburg monarchs invested not only in secret 
military maps but also strived to be at the vanguard of scientific developments in Europe. For 
late eighteenth-century mapmaking that goal implied combining astronomic and geodetic 
measurements. Being at the forefront of scientific advances allowed the Habsburgs to tap into the 
international pool of experts and recruit them permanently or temporarily into the service of 
Vienna. As chapter 7 discusses, the collaboration between French scientist, Cassini de Thury, 
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and the director of the Observatory at the University of Vienna, Joseph Liesganig, led to the 
implementation of a trigonometrical survey in the area of Vienna. Roger Boscovich, another 
international expert, contributed decisively to the foundation of the Brera Observatory in 
Lombardy. Therefore, publishing a map of Lombardy based on both astronomic and geodetic 
operations would have reaffirmed in the eyes of the European community of scientists that the 
Habsburgs were committed to contributing to the development of cartography on a global scale.  
8.1 THE CADASTRAL MAPS OF LOMBARDY 
The exclusion of Lombardy’s territory from the Great Military Map was not due to the 
government’s lack of interest; quite the contrary. Already by the middle of the eighteenth 
century, the Habsburg rulers had finalized an impressive survey of their lands in the State of 
Milan for taxation purposes. The legacy of these cadastral maps influenced projects for the 
mapping of Lombardy until the late 1780s, as they were considered ideal starting points for a 
new cartographic enterprise. Therefore, this chapter section briefly outlines the first Habsburg 
large-scale mapping projects in Lombardy.  
Between 1718 and 1750, in order to increase the tax base and curtail tax evasion in the 
State of Milan, the Habsburg authorities commissioned a set of maps accompanied by registers 
that contained estimates for agricultural produce, the land’s size and the land’s value. The 
Habsburg agents surveyed 2387 maps at the scale of 1:2,000 and they compiled reduced scale 
versions of these maps for the Census office, for the central administration, and for the local 
communities.  
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The historiography of cadastral maps has applauded this Habsburg initiative because it 
encouraged a modern tax reform in Lombardy and inspired similar enterprises in places like 
France, Piedmont and Spain.1041 However, the story of the Milanese cadaster is not a narrative of 
an imperial reform implemented without any problems. In fact, the local elites of Lombardy, 
who desired to preserve their fiscal immunities, consistently tried to thwart the success of this 
project. In Dianne Harris’s words, “the history of the Austro-Lombardian cadaster is also a 
poignant story about colonial authority and its limits, a case study in efforts at foreign dominance 
and native opposition.”1042 Although the locals initially refused to accept the inclusion on these 
maps of domains whose owners resided in other communities, the authorities ordered that all 
lands should be represented “where nature placed them” (nel territorio dove natura li ha 
collocati), thus confirming the primacy of imperial territorial priorities over local interests and 
traditional land subdivisions.1043 Each cadastral register contained a list of all landowners, details 
about the land’s usage, the property’s dimensions and the property’s value. Instead of the 
owners’ names, the surveyors used numbers to identify all properties. Because the mapmakers 
used highly specialized surveying instruments (the plane table) and a standard measurement unit 
(the pertica), “the cadaster reduced physical space to a geometric equation, an abstraction that 
was to be taken as fact.”1044 Presenting Lombardy’s landscape in a series of what were perceived 
as accurate and precise maps made this province’s geography visible to the decision-makers in 
Vienna.  
                                                          
1041 See for example “The Milanese Censimento: the first surveyed and mapped cadastre” in The Cadastral Map in 
the Service of the State. A History of Property Mapping, eds. Roger J.P. Kain and Elizabeth Baigent (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), 181-190; Daniel M. Klang, Tax Reform in Eighteenth Century Lombardy (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Zaninelli, Il Nuovo Censo dello Stato di Milano. 
1042 Dianne Harris, The Nature of Authority: Villa Culture, Landscape, and Representation in Eighteenth-Century 
Lombardy (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), 40. 
1043 Aurora Scotti, “La cartografia lombarda: criteri di rappresentazione, uso e destinazione,” in Lombardia: il 
territorio, l'ambiente, il paesaggio, ed. Carlo Pirovano, vol. 3 (Milan: Electa, 1983), 102-103. 
1044 Harris, The Nature of Authority, 43-49. 
 407 
Estimating the circulation of maps that resulted from the work on the Milanese Census is 
difficult. For example, we know that the engraver Marc’Antonio Dal Re managed to obtain the 
drawings and started producing commercial versions of the provincial maps, but then Dal Re 
ended up entangled in a complicated juridical case that led to the cessation of his work and the 
confiscation of his plates by the provincial authorities.1045 A possible reason for the Habsburg 
state’s confiscation of Dal Re’s engraved plates could have been the officials’ fear that Dal Re 
had manipulated and distorted the information present on the maps in favor of Lombardy’s 
nobility, a group opposed to the reform of taxation.1046 On the other hand, the Habsburg 
authorities might have desired to use Dal Re’s plates as a starting point for a commercial version 
of the map. Indeed, the fiscal lawyer (avvocato fiscale) who led the investigation against Dal Re, 
Francesco Fenaroli, encouraged the government to support the publication of a version of the 
general cadastral map, because “in the most cultured states of the world, the publication of 
geographic descriptions of cities and provinces is allowed [...] and without the help of such 
publications the beautiful and profitable study of geography would be done in vain, and the many 
published atlases and numerous geographic maps reveal the interest of the Rulers/Sovereigns 
themselves, and the best editions derive from the work of either Real Geographers or Public 
Academies opened by princes, who gave if not the actual order, at least the permission for such 
geographic works.”1047 Clearly, some Habsburg agents perceived the advantages of producing a 
publishable version of these cadastral maps.  
                                                          
1045 Mario Signori, “La cartografia lombarda fra tradizione catastale ed esigenze amministrative,” in L'immagine 
interessata territorio e cartografia in lombardia tra 500 e 800 (Como: NODO, 1984), 58.  
1046 Harris, The Nature of Authority, 55. 
1047 The quote: “comprendere che li Sovrani stessi se ne sono interessati e le migli'Ori edizioni derivano o da Reali 
Geografi, o dalle pubbliche accademie erette da Principi, onde vi è la presonzione se non del Comando, almeno della 
permissione,” Cited in Signori, “La cartografia lombarda fra tradizione catastale ed esigenze amministrative,” 58-59. 
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In 1757, the Census Giunta ordered the publication of a Topographical Atlas of the State 
of Milan, including maps based on the cadastral cartographic operations.1048 This atlas contained 
71 maps of the various cities and provinces of the State of Milan.1049 A map showing the whole 
State of Milan was at the front of the atlas and remained the only unitary image of this part of 
Lombardy throughout the 1760s.1050 Yet, the value of these maps was doubtful, as they lacked a 
representation of the landscape’s topography, contained no latitude and longitude information 
and included multiple errors with respect to the position of roads and boundaries. Moreover, due 
to political and military concerns led the Habsburgs to prohibit any reproductions of this 
atlas.1051  
The cadastral maps offered an incomplete image of the Habsburg dominions in 
Lombardy. Limited to the State of Milan, they failed to incorporate the Duchy of Mantua.1052 But 
even before the 1780s, when the Habsburgs extended the census measurements to Mantua, 
Vienna took the first steps in the production of a printed, for-sale map of Lombardy. In the early 
1770s, Chancellor Kaunitz expressed his desire for a map of Lombardy that would not only serve 
Habsburg bureaucrats, but would also promote a unitary image of this Habsburg province for 
whoever acquired a copy, including travelers, scientists and other intellectuals.1053  
Therefore, in the summer of 1773, the Chancellor ordered Firmian to start preparatory 
work for a map of the State of Milan. At Roger Boscovich’s suggestion, Kaunitz commissioned 
two experts in the art of mapmaking to evaluate the quality of the geodetic measurements 
                                                          
1048 Scotti, “La cartografia lombarda,” 114. 
1049 Signori, “La cartografia lombarda fra tradizione catastale ed esigenze amministrative,” 58. 
1050 Aurora Scotti, “L’immagine della Lombardia nel secolo XVIII: definizione dei confini e rappresentazione 
cartografica,” in Lo Stato e la Città: Architetture, Istituzioni e Funzionari nella Lombardia Illuminista (Milan: 
Franco Angeli, 1984), 28.  
1051 Harris, The Nature of Authority, 47. 
1052 As discussed in chapter 6, the integration of Lombardy’s administrative components took most of the eighteenth 
century. Mori, Il Ducato di Mantova. 
1053 Scotti, “La cartografia lombarda,” 115. 
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performed during the Census operations and to analyze the final cadastral maps.1054 Having no 
desire to commission a new expensive and lengthy topographic survey of the State of Milan, 
Kaunitz hoped the wealth of information encompassed on the cadastral maps would accelerate 
the cartographic operations. The specialists Kaunitz consulted were the Jesuit father Francesco 
Luini (1740-1792), professor of mathematics training engineers in Milan, and counselor 
Giuseppe Pecis, the coordinator of the short-lived ad-hoc commission in charge of Lombardy’s 
borders, waterways and roads.1055  
Kaunitz’s order for a new map of the State of Milan resonated strongly with Pecis, who 
had decried the lack of a map of Lombardy as shameful, especially when taking into account the 
existence of detailed survey maps in the archives of the Census Office.1056 In Pecis’s opinion, the 
Habsburg government’s lack of a general map of Lombardy was even more striking in view of 
the French mapmakers’ efforts and successes in obtaining a cartographic representation of this 
province. Pecis mentioned the existence of a series of maps of Lombardy in the archives of the 
French War Ministry, probably prepared during the war campaigns of 1733 and 1735, and 
revealed how French cartographers George-Louis le Rouge and Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon 
d’Anville had already managed to obtain maps based on the Census sources. Indeed, as Pecis 
quoted in his memoir, d’Anville confessed in his “Geographical Analysis of Italy” that he “had 
been quite lucky to obtain a copy of a manuscript and general map of this [Milanese] census.”1057 
As foreign mapmakers so reputable as d’Anville used the cadastral maps as an essential source 
for discussing the geography of Lombardy, Pecis encouraged the Habsburg government to 
                                                          
1054 ASM Confini p.a., box 5, June 14, 1773, Kaunitz to Firmian. 
1055 For biographical information about Francesco Luini see W. Mantovani, F. Luini, fisico e paesano d'Europa del 
'700, Quaderni di storia della fisica XI (2003), 49-57. For information about Pecis see ASM DR, box 241, October 
6, 1768, Maria Theresa’s order. Also mentioned in Capra, La Lombardia Austriaca Nell’Età delle Riforme, 274. 
1056 ASM Confini p.a., box 5, July 16, 1773, Pecis to Firmian. 
1057 Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon d'Anville, Analyse Géographique de l’Italie, dédiée a Monseigneur le Duc 
d’Orleans, Premier Prince du Sang (Paris: Veuve Estienne & fils, 1744), 42. 
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follow in their footsteps. D’Anville’s access to a version of the general cadastral map 
demonstrates the unauthorized circulation of cartographic material in the eighteenth century.1058  
In addition to the cadastral maps, Pecis mentioned to his superiors the possible existence 
in the Archive of the Castle in Milan of a series of plates used for Giacomo Cotta’s topographic 
maps.1059 The Census and the Cotta maps were the only cartographic sources available for 
preparing a Map of Lombardy. This is especially striking considering the existence in Lombardy 
of skilled military engineers, such as the de Blasco brothers discussed in chapter 2, and the 
Habsburg government’s preoccupation with preparing cartographic material to assist in the 
process of border demarcation, as described in chapter 6.  
Based on Kaunitz’s letters to Milan, it is clear that the Chancellor envisioned the map of 
Lombardy as a piece in the larger cartographic representation of the Habsburg Monarchy. 
Indeed, in answering Pecis’s query about the size of the final map of Lombardy, Kaunitz 
mentioned as a reliable model for this enterprise the project for a general map of the Austrian 
Netherlands, at the time proceeding under the leadership of Ferraris. In the Chancellor’s view, a 
good map incorporated elements such as royal and public roads, navigable channels, significant 
waterways, the location of postal stations, monasteries, abbeys, big and small towns, castles, 
ruins or abandoned fortresses, mines and forests.1060  
                                                          
1058 D’Anville’s success in obtaining sensitive information such as Lombardy’s cadastral maps is not the only known 
instance of this mapmaker’s ability to use his international network to acquire cartographic material. As Júnia 
Ferreira Furtado showed, in the 1740s, the Portuguese minister to France, Luís da Cunha, had provided the French 
mapmaker Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon d’Anville with invaluable cartographic information, to enlist this scientist’s 
help in preparing maps of South America. Although, in that case, the decision-makers in Lisbon had sanctioned the 
circulation of this cartographic material, the collaboration between da Cunha and d’Anville illustrates the creation of 
trans-imperial personal connections that facilitated the transmission of manuscript maps. Júnia Ferreira Furtado, 
Oráculos da Geografia Iluminista: Dom Luís da Cunha e Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon d’Anville na Construção da 
Cartografia do Brasil (Belo Horizonte, Brazil: UFMG, 2012). 
1059 ASM Confini p.a., box 5, August 5, 1773, Kaunitz to Firmian. Maria Combi identified a note mentioning the 
existence of four plates by Giacomo Cotta in the Archive of the Castle that showed the following territories: the 
Principality of Pavia, Lomellina, Novarese, Vigevenasco, Tortonese, Alessandrino, and the Vercellese with part of 
Piedmont, Langhe and Monferrato. Combi, Una carta topografica della Lombardia, 16.  
1060 ASM Confini p.a., box 5, August 5, 1773, Kaunitz to Firmian. 
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This was a minimal list of elements that most eighteenth-century topographic maps 
incorporated in their legend, as illustrated also by the Great Military Map of the Habsburg 
provinces. Including such interest points on a map made the imperial authorities’ presence 
visible and inserted the province into the larger polity, namely the Habsburg Monarchy. The 
network of postal stations, roads and channels connected Lombardy with the rest of the 
Monarchy, whereas mines, forests and towns were sources of revenue for the Habsburg 
authorities. Therefore, Kaunitz’s understanding of a good map implied not only an accurate 
representation of the natural landscape, but also the insertion of human-made elements that 
impacted the Habsburg administration of this province. 
 The Chancellor was not the only one envisioning Lombardy as part of the larger imperial 
fabric. Before starting the mapping process, Pecis requested from Vienna copies of two 
measurement units: the Viennese klafter and the French toise.1061 Clearly, Pecis hoped that the 
new map of Lombardy would become part of a larger cartographic discourse and that it would 
convey information relevant both for the imperial and European scientific community. Kaunitz 
fulfilled Pecis’s request with the help of the director of the University Observatory in Vienna, the 
Jesuit Father Joseph Liesganig, who personally prepared a copy of the French toise.1062 Ensuring 
the use of consistent measurement units to map Lombardy’s landscape was not something new. 
Rather than employing a mosaic of local traditional systems of measurement, the census surveys 
used as a measurement unit the pertica.1063 Nonetheless, Pecis’s request introduced a novel 
element: employing standard units developed in the empire’s capital and France. Using the 
Viennese klafter confirmed that Lombardy was a Habsburg province and that the results of the 
                                                          
1061 Ibid., July 16, 1773, Pecis to Firmian. One French toise equals 1.94 meters and one Austrian klafter is equivalent 
to 1.896 meters. Cardarelli, Encyclopaedia of Scientific Units, Weights, and Measures 79; 99. 
1062 Ibid., August 5, 1773, Kaunitz to Firmian; December 1, 1774, Kaunitz to Firmian. 
1063 Harris, The Nature of Authority, 43.  
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surveying and mapping process had relevance for an imperial audience. Adding to the list of 
units the French toise confirmed this measurement entity’s emergence as the European standard.  
Another important issue the authorities had to consider was the geographic extension of 
the map. The continuously changing political landscape of Italy in the first half of the eighteenth 
century created a serious cartographic dilemma: should the general map of Lombardy 
incorporate information from all the maps contained in the Office of the Census, including the 
ones representing territories that were no longer Habsburg dominions? To answer this query, 
Kaunitz reminded Pecis how “on the well-executed maps, we always find some part of the 
neighboring states, even if only to make known what the adjacent districts are.”1064 Moreover, in 
some cases, including segments of neighboring states allowed the mapmakers to fill in otherwise 
empty slots on the final map.1065  
Despite this promising correspondence between Kaunitz and Pecis, the work on the new 
map of Lombardy stagnated. As a result, on December 1, 1774, Kaunitz complained about the 
lack of any news about the progress of this project. The archives did not preserve any answer 
from Lombardy.1066 The Chancellor repeatedly tried to reanimate the project in 1776 and 1777. 
In 1776, Cassini de Thury expressed his desire to perform geodetic measurements in Lombardy, 
as part of a larger project extending the triangulation network covering France all the way to 
Italy.1067 In 1777, the Italian mapmaker J.A. Rizzi Zannoni (1736-1814) offered to measure two 
degrees of Milan’s meridian and to use the results of this operation to prepare an improved 
geographical map of the State of Milan. Although fruitless, Cassini de Thury’s and Rizzi 
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1065 Ibid.  
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Zannoni’s proposals offer an intriguing view of trans-imperial scientific connections and the 
commitment of the Habsburg government to recruit into their service the brightest mapmakers of 
the age. Moreover, these failed projects offered the astronomers from Brera the opportunity to 
demonstrate the Habsburg government their ability to coordinate the mapping of Lombardy. 
8.2 CASSINI DE THURY’S AND RIZZI ZANNONI’S GEOGRAPHIC PROJECTS 
FOR LOMBARDY 
Cassini de Thury’s successful mission in the German lands during the early 1760s, when he 
measured the length of the perpendicular to the Paris meridian all the way to Vienna, encouraged 
the French scientist to propose a similar enterprise in 1776. The diplomatic correspondence 
surrounding the discussions about Cassini de Thury’s proposal paints an image of Habsburg 
rulers as invested patrons of cartography in the eighteenth century. However, the failure of this 
project also exposes how the dynasty only encouraged trans-imperial mapmaking and astronomic 
collaborations in exchange for significant perceived benefits for their empire. International 
scientific collaboration had its limits.  
On March 25, 1776, the French foreign minister, Vergennes, contacted the Habsburg 
ambassador in Paris and initiated negotiations for a new scientific venture: Cassini de Thury’s 
plan to extend the triangulation network covering France all the way to Italy.1068 The French 
academician planned to measure a baseline going along the 45th parallel north, connecting 
Grénoble to Florence, and therefore also passing through the Habsburg provinces of Lombardy 
                                                          
1068 Drapeyron, “Project de géométrie géodésique de la France et de L’Italie en 1776, par Cassini de Thury,” 795-
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and Tuscany.1069 In his detailed proposal for doing these calculations, Cassini de Thury 
repeatedly compared the venture with his earlier project in the German lands in order to 
encourage Maria Theresa’s consent, which he obtained after some months.1070  
From the correspondence between Kaunitz and Lombardy’s minister, Firmian, we learn 
Maria Theresa’s motivations for approving Cassini de Thury’s request. Firstly, France was the 
main ally of the Habsburg Court in Europe and the French king supported Cassini de Thury’s 
project. Secondly, the empress wanted to be seen as an important patron of sciences in the 
French astronomer’s subsequent publication of his travels in Italy. Kaunitz reminded Firmian to 
approach this collaboration cautiously, as “this Frenchmen believes himself to be the 
restaurateur, and maybe creator of our Geography, and desires to attribute to only himself all the 
credit.”1071 On the other hand, Milan had its own expert astronomers working in Brera, so 
Kaunitz advised Firmian to consult them regarding Cassini de Thury’s project and to prepare a 
plan on how to take advantage of the French scientist’s operations in Lombardy to stimulate 
Habsburg geographic ventures in the area.1072 As per Kaunitz’s instructions, Firmian forwarded 
Cassini de Thury’s project to the director of the Brera Observatory, Lagrange, and to Paolo Frisi, 
mathematics professor at the Palatine Schools.1073 In order to counteract any possibility of 
Cassini de Thury’s claiming for himself all the glory of a successful implementation of the 
project, Lagrange and Frisi promised to prepare detailed reports containing all preliminary work 
done by Habsburg employees.1074 
                                                          
1069 HHStA Frankreich Notenwechsel, box 11, March 25, 1776, Vergennes to Mercy. 
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1074 Ibid., June 29, 1776, Firmian to Kaunitz. The Lombardy authorities were also concerned with being 
overshadowed as patrons of sciences by the ruler of Piedmont, in whose states Cassini de Thury had to perform 
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Additionally, in preparation for Cassini’s expedition, the astronomers in Brera, together 
with Frisi, decided to determine the longitude and latitude of Pavia and Cremona, both on the 
45th parallel north, along which Cassini de Thury planned to execute his measurements. The 
geographic coordinates obtained by the astronomers could then be corroborated with Cassini de 
Thury’s astronomic and geodetic measurements. Reliable coordinates for the main cities in 
Lombardy would then improve the reliability of provincial maps. Lombardy’s scientists also 
made plans to extend the triangulation network Cassini hoped to measure on the province’s 
territory.1075 Clearly, the scientists serving the Habsburgs tried to use this international scientific 
collaboration with Cassini de Thury for the betterment of provincial cartography. 
Just four days later, after the first report, Frisi contacted Firmian again to inform him 
about an addition to the earlier plan: with the help of Giuseppe Megel, working as a macchinista 
(mechanical engineer) in Brera, the astronomers had prepared an additional set of instruments 
which could be used to calculate the coordinates of Como. Frisi considered this operation as a 
possible preliminary step for calculating the length of a meridian degree going from the banks of 
the Lake Como, through Milan and towards Pavia.1076 In this way, Lombardy’s scientists hoped 
to continue in Boscovich’s and Liesganig’s footsteps and contribute to one of the eighteenth 
century’s scientific quests: establishing the shape of the Earth.  
Kaunitz offered governmental support for the Brera astronomers’ initiative and 
understood the importance of their work to preparing an accurate map of the province. The 
Habsburg Chancellor considered astronomic observations essential for obtaining a “precise” map 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
measurements before arriving in Lombardy. In order to make sure the Habsburg authorities’ reception of Cassini de 
Thury would match the ruler of Piedmont’s attentions, Firmian ordered the Habsburg representative in Turin, 
Antonio Enrico de Bem, to gather all the relevant information. Bem had to pay special attention to the help offered 
by the Court of Turin to Cassini de Thury during the measurement operations, especially regarding postal services, 
accommodation and additional personnel. Ibid., June 29, 1776, Firmian to Antonio Enrico de Bem. 
1075 ASM Autografi, box 129, folder 16 (Paolo Frisi), July 7, 1776, Frisi to Firmian. 
1076 Using the opportunity of a moon eclipse, the astronomers affiliated with Brera planned to make observations in 
Pavia, Cremona and Como. Ibid., July 11, 1776, Frisi to Firmian. 
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and had considered the possibility of calculating the coordinates for Lodi and Como even before 
he received Frisi’s proposal.1077 This example shows again how the main decision-makers in 
Vienna, such as Kaunitz, had a firm belief in the possibility of drawing an accurate map, which 
would need no further modifications if based on correct mathematical and astronomical 
principles.  
In the end, Cassini de Thury’s project was abandoned because the King of Sardinia 
refused to allow the French scientist to perform any measurements in Piedmont.1078 In Kaunitz’s 
opinion, the king’s decision was influenced by Cassini de Thury’s claim that his operations 
would help create better maps, which could be useful during military operations. As the King of 
Sardinia feared a possible military conflict with France, he did not want to take any risks by 
letting a French agent obtain a good representation of his territory. However, Kaunitz advised 
Firmian that if Cassini still desired to pursue his measurements in Lombardy, he should receive 
full support from the provincial government. The Habsburg rulers were not afraid of a foreign 
state obtaining good maps of Lombardy because, as revealed by Kaunitz’s letter, “the cadastral 
maps, and even the specific maps of each parish and province, are easily obtained even by 
foreign travelers for the price of few zecchinis, as I know from their own confessions.”1079 The 
Chancellor obviously understood that some cartographic information could not be kept secret. 
Although Cassini de Thury’s proposed project never became reality, the discussion 
surrounding it brought to life a diplomatic and scientific network connecting Habsburg 
astronomers, diplomats and political rulers with their counterparts across the border. Kaunitz and 
                                                          
1077 At the time he had not been informed yet of the astronomers’ decision to include Como in their project. ASM 
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Maria Theresa promised help to Cassini de Thury in the hope of accelerating the work on the 
map of Lombardy. But as soon as it became obvious that the diplomatic efforts and financial 
costs to implement the French scientist’s ideas were too high, the Habsburg rulers decided to 
keep their distance as they anyway had a significant group of astronomers residing in Lombardy.  
Soon after the abandonment of Cassini de Thury’s proposal, the authorities in Lombardy 
sent to Vienna their attempt at remapping the State of Milan. Chancellor Kaunitz was deeply 
disappointed with the results. Kaunitz considered the so-called Ramis map, engraved in 1777 by 
Giovanni Ramis, as just another copy of the cadastral maps that failed to incorporate the results 
of the latest astronomic observations.1080 In the Chancellor’s words, this map was “not only 
infinitely far from the degree of perfection that it could have had, if it had been directed by an 
intelligent man belonging to this profession, but [was] also much below the most common 
topographic maps of other states.”1081 Kaunitz criticized the map for being just a copy of the map 
prepared some decades before by the employees of the Milanese Census office, a cartographic 
source full of deficiencies, including: the omission of border areas belonging to the State of 
Milan’s neighbors that would have helped illuminate boundary disputes; the poor representation 
of the road network and main settlements; the lack of toponyms for various sites; the inability to 
distinguish between various landscape features, such as mountains, plains or forests; and the 
absence of any correlation between geodetic and astronomic measurements, despite the presence 
of highly trained astronomers in Milan.1082 The Chancellor’s detailed review of this latest map of 
Lombardy reveals this official’s understanding of what made a map useful to the government and 
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valuable to the larger scientific community. Therefore, the Chancellor’s statement that “the 
money used for this map full of defects could have been spent with more profit” was not 
surprising. Kaunitz contrasted the Ramis map with the Ferraris map of the Austrian Netherlands, 
finalized that same year, and offered the topographic map of the Austrian Netherlands as a model 
for Lombardy’s authorities.1083  
The desire of the Habsburg government for a good map of Lombardy was probably no 
secret in the circle of international elite mapmakers. Indeed, in the fall of 1777, J.A. Rizzi 
Zannoni (1736-1814), known at the time to the Habsburg Court for his Atlas of Poland, sent a 
memoir to Chancellor Kaunitz expressing his desire for a commission to measure two degrees of 
Milan’s meridian and to use the results of this geodetic operation to prepare an improved 
geographical map of the State of Milan. Rizzi Zannoni openly admitted he had obtained a copy 
of the manuscript map compiled based on the Milanese census results, and he criticized this 
cartographic source for placing significant sites inaccurately (à caprice).1084 Rizzi Zannoni’s 
international career, which had taken him from Warsaw to Paris to Padua, to name just some of 
the places he passed through, had helped him build a wide-ranging network. These international 
connections were instrumental in Rizzi Zannoni’s ability to obtain high rank commissions from 
various European monarchs.1085 Although we cannot know for sure what motivated Rizzi 
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183-203; 453-466; 523-537. Konvitz offers some details about Rizzi Zannoni’s career in the service of the French 
king, which included a variety of projects, such as a commission to trace the boundary between France and the 
Bishopric of Liège, an unfinished project for an atlas of all the French borderlines, and a map of the war theater 
between the Russian and Ottoman Empires. The financial scandals surrounding Rizzi Zannoni’s commissions and 
his sudden departure from France to elude his creditors in 1776 support Kaunitz’s statement that this mapmaker 
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Zannoni to submit his proposal to Vienna, this mapmaker had been working in Paris at the time 
when Cassini de Thury had sent his 1776 memoir to Maria Theresa asking for the permission to 
perform geodetic measurements on Lombardy’s territory. Moreover, the Habsburg Court’s desire 
for a map of Lombardy was probably known.  
Kaunitz saw Rizzi Zannoni’s request as an opportunity to motivate the government of 
Lombardy to finalize the map of the whole province. The Chancellor shared the memoir with 
Firmian and expressed his hope that Lombardy’s scientists, including the astronomers of Brera, 
would expand Rizzi Zannoni’s ideas so that the map incorporated the whole of Lombardy, 
namely both the State of Milan and the Duchy of Mantua. Kaunitz also expressed his firm belief 
that, in order for a map to be precise, it had to be based on astronomical observations. Therefore, 
he ordered for Rizzi Zannoni’s geodetic measurements to be accompanied by the work of the 
Brera astronomers.1086  
The provincial government made efforts to create a dream-team of mapmakers to 
collaborate with Rizzi Zannoni. In order to gather insightful comments on Rizzi Zannoni’s plan, 
Firmian questioned astronomers Cesaris, Reggio and Oriani, working at the Brera Observatory, 
government counselor Giuseppe Pecis and Paolo Frisi (1728-1784),1087 mathematics professor at 
the Palatine Schools in Milan.1088 Distrustful of Lombardy’s government ability to implement a 
precise map of this province, Kaunitz followed this project closely. Once the astronomers’ and 
Frisi’s comments regarding Rizzi Zannoni’s memoir arrived in Vienna, Kaunitz involved in the 
evaluation process a mathematics professor that had worked on a recent map of Galicia and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
“was one of a few cartographers who used their skills to defraud their patrons.”  Konvitz, Cartography in France, 
35-36.   
1086 ASM Confini p.a., box 5, November 13, 1777, Kaunitz to Firmian. 
1087 Amedeo Agostini, “Frisi, Paolo,” http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/paolo-frisi_(Enciclopedia-Italiana)/, last 
accessed on November 20, 2014.  
1088 AOAB, AAV, box 8, April 7, 1781, Milan. Firmian to Angelo de Cesaris, Milan. Combi, Una carta topografica 
della Lombardia, 35.  
 420 
Lodomeria.1089 This evaluator could have been none other than the experienced astronomer and 
surveyor Joseph Liesganig, who had performed measurements of arc meridians in the proximity 
of Vienna and the Hungarian plains. Furthermore, Liesganig was a strong promoter of 
coordinating geodetic and astronomic measurements in order to increase the precision of large-
scale maps.1090  
The Chancellor reaffirmed Vienna’s commitment to support a surveying project that 
would give the government access to “a precise geographic map of our Lombardy.” 1091 He also 
underscored the connection between this initiative and enterprises underway in other areas of the 
empire. Indeed, Kaunitz reminded Firmian that, during recent years, the Habsburg employees 
had surveyed other provinces of the Monarchy with precision. Furthermore, Kaunitz did not 
simply mention these other Habsburg cartographic projects, but promised to send a copy of the 
Ferraris Map to serve as a tangible model for the Lombardy project.1092 The Chancellor did not 
offer to send any map sheets of the Great Military Map because he envisioned Lombardy’s map 
as a printed, commercial cartographic work, along similar lines as the Carte Marchande version 
of the Austrian Netherlands’ map, prepared under the leadership of Ferraris.  
Kaunitz overrode Governor Ferdinand’s reluctance to commit significant funds for this 
cartographic enterprise, and on February 5, 1781, the Chancellor ordered the States of Milan and 
Mantua to pay for all of the astronomic instruments necessary for the completion of the Map of 
Lombardy. Although Kaunitz put Paolo Frisi in charge of this project as the most experienced 
scientist, he ordered him to work together with the Brera astronomers and to consult Pecis with 
                                                          
1089 August 20, 1778, Kaunitz to Firmian. Reproduced in Blessich, “Un Geografo Italiano del secolo XVIII,” 194-
196. 
1090 See chapter 7, Section 7.1. where I discuss this report.  
1091 “una esatta Carta geografica della nostra Lombardia.” August 20, 1778, Kaunitz to Firmian. Reproduced in 
Blessich, “Un Geografo Italiano del secolo XVIII,” 194. 
1092 Ibid. 
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respect to technical issues, such as the scale of the map. Furthermore, Kaunitz commissioned the 
Census office to assist the mapmakers in their operations and to lend them some draftsmen.1093 
To familiarize the astronomers of Brera with Rizzi Zannoni’s earlier work, Firmian sent them a 
copy of Rizzi Zannoni’s Atlas of Poland.1094 Also, to guide them in their plans for the map of 
Lombardy, Kaunitz sent to Pecis and Frisi the engraved Ferraris Map of the Austrian 
Netherlands.1095 The Chancellor’s first-hand involvement in the preparation for realizing this 
map of Lombardy reveals his familiarity with other cartographic projects underway within the 
Monarchy lands and abroad. Furthermore, Kaunitz was well aware of the resources that the 
province of Lombardy could mobilize, including astronomers, employees of the Census office, 
professors residing in Milan and other bureaucratic experts in mapmaking.  
Unfortunately, the provincial agents did not work well together. The personal rivalry 
between Paolo Frisi and the astronomers of Brera compromised the success of the possible 
collaboration between these scientists and Rizzi Zannoni. Frisi had met Rizzi Zannoni for the 
first time in mid-December 1777, and initially they both planned to include astronomic 
observations as part of this cartographic project, thus factoring in the collaboration of the 
astronomers of Brera. However, soon after, Frisi resorted to underscoring the geodetic dimension 
of the project in his proposals to the government and relegated the astronomic part to a secondary 
role.1096 On the other hand, in a memoir sent to the government on April 18, 1781, the 
astronomers insisted that geography was subordinate to astronomy and provincial maps were 
“arbitrary and abnormal” if not connected with celestial points. These scientists’ statement that 
“in France and other parts, the best geographic maps were preceded by similar operations 
                                                          
1093 Combi, Una carta topografica della Lombardia, 32; 34-35. 
1094 AOAB AAV, box 8, December 13, 1777 Firmian  to Cesaris. 
1095 Combi, Una carta topografica della Lombardia, 35. 
1096 Valerio, Societa, uomini e istituzioni cartografiche nel Mezzogiorno d’Italia, 110-111. 
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performed by astronomers” had the purpose of convincing the government that other states had 
already recognized the superiority of astronomy.1097  
Clearly, both Frisi and the Brera astronomers tried to establish their preeminence as 
coordinators of this cartographic project by bringing to the forefront the area of their expertise, 
namely geodesy and astronomy, respectively. Scholars trying to explain the conflict that 
developed between Frisi and the astronomers blamed it either on the astronomers’ jealousy and 
their desire to coordinate this project1098 or the lack of respect Frisi showed towards the Brera 
scientists’ expertise.1099 However, identifying a culprit is less important than the impact this lack 
of cooperation had on the faith of Rizzi Zannoni’s project.1100 
More than three years after Rizzi Zannoni had submitted his proposal, the top scientists in 
Lombardy could not reach a consensus and failed to obtain the government’s approval for any 
operations. Meanwhile, Rizzi Zannoni received a more tempting offer of employment from the 
Kingdom of Naples. Despite the Habsburg efforts to delay this mapmaker’s departure, by June 
1781 he had left Padua for Naples and begun working on a map of those dominions.1101 Vienna 
had missed another opportunity to obtain a high quality topographic map of Lombardy. 
                                                          
1097 AOAB AAV, box 8, April 18, 1781. Plan of astronomical observations with respect to the Geographical Map of 
Milan and Mantua presented by the Brera astronomers. 
1098 Blessich, “Un Geografo Italiano del secolo XVIII,” 197.  
1099 Combi, Una carta topografica della Lombardia, 28. 
1100 Frisi refused to convene with the Brera astronomers and maintained a unilateral correspondence with Rizzi 
Zannoni.  The reason he gave for his behavior was that astronomic observations were not a necessary prerequisite 
for the implementation of Rizzi Zannoni’s map project. Moreover, Frisi accused the astronomers of having 
published faulty astronomic observations and calculations in the Observatory’s Ephemerides. AOAB AAV, box 8, 
April 9, 1781, copy of the letter from Cesaris to Frisi; April 18, 1781, copy of the letter from Cesaris to Firmian; 
April 28, 1781, letter from the astronomers to Baron de Sperges; May 22, 1781, memoir of the Brera astronomers. 
The public indictments Frisi brought against the work of his colleagues working at Brera did not remain restricted to 
governmental circles, but resonated within the larger scientific community. For example, the famous Veronese 
mathematician, Antonio Maria Lorgna (1735-1796) sent a letter of support to Cesaris congratulating him on the 
moderation with which he had answered Frisi’s accusations. AOAB, AAV, Corrispondenza Scientifica  (CS), box 
83, June 15, 1782, Lorgna to Cesaris.  
1101 Valerio, Societa, uomini e istituzioni cartografiche nel Mezzogiorno d’Italia, 112-117. In 1795, Rizzi Zannoni 
published a “New Map of Lombardy and its adjacent regions drawn at the order of its Sicilian Majesty” (Nuova 
Carta della Lombardia e delle sue regioni aggiacenti formata d’ordine di SM Siciliana) that might have been based 
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8.3 THE BRERA ASTRONOMERS AND THE GEOGRAPHIC MAP OF LOMBARDY 
Archival documents do not mention the Map of Lombardy after Rizzi Zannoni’s departure to 
Naples. This archival silence does not mean that the project was abandoned. On February 14, 
1785, Kaunitz resurrected the idea and ordered Firmian to safeguard its implementation. The 
Chancellor considered this an opportune moment, as the provincial government had just finalized 
the survey and the tax reform for the Duchy of Mantua.1102 Frisi’s death might have been another 
factor encouraging the resuscitation of this project, as the Brera astronomers could finally 
coordinate the work without having their scientific authority contested.1103 As a result of 
Kaunitz’s desire, on May 20, 1786, the government ordered the astronomers of Brera to estimate 
the total costs for preparing a new geographical map of Lombardy based on both astronomic and 
geodetic observations. The imperial order also decreed that the astronomers consult Roger 
Boscovich regarding the implementation of this project.1104  
This example shows that, although Boscovich had left the Habsburg service in 1773, he 
continued to act as a scientific consultant for the Habsburg government. On May 26, 1786, 
Boscovich replied and refused to offer a cost estimate for the project, because he could not 
predict local conditions and the pace of the work. Furthermore, he argued that the cadastral maps 
contained faulty information, establishing the position of the topographic elements, such as the 
flow of the rivers, channels and other points of interest. Therefore, the new mapping project 
required expensive teams of engineers and surveyors.1105 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
on some observations he had managed to perform in Lombardy. However, no further information confirms this 
hypothesis. Combi, Una carta topografica della Lombardia, 42. 
1102 Mori, Il Ducato di Mantova, 106. 
1103 Combi, Una carta topografica della Lombardia, 54-55.  
1104 AOAB AAV, box 8, May 20, 1786, Decree 396 to the astronomers of Brera. 
1105 Combi, Una carta topografica della Lombardia, 66-67. 
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In contrast to Boscovich, the Brera astronomers did not shrink from offering an estimate 
of the map’s costs. As this was not the first time that the Brera astronomers had served as 
government advisers on this issue, it took them only eleven days to send a detailed memorandum 
to the provincial authorities.1106 They projected a cost of approximately 10,000 florins for the 
project and envisioned the following main steps in the process of the map’s production: 
determining the map’s triangulation network, choosing a series of intermediary sites as control 
points, drawing a manuscript version of the map, and engraving it. The astronomers themselves 
intended to perform the first stage, namely the measurement of two bases and a series of 
triangles, and to accompany it with a series of celestial observations performed at Lombardy’s 
borders. For the second step, which entailed establishing the position of intermediary sites and 
necessitated less-skilled labor, the astronomers recommended the employment of young 
geometers and engineers in training in order to keep the costs of the operations low. The 
cadastral maps are presented again in this document as essential sources for the map of 
Lombardy. Although taking a cautious stance with respect to the accuracy of these cadastral 
maps, the astronomers show confidence that they could identify and correct any blatant errors 
with additional measurements. After finalizing on-site measurements and compiling information 
from the cadastral maps, the astronomers planned to use the meridian of Milan as a reference 
point for calculating all distances. Similar to the Ferraris proposal for an engraved map of the 
Austrian Netherlands, the astronomers of Brera hoped to recoup some of the expenses by selling 
500 or even 1,000 copies of the final product. However, they warned the government that such 
cartographic projects always entailed varying costs due to the unpredictable nature of mapping 
operations.   
                                                          
1106 AOAB AAV, box 8, May 31, 1786, memoir of the astronomers. 
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Due to their need to step outside the Observatory and perform on-site measurements, the 
astronomers requested from the government a variety of instruments, some unavailable in 
Lombardy. An undated document, probably sent in 1786, signed by Barnaba Oriani, one of the 
main astronomers working at Brera, provides more information about the nature of the 
instruments and observations believed to be essential for the new map of Lombardy.1107 In 
October 1785, Oriani travelled through most of the Duchy of Milan and performed a series of 
measurements that confirmed the higher accuracy of the cadastral maps when they did not 
include hilly or mountainous areas. In Oriani’s opinion, as expressed in his memoir, the 
astronomers could perform geodetic measurements and rectify the cadastral maps in maximum 
two years. This scientist was also optimistic that performing measurements in the mountainous 
locations in the border areas would allow the mapmakers to perform observations of sites 
belonging to Lombardy’s neighboring states, information that could be included in the final map.  
Oriani considered this cartographic project significant not only in the context of the 
Habsburg Monarchy. Indeed, this astronomer argued that a new map of Lombardy had the 
potential to encourage similar projects in neighboring lands, and claimed that in this way, “the 
Imperial Court would have the honor of having offered the first example and the first push 
towards perfecting the Geography of Italy, as it [the Court] had already done for its domains in 
the Low Countries [Austrian Netherlands], Hungary, Austrian Poland etc.”1108 Furthermore, 
Oriani projected that the map of Lombardy and its triangulation network could connect with 
Cassini’s map of France, as the heights of the Alps were visible from both Italy and France and 
could thus serve as a bridge. Clearly, Oriani saw a double purpose for the map of Lombardy: 
                                                          
1107 Ibid., 1786, Barnaba Oriani memoir. 
1108 “e la Corte Imperiale avrebbe l’onore d’aver dato il primo esempio e la prima spinta alla perfezione della 
Geografia dell’italia, come lo hà gia dato per i suoi dominj dei Paesi Bassi, dell’Ungheria, della Polonia Austriaca 
etc.” Ibid. Combi dates this document to the time interval March-April 1786. Combi, Una carta topografica della 
Lombardia, 63. 
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satisfying the Habsburg government’s desire for a precise provincial map and contributing to the 
international effort to survey and represent accurately as much land as possible. In this way, 
Oriani considered himself not only a Habsburg employee, but also a member of the larger 
scientific community. 
 As a result of Oriani’s commitment to developing international links, it is not surprising 
that, in the spring of 1786, he accepted Chancellor Kaunitz’ proposal to submit a plan for a 
journey to acquire scientific instruments needed to perform the geodetic operations for the new 
map of Lombardy.1109 Oriani proposed an itinerary from Milan to London with stops in 
important cultural and astronomical centers, including Turin, Genoa, Strasbourg, Mannheim, 
Frankfurt, Brussels, Amsterdam and Paris. The journey had a dual goal: ordering high quality 
instruments in London to perform the geodetic and astronomic measurements required to 
complete the map of Lombardy and connecting the Brera Observatory and its astronomers with 
similar foreign institutions and scientists.1110 Plenipotentiary minister Wilzeck and Chancellor 
Kaunitz had no hesitations in approving financial support for Oriani’s journey, which they 
considered a beneficial enterprise both for the future of the Brera Observatory and the success of 
the map of Lombardy.1111 However, Kaunitz conditioned Oriani’s trip on a pledge that the 
scientist had to make to not abandon the work on the map of Lombardy in exchange for an offer 
                                                          
1109 Combi, Una carta topografica della Lombardia, 57-58. 
1110 AOAB, Collection B Oriani, box 206, fascicle 2, April 1786, Barnaba Oriani’s proposal. This document is also 
discussed in Guido Tagliaferri, Pasquale Tucci,” The visit to the Low Countries in 1786 of the astronomer Barnaba 
Oriani of Milan,” in Italian Scientists in the Low Countries in the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries, eds. C.S.Maffioli 
and L.C.Palm (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1989), 277-290. 
1111 AOAB AAV, box 9, fascicle 18, April 18, 1786, Wilzeck to Oriani; Combi, Una carta topografica della 
Lombardia, 64. Oriani’s journey benefitted from the diplomatic apparatus of the Habsburg Monarchy, as Wilzeck 
recommended him to the Habsburg ministers and other imperial officials stationed in cities such as Brussels, 
Amsterdam, Hague, London, and Paris.  AOAB, Collection B Oriani, box 206, fascicle 2, 1786, April, Oriani to 
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Oriani’s behalf to some of his contacts that could prove helpful during the trip. AOAB, Collection B Oriani, box 
206, fascicle 2, April 30, 1786, Boscovich to the Marquis of Paulmy and the Cardinal of Luynes. 
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of employment by another European monarch.1112 After Rizzi Zannoni abandoned his 
commitment to the map of Lombardy in exchange for a better offer from Naples, Kaunitz wanted 
to make sure Vienna would not lose another valuable mapmaker.  
During the journey, Oriani maintained a regular correspondence with Wilzeck and kept 
this minister informed about the people he encountered, the state of science in the various lands 
he visited, and even his participation in scientific observations such as the balloon ascent of Jean-
Pierre Blanchard in Brussels in the summer of 1786.1113 As illustrated by Oriani’s diary entries at 
various points in the journey, the astronomer examined maps that could have served as a model 
for or continuation of the map of Lombardy. On May 16, 1786, during his stay in Lucerne, 
Oriani met François Louis Pfeiffer de Wyher (1716-1802), an ex-captain in the Swiss guard who 
had performed detailed topographic surveys for some parts of Switzerland. The map this 
cartographer showed to Oriani included 136 sections and surprised the Italian astronomer with its 
ambitious scope and precision. Oriani even expressed the hope that the Swiss map could be 
connected with the future map of Lombardy.1114 One month later, in Brussels, Oriani obtained 
access to the original maps Ferraris and his artillerymen had prepared for the Austrian 
Netherlands.1115 Considering that Chancellor Kaunitz had suggested to the government in Milan 
his desire to take the Ferraris map as a model for a similar venture in Lombardy, Oriani’s interest 
in the work of this cartographer is to be expected.  
Throughout his journey, Oriani actively pursued meetings with renowned astronomers. In 
Brussels, he visited Jean-Baptiste Chevalier, member of the Imperial and Royal Academy of 
Sciences and Letters in Brussels, a strong promoter for the establishment of an observatory in the 
                                                          
1112 ASM Confini p.a., box 5, May 4, 1786, Kaunitz to Firmian. 
1113 AOAB AAV, box 9, fascicle 18, June 6, 1786; July 4, 1786; July 22, 1786. Wilzeck to Oriani. 
1114 Un Viaggio in Europa nel 1786: Diario di Barnaba Oriani Astronomo Milanese, eds. Agnese Mandrino, Guido 
Tagliaferri, and Pasquale Tucci (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1994), 56-57. 
1115 Ibid., 84-85, 87.  
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Austrian Netherlands.1116 In Paris, Oriani hoped to meet the famous scientist Cassini IV, who 
had offered in 1776 to map Tuscany, then ruled by Maria Theresa’s son, Leopold. Continuing in 
his father’s footsteps, Cassini IV was also an established astronomer. Although Oriani failed to 
encounter Cassini IV, who was out of town at the time, the French scientist later contacted him 
and requested some of the volumes of the Ephemerides published under the auspices of the Brera 
Observatory, thus expressing his vivid interest in the scientific activity of Lombardy’s 
astronomers.1117  
After his arrival in London, Oriani learned from General William Roy (1726–1790) about 
a joint project agreed upon by London and Versailles measuring the difference between the 
Greenwich and Paris meridians.1118 The English king, George II, had commissioned Roy and the 
royal engineers to implement this work.1119 With the help of triangulation, Cassini de Thury had 
already established the difference in longitude between Paris and Vienna, and he hoped to 
perform similar work in Italy, as discussed in the previous chapter section. Therefore, measuring 
the longitude difference between Greenwich and Paris would provide one more piece in Cassini 
de Thury’s ambition to create a global network.  
The main focus of Oriani’s journey was ordering instruments for the Observatory, and he 
was highly successful. Indeed, the contacts this astronomer made during his 1786 trip proved 
useful in the years to come regarding this aspect. The instruments ordered in London served the 
astronomers in Brera in their daily activities, including their work on the map of Lombardy. By 
                                                          
1116 AARS AA, ARB 39, 196. Un Viaggio in Europa nel 1786, 85. Tagliaferri and Tucci also published an article 
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the second half of the eighteenth century, London had emerged as the center of scientific 
instrument-making and Oriani was not the first nor the last European scholar travelling all the 
way there to put in an order.1120  
Hans Moritz von Brühl (1736-1809), Saxon minister plenipotentiary in London and 
astronomer, proved extremely helpful in ensuring the implementation of Oriani’s orders for 
instruments.1121 Brühl had an extensive knowledge of and connections with numerous instrument 
makers located in London. For example, on May 28, 1787, Brühl informed Oriani that he had 
ordered a sextant and put on hold a theodolite from the Dollond family’s shop. Although Oriani 
would have preferred purchasing a theodolite from Ramsden, Brühl assured him that by adding a 
second telescope to Dollond’s theodolite, the final product would be as good as any instrument 
manufactured in Ramsden’s workshop.1122 When Oriani insisted on acquiring a theodolite with 
two telescopes from Ramsden, his determination proved futile, as the manufacturer sold the one 
available instrument fulfilling these requirements to another customer. Brühl insisted again on 
the idea of making the purchase from Dollond’s shop.1123 However, it quickly became clear that 
Dollond’s theodolite could not accommodate the addition of a telescope, and Brühl contacted 
manufacturer John Stancliffe.1124 Luckily for Oriani, Brühl was able to navigate with dexterity 
the complex Londonese network of instrument-makers and retailers.1125  
                                                          
1120 For information about the emergence of scientific instruments and the role of London in the scientific 
instruments’ trade, see G.L’E.Turner, “Eighteenth-Century Scientific Instruments and their Makers,” in Eighteenth-
Century Science. The Cambridge History of Science, vol. 4, 511-535. To read more about the impact of instruments 
on the history of science, see Bourguet, Licoppe, and Sibum Instruments, Travel and Science. 
1121 Anita McConnell, Jesse Ramsden (1735-1800). London’s Leading Scientific Instrument Maker. (Aldershot, 
England: Ashgate, 2007), 124; "BRÜHL (Heinrich Reichsgraf v.)" in Allgemeine Encyclopädie der Wissenschaften 
und Künste, vol. 13,  
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1122 AOAB AAV, CS, box 85, May 28, 1787, Brühl to Oriani, London.  
1123 Ibid., June 25, 1787, Brühl to Oriani, London.  
1124 Ibid., July 13, 1787, Brühl to Oriani, London.  
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Ordering a sextant did not prove straightforward either. Dollond’s worker in charge of 
that task had so many other orders to honor that the waiting time for a customized sextant could 
have easily reached a couple of years. Therefore, Brühl suggested to Oriani that he purchase a 
version of this instrument already available in Dollond’s shop.1126 In the end, to accommodate 
Oriani’s special order for the sextant, Brühl had to order the instrument from the Troughton 
workshop, and the Italian astronomer was very satisfied with the final product.1127 Once the 
instruments were finished, Brühl sent them towards Milan either through Brussels, via the 
Habsburg plenipotentiary minister of the Austrian Netherlands, Count Belgiojoso, or on ships 
travelling to Genoa or other Italian ports closer to Milan.1128  
By the end of July 1788 Brühl had sent to Milan a theodolite and a sextant; and although 
the instruments were not manufactured in Ramsden’s shop, the German astronomer hoped that 
Oriani and his colleagues would use them successfully during the trigonometric operations for 
the map of Lombardy.1129 The correspondence between Oriani and Brühl illustrates the 
complexity of the process of ordering geodetic and astronomic instruments. Sending a 
commission to a reputable manufacturer did not ensure the successful delivery of the instrument, 
unless the client monitored the production process and answered additional queries regarding the 
customization of the device. The limited number of expert instrument makers introduced further 
delays in the production process and maintained the prices elevated. The Habsburg astronomers’ 
active participation in this highly specialized market demonstrates their membership in the 
community of leading scientists in the fields of astronomy and geodetic measurements. Crossing 
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1128 In June 1787, Brühl sent a clock to Belgiojoso. Ibid., box 85, June 25, 1787, Brühl to Oriani, London. 
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boundaries repeatedly during his journeys and correspondence, Oriani helped consolidate the 
position of the Brera Observatory as an active node in the network of Enlightenment.  
No instrument was more important for the astronomers of Brera than the mural quadrant 
they had ordered from Ramsden. Mural quadrants were essential instruments to fix the position 
of stars.1130 The Brera observatory had possessed a quadrant since 1768. However, the faulty 
construction of the instrument led to numerous errors in the astronomers’ calculations, which 
encouraged them to request financial help from the government for the acquisition of a more 
precise quadrant.1131 The Brera astronomers were not the only scientists seeking Ramsden 
instruments. This London manufacturer rose to fame in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, 
and scientists travelled from far away to buy and order custom geodetic and astronomic 
instruments. Even though Ramsden constantly failed to respect agreed-upon deadlines, the 
accuracy of the final products preserved the success of his business.1132 The mural quadrant 
Oriani ordered during his stay in London was an essential instrument for identifying accurately 
the geographical coordinates of the Brera Observatory, and therefore would have contributed to 
the precision of the map of Lombardy.1133  
The Habsburg government’s direct interest in the success of the cartographic operations 
ensured Wilzeck’s approval of a subsidy of 600 zecchini to help the astronomers cover the cost 
of the mural quadrant.1134 Furthermore, once in London, Oriani visited Ramsden’s shop together 
with the Habsburg consul Antonio Songa.1135 The presence of this Habsburg official probably 
had the function of signaling to the London manufacturer the direct interest of the Habsburg ruler 
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in the commissioning of the mural quadrant to enhance the likelihood of a speedy execution of 
the order. However, this probable intent did not materialize. Based on Brühl’s letters to Oriani, 
we know that although the work on some of the quadrant’s components was in full swing by the 
summer of 1787, the quadrant was finalized only in 1790, four years after the initial order.1136 
The astronomers finally installed the instrument in Brera in the summer of 1791.1137 Obtaining a 
quadrant from the top instrument maker in Europe increased the reliability of the measurements 
performed in Brera, and thus raised the profile of their publications, such as the annual 
Ephemerides.  
Before the installation of this quadrant, the Brera astronomers spent some years working 
on the Map of Lombardy. After Oriani’s return to Milan and while waiting for the arrival of 
some instruments ordered in London, the astronomers ensured the fabrication of some other 
apparatuses with the help of Brera’s mechanic, Giuseppe Megele.1138 Trained in Vienna by 
Liesganig, Megele had been working as a mechanic at the Observatory of Brera since 1773.1139 
Therefore, the astronomers had to rely on imperial and trans-imperial connections to obtain the 
necessary instruments for their cartographic work.  
By August 1788, the astronomers had completed the measurement of the basis for their 
triangulation networks in the area along the River Ticino between Nossate and Soma. Performing 
measurements along the river had two advantages: it reduced the effort required for the 
transportation of instruments and the results of the measurements could help the government to 
improve the irrigation system in the area. In their report to Lombardy’s government, the 
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astronomers describe the methodology they used in detail; providing such specifics corroborated 
the validity of their measurements. In the first stage, the scientists identified two tall points, 
namely the bell tower of Nossate and a nearby church. They positioned ten indicators between 
these reference points and measured the distance with the help of instruments such as an English 
theodolite and a telescope. The English theodolite mentioned in this report was probably 
acquired thanks to Barnaba Oriani’s efforts. Next, the astronomers added to the triangle the bell 
towers of Busto and Soma. Once they linked the bell towers of Busto, Soma, Nossate and some 
other key sites by determining their angles, the astronomers finalized the first stage of the 
operations. During this measurement campaign, the astronomers had to pay special attention to 
preserving the properties of the metal measurement units that were sensitive to variations in 
temperature.1140  
For the second stage of their geodetic operations, the astronomers split into more teams 
and continued building the triangulation network in different provinces. For this phase, they 
requested and obtained from the government copies of a printed map of Lombardy to ensure the 
coordination of their measurements.1141 The measurement of the triangles continued without 
problems in 1788 and 1789, and the astronomers determined the distances and positions for 
towns and sites from the western to the eastern extremity of the State of Milan.1142 The work was 
not extended to the Duchy of Mantua until 1790 due to the astronomers’ concurrent commitment 
to publish the volumes of the Brera Ephemerides for 1790 and 1791.1143 
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In addition to performing geodetic measurements, the astronomers had to rely on the 
information encompassed in the cadastral maps. Therefore, in the beginning of 1788, they 
requested the government’s permission to utilize these cartographic documents. Initially, the 
representatives of the Census Office refused to share this data,1144 and we can infer that the 
provincial or central government had to interfere to ensure the astronomers’ access to the maps. 
One issue important for the Viennese Court since the early 1750s had been establishing 
the position of Lombardy’s borders and concluding treaties with neighboring states to avoid 
further conflicts. With the exception of the border segment with Parma and Piacenza (discussed 
in chapter 6), the Habsburg government was successful in marking Lombardy’s borderline 
during Maria Theresa’s reign. Once Joseph II inherited the throne in 1780, he reinforced 
Vienna’s commitment to defending the inviolability of Lombardy’s borders. Indeed, an imperial 
decree from 1786 stipulated that the local authorities from Lombardy’s administrative subunits 
located on the borders had to perform trimestral, monthly or weekly inspections to observe the 
position of the frontier line.1145  
The government’s vow to defend Lombardy’s borderlines encouraged the authorities to 
try to obtain geographic information about the neighboring areas lying outside this province. 
Therefore, on October 20, 1788, the Habsburg government announced that “any map would be 
faulty if it does not include the indication of Lombardy’s borders with the foreign states, and the 
places of these [foreign states] close to the borders.”1146 This order was not news for the Brera 
astronomers, as Kaunitz had expressed since the 1770s his strong desire for a Map of Lombardy 
that would include part of neighboring territories. Therefore, during the month of October 1788, 
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the astronomers connected sites and settlements from the western part of Milan with territories 
outside the Habsburg lands located across the Ticino River and the Lake Maggiore.1147 In this 
way, the Map of Lombardy offered not only an accurate image of the Habsburg of territory but, 
just as with the Great Military Map of Transylvania, overflowed across the borderlines. Figure 
8.1 reproduces part of the second map sheet of the Brera Astronomers’ Map of Lombardy as an 
example.1148 The density of settlements and roads shown for the territory of the State of Milan 
surpasses the amount of detail incorporated for the lands west of Lombardy. Still, when 
compared with the earlier Ramis Map, which included nothing across the Lombardy’s borders, 
the Astronomers’ Map was substantially better.  
 
 
 
Figure 8.1 Sheet Two from the Map of the Brera Astronomers 
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Rather than choosing as a map scale the scale of the Great Military Map, the astronomers 
selected the scale of Cassini’s Map of France (1:86,400).1149 This decision might have been 
influenced by Ferraris’s decision to publish the Carte Marchande of the Austrian Netherlands at 
the same scale as Cassini’s Map of France. The choice of the map’s scale shows how in addition 
to fulfilling the Habsburg imperial goals, the astronomers conceptualized the Map of Lombardy 
as a testimony of their cartographic ability and their contribution to the European corpus of 
topographic maps.  
8.4 CONCLUSION 
Kaunitz did not live to see the geographic map of Lombardy he so desired. After the 
Chancellor’s death in 1792, only eight out of the nine map sheets of the Brera Astronomers’ Map 
were engraved before the French invasion of Lombardy in 1796. In the face of the French 
danger, the Habsburg authorities sent the already engraved maps, the drawings, and the plates to 
Vienna. The last sheet was engraved in Vienna and by the time the complete map was ready for 
distribution and made its way back to Milan, its importance had declined sharply. The French 
topographers had surveyed the territory themselves and had integrated their map of Lombardy 
into a larger geographical context that included a large part of the Pò valley and the newly 
formed Cisalpine Republic.1150  Soon after its completion, the Map of the Brera astronomers was 
already showing an outdated political reality and had lost its relevance for the government.  
 This chapter shows, that, in the case of Lombardy, the existence of detailed cadastral 
maps from the middle of the eighteenth century tempered the government’s enthusiasm to invest 
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in another set of large-scale cartographic works. Instead, Vienna prioritized the mapping of 
provinces for which there were no large-scale cartographic sources, such as Transylvania and the 
Austrian Netherlands. And in the end, the Great Military Map was never extended to Lombardy 
for financial and military reasons. Even when Chancellor Kaunitz pursued the implementation of 
a precise map of Lombardy based on geodetic and astronomic measurements, he envisioned this 
project as a way to show the world the Habsburg prowess in the field of mapmaking. Therefore, 
it was to be expected that the astronomers of Brera, active members of an international network 
of scientists, took the lead in the mapping of Lombardy. The story of the map of Lombardy 
demonstrates that not all Habsburg-sponsored international collaborations were fruitful. 
Nonetheless, both successful and failed trans-imperial enterprises reveal Vienna’s commitment 
to participate in the multi-polar dialogue that shaped cartography in the Age of Enlightenment.  
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9.0 CONCLUSION 
The map-mindedness of the Habsburg leading triad between 1740 and 1790, including empress 
Maria Theresa, Emperor Joseph II and Chancellor Kaunitz, determined an intensification of 
geographic enterprises, ranging from large-scale topographic surveys, border maps, the 
measurement of meridian degrees, geographic provincial maps and maps of strategic areas, such 
as fortresses and mountain passes. This list is far from exhaustive, but is representative of the 
various scales that Habsburg mapping encompassed. As maps permeated the fabric of 
government, obtaining visual information about far-away provinces became a priority for the 
Viennese decision-makers, whether they attempted to improve the fortification system or 
outsmart their neighbors in diplomatic negotiations regarding the positions of the borderline. 
This dissertation offers examples for different types of maps and shows some 
commonalities of imperial cartography in the eighteenth century. First of all, mapmakers became 
affiliated with imperial institutions. The Habsburg corps of engineers, the artillery corps of the 
Austrian Netherlands and the imperial astronomers active in Vienna and Milan all shared a belief 
in the power of mathematics and measurement instruments to transplant the complexity of the 
landscape to a two-dimensional medium. As these expert groups monopolized the science of 
mapmaking, they developed a set of criteria that validated the quality of maps. Surveying 
expeditions became a necessary prerequisite for accurate and reliable maps, as engineers and 
astronomers busied themselves with measuring the Habsburg territory.  
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The second element bridging the various types of Habsburg maps was the desire of 
imperial authorities to curtail the circulation of sensitive information. Vienna attempted to 
impose these “intentional silences”1151 with the help of military institutions. The rigid hierarchy 
and centralized nature of the army encouraged a culture of secrecy. The Aulic War Council 
strived to collect all strategically valuable maps in Vienna and limit the access to these sources. 
As shown in chapter 1, one of the standard procedures after the death of Habsburg officers, 
especially if they had mapmaking responsibilities, included retrieving all sensitive cartographic 
material before other parties accessed the information. It is doubtful that this collection strategy 
was without fail, especially when officers perished in conflict areas. Also, even the Aulic War 
Council’s attempt to retrieve unauthorized copies of maps from Habsburg subjects, as shown in 
chapter 7 for the case of the map of Transylvania, reveals that provincial actors sometimes 
disregarded their superiors’ directives. Clearly, the effort of the decision-makers in Vienna to 
control the circulation of maps had its limits. Still, the Aulic War Council maintained its 
monopoly of production and preservation of military maps, especially in manuscript form.  
The third element that confers unity to Habsburg maps was the preoccupation of 
Vienna’s rulers with eliminating territorial enclaves, eradicating frontier disputes and 
establishing linear borderlines. These priorities led to a quantitative explosion of border maps. 
Vienna had been at the forefront of employing maps in the service of border treaties, ever since 
the implementation of the 1699 Treaty of Karlowitz. Situated in the center of Europe and 
bordering numerous states, the Habsburg Monarchy contributed significantly to the development 
of a more or less standardized European approach to border negotiations. Combining legal and 
historical documents with visual representations of the contested lands and sending joint 
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demarcation commissions to implement border treaties, the Habsburgs and their negotiating 
counterparts strived to assume economic and social control of contested borderlands. Even the 
Great Military Survey of Transylvania, the Ferraris map of the Austrian Netherlands and the 
Astronomers’ Map of Lombardy devoted special attention to the frontier areas and, in some 
cases, spilled over the imperial borders. The Great Military Map of Transylvania served as the 
stepping-stone for extending Habsburg maps to foreign lands, namely the borderlands of 
Moldavia and Wallachia. Ferraris convinced the prince bishop of Liège and the prince abbot of 
Stavelot to allow his artillerists to survey their lands. Clearly, there was a pattern for mapping as 
an antecedent of Habsburg expansion or territorial adjustment. Therefore, it is not surprising that, 
in the case of the geographic map of Lombardy, Kaunitz’s desire to incorporate information 
about the neighboring areas could not be easily accommodated; the Duchy of Parma did not 
allow Habsburg engineers to step on their lands due to fear of Habsburg expansionism. 
Last but not least, the Habsburg rulers co-opted the assistance of large-scale topographic 
maps to quantify their natural and human resources. The Great Military Map together with the 
Ferraris Map covered most of the provinces of the Monarchy and offered extensive information 
about all settlements, the road network, the natural resources, the landscape and other significant 
sites for each area. Preserved in manuscript form, these large-scale maps constituted the first 
consistent representation of most of the lands of the Habsburg Monarchy. The general 
quartermaster’s officers directed the surveying of contiguous Habsburg provinces and they 
employed similar techniques of collecting information and transposing the imperial geography 
on maps. Ferraris and his subordinates from the artillery corps of the Austrian Netherlands had a 
similar training and their cartographic work can be interpreted as an extension of the Great 
Military Map.  
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 The production process of Habsburg maps in the second half of the eighteenth century 
problematizes the notion of authorship. Vienna guided the mapmakers in their representational 
choices, prioritizing information about imperial borders, military objectives and economic 
resources. The mapmakers themselves worked in teams and in some cases, such as the Ferraris 
map or border demarcation surveys, employed cartographic material produced in foreign centers. 
Often forgotten, the local population contributed significantly to the mapping of their regions. As 
the case of Transylvania underscores, the inhabitants of this region assisted the imperial 
mapmakers not only with information about the land’s toponymy and logistics support, such as 
housing, means of transportation and food; officers with some mapmaking skill belonging to the 
military border regiments acted as surveyors and draftsmen. Therefore, we should interpret the 
Great Military Map, the Ferraris Map, the border demarcation maps and the geographic map of 
Lombardy as collective projects, benefitting from the input of various layers: provincial, 
imperial, and trans-imperial.  
 Extending the idea of communication across borders, we can conceptualize Habsburg 
mapmakers as knowledge-brokers, mediating between the networks of scientific Enlightenment 
and the Habsburg political centers. Military engineers, such as Michel Angelo de Blasco, Mihály 
Lajos Jeney, and Ferraris, together with astronomers including Maximilian Hell, Roger 
Boscovich, and Barnaba Oriani, crossed political borders, sometimes repeatedly, and contributed 
to the circulation of geographic knowledge. And although not all of them ended their career in 
the service of Vienna, their Habsburg connections lasted throughout their lives. Most of the 
biographical sketches I selected underscore links between Vienna and Versailles, due to the 
nature of my research trips and archival serendipity. Nonetheless, the journey of Maximilian Hell 
to Denmark’s province of Lapland and de Blasco’s transfer into the Portuguese service suggest 
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that further investigations would probably yield information about other international 
connections that facilitated the development of Habsburg cartography. The efforts of the Brera 
astronomers to acquire instrumentation from London and the attempt of Boscovich and 
Liesganig to travel to America as part of a mission sponsored by the Royal Society suggest 
additional links. Considering the transimperial careers of mapmakers challenges us to reevaluate 
the existence of a distinct Habsburg cartography. Instead of conceptualizing the development of 
mapmaking along national or imperial lines, we need to address the existence of international 
experts, whose ability to coordinate cartographic enterprises recommended them to political 
rulers as desirable employees. In the eighteenth century, these mapmakers’ visual vocabulary, 
the instruments they used, and their land surveying technologies converged, contributing to the 
development of similar European and even global standards about what made a map accurate.  
The work of expert mapmakers could not have been possible without the interest and vast 
resources of imperial polities. Purchasing instruments necessary for land measurements and 
astronomic observations, hiring people to help with the logistical matters of scientific ventures, 
and relying on governmental agents to access certain territories were essential matters ensuring 
the success or failure of cartographic projects. Even though Ferraris was a recognized mapmaker 
who relied on his subordinates from the artillery corps, in order to map the Austrian Netherlands 
he required financial help from Vienna and the collaboration of provincial authorities.  
On the other hand, the imperial decision-makers’ desire for the preparation of certain 
maps was not sufficient either. As the case of the geographic map of Lombardy revealed, 
Chancellor Kaunitz’s persistence in commissioning this work encountered numerous obstacles. 
The astronomers working at Brera and Paolo Frisi squabbled over the methodology and the 
leadership of the project. And even after the government acknowledged the astronomers’ 
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foremost role in mapping Lombardy, acquiring specific surveying instruments delayed the 
implementation of this enterprise.  
Based on the examples included in the dissertation we conclude that the success of 
Habsburg cartographic projects depended on the financial and logistical support of the Viennese 
political leaders, the existence of mapmakers capable to coordinate the enterprise, and the 
collaboration of provincial officials.  
In addition to drawing conclusions about the history of Habsburg cartography, this 
dissertation illuminates the functioning of the Monarchy’s government. Despite the efforts of 
Maria Theresa and especially Joseph II to centralize their dominions, the mechanics of 
cartographic enterprises in Transylvania, the Austrian Netherlands and Lombardy reveal the 
variety of provincial institutions and approaches employed to manage the geography of these 
areas. Whereas the Austrian Netherlands and Lombardy had a pre-eighteenth-century tradition of 
mapmaking, schools for training engineers and a body of cartographic knowledge, Transylvania 
was deficient in these respects. But when it came to the actual implementation of Habsburg 
imperial projects, the efficient military chain of command in Transylvania trumped any potential 
disagreements with provincial authorities about the project. If financial and human resources had 
allowed it, Maria Theresa would have used the mapping of Transylvania to gather detailed 
information about the value of taxable lands in order to curtail fiscal evasion. In less than four 
years, the officers of the general quartermaster’s staff and of the regiments deployed in 
Transylvania finalized the Great Military Map and extended it to Moldavia and Wallachia. In the 
case of Lombardy and the Austrian Netherlands, obtaining a good geographic map of these areas 
relying on coopting provincial civil authorities in the mapmaking effort. The paper trail of the 
Ferraris Map demonstrates that the governor of the province had to issue specific orders to all the 
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administrative units of the Austrian Netherlands to enlist their aid. Still, obtaining information 
about the position of borderlines and the toponymy of each region remained a convoluted affair.  
Examining Transylvania, the Austrian Netherlands and Lombardy allows us to grasp both 
the diversity of cartographic projects in the Habsburg Monarchy and the diverse political 
interactions between Vienna and provincial centers. These case studies cover three different 
segments of the imperial borders and thus include trans-imperial interactions with a variety of 
political neighbors. Even though these three examples are only a subset of the total number of 
Habsburg dominions, their experiences stand in for other regions as well.  
One of the main topics this dissertation investigated was the contribution of cartography 
to the emergence of imperial borderlines. The desire to consolidate the natural border consisting 
of the Carpathian Mountains with a tracing of the borderline favoring Transylvania’s defense 
influenced the Habsburg policy in the area. In the case of their Transylvanian borderlines, the 
Monarchy obtained not only a frontier demarcation favorable to Vienna, but also the northern 
part of Moldavia. Profiting from the subordinate rapport between Moldavia and the Ottoman 
Court, and Constantinople’s need for a peaceful relationship with Vienna, the Habsburg 
authorities greatly diminished the value of Moldavian maps in the border negotiations.  
Examining the process through which the Viennese rulers laid their claims in the border 
areas identified the significant role of provincial mapmakers and military agents. Applying the 
standards of Habsburg military engineers regarding what made a map accurate, the 
Transylvanian Stephan Lutsch von Luchsenstein discredited the spatial representations of the 
Moldavians from the 1750s and 1760s and challenged their understanding of the boundary areas’ 
geography. The creation of special border regiments in Transylvania consolidated the Habsburg 
control of the frontier areas, as officers belonging to these regiments inspected the position of the 
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border markers. These regiments served as the first line of defense not only against military 
enemies but also by enforcing the sanitary cordon, the customs regulations and the circulation of 
migrants. With the help of provincial agents and the geopolitical situation, Vienna imposed its 
territorial desires in the Transylvanian borderlands. The documents of the 1775 Habsburg-
Ottoman convention included a map modeled on the cartographic standards of Viennese 
mapmakers, thus demonstrating that the Habsburgs were victorious not only from a political 
point of view, but also from a scientific one.  
Delimiting clear borderlines did not go as planned for Vienna in all provinces. The first 
border treaty signed with France in 1769 aimed to eliminate territorial disputes on the Austrian 
Netherlands’ frontier. But this document failed to offer a definitive solution. The implementation 
of the convention’s articles led to another decade of negotiations and the conclusion of a new 
treaty. The joint French-Austrian border commissions argued over newly discovered enclaves, 
regardless of their size, and both sides prepared memoranda and counter-memoranda to support 
their arguments for the trajectory of the borderline. The Austrian Netherlands’ experienced 
military engineers and the Giunta of Contested Lands found their match in the negotiating ability 
of French agents, such as the jurist Christian-Frédéric Pfeffel. Using cartographic weapons 
similar to those of the Habsburgs, Pfeffel defended the French political and commercial interests 
in the borderlands and his work paved the way for the second border convention.  
In addition to having to confront an equal opponent, the Habsburg representatives in the 
Austrian Netherlands had to tackle the interests of the four separate entities belonging to this 
province and bordering the French lands: the counties of Flanders and Hainaut, the duchy of 
Luxembourg and the city of Tournai. Rather than pursuing the border negotiations in Brussels by 
taking into account only the priorities of Vienna and Versailles, the French and Habsburg 
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diplomats had first to obtain the approval of the provincial Estates of Flanders, Hainaut, 
Luxembourg, and Tournai. The institutional and administrative complexity of the Habsburg 
governance in the Austrian Netherlands, together with the political strength of their neighbor, 
explains the convoluted nature of the border negotiations in this part of the empire. 
The longwinded discussions with the duke of Parma and the failure of the Habsburg 
Court to trace a clear borderline between Lombardy and this duchy offers a counter-example to 
the success of Vienna in demarking imperial frontiers in Transylvania and the Austrian 
Netherlands. Even in the case of Lombardy, the Monarchy achieved the negotiation and signing 
of treaties with other neighbors, including the Republic of Venice, the Kingdom of Sardinia and 
the Duchy of Modena. The strategic and economic value of the Pò River, separating Vienna’s 
dominions from Parma, raised the stakes of the negotiation, especially after Joseph II expressed 
his desire to take full control of this waterway. The existence of skilled engineers both in Parma 
and Lombardy, together with the preparation of detailed historical and legal memoranda debating 
the ownership of the contested lands located on the banks of the Pò, were insufficient. The Duke 
of Parma refused to accept any of the Habsburg territorial claims and brought into the conflict his 
Bourbon relatives ruling in France and Spain. As bilateral negotiation became a trans-imperial 
dialogue involving four rulers, the conflicts between the Parmesan and Lombardy’s inhabitants 
in the border areas intensified and no consensus could be reached by the end of Joseph II’s reign.  
These three case studies of border demarcations cover a small percentage of the entirety 
of Habsburg frontiers. Nonetheless, they reveal some key factors in understanding the evolution 
from jurisdictional to territorial sovereignty in the eighteenth century. Regardless of their size, 
European states, such as the Habsburg Monarchy, France, the Duchy of Parma and the Ottoman 
Empire, prioritized the interests of central political rulers against provincial interests. The rise of 
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maps as crucial negotiating weapons spanned the whole continent. Military engineers prepared 
detailed territorial representations that brought the complexity of the borderlands to the tables of 
diplomatic negotiators. An increased awareness about the local geography of the frontier lands 
increased the governments’ commitment to eliminate ambiguous situations and to define clear 
borderlines.  
 At the same time as the Habsburg rulers identified the necessity to define clear 
borderlines as a political priority, they also desired to inventory the resources of their own 
dominions. Examining the production of Habsburg maps reveals the utilitarian face of the 
Enlightenment. The central and provincial government gathered information about the landscape 
features and the human geography of Vienna’s dominions in order to negotiate successfully 
territorial exchanges, demark borderlines, improve the defense of the empire, extract economic 
resources, and increase taxes.  
The Great Military Map of Transylvania engaged the efforts of imperial and provincial 
mapmakers and, together with emperor Joseph II’s 1773 journey to this province, increased the 
visibility of this area in Vienna. Although Maria Theresa failed to employ the survey work for 
this map as a pretext to reevaluate the taxation system, the Habsburgs gathered a diverse array of 
economic information about settlements, mines, crops and roads. On the opposite side of the 
empire, Ferraris developed a project similar in scope to the Great Military Map. Although, 
initially, Ferraris had hoped to combine survey work with information preserved on French 
maps, his failure to retrieve useful cartographic works extended the time required to finalize his 
project. In the end, the manuscript maps of the Austrian Netherlands included a range of points 
of interest similar to those of the Great Military Map of the Monarchy, and the information was 
gathered based on the direct land survey of military agents. The case of Lombardy contrasted 
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with those of Transylvania and the Austrian Netherlands, as this area had already been the object 
of a detailed survey in the first half of the eighteenth century. By the 1770s, the cadastral maps 
produced as a necessary step for the reform of taxation were no longer sufficient for the decision-
makers in Vienna. Chancellor Kaunitz desired a new geographic map based on a combination of 
astronomic measurements and land surveys that would position Habsburg cartography at the 
forefront of scientific developments in this field.  
 The story of the map of Lombardy reveals that Habsburg cartography produced more 
than governmental tools for managing distant provinces or settling border disputes. Maria 
Theresa, Kaunitz and Joseph II also fulfilled the role of educated patrons who valued the 
geographic work of astronomers for its pure scientific virtue. Without idealizing the altruistic 
goals of the Habsburg rulers, the collaboration between Liesganig and Cassini de Thury in the 
surroundings of Vienna, the government’s approval for Cassini de Thury’s plans to perform 
geodetic measurements in Lombardy and the authorities’ financial and diplomatic support for 
Barnaba Oriani’s European journey all support the active role of the Habsburgs in the 
development of cartography as a trans-imperial science.  
 The story of Habsburg maps and mapmakers in the Age of Enlightenment offers a 
window into the complex imperial politics that shaped the Habsburg lands throughout the 
eighteenth century. Same as the Enlightened Absolutist policies, the Habsburg cartographic gaze 
was neither all-encompassing nor unchallenged. Vienna had to constantly negotiate its authority 
over provinces and in the arena of international diplomacy. Nonetheless, the Habsburg rulers’ 
optimistic belief in the power of maps to facilitate a rational approach to governing an empire 
encouraged numerous imperial cartographic projects that guided Maria Theresa’s and Joseph II’s 
reforms.  
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APPENDIX. TIMELINES  
 
Figure A.1 Habsburg Monarchy Timeline 
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Figure A.2 Transylvania Timeline 
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Figure A.3 Austrian Netherlands Timeline 
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Figure A.4 Lombardy Timeline 
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ARCHIVAL SOURCES 
As my narrative centers around the process of imperial centralization, I used many documents 
produced by state institutions that initiated cartographic projects or relied on their results as part 
of their work. Whenever possible I gathered biographical information about specific officers and 
astronomers that contributed to the Habsburg cartographic production in the eighteenth century. 
The correspondence among different central Habsburg institutions located in Vienna, and among 
Viennese superiors and provincial subordinates, sometimes mentioned maps and provided 
further clues about these documents’ use. Diplomatic correspondence crossing imperial borders 
and exchanges of letters between Habsburg scientists and their international counterparts 
connected Vienna’s cartographic contributions to global developments. And last but not least, 
map collections contained rich material for the eighteenth century. The main challenge I 
encountered working with maps from special collections was finding accompanying documents 
that would detail their commissioning, production, circulation, and use. In some instances I 
found archival documents in other collections that helped fill in the blanks about the maps’ 
context.  
The archives are grouped based on the city they are preserved. I have ordered the 
archives in the following order: imperial archives and collections in Vienna in alphabetical order, 
provincial archives and collections from the Austrian Netherlands, Lombardy and Transylvania 
in alphabetical order, other archives in alphabetical order. In Vienna I consulted documents from 
the Austrian State Archives (Kriegsarchiv and Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv) related to the 
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activities of Habsburg military engineers; correspondence among various state institutions, such 
as the Aulic War Council and the State Chancellery; correspondence between the central 
government in Vienna and provincial governments. Additionally, I did extensive research at Map 
Department at the Austrian National Library (Österreichische Nationalbibliothek) that preserves, 
among other things, the Habsburg Court’s map collection. The archives of the Observatory in 
Vienna house folders containing the correspondence of Jesuit astronomer Maximilian Hell.  
The archives in Brussels, Milan and Sibiu contain documents related to the governance of 
the Austrian Netherlands, Lombardy and Transylvania, respectively. In all three cases I have 
searched for map collections and any additional repositories related to the history of astronomy 
and astronomers. In Brussels there was no Observatory during the time of Maria Theresa and 
Joseph II; instead, I examined the archives of the Academy of Sciences that included among its 
members astronomers. The collections of the Brera Observatory in Milan were a wealth of 
information about the founding of this observatory, the scientific correspondence between the 
Brera astronomers and other scientists, Barnaba Oriani’s journey to London and the production 
of the geographic map of Lombardy. Although he founded the Brera Observatory, Roger 
Boscovich’s correspondance is located at the Bancroft Library, University of California; with the 
help of the interlibrary loan office at the University of Pittsburgh I obtained copies of relevant 
letters. In the collections of the Ambrosian Library, I have located family documents and 
correspondence related to military engineer Michel Angelo de Blasco. In Sibiu, in addition to the 
National Archives (Arhivele Nationale) I spent time researching at the Brukenthal Library, as it 
preserves an important map collection of eighteenth- century governor Samuel von Brukenthal.  
The archives in Paris allowed me to trace some trans-imperial threads. The rich 
diplomatic correspondence preserved in the Foreign Affairs Archives (Archives du Ministère des 
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Affaires étrangères) provided invaluable insight into the cartographic activities of the Habsburgs, 
as reported by French ambassadors in Vienna, Brussels and Parma. Moreover, these archives 
house collections related to the border demarcations between France and the Austrian 
Netherlands. The archives center of the French Ministry of Defense and its armed forces 
(Vincennes, Service historique de la Défense) contain relevant information about French military 
engineers and their activities. The map collections of the French National Library (Bibliothèque 
Nationale de France) and the National Archives (Archives Nationales) include cartographic 
material related to the French-Austrian Netherlands border demarcations.  
Vienna 
1. Österreichische Nationalbibliothek (ÖNB) 
 
a. Kartensammlung: ALB Port 14b, 18 Kar; ALB kleinPort 43,1 Kar; ALB Port 154,8 
Kar; Alb. 180-14; K III 113230; K III 103848; FKB AA.8.1-4; FKB C.105.1a-v; FKB 
C.107.A.1-4; FKB C.107.3. 
 
2. Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus,-Hof- und Staatsarchiv (HHStA) 
 
a. Staatskanzlei (StK) 
 i. Notenwechsel: 
   - An den Hofkriegsrat (An den HKR): 5; 7. 
   - Von dem Hofkriegsrat (Von dem HKR): 78; 81; 82; 85; 86. 
 ii. Vorträge: 104; 105. 
iii. Wissenschaft, Kunst und Literatur: 5 (Blasco, Michelangelo de; Liesganig, P.; 
Cassini de Thury und P. Luskanik). 
b. Große Korrespondenz: 76a. 
 
c. Frankreich Notenwechsel: 11. 
 
d. Belgien DD A 
i. Berichte: 168. 
ii. Weisungen: 7; 11. 
 
e. Italien-Spanischer Rat 
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i. Lombardei Collectanea: 75. 
ii. Lombardei Korrespondenz: 131; 132; 133; 134; 153. 
 
3. Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Kriegsarchiv (KA) 
 
a. Genie-Hauptamt (GHA): 1769 17 65; 1771 15 38; 1772 23 1; 1773 17 187; 1778 10 
152. 
 
b. Hofkriegsrat (HKR): 1769 56 25; 1769 66 69; 1769 66 137; 1770 57 107; 1770 57 113; 
1771 57 37; 1773 57 64; 1773 57 101; 1774 57 117; 1775 57 6; 1775 57 33 per 1; 1781 
34 39; 1781 34 54; 1781 34 128/2; 1782 34 52; 1782 34 76; 1782 34 105; 1782 34 135; 
1783 34 60; 1787 34 191; 1787 34 200; 1787 34 205; 1789 34 58; 1792 34 39; Protocoll 
1037, Rubrik 57; Protocoll 1070, Rubrik 57. 
 
c. Karten- und Plansammlung (KPS): KA BVc050-01a; B VII C 132-10; B IX a 1; BIX a 
702; B IXa 713; B IX a 715; BIX a 716; BIX a 717; BIX a 741; B IX c 744; B IX c 748; 
B IX c 751; B IX c 756; B IX c 757; H III e 710; H III e 751; H III e 952; K VI 17-100 F; 
K VII a 6-5; K VII k 322 ½ F; K VII K 329 F; K VII K 338 F. 
 
4. Wiener Universitätssternwarte (WUS) 
 
a. “Manuscripte von Hell, Chr. 90,” Band 3 (Manuskripte von Hell 2), Mappe 3. 
Brussels 
1. Archives Générales du Royaume (AGR) 
 
a. Chancellerie Autrichienne des Pays Bas (CAPB): 403; 455; 470; 474; 476; 679; 680; 
687. 
 
b. Secrétairerie d’Etat et de Guerre (SEG): 1350; 1406; 1407; 1496; 2773. 
 
c. Conseil Privé (CP): 967 B; 1067. 
 
d. Jointe des Terres Contestées: 33. 
 
e. Cartes et Plans: I 03, 12; I 012, 2198; I 012, 2187; T 459, 228; I 012, 2205. 
 
2. Archives de l’Académie royale des Sciences, des Lettres et des Beaux-Arts de Belgique 
(AARS) 
 
a. Archives Anciennes (AA): ARB 15; ARB 16; ARB 39; ARB 40; ARB 41; ARB 539; 
ARB 771.  
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3. Koninklijke Bibliotheek van België (KBR) 
 
a. s. III 622-646, section 16.  
http://lucia.kbr.be/mapview/index.php?image=/CM/1627904.imgf, last accessed on 
February 18, 2015 
 
b. Ferraris, Carte de Cabinet, section 111, 
 http://belgica.kbr.be/nl/coll/cp/cpFerrarisCarte_nl.html, last accessed on February 18, 
2015. 
Cluj-Napoca 
1. Biblioteca Centrală Universitară (BCU) 
 
a. Special Collections: H 70/1. 
Milan 
1. Archivio di Stato di Milano (ASM)  
 
a. Autografi 
i.  119, folder 26 (Cassini di Thury Cesare Francesco); 
ii. 129, folder 16 (Paolo Frisi); 
iii. 138, folder 20 (Luino Francesco). 
 
b. Dispacci Reali (DR): 219; 222; 234; 241; 245; 253; 256; 258; 259. 
 
c. Confini parte antica (Confini p.a.): 3; 5; 14; 16; 17; 73; 74; 76; 77; 78; 79; 80. 
 
d. Atti di Governo, (AG)  
i. Araldica parte antica: 54 (Blasco); 
 ii. Militare parte antica: 16. 
 
e. “Carta topografica del Milanese e del Mantovano basata sulle misure effettuate dagli 
astronomi di Brera fra il 1788 e il 1791.”  
2. Biblioteca Ambrosiana (BA) 
 
a. Archivio Beccaria (Beccaria): B 234, 6.  
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3. Archivio dell’Osservatorio Astronomico di Brera (AOAB) 
 
a. Archivio Amministrativo Vecchio (AAV) 
i. boxes 2; 8; 9.  
ii. Corrispondenza Scientifica (CS): 83; 85; 86. 
 
b. Collection Barnaba Oriani, box 206, fascicle 2. 
Sibiu 
1. Arhivele Nationale (AN) 
 
a. Comandamentul general al armatei austriece din Transilvania 1703-1865 (CC): 
Document 6 (1768); Document 1 (1769); Document 7 (1779) 
 
b. Series Brukenthal: 106/L 1-8, 197; 106/L 1-8, 216; 106/L 1-8, 366; 106/L 1-8, 367; 
108/M 1-5, 1-6; 120/RR 1-68, 21. 
 
2. Biblioteca Brukenthal 
a. Harti, No 5731.  
Paris 
1. Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BNF) 
 
a. GE C – 11362. 
 
 
 
2. Archives Nationales (AN) 
 
a. Cartes et Plans: N II Jemappes 3; N III Pays-Bas 2; NN 156-130.  
 
3. Vincennes, Service historique de la Défense (SHD) 
 
a. Archives de l’armée de terre (AAT): M 1 1582; 1 M 1750; 3 M 379. 
 
b. J 10 C 647; J 10 C 623. 
 
c. A. 3685; A.3767. 
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4. Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères (MAE) 
 
a. Correspondance politique (CP) 
  i.   Autriche: 282; 309; 312; 321; 329; 354; 355. 
ii.  Pays Bas: 167; 168; 171. 
iii. Parme: 41; 43; 44; 45. 
 
b. Limites, Pays Bas: 97; 107; 108; 110; 126; 127; 128; 138. 
 
Berkeley 
1. Bancroft Library, University of California (BA) 
 
a. Boscovich Archives, box 4: folder 26, item 28; folder 34, item K1; folder 48, item 
M45. 
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